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In this age of social media, society finds itself paying extraordinarily close 
attention to phenomena that have, through past decades or even centuries, 
lurked well under the radar of public attention. The bullying and hostilities 
that occur among children at school and elsewhere have long been dismissed 
as banal—just what kids do, hardly deserving of public scrutiny or effortful 
intervention. The ambiguities of children’s play, including the dubious 
pleasures of testing personal boundaries, transgressing adult norms, and, 
on occasion, experimenting with hurting others, have until recently been 
firmly relegated—if noticed at all—to the private realm, a matter for parents, 
perhaps teachers.
But today, many of children’s interactions—what they like or say, who 
they know or hate, when they behave well or badly, and whether they 
are happy, bored or desperate—all of this is recorded, tracked, monitored, 
and monetized on proprietary networks. Thus, children’s troubles are newly 
accessible to intervention and regulation, in principle at least, and not 
just by the parents, teachers, or community actors who know them as 
individuals, nor even by the government that, after all, bears the ultimate 
responsibility for their welfare. Also implicated are the biggest multinational 
corporations the world has ever seen: technology companies headquartered 
elsewhere, driven by financial and political interests to innovate fast in 
the global competition to dominate society’s collective attention. Their 
corporate concerns are so distant from the realities of their users’ lives that 
many of these companies even refuse to recognize that children use their 
services, let alone take responsibility for them. Why should these corpora-
tions care that their services have become so meaningful to children that 
they couldn’t live without them, checking for updates every few minutes, 
pinning their hopes on the next notification and, sometimes, tragically, 
dreading the next message so intensely that they may take their own life.
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The loudest chronicles of this transformation are the news stories that 
proclaim with indecent relish the suffering among young social media 
users. Often cavalier in their reporting of prevalence statistics and simplistic 
in inferring technological causes for psychological effects, the news media 
are proving effective in banging the drum for society to “do something.” 
But what exactly should be done, who should do it, and will it work? Tijana 
Milosevic’s insightful book shows how complex and difficult it is to find 
effective solutions to cyberbullying, among other online problems. And there 
are a host of reasons why this is true. As Milosevic clearly explains for the 
benefit of those new to this field, there are some genuine organizational, 
technical, and regulatory challenges, which dispel any hope of a quick-fix 
technical solution. But there are also some political challenges arising from 
shifting power struggles between states and corporate entities, being played 
out in the esoteric but crucial domain of internet governance.
While the media, NGOs, children’s rights activists, and parenting groups 
call for action to prevent cyberbullying, the numerous small companies 
they try to target keep changing, thus continuing to be blind to the needs of 
children on their networks. Meanwhile, the public relations and corporate 
social responsibility teams at the big companies have become proficient at 
claiming the operation of proprietary solutions, albeit with little transpar-
ency or accountability to the public, thereby adeptly evading regulatory 
responsibility for children’s welfare. Further complicating matters, it is also 
the case that society does not want multinational corporates acting in loco 
parentis (or, as one of Milosevic’s informants puts it, as “judge and jury” 
when relations among children become fraught). And, for reasons of free 
speech, expression, and rights to privacy, society does not want social net-
work companies surveilling and intervening in the everyday interactions 
of either adults or children.
In trying to unravel the pressing conundrum of incidence, causation, 
responsibility, and practicalities regarding cyberbullying, Milosevic urges 
us to look more deeply at the ethical infrastructure of the society that has 
both produced and failed to address this problematic behavior. As she 
argues, it is incumbent on society now to debate the critical consequences 
of the privatization of the digital public sphere, and to address the chal-
lenges this poses to human dignity—for children in particular, but also 
for those who live among them. In this sense, cyberbullying is a highly 
visible manifestation of a much larger set of problems facing all of us. If 
society would commit to taking forward Milosevic’s recommendations to 
reduce cyberbullying, children and the wider public would benefit. I hope 
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the host of stakeholders currently scratching their heads, investing their 
scarce resources, and generally worrying about cyberbullying will read this 
book and take its advice. What do we have to lose?
Sonia Livingstone  
London School of Economics and Political Science

I would like to thank all the wonderful people who have supported me 
throughout this research and book-writing process, as well as during my 
PhD studies, with apologies to all those whose names do not appear in the 
following lines.
My gratitude goes out to my brave and caring family without whose 
unconditional love and support none of this would have been possible: 
To my loving grandparents Katica and Lazar Radak, who saved my life and 
enabled my education. To my mother Snezana Radak, who gave me every-
thing she had and could. My aunt, Vesna Radak, my sister, Gala Borovic, 
and my uncle, Srecko Borovic, for taking care of me as if I were their own. To 
Vida and Milivoj Milosevic for being an extra set of grandparents that one 
can only wish for.
I remain grateful and indebted to my dear mentor and doctoral disser-
tation chair, Kathryn Montgomery, for her warm, uplifting, and inspiring 
guidance. Knowing that I could rely on her at any time has been priceless. 
To Professor Patricia Aufderheide, whose intellect, work ethic, and persever-
ance were exemplary to me, and who never hesitated to prioritize my interests 
to help me arrive where I needed to be. To Professor Laura DeNardis, for 
being a true positive force, not just in my life, but in the lives of many PhD 
students in my program; and for taking a chance on me; and especially for 
teaching me a life-long lesson of quieting down self-criticism at a point 
when it is no longer helpful. To Professor Sonia Livingstone, who gener-
ously helped me in the research process and assisted in guiding my career 
at a crucial point in time. Children and media scholars internationally are 
grateful and exceptionally lucky to have her kind, unassuming, and tal-
ented leadership. To Professor Elisabeth Staksrud, whose precious research 
paved the way to developing my line of argument, I remain indebted for all 
the long hours (and lunches!) of feedback and guidance that she generously 
gave me, and for supporting me both professionally and personally. To the 
Acknowledgments
xiv Acknowledgments
exceptional professors and human beings Lauren Feldman and Rhonda 
Zaharna, for generously giving me their time and guidance. To Professors 
Celine-Marie Pascale and Bobbie Eisenstock for their help in guiding and 
reading my work. To Professor Angelika Sorteberg, for supporting me dur-
ing the book-writing process and being a good listener.
To all the anonymous book reviewers, who invested their time and energy 
and provided thoughtful and helpful comments. To Professors Simone van 
der Hof and Brian O’Neill for taking the time to read my work and for their 
careful and thoughtful feedback. To all the wonderful colleagues gathered 
around EU Kids Online research network whose efforts have been crucial 
in building a nuanced understanding of children in digital contexts. To all 
my interviewees for generously offering their time and assistance. Among 
industry and NGO representatives, I especially thank Patricia Cartes, Anne 
Collier, and Will Gardner for handling the process in such a helpful manner. 
To Annie Mullins, for all of her kind help during my research. To John Carr, 
Robert Madelin, Julian Coles, and Justin Patchin for generously giving me 
their time and providing helpful insights. To all my colleagues at the Univer-
sity of Oslo and the Department of Media and Communication for the gen-
erous support, especially in assisting the funding of open-access publication 
of this book. To the MIT Press, especially Michael Zimmer, the editorial direc-
tor Gita Manaktala, Jesus Hernandez and Marcy Ross for guiding me through 
the publication process in a most helpful way. To Mary Bagg and Patricia 
Harriman for their meticulous work on copy-editing and creative solutions.
To American University, whose Doctoral Dissertation Award funded some 
of the research that I draw from in this book. To all my PhD colleagues at 
American University. To Tatevik Sargsyan—for sharing the best and lifting 
me up in the worst moments—it is a rare privilege to have a friend and col-
league like you. To Luis E. Hestres for continuously sharing helpful advice. 
To Nathalia Foditsch, for an inspiring mindset and for being there.
To Professors Steven Livingston, Bruce Gregory, and Kerric Harvey for 
generously investing in me during my MA studies and supporting my PhD 
endeavors. To Professor Robert Entman, for supporting my PhD applications. 
To the memory of an extraordinary intellectual and dear friend, Walter R. 
Roberts, whose sense of curiosity and joy for life I will never forget. To 
the Public Diplomacy Council—especially Alan Heil, Bob Heath, and Bob 
Coonrod. To Professor Sinisa Atlagic for all of his generous help.
To all my friends whose presence and help during my dissertation- and 
book-writing processes made an enormous difference: To my dear, dear friend, 
Korab Zuka—I would not have completed this research without you! To my 
life-long friend Jelena Bosnjak, I am exceptionally lucky and grateful to have 
Acknowledgments xv
you. To Gligor Cvetkovski for an extraordinary friendship, for always being 
there for me, and especially for helping me find the fastest way around 
 London tube, making sure I was on time for the interviews. To Douglas LaBier, 
who believed in me when I did not, and selflessly invested in me throughout 
the years. To two remarkable women, Nita Gojani and Lynsea Garrison, for 
being there when I needed them during my MA and PhD journeys. To Vera 
Korab and her family and to Studenka Ivkovic, for all the wonderful support. 
To the memory of Ljudmila Kattan-Tomasevic, a rare individual and beauti-
ful person who is very much missed. To my dear friends who cheered me up 
when writing, editing, and research became slightly overwhelming—Zorana 
Jovanovic, Aleksandra Stojanovic-Milic, Tatjana Kojic-Cehic, Tamara Djord-
jevic, Maja Medovic, Ksenija Bogetic, Lazar Milic, Ana Vuckovic, and Marija 
Vucinic—and their significant others. To an outstanding group of people 
gathered around Urban Artistry, who helped me feel at home in Washington, 
DC. To Gordana, Ratko and Sofija Musicki for all their support. And the very 
last but most certainly not least: to Vladimir, who took care of me and helped 
me become more of who I am.

I Cyberbullying, Dignity, and Children’s Rights

“do us all a favour n kill ur self”
This was one of the comments that 14-year-old Hannah Smith from the 
UK received on the social media platform Ask .fm, prior to hanging herself in 
her bedroom (Henley, 2013; Smith-Spark, 2013). The teen had allegedly been 
exposed to a series of online taunts on the site, which allows users to pose 
questions to each other anonymously. The powerful influence of the site at 
one point, particularly among youth, is best exemplified by a recorded “13 
billion page views from 180 million unique visitors” in 150 countries in April 
2013, approximately half of whom were under 18 (Henley, 2013). In response 
to her suicide, some 15,000 people signed an online petition requesting the 
UK government to act against Ask .fm (Dunn, 2013). The UK prime minister, 
David Cameron, called the website “vile” and asked its advertisers to boycott 
it. Ask .fm issued a statement of condolence and promised to improve its 
safety measures and cyberbullying policies.
This case joins a long list of incidents involving social media plat-
forms that attract public attention because of their connection to self-
harm (Bazelon, 2013b). Almost without an exception, every cyberbullying 
incident with such a tragic outcome kindles a blame-gaming rally that can 
result in arrests of individuals—often the children who posted the offen-
sive material1—and calls for tougher cyberbullying laws. But there is little 
research-based evidence to support the effectiveness of such laws aimed at 
children (Bulger, Burton, O’Neill, & Staksrud, 2017). Bullying is a complex 
behavioral issue and, as I reveal in this book, a cultural issue. It can hardly 
be solved by punishing, and especially not by stigmatizing, individuals.
Public reaction to high-profile cyberbullying incidents can spark “media 
panics” of a kind not uncommon around children’s use of technology (Drot-
ner, 1999; Buckingham, 2011; Staksrud & Kirksæther, 2013). Exaggerated 
anxieties about the negative effects of children’s use of social media and 
internet have surfaced historically in reference to the advent of TV, video 
1 When Cyberbullying Ends in Suicide
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games, and every previous “new” technology. This does not mean that the 
concerns expressed are necessarily invalid, but they can be misdirected 
to blame the technology itself for broader social problems (Livingstone, 
2009a).
As I note above, the children themselves can become the focus of con-
cern and punishment. Take the case of 12-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick 
of Florida, who died by falling from a tower in an abandoned factory after 
allegedly being bullied on Ask .fm, Kik, and Voxer; the local sheriff arrested 
two girls, asserting that he feared for the safety of other children (“Rebecca 
Ann Sedwick suicide,” 2013). After 17-year old Rehtaeh Parsons hanged 
herself in Canada, the local authorities in Nova Scotia voted in a new cyber-
bullying law that allowed victims to seek help in identifying anonymous 
perpetrators, as well as to sue individuals or even parents if the offender 
was a minor (CBC News, 2013).2 The law was finally struck down in court 
as “colossal failure” for violating personal freedoms (Ruskin, 2015). More-
over, members of the hacking vigilante group Anonymous threatened to 
find Parsons’s offenders on their own and publish their names, potentially 
exposing them to acts of revenge (“Rehtaeh Parsons suicide,” 2013).
Projecting an Image of Safety
Cyberbullying cases exist on a spectrum of social media sites, and the case of 
Ask .fm and Hannah Smith illustrates particularly well how a company with 
a reputation as a breeding ground for bullying can suffer from far-reaching 
negative effects. Ironically, though, a year after Hannah Smith’s suicide, 
the coroner’s report concluded that the girl had been sending “vile” mes-
sages to herself on Ask .fm, and a police investigation could not find any 
evidence of digital bullying (Davies, 2014). Ask .fm had already been hurt 
by the publicity this high-profile case attracted, however, so the revelation 
appeared to do little to repair its reputation. The advertisers pulled out, 
causing the company to lose revenue, while educators and e-safety experts 
were warning parents against allowing their children to use Ask .fm.
By mentioning the ironic effect on the reputation of Ask .fm, I do not 
mean to gloss over the fact that this company and others like it have been 
riddled with many actual cyberbullying cases, or to suggest that companies 
should not take responsibility.
Rather, I mean to stress a key point that I will come back to throughout this 
book: social media companies are currently not obliged to provide informa-
tion to the public (either the general public or international policy makers) 
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about the prevalence of bullying on their platforms. This is equally true for 
Ask .fm and for much more successful companies with better reputations, 
such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Snapchat, or Instagram. Therefore, very 
little evidence exists to show if children find the measures these companies 
take against bullying to be effective. Nonetheless, the actual prevalence rates 
and effectiveness of measures appear to matter less for companies’ success-
ful business operations than the good reputations they are able to maintain, 
especially when faced with real or alleged high-profile incidents.
What matters to them, in terms of their business success, is also the per-
formative act of demonstrating to the public that a given company cares 
about fighting bullying—and is actively taking measures against cyberbul-
lying. Typically the more experienced and older companies with more 
resources—those referred to as “more established companies” such as Face-
book, Twitter, or YouTube—understand this point and take such measures 
on an ongoing basis, not just in response to a high-profile case. This is best 
illustrated when comparing the reaction of Ask .fm in the aftermath of the 
Hannah Smith case to actions that Facebook continuously undertakes to 
show to the public that it fights bullying.
Reputation Matters
In an interview with Time magazine titled “Meet the Brothers Behind 
the Web’s Most Controversial Social Network,” the two Latvian men who 
headed Ask .fm when the incident took place failed to show penitence or 
take adequate responsibility for demonstrating ways to ensure that their 
company would become bully-free (Dickey, 2014). Rather, they said, bullying 
would always take place, as it was a wider cultural and social problem: “We 
[society] teach people to bully. Look at the media. Do you have muscles? 
You’re a cool guy. Are you fat? You’re a loser.” Short of providing tools with 
which to report cyberbullying and “punish[ing] whoever sent the bad com-
ment or question,” they said there was little that their company could do 
to prevent it. The brothers concluded that Ask .fm had itself been bullied by 
the negative media coverage (Dickey, 2014). Their observations about bul-
lying being a wider social problem actually reflect some of the key tenets of 
dignity theory, which I adopt as the framework for this book. None of the 
brothers’ defenses mattered, however, whether self-justifying or on point. 
Although the company had acquired a reputation in the UK tabloid press 
for being run by two obscure “playboy brothers” (Evans, 2013), it had been 
publicly expected to take responsibility and would have been well served 
by demonstrating decisive resolve for improvement.
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Companies with more experience, such as Facebook, tend to handle the 
policy, the discourse and their reputations much better than Ask .fm did. 
Consider, as an illustration, an event called the Anti-bullying Ambassa-
dors Program Showcase (Facebook London Showcase, 2014; see also Anti- 
bullying showcase 2013). The program itself, which is run by a UK charity or 
non-governmental organization (NGO), trains young people from schools 
in the UK and Ireland to fight against bullying, supports their progress, 
and bestows the title Anti-bullying Ambassadors on those who participate 
in the program (Antibullyingpro .com, n.d.).3 Facebook organized the Lon-
don showcase event for the program in cooperation with the NGO (I give 
attention to collaboration of various NGOs with companies in chapter 7). 
The company opened the doors of its London headquarters and invited 
numerous children, excited and honored to be there, to participate with 
MPs, celebrities, Facebook’s Team, schools and parents, in demonstrating 
collaborative ways to fight bullying (see Anti-bullying Ambassador . . ., 
2016, para 1).
By soliciting the help of, among others, the child hip-hop celebrity 
duo Bars and Melody—who are known for their participation in Britain’s 
Got Talent, and who, for this occasion rapped against bullying—the event 
sought to send a powerful message designed to resonate with young people 
that bullying was not okay. It recognized as well that Facebook was not only 
willing, but had already been taking the responsibility, to fight against it.
Regulators seemed to agree. It was not uncommon for e-safety experts or 
policy makers I talked to—for instance Robert Madelin, former Director Gen-
eral for Communications, Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT) at 
the European Commission, who had extensive experience with alternative 
regulatory mechanisms—to cite Facebook as an example of a positive self-
regulatory trajectory. It was widely recognized as a company that started 
with few options for users in the beginning and gradually developed a robust 
e-safety effort that served as a model for new companies in the industry, 
Ask .fm being one.
An Overall Lack of Transparency
While the more established companies appear to succeed in projecting 
an image of decisive and effective handling of bullying, they nonetheless 
provide extremely limited information about their operational policies. A 
widespread use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in the industry pre-
vents much insight into concrete evidence for the effectiveness of anti-
bullying enforcement mechanisms, in both the less established and the 
more established companies alike. As a common industry practice, having 
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an NDA in place prevents any use of these materials without explicit permis-
sion from the company; such measures tend to apply to NGOs and e-safety 
experts that collaborate with the companies as well (Carr, 2013b).
Social Media Companies among Other Stakeholders
In this book I trace a trajectory: from start-up companies developing their 
cyberbullying policies to more experienced companies that face continued 
challenges implementing them, all the while critically evaluating available 
data on the effectiveness of the self-regulatory systems in place. Cyberbul-
lying has gained significant traction in the public agenda. When cyber-
bullying incidents are linked with suicides, social media companies find 
themselves in the spotlight, pressured to respond. Most scholarly research 
on cyberbullying, however, focuses primarily on the role of educators, fam-
ilies, and peers in handling cyberbullying. Legal studies discuss whether 
there is a need for introducing new laws specific to cyberbullying.
Accordingly, I address a gap in academic research concerning the role 
of social media companies in intervening with and preventing cyberbul-
lying cases. It is first important to identify both the parameters and policies 
of social media. Social media platforms, as I define them in this book, are 
those that meet the first three of the four conditions proposed by the schol-
ars Laura DeNardis and Andrea Hackl (2015): (1) “enable the intermedia-
tion of user generated content,” (2) “allow for interactivity among users,” 
and (3) “direct engagement with the content.” Because some of the anony-
mous apps I analyze in this book may not allow users to know the identity 
of those they connect with, these platforms may not meet the fourth con-
dition: “the ability of an individual to articulate connections with other 
users” (DeNardis & Hackl, 2015, p. 762).
Other, broader, definitions of social media include: “those that facilitate 
online communication, networking and/or collaboration” (Russo, Wat-
kins, Kelly, & Chan, 2008, p. 22), or “a group of internet-based applications 
that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and 
that allow the creation and exchange of user generated content” (Kaplan & 
Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). All these definitions would also include digital mes-
sengers, such as WhatsApp, Kik, and Voxer. Digital messengers enable 
private communication between two or more people, similar to short mes-
sage service (SMS) or group chat, which is transmitted online. However, as 
the subsequent chapters detail, there are different interpretations within the 
industry as to what constitutes social media, and these companies none-
theless may not consider themselves as such.
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By “cyberbullying policies” I refer to provisions against bullying, harass-
ment, or abuse that companies stipulate in their corporate documents—such 
as Terms of Service (TOS) and Community Guidelines or Principles—and to 
subsequent enforcement mechanisms that social media companies have in 
place to intervene in existing cyberbullying and prevent future incidents 
on their platforms. These mechanisms include, but are not limited to: 
reporting tools; blocking and filtering; geofencing, which leverages global 
positioning system (GPS) to ban certain geographic locations from access-
ing a social media platform; any forms of human or automated moderation 
systems, such as supervised machine learning, various forms of artificial 
intelligence (AI) or algorithmic learning; as well as anti-bullying educational 
materials.
Some of these policies are aimed at intervention, in some cases by allow-
ing users to block or report someone who they think is bullying them 
on the platform, or in others by flagging abusive content. The company 
can then decide if it wants to block such a user, remove the abusive con-
tent, or take some other action. Cyberbullying policies such as geofencing, 
supervised machine learning, and developing educational materials are 
oriented toward prevention. For instance, geofencing allows companies to 
prevent certain geographic areas, such as high schools, from accessing the 
service; educational materials that some companies develop in cooperation 
with e-safety NGOs are aimed at teaching children about positive online 
relationships in an effort to prevent bullying. Supervised machine learning 
would involve monitoring social media platforms for the content that can 
result in bullying incidents in order to prevent them before they escalate.
In the US, state laws and proposed federal laws contain anti-bullying 
or anti-cyberbullying provisions that stipulate the role of schools in work-
ing with parents and sometimes law enforcement to address cyberbullying. 
However, these laws do not contain provisions regarding the responsibil-
ity of social media companies on whose platforms these incidents tend to 
take place. Furthermore in the US, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA) shields these services from liability in such cases. It stip-
ulates that “where an entity has provided a forum for online speech, that 
entity shall not be held liable for tortuous speech of others who may use 
the forum for harmful purposes” (Lipton, 2011, p. 1132).4 The European 
eCommerce Directive also provides safe harbor provisions (see chapter 5).
Although the companies regulate bullying on their platforms via private 
regulation in the EU as well, the situation there differs from that in the US 
in a number of important ways (Newman & Bach, 2004; O’Neill & Staksrud, 
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2012; see also McLaughlin, 2013; O’Neill 2014a, 2014b), as I elaborate later, 
particularly in chapter 5.
Such creation and enforcement of rules by the industry “with minimal 
or no intervention by the state” (Lievens, 2016, p.77, cf. Lievens, 2010) 
can be characterized as “self-regulation.” But for the system to be classified 
as “self-regulatory,” some conditions need to be met, other than an indi-
vidual company’s private regulation or the self-organization illustrated in 
their policies. Throughout the book, when referring only to a company’s 
private policies—those that define the contractual relationship between the 
company and the user—the terms “private regulation” or “self-organization” 
will be used.
Liability exemptions can leave companies with little incentive to moni-
tor posts on their platforms and the victim with few legal remedies when 
it is not clear who the anonymous perpetrator is, as is sometimes the case 
with cyberbullying incidents (Lipton, 2011; Citron, 2014a). Yet when an 
incident with severe consequences unfolds, such as the ones described in 
the beginning of this chapter, the ensuing controversy creates incentives 
for a company to assume corporate social responsibility and regulate cyber-
bullying behavior. Furthermore, a company’s behavior is subject to regula-
tion by the local laws in the countries where it operates, which can provide 
further incentive.
There is still a paucity of academic studies about the role of these tech-
nological platforms in intervening with and preventing cyberbullying inci-
dents. Media reports have emerged in the recent past which discuss the 
slow response of some companies to bullying complaints (Franks, 2014); 
such reports raise concerns about the levels of transparency with which 
companies moderated the reports they would receive about abuse (Barnett 
& Hollingshead, 2012). And yet a systematic analysis of these tools across 
the industry has rarely been a subject of academic study. With this book I 
aim to contribute to this effort, which also includes the work of Bazelon 
(2013b), Schneider, Smith, and O’Donnell (2013b), Citron, (2014a), Matias 
et al. (2015), Crawford and Gillespie (2016), and Van Royen, Poels, and 
Vandebosch (2016).5
“Information intermediary” (or “online intermediary”) is an umbrella 
term that applies to online service providers such as social media and dig-
ital messenger services. “Internet intermediaries are third-party platforms 
that mediate between digital content and the humans who contribute and 
access this content” (DeNardis, 2014, p. 154). I use this term as well to refer 
to the relevant social media companies.
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While these online companies play an important role in addressing bully-
ing, their operational or internal policies and enforcement practices are not 
well understood. Although their official policies tend to be—to a degree at 
least—spelled out on their websites, these written policies do not always 
reflect the more complex operations that take place within these corpora-
tions. Thus, I set out in this book to explain what the policies mean, and 
especially to determine how company representatives position their com-
panies’ roles in addressing cyberbullying on their platforms.
Moreover, non-governmental organizations play an important interna-
tional role in how companies deal with online bullying by participating in 
the design and execution of what is often described in the US and the EU 
as a multi-stakeholder self-regulatory process.6 Yet, except for news articles, 
and a limited number of reports, little is understood about the role of NGOs 
in helping companies address cyberbullying. Subsequently, in chapters 6 
and 7, I examine what can be known about the effectiveness and implica-
tions of this process.
Social media companies’ involvement with the content on their platforms 
can be controversial as well, as it allows these companies, which are private 
entities, to regulate free speech (DeNardis, 2014). By asking social media 
companies to decide if a case constitutes cyberbullying, and consequently 
make decisions about which content to take down, any law that would pro-
pose such a feature would delegate to private companies a regulation of free 
speech that is forbidden to the US government by the First Amendment 
and to many other governments by their constitutions. Social media com-
panies already take content down if they decide that a case constitutes bul-
lying and thus violates their TOS, a procedure that I analyze later in detail.
A much-discussed legal remedy is to institutionalize a procedure similar 
to the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides for a 
“notice and takedown system” whereby a copyright owner can file a notice 
to the platform whose user posted the material that infringed on copyright 
material of the owner. The platform then avoids liability for the infringing 
content as long as it removes such content upon notice from the copyright 
holder. The legal scholar Daniel Solove (2007) proposed that a similar sys-
tem should be instituted for reputational harm and privacy issues. Some 
legal and communication scholars have pointed out that such a system 
could be applied to cyberbullying cases (Chang, 2010; Poole, 2013). None-
theless, this procedure could be prone to abuse. For instance, false bullying 
reports could become a common occurrence; platforms would have to find 
a way to penalize those who abuse the system, which would again mandate 
a degree of involvement from private companies with content on their 
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platforms. Yet DMCA is prone to abuse as well and a broader normative 
question at issue here is why intellectual property seems to hold a higher 
value in the US culture than e-safety, dignity, privacy, and reputation—all 
of which can be at stake when cyberbullying is concerned. I will critically 
examine the application of such solutions in the context of bullying cases 
concerning children.
All intermediaries require that their users agree to the TOS, the contracts 
designed by companies that typically contain anti-cyberbullying provisions. 
In this book I incorporate a qualitative analysis of TOS, Community Guide-
lines/Standards/Principles, corporate statements and blogs, media coverage 
of cyberbullying, congressional hearings, and other relevant meetings and 
documents (in the US and EU) to explain the scope of anti-bullying policies 
and tools of enforcement employed by these companies.
When analyzing these policies, particular attention must be paid to how 
the texts used in these documents may emphasize certain facts over others 
and what implications such use of the text may have for users, companies, 
and policy in general. Of particular note for companies is the inherent 
profitability factor that underlies their policies and practices. In her semi-
nal book, The Culture of Connectivity, scholar José van Dijck provided a 
framework for analyzing how social media companies engineer human 
connectedness as algorithmic expression. By actively steering and curat-
ing user connections in ways that are not always transparent, companies 
use data created thereby to “monetize engineered streams of information” 
(van Dijck, 2013, p. 12). For users, “connectivity” may mean accumulating 
friends and social capital, but for platform owners it refers to “amassing 
economic capital” (van Dijck, 2013, p. 16). Similarly, the word “platform” is 
discursively employed by social media companies to minimize the percep-
tion of any conflict of interest in companies’ services to various constitu-
encies, from advertisers to users and policy makers (Gillespie, 2010, 2015).
In this book I present an overview of five cases that were characterized 
as “cyberbullying incidents” and that were also said to have contributed to 
suicides of young people; these case studies provide a context for examin-
ing the interplay of factors that influence social media companies in such 
crises. Analysis of corporate documents and relevant media coverage, as 
well as the interviews with representatives of selected companies, NGOs, 
and e-safety consultants who participate in the design of these policies, or 
have an expert understanding of the issue inform the subsequent discus-
sions.7 I also draw from experience at international conferences, summits, 
or events organized by various stakeholders in the area of e-safety. I thus 
propose to shed light on the following overarching and pivotal questions:
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• In what ways are online intermediaries addressing cyberbullying? How 
have their efforts evolved?
• What issues might these companies be encountering and what can be 
known about effectiveness of their policies? How do the companies under-
stand and describe the relative effectiveness of their tools of enforcement?
• How do the companies measure this effectiveness and what evidence of 
effectiveness do they provide?
• What roles do e-safety NGOs play in the process of self-regulatory and 
self-organizational effort?
In addition to these empirical questions, I address several larger, norma-
tive issues:
• Whose responsibility should it be to handle cyberbullying cases on these 
platforms?
• Should laws require companies to intervene, and which interventions are 
supported by research?
• What implications would companies’ actions have for freedom of speech?
• Should the burden of policing the platforms, and making decisions in 
terms of which speech is allowed, be left to private corporations?
• What should be done about the characteristics of platforms that are con-
sidered as particularly conducive to cyberbullying?
Addressing each of these questions involves a complexity of consid-
erations. As an example of peripheral factors, anonymity is perceived 
as especially favorable to cyberbullying.8 As I discuss in more detail in the 
subsequent chapters, some research shows that anonymity can disinhibit 
people in ways that can, under certain conditions, facilitate meanness. 
But anonymity also allows for a freedom of expression that people may be 
reluctant to adopt when they are bound by their real identities, and in that 
sense anonymity can be a valuable asset as well.
Overview of Cyberbullying (Digital or Online Bullying)
Bullying is often characterized as aggressive, typically repetitive behavior 
among school-aged children that also tends to involve a form of real or 
perceived power imbalance (Mishna, 2012). Likewise, cyberbullying is bul-
lying that takes place using electronic and particularly digital technology—
smart phones, computers, and social media (Kowalski, Giumetti, Schroeder, 
& Lattanner, 2014; Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2009). Research suggests 
that while bullying and cyberbullying tend to occur together, cyberbullying 
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can be more difficult to escape by providing bullies with more access to the 
victim online, a wider audience to witness the humiliation, and a digital 
record that does not easily go away (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009; Katz, 2012; 
Patchin & Hinduja, 2012; Görzig & Macháčková, 2015). Specific qualities 
of online environments can create a false sense of privacy, escalate nega-
tive emotions, and increase impulsivity, all of which can alter the nature of 
bullying online or intensify its consequences (Englander, 2015). Cyberbul-
lying can have negative impact on children’s performance at school as well 
as on their self-esteem, and was sometimes found to be related to other 
psychological problems, substance abuse or maladaptive behavior (Hin-
duja & Patchin, 2010; Subrahmanyam & Šmahel, 2011; Kowalski, Limber, & 
Agatston, 2012; Patchin & Hinduja, 2012).
Rates of prevalence of cyberbullying differ significantly from study to study, 
depending on how cyberbullying studies are conducted and measured—rang-
ing from as few as 6.5% to as many as 72% (Tokunaga, 2010; Kowalski, Giu-
metti, Schroeder, & Lattanner, 2014). The Cyberbullying Research Center in 
the US reveals that on average about 27 percent of students who participated 
in their ten most recent representative studies (from 2007 to 2016) reported 
being victims of cyberbullying at some point in their lives (Cyberbullying 
Research Center, n.d.). Relying on a robust, representative sample collected in 
25 European countries, the EU Kids Online project reports that internet-using 
children between the age of 11 and 16 were 7–12% more likely to be exposed 
to cyberbullying in 2014 than in 2010. EU Kids Online places these num-
bers in context: “being cyberbullied is reported by a small minority of 11- to 
16-year-olds. However, this risk is the most likely to result in harm—half of 
these youngsters report being fairly or very upset by receiving nasty or hurtful 
messages online” (EU Kids Online, 2014, p. 16). Similarly, scholars Sameer 
Hinduja and Justin Patchin, who lead the Cyberbullying Research Center 
in the US, conclude that cyberbullying is “neither an epidemic nor a rarity” 
and that judging by media reports, a reader would think that cyberbullying 
is acquiring epidemic dimensions, which research does not support (Cyber-
bullying Research Center, 2013, title).
Bullying and cyberbullying disproportionately affect lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) youth. Research shows that 
LGBT youth are more likely to experience harassment than non-LGBT peers 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). A national study in US 
schools revealed that more than 80% of LGBT youth reported being ver-
bally harassed because of their sexual orientation and over 38% were physi-
cally harassed (Kosciw, Greytak, Bartkiewitz, Boesen, Palmer, 2012, p. xiv). 
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Research also suggests that bias-based harassment is more strongly related 
with psychological problems than general forms of harassment (Ybarra, 
Mitchell, Kosciw, & Korchmaros, 2015).
The online intermediaries’ corporate documents such as TOS stipulate 
the range of acceptable behavior that users need to agree to in order to 
be able to use the platform, and provisions against abuse, harassment, or 
cyberbullying tend to be included in those. Cyberbullying policies can also 
fall under the companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR); this form 
of self-organization, incorporated into the business model, is designed to 
guide the company’s ethical behavior in a way that ensures the company’s 
engagement in actions that further social good (Haigh, Brubaker, & White-
side, 2013).
I selected the companies I analyze in this book based on several criteria: 
the high number of users they had at the time of research and writing (see 
table A.1 in appendix A), their reported popularity among teen and preteen 
users, and/or their appearance in media reports in relationship to online bul-
lying, especially in reference to self-harm or suicide. Some companies do not 
reveal the exact numbers of their users. This is especially true for startups—
smaller companies that gained millions of users in a short span of time and 
garnered significant media attention, sometimes due to alleged bullying inci-
dents. The 14 social media companies I analyze in this book are: Facebook, 
Instagram (Facebook-owned), Twitter, Ask .fm, Snapchat, YouTube (Google-
owned), Yik Yak, Secret, Google+, Tumblr (Yahoo! owned), and Whisper, and 
the digital messengers Voxer, WhatsApp (Facebook-owned), and Kik.
This choice of companies also allows for a comparison among a variety 
of platforms. Facebook’s affordances are quite different from Twitter’s and 
not at all similar to those of some anonymous or messaging apps. Hence 
these companies will face different issues and are expected to have different 
policies for preventing cyberbullying.
In general, however, these companies tend to offer the technological capa-
bility for a user to report an offensive post to the sites’ administrators, with 
the promise that such content will be taken down if it violates company pol-
icy. Some companies also seek to actively educate users about cyberbullying. 
For instance, Facebook has created the Safety Center with “Parents Portal” 
and “Bullying Prevention Hub,” an information clearinghouse on Facebook’s 
platform with specific advice for parents, educators, and children who 
become involved in these incidents on how to handle emerging situations.
While these efforts have their merits (Family Online Safety Institute 
Annual Conference, 2013), some researchers have shown examples of what 
is perceived as the ineffectiveness of these reporting mechanisms, such as 
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slow response to reported content (Bazelon, 2013b; Crawford & Gillespie, 
2016; Van Royen, Poels, & Vandebosch, 2016). Some researchers have 
observed that reporting might not be enough, especially given the abil-
ity to employ various forms of AI, which enable intermediaries’ managers 
to monitor any suspicious activity on their platforms and catch cyberbul-
lying as it happens (Bazelon, 2013b; Greenberg, 2016). Others, however, 
have also pointed out that supervised machine learning would clash with 
freedom of speech as ensured by the First Amendment, or with privacy pro-
tections, for instance when such measures are applied to content shared 
among users privately. These concerns go beyond political expression in 
the strict sense of the word. A democratic culture, where “individuals have 
a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that con-
stitute them as individuals” (Balkin, 2004, p. 1), can be affected when inter-
mediaries, being private entities, decide which speech is allowed on their 
platforms and which should be taken down.
Some social media companies are trying to incorporate “digital citizen-
ship”—teaching children not only how to use technology, but how to do 
so responsibly—into their self-organizational efforts to curb cyberbullying 
(Ohler, 2011; Family Online Safety Institute Annual Conference, 2013; 
Schneider, Smith, & O’Donnel, 2013b; Davidson, 2014). A theme that 
would sometimes emerge in the discourse around digital citizenship is that 
of “dignity” (Family Online Safety . . ., 2013; Wiseman, 2013). Contem-
porary scholars who write about dignity define it as an inherent worth 
of every human being, which is equal to all humans and, unlike respect, 
does not have to be earned (Fuller, 2006; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008; Lindner, 
2010; Hicks, 2011). While “conflict may be inevitable, human dignity is 
not negotiable” (Wiseman, 2013), and teaching children about the values 
of dignity within digital citizenship education is an approach that could 
lead to effective interventions (Family Online Safety . . ., 2013). Analysis 
follows regarding what efforts intermediaries make to incorporate “digital 
citizenship” into their cyberbullying initiatives and to what extent these 
measures help create more dignitarian relationships among children. Dig-
nity is what is violated when bullying and cyberbullying take place—when 
a child or a teen is ridiculed because of who or what they are (Fuller, 2006). 
Dignity theory echoes a strong emphasis on children’s rights, an approach 
recently promulgated by leading scholars in the field of children and media 
(Livingstone & Bulger, 2014; Livingstone, Carr, & Byrne, 2015; Staksrud, 
2013a). As I explain in chapter 2, it can facilitate a more constructive public 
understanding of young people’s interaction with digital media than the 
one we have witnessed thus far.
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It is worth noting, when discussing peer aggression in general, how we 
are prone to overlook the wider social and cultural conditions and the peer 
relations among adults that abound with indignities. Children’s relation-
ships do not happen in a vacuum; they are influenced by the world of 
adults (Durkheim, 2002) and are reflected in the media as well (Fuller, 2003, 
2006; Hicks, 2011 Fuller & Gerloff, 2008). Yet rather than acting merely as 
passive recipients of that culture, children actively appropriate from it in 
the process of social positioning (Corsaro, 2005; Thornberg, 2015). Social 
positioning, depending on how we define the phenomena, is often a cen-
tral theme in bullying and cyberbullying, another element in the constel-
lation of issues contributing to it.
The temporality of many social media companies within the industry 
also deserves mention in my study. In a casual conversation at a conference 
in London in the summer of 2016, I told a high-ranking Facebook employee 
about my book. The person bemusedly (and rhetorically) wondered how 
many of the companies in my sample would still exist by the time the book 
was published. I smiled and nodded in acknowledgment. The social media 
industry is a dynamic one where important players often appear quickly 
and can gain millions of active users in the course of only several months. 
Yet, subject to fierce competition, not every company has the same chances 
of surviving in the market. This seems to be especially true for the new 
platforms that have been available only for a year or two and that may 
not yet be fully established. But this can also be the case with the well-
established companies (Moscaritolo, 2014). Once a behemoth in the indus-
try in terms of user base, MySpace’s popularity and continued growth were 
affected by the advent of other social media companies. A similar fate befell 
another social media site, Bebo, especially popular among younger teens 
(Kiss, 2010). This is why an analysis of the kind I provide here can hardly 
be comprehensive. But it can purport to provide an overview of dominant 
industry trends in how companies address cyberbullying.
Focus, Themes, and Terms
As an overall framework, I emphasize that this work looks into bullying 
with a focus on children: it does not provide an analysis of cyberstalk-
ing, revenge porn, and online hate speech, which can also revolve around 
adults or specific groups of individuals based on their characteristics (for 
a discussion of these and legal remedies see, e.g., Citron, 2014a; Marwick & 
Miller, 2014). Trolling is also a phenomenon distinct from bullying but 
sometimes falls under the bullying label.9 Although there are certainly 
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overlapping elements between these concepts and bullying, I will reference 
them only if they are germane to particular companies’ bullying policies. 
Sexting, while sometimes related to bullying, is considered to be a separate 
issue as well. Covering these topics would constitute too broad of a scope 
for a project of this kind.
The words “harassment” and “abuse” are often used in corporate docu-
ments as synonyms for cyberbullying (or umbrella terms for cyberbullying). 
I mention them in this work because of such circumstances. One issue with 
bullying research is that the terms “online harassment” and “cyberbully-
ing” are commonly used interchangeably but measured differently, which 
introduces confusion into what is being measured and the frequency of 
occurrence, as well as the consequences (Mitchell, Ybarra, Jones, & Espelage, 
2016, cf. Jones, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, 2013).
In chapter 2, I look into the circumstances under which online risks, 
such as digital bullying, can generate exaggerated concerns over youth use 
of technology and the consequences for different stakeholders. The chapter 
places such fears in the context of amplified public concerns about other 
types of risks. I give special attention in the chapter to wider social and 
cultural problems that remain less discussed in discourse on digital bullying, 
building the case as to why it is important to address the culture of humili-
ation rather than engage in simplistic binaries of finger-pointing that are so 
often witnessed in the aftermath of high profile incidents. I also build the 
case for considering digital bullying in the context of children’s rights by 
discussing how social media companies structure policies and enforcement 
mechanisms around the rights to protection and participation, which are 
often perceived as conflicting. This fear-driven media coverage is critiqued 
against research about digital bullying, which draws from interdisciplinary 
literature in the field of media and communication (specifically children 
and media), education, clinical and developmental psychology, as well as 
criminal justice. The chapter is particularly relevant for those who need to 
familiarize themselves with the concept of cyberbullying from four perspec-
tives: (1) what is known about the prevalence of this phenomenon interna-
tionally; (2) the relationship between offline and online bullying, and the 
role of anonymity; (3) sociodemographic and cross-cultural variables; and 
(4) the known physical and psychological consequences of digital bullying. 
I use these findings to assess the connotations behind the term “cyberbul-
lying,” which is problematic from the perspective of a number of experts, 
as it implies that the digital world is somehow a separate, detached space 
from the offline world (see boyd, 2014; Fisk, 2017). Such a connotation can 
create exaggerated concerns among parents and caregivers. I also present 
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research-based evidence about the relationship between online risks and 
harm, emphasizing that not every risk leads to harm and that harm from 
digital bullying needs to be considered in context, rather than by adopting 
an alarmist approach.
In chapter 3, I include an overview of critical research on the increasing 
role of private intermediaries in regulating digital environments (DeNardis, 
2014), placing this information against the safe harbor provisions of the 
CDA and DMCA, which ensure limited liability for online intermediaries. 
Those readers who are not familiar with the companies whose policies I 
examine in this book, or with their history in relationship to bullying inci-
dents, can find the brief company profiles in appendix B.
In the introduction to part II of the book (chapter 4), I provide an analy-
sis of five cases that resulted in suicides (the so-called high-profile cases): 
the case of Megan Meier and Rebecca Ann Sedwick in the US, Rehtaeh 
Parsons and Amanda Todd in Canada, and Hannah Smith in England.10 I 
document pressures that companies face when such circumstances arise, 
the nature of the public discussion and media coverage, reactions from rel-
evant stakeholders, and how such circumstances may result in government 
regulation that does not necessarily address the problem in a manner that 
benefits children. I also examine the consequences of similar legislation 
that developed in the aftermath of tragic incidents in other parts of the 
world, ushering in the discussion on liability protections for intermediaries 
and self-regulatory systems that I take up in the following chapter.
I analyze the regulatory environment in terms of digital bullying in the 
US and the EU in chapter 5. I intend neither this chapter nor the book 
to provide a comparative perspective in terms of legal differences in how 
individual cyberbullying cases are handled in these two locations or how 
they may vary based on legal requirements in the EU members states. The 
purpose of the chapter is rather to explain the regulatory structures that 
ensure limited liability for the companies. As such, the chapter should be 
especially useful to those readers who are not familiar with self-regulation 
and co-regulation. It includes explanations of relevant regulatory stake-
holders, the process of self-regulation versus traditional, Command and 
Control regulation, and the benefits and downsides of each in the context 
of digital bullying. Drawing from my interviews with e-safety experts, aca-
demics, and social media companies, I explain how and why the current 
self-regulatory environment came into existence, the scarcity of indepen-
dent evaluation, especially from children’s perspective, and how such a 
state of affairs reflects upon children’s rights.
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In chapter 6, I outline the key findings of this research, policies and 
mechanisms against bullying on social media platforms. Relying on an analy-
sis of texts and an examination of specific platforms, as well as on interviews 
with social media companies, e-safety experts, and NGO representatives, I 
document what is missing in the policies and discuss the implications of 
how these policies are worded. I further explain the companies’ modera-
tion systems, what can be known about their effectiveness, presenting the 
consequences of such mechanisms for child protection and empowerment 
on the one hand, and users’ freedom of speech on the other. I address the 
patterns of how the policies tend to evolve and how this development can 
affect the perceptions of regulators.
Chapter 7 consists of an analysis of NGO-company partnerships with 
respect to bullying prevention and the primarily digital citizenship-based 
educational initiatives developed in cooperation with NGOs, which con-
stitute an important component of the self-regulatory process. I explain 
the NGO landscape, relying on information about primarily US- and EU-
based NGOs, examining the many important roles of these actors in policy 
design. I also raise important questions about transparency of this interde-
pendent ecology and how it impacts the ability to examine the effective-
ness of the self-regulatory process.
Part III, containing the final chapters (8 and 9), functions as a conclu-
sion to the results I present throughout the book by applying the dignity 
framework to the findings. I place dignity theory in its broader social and 
cultural context; it may be a less often discussed aspect of the issue, yet it is 
one of key relevance to policy development. In part III I argue that the sys-
tem works toward eliding public discussions about the effectiveness of the 
self-regulatory system, and that the debate about regulation becomes sim-
plified and politicized to the detriment of not only children and caregivers 
but also companies and the wider public. Further, the simplified nature 
of the public debate in the countries I examine leaves stakeholders with 
proposals for legislation that, while perhaps politically favorable to its pro-
mulgators, fail to address the problem and can have negative implications 
for users’ civil liberties. What the research suggests could be more effective 
regulatory tools than restrictive or punitive ones, such as ensuring funding 
for educational and bullying-prevention initiatives, or for involvement of 
mental health practitioners on social media, are rarely publicly discussed.
In this book I propose what a more transparent and dignity-honoring, self-
regulatory framework might look like, arguing that policies and enforcement 
mechanisms need to be publicized and regularly evaluated. I also explore 
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why transparency is not an end-goal in and of itself. The aim behind ensur-
ing transparency is to allow for an evaluation of the mechanisms’ effective-
ness from the perspective of the children involved, which could open up space for 
changes in policies and mechanisms in a way that works for youth. In the final 
chapter I ask questions about what it means to create a culture of dignity 
and a policy framework that balances child protection rights with those of 
provision and participation.
Readers intrigued by “They Call It Bunny Hunting,” the title of a Septem-
ber 2016 article in the Washington Post, may not have expected its subject 
to be e-safety education in the US (Gibson, 2016). The article described a 
class offered to tweens (11- and 12-year-olds) in Virginia, where a somber-
looking sheriff deputy explained that predators and sex offenders refer to 
the process of luring children to communicate online as “bunny hunting.” 
Among the scare tactics he used to inform children about the dangers 
lurking from an ever-proliferating number of digital devices was a warning: 
children could go to jail for sexting. Although he stopped short of citing 
cyberbullying cases that resulted in a child’s suicide, or of a child killed 
by an online stalker, he bluntly spoke of children whose lives have been 
irrevocably changed because of hacking or posting photos online with geo-
tags (Gibson, 2016). His message elicited gawks, gasps, and uncomfortable 
glances among the grim-faced students.
It is perhaps difficult to imagine that such educational practices were 
still taking place in 2016, three years after the US Department of Justice saw 
the results of its commissioned evaluation of e-safety curricula published, 
which recommended reducing reliance on “dramatic statements and scare 
tactics” (Jones, Mitchell, & Walsh, 2013, p. x; see also Jones, Mitchell, & 
Walsh, 2014). (I revisit this topic in chapter 7.) Despite what I saw as an 
ironic, or, at the very least, bemused tone of the Washington Post article, a 
cursory glance at Twitter revealed retweets that seemed to take the mes-
sages seriously—even urging parents not to hesitate to engage in similar 
scare tactics with their children—because “internet predators don’t care” 
(publicly shared anonymized tweet).
This precarious attitude toward technology and the urge to protect chil-
dren in the face of its real and perceived dangers is most certainly not new. 
Communication scholars have observed that in the past “each new media 
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technology brought with it great promise for social educational benefits, 
and great concern about children’s exposure to inappropriate and harmful 
content” (Wartella & Jennings, 2000, p. 31; see also Livingstone, 2009a). Dig-
ital technology can likewise become an easy scapegoat for competing agen-
das of policy makers and interest groups, and in the frequently simplified 
media coverage of complex issues such as cyberbullying. Much coverage of 
the internet and youth in general has focused on online pornography, the 
“stranger danger” of internet predators, as well as digital marketing “scav-
engers” (Montgomery, 2007).
This tendency to use new media as scapegoats for societal ills was per-
haps best exemplified in the coverage of the Columbine incident in 1999, 
where two teenagers murdered their classmates in a shooting spree. Media 
emphasized these teens’ tendency to play murder games and post hateful 
comments on websites (Montgomery, 2007). But social science researchers 
with a critical attitude toward predominant cultural values emphasize that 
the roots of the problem can be found in socialization patterns that neglect 
compassion and human dignity while encouraging meanness, competi-
tion, and even aggression—and that this state of affairs predates the advent 
of digital media (Klein, 2012).
Media coverage of cyberbullying incidents rarely examines these fac-
tors, especially coverage of the ones often labeled “high-profile cyberbully-
ing incidents” or “bullycides,” those with tragic results, ending in suicides 
(Bazelon, 2013b). Research indicates that a complex set of factors must come 
together for bullying and cyberbullying to actually result in suicide: an 
outcome of this kind tends to involve preexisting psychological vulner-
abilities, either combined with or apart from unique social circumstances 
(Herba et al., 2008), and sometimes with self-harming tendencies (Lereya 
et al., 2013). In other words, while bullying and cyberbullying have been 
found to be associated with suicidal ideation and attempts (Geoffroy et 
al., 2016), not all cases of bullying and cyberbullying are likely to result in 
suicide, nor is suicide a monocausal phenomenon. Not every child who is 
bullied will develop anxiety or depression, even though repeated victimiza-
tion can increase the odds of such an outcome (Connolly & Beaver, 2016, cf. 
 Arseneault et al., 2010). I do not mean to propose here, or even suggest, that 
bullying should be seen as “a right of passage” or “a minor problem.” But it 
is significant to mention that this level of nuance rarely finds its way into 
media coverage and a portrayal of the bullying-suicide relationship as one 
of cause-and-effect can misleadingly stoke fears of parents and caregivers.
In public debates around cyberbullying that can emerge in the aftermath 
of such cases, where media coverage is driven by sensationalism—and policy 
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makers fight for votes of concerned parents and caregivers, while social media 
companies strive to secure polices that would allow them a degree of latitude 
in self-organization, children can become an excuse for policies that do not 
apply solely to them. “Making children the focus of claims often provides 
a powerful means for pressing emotional buttons and commanding assent 
even when the target is much broader” (Buckingham, 2011, p. 8). If socially 
harmful influences are seen as affecting children most especially, then the 
argument for controlling such influences appears stronger (Buckingham, 
2011; Staksrud, 2013a). Philip Jenkins (1992) illustrates this tendency with 
the example of “moral entrepreneurs” who instigated the panic concerning 
child abuse that spread through Britain in the 1980s (Buckingham, 2011). 
Campaigns “against homosexuality” were reframed into campaigns “against 
pedophiles,” and campaigns “against pornography” into campaigns “against 
child pornography,” while “campaigns against ‘immorality’ and ‘Satanism’ 
became campaigns against ‘ritualistic child abuse’” (Buckingham, 2011, p. 8 
[emphasis added], cf. Jenkins, 1992). As some of the high-profile cases in 
chapter 4 demonstrate, laws resulting from cyberbullying incidents can 
reach well beyond their attempts to regulate harmful effects on children; as 
some experts observe, those efforts often fail, leaving behind implications for 
civil liberties and the rights of adults.
The concept of moral panic and its special cases, the media panic and 
technopanic (which I discuss below), can provide some background for 
understanding so-called high-profile cyberbullying incidents.1 As a term 
that originated in the field of sociology, “moral panic” has been widely (and 
generically) used among scholars to refer to an exaggerated social reaction 
in response to a phenomenon or to activities of a social group, and media 
tends to play an important role in amplifying these concerns (Cohen, 1972; 
Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Staksrud, 2013a). In their influential essay on 
moral panics, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994) outlined “five 
crucial elements” (p. 156) that define moral panic: “concern, hostility, con-
sensus, disproportionality and volatility.” Moral panics are characterized 
by the “heightened concern” that the behavior “of a certain group” poses 
for the remainder of the society (p. 157). They provoke an “increased level 
of hostility” (p. 157) toward people or a group engaging in certain behav-
ior; they are seen as “deviant” and as a threat to the values or morals of the 
rest of society. Demonizing children who were the so-called perpetrators in 
high-profile cyberbullying incidents not only violates the dignity of these 
children, as I argue in chapter 4, but it can also misleadingly simplify the 
problem of bullying and cyberbullying. As such, it can be counterproduc-
tive in finding constructive solutions to the problem.
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Moral panic does not require a majority consensus in a society, how-
ever, to deem the “wrongdoing of group members” as a “real” or “serious” 
a threat (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 157). Moral panic can result in 
“disproportionality,” meaning that the “concern is out of proportion to 
the nature of the threat” or “considerably greater than that which a sober 
empirical evaluation would support” (p. 158). This may be the case when 
media coverage exaggerates cyberbullying prevalence rates or the connec-
tion between being bullied and the likelihood of dying by suicide (Under-
wood, Rish-Scott, & Springer, 2011; Olweus, 2012). High-profile bullying 
cases may not meet the criteria of moral panics, however. And although the 
goal here is not to examine to what extent they do or do not, it is important to 
stress that bullying cases can elicit similar reactions, especially because 
of the outcome: “the consequences of a moral panic are normally changes 
in the law or its enforcement,” (Critcher, 2008, p. 1130). Some of the cases 
discussed in chapter 4 provide examples.
A type of moral panic where the focus of concern is media itself (usu-
ally fears over a new medium) is referred to as “media panic” (Staksrud & 
Kirksæther, 2013 cf. Drotner, 1999). If concerns center on technology, it’s 
referred to as “technopanic.” Technopanics tend to coalesce around a variety 
of internet-related issues. Nonetheless, they can share similar traits, as the 
scholar Alice Marwick explains in her comparison of the cyberporn panic 
of 1996 and the panic over predators on MySpace social media platform 
more than a decade later:
The technopanic over ‘online predator’ is remarkably similar to the cyberporn panic; 
both are fueled by media coverage, both rely on the idea of harm to children as 
the justification for internet content restriction, and both have resulted in carefully 
crafted legislation to circumvent First Amendment concerns. (. . .) However, my re-
search demonstrates that legislation proposed—or passed—to curb these problems is 
an extraordinary response; it is misguided and in many cases masks the underlying 
problem. (Marwick, 2008, abstract)
In this book I stand in strong opposition to overly risk-averse and harm-
emphasizing approaches to children’s involvement with contemporary 
media and technology. A more constructive view of children’s experience 
with digital technology has already been proposed by scholars: “children 
must learn for themselves how to navigate the wider world, including 
learning from their mistakes, and recovering from accidents, for ‘resilience 
can only develop through exposure to risk or stress’” (Staksrud & Living-
stone, 2009, cf. Coleman & Hagell, 2007, p. 15). The importance of this 
proposition can hardly be overstated and was repeatedly emphasized by 
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the e-safety experts I interviewed for this book. Yet the media coverage and 
public debates that have emerged around the cases I discuss in chapter 4 do 
not lead to such conclusions.
Risk and Harm in Context
Cyberbullying is frequently conceptualized as an “e-safety” or “online safety 
issue” (Katz, 2012), or an “online risk” (EU Kids Online, 2014) along with 
other types of risks such as child pornography, exposure to violent and sex-
ual material, grooming (i.e., luring or enticing a child to engage in online 
communication), sexting, and so forth.2 With a growing use of technology, 
recent research by EU Kids Online and its sister project Net Children Go 
Mobile shows that exposure to some of the risks is increasing. For instance, 
in comparison to 2010, children in 2014 were more likely to be exposed 
to hate messages (from 13% to 20%), pro-anorexia sites (from 9% to 13%), 
self-harm sites (from 7% to 11%) and cyberbullying (from 7% to 12%) (EU 
Kids Online, 2014).3
But despite the rising trend, EU Kids Online researchers caution against 
panic by placing their findings in context: not all the risk results in harm 
(Livingstone, Mascheroni, & Staksrud, 2015). On the other hand, curbing 
access to online spaces may indeed lower risk, but it may also cut access to 
opportunities. “The more children use the internet, the more online activi-
ties they undertake, the more digital skills they gain, (and thus the higher it 
is likely they climb the ladder of online opportunities to gain the benefits)” 
(Livingstone, Mascheroni, & Staksrud, 2015, p. 9). Likewise, “less engaged, 
skilled or supported children gain fewer opportunities or risks” (p. 9). 
Hence, the positive correlation between risks and opportunities should be 
acknowledged.
Whether risk will result in harm depends on a number of factors, which 
raises a key question: Under what circumstances does risk result in harm 
rather than in coping? Important variables that can affect the likelihood of 
risk resulting in harm include, but are not limited to: children’s psycholog-
ical and sociodemographic characteristics, family circumstances, support 
available at the community level (e.g., school policies and regional and 
country-level policies regarding e-safety education), and cultural differences 
(see, e.g., Strohmeier, Yanagida, & Toda, 2016). EU Kids Online research has 
found that online and offline vulnerability are interrelated: “children with 
more psychological problems suffer more from online as well as offline 
risks” (d’Haenens, Vandoninck, & Donoso, 2013, p. 1). In addition, more 
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resilient children, those who were “higher in self-efficacy,” employed more 
proactive coping strategies, such as talking to someone or attempting to fix 
the problem (e.g., by blocking, reporting, or deleting an offensive message). 
More vulnerable children, however, resorted to fatalistic or passive coping, 
by hoping for instance that the problem would go away on its own, or by 
stopping their internet use (d’Haenens et al., 2013). Taking an extended 
break from the internet could be helpful when children felt bothered by 
some risks, but it also included missing out on online opportunities and 
not building resilience, which is why it was not considered to be a favorable 
strategy.
It is important to repeat the point I made above in the discussion about 
media coverage of high-profile cases: although peer victimization is a risk 
factor for suicide among adolescents, and cyberbullying can contribute to 
suicidal thoughts or be in some way related to suicidal attempts (Hinduja & 
Patchin, 2010; van Geel, Vedder, & Tanilon, 2014) not all bullying and cyber-
bullying is likely to result in self-harm or suicide, nor is suicide monocausal—on 
the contrary. Consider the results of EU Kids Online and Net Children Go 
Mobile research in the UK showing that 21% of internet-using children ages 
9 to 16 have experienced either online or offline bullying and 18% of them 
overall (less than a fifth) reported being upset by what happened (Living-
stone, Haddon, Vincent, Mascheroni, & Olafsson, 2014). Nonetheless, cyber-
bullying has been found to have negative effects on school performance 
and children’s self-esteem, and to contribute to anxiety, depression, and 
even to suicidal ideation (Mitchell, Ybarra, & Finkelhor, 2007; Subrahman-
yam & Šmahel, 2011; Patchin & Hinduja, 2012; Kowalski et al. 2014).
A complex set of socioecological factors on individual, community, and 
national levels surround cyberbullying (Görzig & Macháčková 2015). Many 
variables mediate this particular outcome (see Bauman, Toomey, & Walker, 
2013). But specific circumstances need to exist for cyberbullying to result 
in suicide, as shown by some cases I discuss in chapter 4. Girls are particu-
larly vulnerable; so are children with psychological difficulties and socially 
disadvantaged children (Görzig & Macháčková, 2015). A certain amount of 
exposure to risk is necessary to develop resilience. Hence, without looking 
into an individual child’s circumstances and the context of use, blanket 
denial of access to online spaces in order to prevent cyberbullying is hardly 
a research-based recommendation.4
Consider, for instance, that according to recent European research, adoles-
cents’ offline and online risk experiences were driven by the same general 
propensity to risks (Görzig, 2016). Such findings suggest that so-called new 
technologies do not bring a new type of risk propensity to the nature of 
Can E-safety Compromise Children’s Rights? 27
digital environments (Görzig, 2016). It is therefore important to go beyond 
alarmist claims about technology and to examine how the context of chil-
dren and teens’ internet use results in either harm or benefits. The scholar 
Whitney Phillips explains how trolling is embedded in a wider mainstream 
culture (Phillips, 2015), just as cyberbullying is a problem that transcends 
e-safety, and as long as we see it only as an e-safety problem, it will remain 
difficult to design effective solutions. Further, I propose a dignity-based 
framework to foster an understanding of bullying as part of the wider cul-
ture; such an approach can focus the public debate on alternatives to over-
reactive measures and legal solutions that fail to achieve their stated ends 
(as I discuss in chapter 4).
The technological and cultural environment in which today’s children 
grow up is significantly different from the environment of the pre-internet 
era (Livingstone, 2009a; Livingstone, Görzig, & Haddon, 2012; Bazelon, 
2013b; boyd, 2014). Social relations and patterns of interaction among 
youth that existed in the so-called analogue age are now taking place in rap-
idly changing online venues.
Technological developments happen very quickly and the platforms 
where social interactions were taking place only a couple of years ago may 
no longer exist or be as relevant to youth as they used to be. Technological 
affordances of these platforms provide venues where youth’s lives unfold 
and thus also shape their social interactions. Social media companies, only 
slightly over a decade old, fueled a new business model based on data col-
lection and accumulation of social capital through sharing culture (van 
Dijck, 2013).
This new environment creates additional challenges for dealing with 
bullying and harassment. Although name-calling is not new, being labeled 
“a slut” or “a faggot,” for instance, now has the potential to reach a different 
dimension. As some authors point out (Bazelon, 2013b), the meanness of 
spoken words can be ephemeral and fade, whereas online messaging that 
proliferates and remains visual can even become viral on social networking 
sites. The amplification of harassment through online sharing that takes 
place within the developmental process of social positioning can have more 
insidious consequences than harassment confined to a school or play-
ground. Hurtful social positioning now leaves a trace, as exemplified in 
cyberbullying, perhaps providing a unique opportunity for the public to 
understand the extent of a problem that used to be largely untraceable, for 
example, when limited to verbal slurs on a bathroom wall.5
The cultural climate, at least in the US and the European countries that 
this book focuses on, seems to have become more attentive to bullying. It 
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tends no longer to consider this phenomenon as “a rite of passage” but 
rather as a behavioral problem to be reckoned with. As some authors point 
out, awareness of bullying may have been influenced in part by shooting 
rampages in schools, such as the well-known 1999 Columbine incident in 
the US (Klein, 2012; Bazelon, 2013b).6 Not all the children who showed 
such aggression had been bullied, but this and similar incidents may have 
put the issue into the limelight of public attention. Laws against face-to-face 
bullying have been adopted in US states since 1999, and with an increas-
ing number of high-profile cyberbullying incidents, some states began to 
adopt laws against cyberbullying, too (Sacco et al., 2012). Similarly, the 
situation is changing for youth minorities, such as the LGBTQ population, 
who are disproportionately affected by harassment because of their sexual 
orientation. For instance, the word “fag” was once a commonplace term 
of belittlement for boys with an effeminate affect, and used without much 
question of whether it was right or wrong. Today’s LGBTQ youth, however, 
are “caught between the closet and acceptance”; they have cultural support 
as exemplified by celebrities such as Lady Gaga and Pink, for instance, that 
doesn’t correspond to the rejection they may still experience in their day-
to-day lives (Bazelon, 2013b, p. 65).
Despite a greater recognition in the culture that these minorities need 
additional protection from harassment, LGBTQ youths nonetheless remain 
strongly impacted by cyberbullying as their personal development and 
coming out take place in these ever-changing technological environments. 
The complexity of this process is perhaps best exemplified in the case of 
Tyler Clementi, a Rutgers University student who died by suicide after being 
secretly filmed and derogated by his roommate on Twitter because of his 
sexual orientation (Foderaro, 2010). This story received significant media 
attention and also led to a wider recognition as to the extent of the impact 
that cyberbullying can have, especially for youth minority populations.
Cyberbullying Defined from a Research Perspective
The literature on bullying, cyberbullying, abuse, peer harassment, peer and 
relational aggression, and victimization among young people is vast. Rather 
than purporting to provide a comprehensive review of the topic, I attempt 
in the following very brief overview to draw attention to some of the key 
themes from research about cyberbullying that are relevant for this book.
Cyberbullying is not easily defined and measured (Vandebosch & Van 
Cleemput, 2009; Tokunaga, 2010; Mishna, 2012; Corcoran, Guckin, & Pren-
tice, 2015). It involves the use of electronic communication technology as 
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a means to embarrass, harass, socially exclude, or threaten (Mishna, Saini, & 
Solomon, 2009). It can include making offensive remarks, deceiving some-
one by pretending to be someone else, spreading gossip via digital media, 
excluding others from an online community, or taking part in voting on 
a defamatory site (Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2009). Some researchers 
include flaming (online fighting), harassment (for instance, exemplified 
in repetitive offensive messaging or discrimination based on minority sta-
tus),7 and cyberstalking (following someone online and sending repetitive 
threatening messages) under the umbrella of cyberbullying (see Kowalski 
et al., 2014). Others study these as distinct phenomena from cyberbullying 
(e.g. Navarro et al., 2016). Online harassment can include one-off instances 
that do not necessarily meet the criteria of bullying unless they are related 
to offline targeting in schools or in other interpersonal peer relationships 
(Wolak, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, 2007). Yet online harassment can nonethe-
less happen within a wider pattern of bullying and cause harm, such as 
distress, to the victim (Mitchell et al., 2016).
Similarly to offline bullying, cyberbullying can be defined as “willful 
and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones and 
other electronic devices” (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009, p. 5). This act, as some 
authors emphasize, also involves a form of power imbalance between the 
so-called perpetrator and the victim (Olweus, 2012). There does not seem 
to be an academic consensus on how many times an instance of cyber-
bullying needs to happen in order to qualify as “repeated”: cyberbullying 
varies from case to case and the nature of interactions in digital environ-
ments can make it difficult to apply the criteria of face-to-face bullying. By 
“willful,” researchers refer to “intent” in bullying—to act purposefully in 
this manner—and hence they distinguish bullying and cyberbullying from 
the cases where emotional harm may be inflicted when children use words 
or actions without realizing they may be hurting someone. However, once 
a case occurs it may be difficult to classify and determine if it meets the 
definitional criteria of cyberbullying (Nocentini et al., 2010).
Some findings show that face-to-face bullying and cyberbullying tend 
to co-occur—those who have bullied others offline do so online, too. And 
those who have been victimized offline have had this experience online as 
well (Görzig & Macháčková, 2015; cf. Hasebrink et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
perpetration and victimization was also shown to co-occur—those who 
have been on the sending side have found themselves on the receiving end 
(Görzig, 2011; Hasebrink et al., 2011; Lampert & Donoso, 2012; Görzig & 
Macháčková, 2015). This is particularly interesting from a dignity frame-
work perspective; humiliation seems to beget more humiliation.
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Much like the term “cyberspace,” even the concept of “cyberbullying” can 
be problematic (Rey, 2012; Fisk, 2017). A theme emerging from my inter-
views with e-safety experts addressed how “cyber” can somehow imply that 
the so-called online world is separate from the offline world, whereas these 
worlds are intertwined. Children do not necessarily distinguish between 
“online” and “offline” (Livingstone, 2016, p. 10); their lives take place in 
both—seamlessly (see boyd, 2014). And so “cyber” can add a mysterious con-
notation to online spaces, even implying a lawless “Wild West” that remains 
unconnected to reality. This is why “online bullying,” “digital bullying,” or 
“relational aggression” might be better terms, indicating that the problem 
is bullying, regardless of the medium. It is worth noting that some research 
uses “online bullying” to denote bullying that happens on the internet but 
that excludes mobile phones, whereas they use “cyberbullying” to refer to 
bullying over the internet and mobile phones as well (Livingstone, Haddon, 
Görzig & Ólafsson, 2011).
Some scholars argue that cyberbullying is merely an extension of face-
to-face bullying and that it is a less prevalent phenomenon than its offline 
predecessor (Olweus, 2012), but other European research has shown that 
cyberbullying has increased in recent years and may actually be more prev-
alent than face-to-face bullying (Livingstone, Haddon, Vincent, Masche-
roni & Olafsson, 2014, p. 5). Some find that partly due to the peculiarities 
of digital communication, it may be difficult to apply the criteria of face-
to-face bullying onto types of abuse taking place in online spaces, such as 
bully-victim and bystander labels (see Kofoed & Ringrose, 2012). Others 
propose that the term “cyber-aggression” may be more appropriate (Corco-
ran, Guckin, & Prentice, 2015).
Furthermore, in some cases cyberbullying may be hard to distinguish 
from “online drama,” and what to adults may seem like “cyberbullying,” 
teens may identify or dismiss as “drama” (boyd, 2014; Marwick & boyd, 
2014). Based on a study with American teens, the scholars danah boyd and 
Alice Marwick defined drama as “performative, interpersonal conflict that 
takes place in front of an active, engaged audience, often on social media,” 
explaining that “the emic use of drama distances teens from practices con-
ceptualized by adults as bullying or relational aggression” (Marwick & 
boyd, 2014, p. 1187). Many cases of drama lacked clear bully-victim roles 
and teens preferred not to identify as either “bullies” or “victims” because 
such labels jeopardized their social status, and the concept of bullying 
was perceived as juvenile. Furthermore, bullying, much like drama, can be 
about social positioning—perceived popularity and social capital (Thorn-
berg, 2015). Company representatives and e-safety experts I interviewed 
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for this book would sometimes label cases of one-time friends falling out 
with each other and being mean to each other one day, just to become 
friends again the next day, as examples of “drama.” The terms “bullying” 
and “cyberbullying,” on the other hand, were reserved for what they per-
ceived as more serious cases of continuous taunting, often with clear bully-
victim roles. Yet the lines between these roles can be blurred, and drama 
can be very hurtful even when it is part of a normal growing-up process. 
Because of these difficulties in defining and operationalizing cyberbully-
ing, some companies prefer to use what they see as broader and less spe-
cific terms in their policies, such as “abuse” or “harassment,” rather than 
“cyberbullying.” I discuss these nuances in chapter 6.
The prevalence of cyberbullying differs greatly from study to study in three 
aspects: (1) because of the way cyberbullying is defined and measured (e.g., 
if children are asked whether they have been bullied in the past two or six 
months, or a year, or ever in their life); (2) because of differences in age stud-
ied and location; and (3) due to differing frequency rates of incidents used 
to classify whether one is a victim/perpetrator (e.g., at least once, more than 
once, or several times a week) (see: Kowalski, Giumetti, Schroeder, & Lattan-
ner, 2014). It is also difficult to say if cyberbullying is on the rise by analyzing 
research based on self-reporting and indirect measurement (Vandebosch & 
Van Cleemput, 2009). Some recent studies in different countries show an 
increase in frequency of cyberbullying across various age groups (EU Kids 
Online 2014; Livingstone, Mascheroni, et al., 2014). Estimates of cyberbully-
ing prevalence vary significantly from study to study, from as little as 6.5% 
to as much as 72%, depending on how and where it is measured (Tokunaga, 
2010; Kowalski et al., 2014). While media reports frequently assert that there 
is a “cyberbullying epidemic” (see McGraw, 2015; Waldman & Clementi, 
2015), there is little academic research to support such a claim.
Individuals’ ability to remain anonymous online is a technological affor-
dance that researchers single out as a distinct feature of some cyberbullying 
cases (Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004; Hinduja & Patchin, 2009; Vandebosch & 
Van Cleemput, 2009; Katz, 2012). Yet children frequently know who bul-
lies them and cyberbullying can happen within close relationships as well 
(Mishna, 2012). One-time friends can fall out and start cyberbullying each 
other. The fact that the digital record of cyberbullying may not easily go 
away, combined with the ability for taunting to continue after school and 
on a variety of platforms, making it ubiquitous, are other traits described as 
peculiar to cyberbullying (Katz, 2012).
Unwillingness to identify as a “bully” or as a “victim” (Marwick & boyd, 
2014) or to speak of cyberbullying to parents (Slonje & Smith, 2008) 
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can pose challenges to intervention and prevention. While cyberbullying 
increases in middle school, some authors suggest it reaches a peak, a so-called 
“perfect storm” period (Katz, 2012) at age 14 to 15, which suggests that 
this phase should be anticipated (Katz, 2012, p. 71).8 Some studies indicate 
that boys and girls have equal chances of becoming offenders and victims 
(Ševčíková & Šmahel, 2009), while others find that girls are more likely to 
be victimized by harassment (Wolak, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, 2006; Görzig & 
Macháčková, 2015). In traditional bullying, however, boys are more likely 
to be perpetrators, especially when bullying is physical and studies sug-
gest that this might be the case because cyberbullying involves relational 
aggression (e.g., being mean to each other), which is preferred by girls, rather 
than physical aggression, which boys are more prone to (Subrahmanyam & 
Šmahel, 2011).
Young people who identify as LGBTQ experience higher levels of vic-
timization than their peers who identify as heterosexual (Kosciw, Greytak, 
& Diaz, 2009; Robinson & Espelage, 2012). This minority group was also 
found to be at a greater risk of harm associated with victimization. A num-
ber of authors emphasized the importance of ensuring that schools intro-
duce not only generic anti-bullying policies, but also anti-bullying policies 
that specifically protect LGBTQ youth. Contrary to this research-based 
policy recommendation, however, some US states even enacted bills that 
explicitly prohibit discussions of victimization in relation to sexual orienta-
tion (Robinson & Espelage, 2012). Scholars conducting discourse analyses 
explained how the public discussion of safety, which also includes online 
safety, works toward establishing e-safety as “a commodity that is unequally 
distributed across identity groups,” arguing that “the discourses of safety 
require a person to acquiesce to normative race, gender and sexual identity 
performances as a pre-requisite for unconditional safety” (Pritchard, 2013, 
p. 339). Such a discourse places LGBTQ youth as well as racial and ethnic 
minorities in a particularly vulnerable position where the public outrage 
over cyberbullying incidents that happen to these children, even when 
they end in suicide, does not reach the same proportions as in the case of 
non-minority children. Furthermore, this public discourse fails to acknowl-
edge the instances when adults working with children are hostile to diver-
sity or “anything they deem non-normative” (Pritchard, 2013, p. 337).
A compounding factor is the ubiquity of technology ownership and 
children’s ability to access it unbeknownst to parents and caregivers. For 
instance, in the US, according to nationally representative data from the 
Pew Research Center published in 2015, 92% of teens reported going online 
daily, 24% reported going online “almost constantly,” and nearly three 
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quarters of them reported either having or having access to a smartphone 
(Lenhart, 2015). According to an EU Kids Online survey from 2010, 93% of 
internet-using children aged 9–16 in 25 European countries went online at 
least weekly and 60% of them reported doing so every day or almost every 
day; by 2014, EU Kids Online reported that compared to 2010, children 
were going online more often at younger ages, and that access was diver-
sifying (EU Kids Online, 2014). There are significant research gaps about 
digital access, opportunities, risk, and harm from less developed coun-
tries or what is sometimes called the Global South (Livingstone & Bulger, 
2014). Nonetheless, where data is available, they tend to suggest a growing 
access to digital technologies. An EU Kids Online study in Brazil showed 
that regardless of their socioeconomic status, over two-thirds of Brazilian 
children consider themselves to be more knowledgeable about the internet 
than their parents (Barbosa et al., 2013).
The Dynamics of Bullying and Cyberbullying
Several theoretical frameworks purport to explain causes behind bullying 
and cyberbullying, such as theories that focus on the individual, aggres-
sive attribution theories, social and moral cognition theories, theories of 
mind, and dominance theories (Mishna, 2012). Bullying can be regarded 
in the context of unequal power among children. A more powerful child 
can be one that is more popular or physically stronger, and the very act of 
aggression can fuel popularity (Adler & Adler, 1998; Bernstein & Watson, 
1997; Mishna, 2012). This theme of “social positioning” also emerges from 
teenagers’ accounts of how and why bullying happens (Thornberg, 2015). 
Bullying can be a way for those who want to be “cool” to achieve their 
goals (Frisen, Jonsson, & Persson, 2007; Frisen, Holmqvist, & Oscarsson, 
2008), and the school culture where social hierarchy is valued, and forma-
tion of cliques tolerated as normal, can contribute to this process (Swart & 
Bredekamp, 2009). Hence, those who are victims for a long time can fall to 
the bottom echelons of social hierarchy, while those who successfully bully 
could achieve higher status. In dignity terms—such culture is regarded as non-
dignitarian (Fuller, 2003, 2006; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008).
This kind of social dominance means that individuals have resources 
that signify power, which can depend on the developmental stage—for 
example toys with younger children and sex in adolescence (Long & Pel-
legrini, 2003). This quest for dominance can be especially present when 
new groups form or when new members are added to the existing groups as 
they compete for dominance, suggesting that bullying and cyberbullying 
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may be particularly likely when children switch to high school or into dif-
ferent classes, and which can be explained by socio-ecological theories as 
well (Swearer & Espelage, 2011).
Other reasons that emerge from individual student accounts are that the 
victim is socially constructed as “different” within a peer group or that the 
bully has psychosocial problems (Thornberg, 2015). Literature does not seem 
to be conclusive on this point—some authors suggest that children who bully 
have trouble processing social information. Others, however, find that chil-
dren who are really good at processing social information, typically extro-
verts, are more likely to bully (Mishna, 2012 cf. Bukowski, 2003, Hawley, 
Little, & Card, 2007). It is worth pointing out, though, that the most recent 
findings about cyberbullying, which suggest an overlap between so-called 
perpetration and victimization (Görzig, 2011; Hasebrink et al., 2011; Lam-
pert & Donoso, 2012), might bring a different interpretation about why and 
how cyberbullying happens. Perhaps rather than attributing cyberbullying 
to aggression and deviance within individuals, cyberbullying can be concep-
tualized as a relational pattern within social positioning, one that unfolds 
differently on various platforms depending, to a degree, on a variety of their 
affordances (Kofoed & Ringrose, 2012).
Intervention and Prevention Approaches
Most bullying and cyberbullying prevention and treatment programs focus 
on school-age children, are frequently school-based, and seek to engage 
parents, schools, teachers, and bystanders in the incidents. (Because the 
volume of literature on intervention and prevention surpasses the limits 
of this book, what follows is a brief but important overview.) While some 
call for legislation—and as I explained in chapter 1, some laws have already 
been enacted—others point out that such laws could clash with freedom of 
speech; and that new laws can introduce further legal confusion, as there 
are already plenty of defamation and other laws that could apply to cyber-
bullying incidents. Most importantly, legislation could fail to eradicate the 
problem, which often originates offline and is relational in nature (Ruedy, 
2008; Popkin, 2009). In her piece on similarities between bullying and hate 
crimes, Elizabeth Englander, a cyberbullying scholar and the director of the 
Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center, draws parallels between the 
two. While Massachusetts has both hate crimes and bullying laws that 
include cyberbullying, she proposes that instead of focusing on punish-
ment, the similarities between hate crimes and bullying should be used to 
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inform prevention efforts emphasizing tolerance of differences, promotion 
of positive attitudes toward diversity, and reduction of negative attitudes 
toward hate-based victimization of children outside of the mainstream 
(Englander, 2007).
These kinds of intervention and prevention mechanisms often reflect 
“ecological systems theories” in which “bullying dynamics are seen to 
extend beyond the children who bully or who are bullied” (Mishna, 2012, 
p. 38; see also Swearer & Espelage, 2011). Rather, “bullying is recognized as 
unfolding within the social context of the peer group, classroom, the fam-
ily, the school and the broader community and society” (Mishna, 2012, p. 
38). Therefore, intervention and prevention programs try to take many of 
these factors into account. Some research that looked specifically into the 
extent to which face-to-face bullying intervention and prevention strategies 
could assist with cyberbullying, emphasized the importance of systematic 
whole-school approaches (Pearce, Cross, Monks, Waters, & Falconer, 2011).
But it is not entirely clear to what extent the existing bullying interven-
tion and prevention mechanisms in schools are effective (Vreeman & Car-
roll, 2007; Ttofi & Farrington, 2011). Some of this inconclusiveness can be 
attributed to methodological downsides in the evaluation process, such as 
uncontrolled design (Ttofi & Farrington, 2011).
Some authors are proposing social-emotional learning (Cohen, 2006; 
Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, & Taylor, 2011) as a strategy to build overall 
resilience, which can then be helpful when bullying or drama occur. Such 
programs involve developing interpersonal skills, emotional management, 
goal achievement, and teaching empathy, and were shown to be successful 
in reducing victimization when applied to school settings (Payton et al., 
2008). Teaching empathy and active listening could assist in building a 
school culture where children value each other’s dignity.
Dignity and Children’s Rights
The concept of dignity is slowly beginning to find its way into discourse 
on children and digital technology, such as in the work of the internation-
ally recognized parenting author Rosalind Wiseman (Family Online Safety 
Institute Annual Conference, 2013; Wiseman, 2013, 2015). Its application 
is still limited, but its full potential and usefulness when discussing cyber-
bullying in particular is significant. Taking account of the importance of 
dignity in our lives can help us understand power imbalances that contrib-
ute to bullying, cyberbullying, and harassment not only among children, 
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but also among adults. Consequently, the principles of dignity can foster 
solutions to these power problems that could in turn help to transcend 
discourse that veers toward moral panic, over-simplification, and blame-
gaming by ushering in a discussion about wider cultural and social forces 
that set the stage for bullying behaviors. Dignity theory, in concert with a 
strong emphasis on children’s rights recently promulgated by leading schol-
ars in the field of children and media (Staksrud, 2013a; Livingstone & Bulger, 
2014; Livingstone, Carr, & Byrne, 2015) can facilitate a more constructive 
public understanding of young people’s interaction with digital media than 
the one we have witnessed thus far, and thus move public perception and 
media coverage toward a more informed, constructive discourse.
Dignity has been written about by an interdisciplinary group of schol-
ars and practitioners from the fields of political science and education 
(Fuller, 2003, 2006; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008), conflict resolution (Lindner, 
2010; Hicks, 2011) and clinical psychology (Hartling, 2010). Some have 
assembled around a research network called Human Dignity and Humilia-
tion Studies (Human Dignity, n.d.), led by the scholars Evelin Lindner and 
Linda Hartling. Dignity signifies that a being has an innate right to be val-
ued and receive ethical treatment; it is an inalienable right, which, unlike 
respect, does not have to be deserved or earned (Fuller, 2003, 2006; Lind-
ner, 2006, 2010; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008; Hicks, 2011). Dignity is sometimes 
conceptualized as an absence of humiliation (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 
Hartling, 2010).
In their book Dignity for All: How to Create a World Without Rankism, Robert 
Fuller and Pamela Gerloff explain the concept as follows:
It’s recognizing that you and everyone else have a right to be here, and that you be-
long. It means valuing your own and others’ presence and special qualities. It means 
honoring who you are and what you have to offer. It means creating a culture in 
which it is safe for everyone to contribute their own gifts and talents. Dignity. It’s a 
need so strong that people will give up their freedom to have it met; an inner drive 
so insistent that it can move people to shocking acts of revenge when the attempt to 
achieve it is thwarted. (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008, p. 2)
Fuller (2003, 2006) describes the key problem in dignity violations as 
“abuse of rank” or what he terms “rankism.” There is nothing wrong with 
“rank” per se—rank is a necessary unit in human organization because some 
people are better suited by their characteristics or qualifications to take cer-
tain positions than others. Rank per se is not a problem, then, it is the abuse 
of rank or abuse of power imbalance that creates the problem of indignity 
(Fuller, 2003; 2006).
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People tend to ignore or overlook their need for dignity when they come 
to accept undignified treatment as “just the way it is”—for example by 
telling themselves there is nothing they can do to escape it, or by rational-
izing their own offensive behavior by insisting that the other person did 
something to deserve it (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008). Examples of dignity viola-
tions can be found in personal and professional relationships: for instance, 
when a supervisor harasses an employee, when an adult verbally abuses 
a child, or when a prison guard torments an inmate. But such violations 
also occur in international relations, as when a more powerful nation pres-
sures a smaller one to commit to a loan that will negatively impact its 
economy (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008). Examples of subtle rankism exist in small 
behaviors that devalue other people, such as when your ideas are ignored by 
your supervisor—whereas when your colleagues come up with the same 
suggestion, it is adopted with praise—or when your name is left off email 
announcement lists (Fuller, 2003, 2006).
Bullying is an excellent example of a dignity violation (Fuller, 2006, p. 
80), as is the broader behavior of everyday meanness among children and 
teens: when a child is deliberately excluded from a closed group on social 
media where all her friends congregate, when gossip is spread about a child, 
or when a social media page is created to mock him or her, and so forth. 
In Rosalind Wiseman’s 2009 book Queen Bees and Wannabes, she aptly 
describes the so-called mean-girls culture, filled with indignities, in which 
girls vie for power as they learn to navigate social positioning and cliques 
during growing-up process. The dynamic of “drama” (see Marwick & boyd, 
2014) is similar to this process.
The experience of indignity due to maltreatment by another person is not 
limited to those at the bottom of the hierarchy. The wealthy, the famous, 
and the beautiful suffer indignities, too, which fuel cycles of humiliation 
(Fuller, 2003, 2006; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008; Hicks, 2011). By thinking that 
success, money, or socially constructed standards of beauty and power will 
earn them a lasting sense of dignity, they base their assumption on a frame-
work of social positioning that revolves around such achievements. This is 
what the dignity scholar Donna Hicks calls false dignity: “the belief that 
our worthiness comes from external sources” (Hicks, 2011, p. 116).
When we lose sight of the fact that we are inherently valuable, that our worth is not 
dependent on external validation; and that we matter as human beings, we let our 
true dignity slip through our own hands. (Hicks, 2011, p. 116)
Adopting a dignity perspective could help illuminate why punishing or 
stigmatizing those who engage in bullying without examining what lies at 
38  Chapter 2
the heart of the problem may not lead to lasting solutions. “Rankist” behav-
ior leads to cycles of humiliation and shame, which can in turn result in a 
desire for retaliation, leading to more rankist behavior. Hence, it becomes 
a never-ending cycle. While rankism can stem from an unconscious mis-
use of power, it can also occur because the perpetrator feels “better than” 
someone else and believes this position of superiority gives him or her the 
green light to diminish another person’s dignity (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008). 
Snobbery falls into this category, just like racism, sexism, classism, and 
other “isms” (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008, p. 9). Fuller (2006) argues that the word 
“rankism” goes to the heart of all “isms,” and can be used as an umbrella term 
for all of them.
Approaching bullying and cyberbullying prevention with an understand-
ing of dignity and rankism may help inform more effective solutions to 
these problems. For example, teaching individuals how to recognize “warn-
ing signs of rankism” (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008, p. 46) could empower them to 
stand up to instances of rankism they detect. Dignity training could be part 
of this proposed solution, with the aim to train people to detect instances of 
rank abuse and teach dignity-supporting behavior (Fuller & Gerloff, 2008). 
Hicks proposes a framework of ten essential elements of dignity, which could 
create an environment that sustains dignity:
1. Acceptance of identity: approaching people “as being neither inferior 
nor superior to you.”
2. Inclusion: making “others feel that they belong, whatever the relation-
ship” (e.g., family, community or organization, or even nation).
3. Safety: putting “people at ease at two levels—physically, so that they 
feel safe from bodily harm, and psychologically, so that they feel safe from 
being humiliated.”
4. Acknowledgment: giving “people your full attention by listening, hear-
ing, validating and responding to their concerns, feelings, and experiences.”
5. Recognition: “being generous with praise” and validating others’ “tal-
ents,” “hard work” and “thoughtfulness.”
6. Fairness: treating people “without discrimination or injustice.”
7. Benefit of the doubt: starting with the premise that people are “trustworthy.”
8. Understanding: implies believing “that what others think matters.”
9. Independence: means encouraging “people to act on their own behalf 
so that they feel in control of their lives.”
10. Accountability: taking “responsibility for your actions” and apologiz-
ing when you feel that you have offended another’s dignity. (Hicks, 2011, 
pp. 25–26)
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The concept of dignity can be viewed as akin to “positive youth devel-
opment,” an “approach that grew out of dissatisfaction with a predomi-
nant view of youth that underestimated the true capacities of young people 
by focusing on their deficits, rather than their developmental potentials” 
(Damon, 2004, p. 13; see also Lerner, Fisher, & Weinberg, 2000). Positive 
youth development shifts the focus from “curing” or “correcting” “risks,” 
“deficits,” or “maladaptive tendencies” to “understanding, educating, and 
engaging young people in productive activities” (Damon, 2004, pp. 15 and 
20). It also sees the child as an essentially prosocial being, having “emo-
tional dispositions biologically hardwired into our species,” with “adverse 
reactions to inhumane or unjust behavior” (Damon, 2004, p. 18). Further-
more, this idea can be found in discussion about fostering good citizens 
and e-citizens/digital citizens (Larson, 2000; Montgomery, Gottlieb-Robles, & 
Larson, 2004). A “good citizen” is the one who “helps those in need dur-
ing times of crisis” (Montgomery et al., 2004, p. 108) and the overall goal 
of civic education is to prepare young citizens to hold “moral and civic 
virtues, such as concern for the rights and welfare of others, social responsibil-
ity, tolerance and respect, and belief in the capacity to make a difference” 
(Montgomery et al., 2004, p. 111).
An increasing number of works today discuss not only the concept of 
citizenship and what it means in the digital era, but also youth activism and 
the ability of young people to participate in civic life (Bennett, Wells, & 
Freelon, 2011). If the citizen is defined as “a member of a community with 
civic, political, and social rights” (Staksrud, 2013a, p. 152, cf. Marshall 
1950; Tsaliki, 2007), then “digital citizenship” can refer to “membership 
of an online community, affording you civic, political, and social rights—
rights coinciding with the UN human rights and rights of the child” (Stak-
srud, 2013a, p. 152). I critically examine the concept of digital citizenship 
as defined here, against how it is used in social media companies’ policies 
and in the context of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
(COPPA) in the US and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provi-
sions in the EU, in chapters 3, 8 and 9.
This section in particular and this book overall examine digital citizen-
ship narrowly—concerning how the concept has been applied in e-safety 
education and specifically in reference to cyberbullying. Educators who 
advocate the introduction of digital citizenship into school curricula argue 
that “the most important job before us is to help students understand issues 
of digital responsibility and to do so at school as part of a digital health ini-
tiative” (Ohler, 2011, p. 26). Jason Ohler, the author of Digital Community, 
Digital Citizen, asserts that trying to solve cyberbullying by restricting access 
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to technology or by punishing students who break the rules, does not solve 
the issue but merely “address[es] the symptoms” (Ohler, 2011, p. 26).
Balancing Protection, Provision, and Participation
In recent years a concentrated group of scholars around the world who 
specialize in children and the media have begun to propagate an important 
approach related to digital citizenship, one of “children’s rights” (Living-
stone & Bulger, 2014; Livingstone, 2016). As I demonstrate in this book, I 
strongly favor the recognition and support of children’s rights as an overall 
framework for discussing company responsibility. The international experts 
Sonia Livingstone, John Carr, and Jasmina Byrne write in their report for 
the Global Commission on Internet Governance:
It is vital that internet governance organizations recognize that around one in three 
internet users is aged under 18, and so assumptions about users (for example users’ 
awareness, understanding, abilities, needs or rights) should acknowledge and ad-
dress the fact that an estimated one in three internet users are children. (Livingstone 
et al., 2015, p. 16)
The authors argue that internet policy makers seldom recognize chil-
dren’s rights, and when children are given consideration, it is usually to 
the extent that they have the right to protection and safety, but the rights 
to provision and participation tend to be neglected (Livingstone et al., 2015, 
p. 1). Livingstone argues that even scholars who study youth and digital 
media shift the focus to risks, perhaps unwittingly, when they choose to 
frame their research in terms of “media effects” rather than choosing to 
focus on “rights” (Livingstone, 2016).
Provision and participation are strongly embedded in the idea of a youth’s 
digital citizenship, and digital citizenship is an important policy adopted 
by social media companies, as an educational tool frequently developed in 
collaboration with NGOs, to address bullying. In thinking about rights of 
protection versus rights of participation it is helpful to analogize “positive 
and negative freedoms” (Livingstone, 2016, p. 9, cf. Berlin, 1958), whereby 
protection rights are akin to negative freedoms (freedom from) and partici-
pation to positive freedoms (freedom and ability to) (Livingstone, 2016). 
While children have the right to be protected from bullying on social media 
they also have the right to participate in these spaces, as they can offer 
opportunities for the social-emotional, educational, and civic development 
of young people, in addition to their leisure and entertainment.
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Protection rights “receive widespread support” as it is “uncontentious 
that children should be free from sexual or violent abuse and that protec-
tion is required online as well as offline” (Livingstone, 2016, p. 9). The same 
argument can be made for protections against cyberbullying. Participation 
rights, on the other hand, may be more difficult to address: “Who are we, 
critics ask, to assert that children have the right to live not merely without 
fear or harm but according to a late-modern vision of participatory democ-
racy?” (Livingstone, 2016, p. 9). Ensuring the entire spectrum of rights 
implies not curbing participation at the expense of protection and vice 
versa. A relevant question is: To what extent are social media companies 
honoring these rights? And some ask, to what extent are they obliged and 
able to ensure these rights having in mind that they are commercial com-
panies with private interests?
Provision includes, for instance, “opportunities for creativity, exploration, 
expression online and with digital media” or “expanded array of enter-
tainment and leisure choices online” (Global Kids Online, 2016, pp. 7–8), 
all of which could be found in children’s participation on social media. 
Participation rights could entail: “Take[ing] up of enhanced connections 
and networking opportunities, user-friendly fora for child/youth voice and 
expression, child-led initiatives for local and global change, and peer-to-
peer connections for entertainment, learning, sharing, and collaboration” 
(Global Kids Online, pp. 7–8), all of which could, arguably, take place on 
social media platforms.
These rights are guaranteed to children under the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which was adopted in 1989.9 The “sub-
stantive rights,” according to the convention, “are commonly divided into 
three Ps”: (1) “rights to provision, concern the resources necessary for chil-
dren’s survival and their development to their full potential”; (2) “rights to 
protection concern[ing] the wide array of threats to children’s dignity, sur-
vival, and development”; and (3) “rights to participation enable children 
to engage with processes that affect their development and enable them to 
play an active part in society” (Livingstone et al., 2015, p. 8).
Child rights advocates agree the most important contribution of the 
UNCRC has been to change the public perception of children from “pas-
sive objects of charity” to “independent holders of rights” (Livingstone 
et al., 2015, p. 9, cf. UNICEF, 2014, p. 40). Although the UNCRC was drafted 
before “mass adoption of the internet,” it is very much applicable to the 
digital age and “it is the yardstick by which any and every action taken by 
states or private sector actors can be judged” (Livingstone et al., 2015, p. 9, 
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emphasis added). Social media companies, as private-sector actors, can also 
be judged by these benchmarks (see also Lievens, 2016).10
While this brief section of the chapter cannot go into discourses about 
cultural construction of childhood (see Prout, 2005; Livingstone, 2009a; 
Facer, 2012), it is important to recognize that children have long been pre-
dominantly constructed, in what might be called the public imagination 
in an economically developed world, as “vulnerable,” “innocent,” and “in 
need of protection” (Livingstone, 2009a; Facer, 2012; Staksrud, 2013a). On 
the other hand, a competing construction of children emerged with their 
growing use of the internet—that of savvy early adopters of digital technol-
ogy or so-called “digital natives” (Prensky, 2001). Adults were then framed 
as “naïve incompetents” struggling to manage online risks, resulting in 
“increasing public anxiety about how children’s participation in digital 
spaces might be managed” (Facer, 2012, pp. 401–402). Such a discourse 
naturally favored protection. As the scholar Keri Facer aptly observes:
We need to recognize that any debate in this area will be inadequate if it is framed 
around an idea of the child only as innocent, vulnerable, and biddable. We need 
to confront the reality of children’s sexuality and exploration of risk; we need to 
recognize the limitations of parental oversight (many parents, not simply negligent 
parents) and we need to have richer conversations with younger people themselves 
about what it means to participate in public space and the risks, the powers, and the 
consequences of such participation (Facer, 2012, p. 410).
Facer concludes that current strategies of doing so, which are based on 
“building children’s awareness of risk and developing their resilience if they 
experience difficult situations” are only the beginning in shifting the focus 
away from risk (Facer, 2012, p. 410).
Perhaps, most importantly, if the support from the state at the level of 
policies and education and other internet governance bodies (including 
those of social media platforms) are wanting, then it may be “unrealistic” 
to assume that “parents are available and competent in all matters regard-
ing their children’s internet use . . . especially given the internet’s complex, 
cross-border nature” (Livingstone et al., 2015, p. 9). The communications 
scholar Elisabeth Staksrud pertinently applies Ulrich Beck’s and Elisabeth 
Beck-Gernsheim’s Theory of Individualization to the field of policy regard-
ing children and digital media (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). Staksrud 
explains how an “outsourcing of the functions of public institutions” to 
the European Commission, and via its self-regulatory initiatives to the 
industry and NGOs, might have left parents and caregivers with a plethora 
of advice, yet at a fundamental loss as to which advice is authoritative 
enough to follow (Staksrud, 2013a, p. 123).11
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In the late 1990s—when media already seemed to pervade every aspect 
of a child’s development—there was a growing recognition that the UNCRC 
needed to do more to address the impact of media and communications 
(Livingstone, 2009a). These communication-related points set forth by the 
UNCRC “include children’s rights to express their views freely in all matters 
affecting them (Art.12), . . . freedom of association and peaceful assembly 
(Art. 15), protection of privacy (Art. 16), and to mass media that disseminate 
information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child” (Liv-
ingstone, 2009a, p. 210). This “free flow of information” should be “driven 
by human needs rather than commercial and political interests” (Livingstone, 
2009a [emphasis added], cf. Hamelink 2003, p. 1; Livingstone, 2009b).
All of these issues covered by the UNCRC point to a growing recogni-
tion of the need to honor children’s digital citizenship, and consequently 
children’s participation and provision rights. But they also urge the pubic 
and policy makers alike to critically examine the ability of social media 
platforms to enable children’s rights in the context of their commercial 
interests as private companies. Adopting a rights-based approach that hon-
ors the full spectrum of children’s rights perhaps makes it easier to see why 
indiscriminately curbing access to online spaces is not a solution to the 
problem. They also advocate a shared responsibility for ensuring children’s 
rights, which applies to online intermediaries as well. Further, they can 
help sort out why an overwhelming focus on risks, of which cyberbullying 
is an example, can result in favoring protection to the detriment of partici-
pation and provision.
Ensuring that social media companies’ policies and mechanisms will 
balance rights of protection, participation, and provision is far from straight-
forward, however, and I take up the subject in the policy solutions sec-
tion of this book. Ensuring provision rights is perhaps the most difficult 
task, and should the companies take it seriously it can require them to go 
beyond their business models by paying attention to children and teens, 
not only in the context of advertising revenue, and not only in terms of 
ensuring basic protections from harms such as bullying, violent content, 
or sexual abuse. Rather, it prompts them to think very carefully as to which 
content or technological affordances allow young people to develop their 
full potential.12 One can perhaps legitimately wonder whether there is a 
place for provision rights that go beyond what is stipulated in the law and 
beyond what the platforms already design as part of CSR, given that these 
private corporations are primarily accountable to their shareholders.
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E-safety Approaches to Honor Children’s Rights
By examining cyberbullying in the context of academic research on the 
subject of e-safety, as well as on coverage of e-safety in the media and the 
fears that emerge in the public concerning young people’s use of so-called 
new technologies, it becomes increasingly clear how such discourses of fear 
and technopanic can overwhelmingly focus on risks, often to the detriment 
of participation and provision rights. A dignity theory approach could help 
drive public debate beyond risk-driven narratives and elucidate broader 
social and cultural factors at play, rendering the discourse less alarmist. 
Thus I propose a framework for assessing the social media companies’ part 
in addressing bullying in the context of honoring the entire spectrum of 
children’s rights.
Offline bullying, once primarily considered a school-based occurrence, also 
tended to be traditionally thought of as a problem for the school to handle, 
whether by managing existing incidents or attempting to prevent future 
ones. With digital communication, however, bullying has spread “beyond 
the schoolyard” (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009), making it less clear as to which 
individuals and institutions are responsible for what aspects of the issue. 
Although most of the literature on cyberbullying discusses the roles of actors 
such as parents, bystanders, and schools, the actual digital platforms where 
cyberbullying incidents frequently happen are less discussed.
In this chapter I briefly illustrate the increasing role of private platforms 
in regulating online spaces and examine its implications for freedom of 
speech and privacy (DeNardis, 2014; Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). I also 
provide a very brief description of available legal tools in cyberbullying 
cases, and how they relate to companies’ liability and the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA). (I provide a more elaborate explanation of regulatory 
environments in the US and the EU, together with the historical context 
behind self-regulation, in chapter 5.) In appendix B, the reader can find pro-
files of the companies whose policies I examine in this book together with 
an explanation of their technological affordances, which can affect the 
nature of bullying that takes place on their platforms.
Privatization of Digital Public Sphere
In September 2016, when Facebook decided to remove a photo posted by a 
Norwegian author, the move caused an international outcry. “While we rec-
ognize that this photo is iconic, it’s difficult to create a distinction between 
allowing a photograph of a nude child in one instance and not others,” 
the company explained (Levin, Wong, & Harding, 2016, para. 3). This was 
not any iconic photo, but the Pulitzer Prize-winning picture of “a naked, 
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9-year-old girl fleeing napalm bombs during the Vietnam War, tears stream-
ing down her face,” an illustration symbolic of “the horrors of modern war-
fare” (Scott & Isaac, 2016, para. 1). Following an intense few days’ debate 
in the global media, Facebook decided to retract its decision and allow the 
photo on the platform after all, recognizing that its historic significance may 
well trump the company’s nudity policy. The incident yet again gave rise to 
concerns about the extent to which online intermediaries were assuming 
the roles of news organizations and publishers—questioning their interme-
diary status (Preston, 2016)—but also regarding cultural sensitivity of their 
policies. It may be difficult to agree on the same nudity standards among 
European countries, or as compared to the US, let alone globally.
Social media companies are corporations that delineate the boundaries 
of what content is allowed on their platforms or which user behavior is 
permitted through end user agreements such as Terms of Service (TOS), pri-
vacy policies, or community guidelines/standards. Of particular relevance 
to the scope of this book is the body of work that discusses the increasing 
privatization of the digital public sphere, and the consequent implications 
of such privatization for civil liberties. As the internet governance scholar 
Laura DeNardis observes: “This private ordering, rather than (or in addition 
to), laws, norms, or governments determines the conditions of freedom of 
expression in the public sphere” (DeNardis, 2014, p. 158). Another well-
known illustration of this process can be found in Facebook’s decision to 
allow users to post breastfeeding images, which had previously not been 
allowed because of nudity concerns (Facebook, 2015b). Nonetheless, child-
birth images that explicitly depict female body parts are still being removed 
by the company’s moderators, if discovered (Hill, 2014; June, 2016).
What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the platform’s 
professed editorial values and economic interests inform its decision-making 
processes. Neither is it clear how pressure groups and the media, or the plat-
form’s perceptions of user preferences, influence its policies. Likewise, when 
companies decide which content contains bullying or is offensive, they reg-
ulate free speech on their platforms, often using their own criteria. While 
one’s privacy and reputation are protected by content removal, this can sig-
nify a limitation of another’s free speech (Solove, 2007; DeNardis, 2014).
Censorship can take place at different levels. For instance, a number of 
app companies whose policies I analyze in this book, including Instagram, 
Kik, Voxer, Secret, WhatsApp, Yik Yak, and Snapchat, are primarily designed 
for use on mobile phones. In order for users to access them, they first 
need to download the app either from the Apple App Store or Google Play. 
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Gatekeeping can take place at this checkpoint as well at the behest of the 
app store. For instance, some explicitly or implicitly political apps have not 
been allowed for distribution by the Apple App Store, having gone through 
an approval process that can be characterized as opaque and arbitrary (Hes-
tres, 2013). A similar type of gatekeeping will be particularly relevant when 
discussing the blocking of the app Secret in Brazil, later on in the book.
Violent content matter on these platforms can provide a testing ground 
for the decision to allow or to censor. Company decisions about which 
content glorifies violence can have important implications for access to 
information in the context of civil liberties. Consider the following case 
that illustrates this process against the backdrop of the Black Lives Matter 
movement in the US. When an African American young woman posted 
videos of her standoff with the police on Facebook-owned Instagram, peo-
ple began to live-comment on her video, which the police said had helped 
embolden her to turn violent on them (Victor, 2016). The police then sub-
mitted a request to Facebook to deactivate her account so that it did not 
interfere with the standoff, and Facebook complied—temporarily deacti-
vating her Instagram and Facebook accounts. The woman had pointed a 
shotgun and fired at the police and was subsequently killed in the standoff 
(Victor, 2016).
The increasing influence of private companies over the online public 
sphere is well illustrated in those cases where, by invoking their private pol-
icies, they defy government preferences and resist government pressure to 
remove contentious content. Google-owned YouTube refused to remove 
the movie Innocence of Muslims, even after the US government urged the 
company to analyze its content as a possible violation of its TOS and remove 
the video accordingly. After Google determined that the video did not con-
stitute a violation, it decided to keep it on the platform and only temporar-
ily blocked access to the video in Egypt and Libya. Google explained that 
the company had a bias toward freedom of speech, and acknowledged the 
difficulty of making such decisions on a platform that spans cultures and 
languages (DeNardis, 2014).
These private companies’ policy decisions have well-documented impli-
cations for end users’ privacy as well (Solove, 2007, 2013; Vaidhyanathan, 
2011; Cohen, 2012; DeNardis, 2014). While social media companies offer 
their services for free, they embed online advertising strategies into their 
platforms, which allow them to target users based on their characteristics 
in an effective manner, and to sell data to third parties. What is not always 
clear, however, is the interplay of companies’ economic incentives and 
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decisions regarding censorship and content removal, including in connec-
tion to bullying.
The regulation of content on the internet often becomes intertwined with 
peripheral institutions such as media companies and politicians, whose 
leveraging of internet infrastructure to accomplish their goals can conflict 
with the rights of individuals (DeNardis, 2012). In the area of international 
copyright, for instance, rights owners and media content industries in coop-
eration with law enforcement are implementing measures that regulate 
copyright infringement by gradually terminating internet access to individ-
uals who commit violations, or by blocking access to infringing websites or 
slowing down the bandwidth (DeNardis, 2012, p. 5). Domain-name seizures 
are also employed to this end. These policies are often exercised in complete 
disregard of the principle of fair use (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2011).
In a similar fashion, politicians frequently invoke protecting “innocent 
children” from risks when trying to make a convincing argument for intro-
ducing legislation that also challenges the human rights of adults (Stak-
srud, 2013a, see chapter 12) or use it as an excuse for enforcing policies that 
do not even concern or help children. (I elaborate on this topic in chapter 
4.) For instance, stopping child pornography is not uncommonly cited as 
a rationale for regulating copyright infringements (Staksrud, 2013a). Since 
child pornography is a concern that politicians understand and could 
capitalize on, anti-piracy groups can leverage this issue to get public office 
holders to block file-sharing sites or work with intermediaries to block 
infringing content (Masnick, 2010).
The publishing of sensitive US government correspondence in 2010 by 
WikiLeaks prompted another turn to intermediaries for content regulation. 
A number of private intermediaries such as EveryDNS .net (a company pro-
viding domain-name related services), Amazon (providing web hosting), as 
well as financial intermediaries like Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal, which 
enabled financing for WikiLeaks, all terminated their services to WikiLeaks. 
All of these private intermediaries had their rationales for these decisions—
primarily referring to their TOS, which did not allow for WikiLeaks to pub-
lish the material that did not belong to it, any materials that may put 
people in danger, or that constituted an encouragement of illegal activity. 
The companies denied that they had been pressured by the US government 
and insisted they had done so solely based on the violation of their private 
policies (DeNardis, 2012). In reprisal for denying services to WikiLeaks, the 
hacker group Anonymous mounted distributed denial of services (DDoS) 
attacks on their websites, disrupting the websites of EveryDNS, Master-
Card, Amazon, Visa, and PayPal. Such dynamics illustrate the complexity 
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involved in the decision making of these private companies, which are 
not always transparent and well understood. Similar complexities can be 
observed in the context of companies’ decision-making processes in refer-
ence to cyberbullying, which I detail in chapters 4 and 6.
How the Use of the Terms “Platform” and “Sharing”  
Reflect a Company’s Business Model
Of particular relevance for this book are works that analyze how these pri-
vate companies conceptualize sharing and human connection, how they 
use language and terminology to position themselves, and how all of this 
relates to transparency of social media companies’ business models. Most 
of the companies I discuss in the book prefer to use the word “platform” to 
describe their ethos and activity. In his influential piece on the politics 
of platforms, scholar Tarleton Gillespie analyzed the discursive deployment 
of the word “platform” to demonstrate how these companies use it strategi-
cally to frame their services in a way that allows them to “both pursue cur-
rent and future profits, to strike a regulatory sweet spot between legislative 
protections that benefit them and obligations that do not, and to lay out 
a cultural imaginary within which their service makes sense” (Gillespie, 
2010, p. 348; see also Gillespie, 2015; Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). As Gil-
lespie points out, using the example of YouTube:
YouTube must present its service not only to its users, but to advertisers, to major 
media producers it hopes to have as partners, and to policy makers. The term “plat-
form” helps reveal how YouTube and others stage themselves for these constitu-
encies, allowing them to make a broadly progressive sales pitch while also eliding 
the tensions inherent in their service: between user-generated and commercially pro-
duced content, between cultivating community and serving up advertising, between 
intervening in the delivery of content and remaining neutral. (Gillespie, 2010, p. 348)
Throughout this book I analyze the implications behind companies’ pro-
vision of cyberbullying policies, which are germane not only when discuss-
ing the tension between cultivating a community and ensuring advertising 
revenue, but also for understanding decisions to intervene in the content 
instead of remaining neutral. Crawford and Gillespie (2016) raised issues 
about the effectiveness of companies’ flagging mechanisms and how these 
can leave users with few options while limiting companies’ responsibility 
for content moderation through its positioning terminology.
In her critical history of social media, The Culture of Connectivity, scholar 
José van Dijck explains how coded structures engineered by these platforms 
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alter the nature of our connections and interactions (van Dijck, 2013). The 
crucial by-product of sharing culture on these platforms is valuable behav-
ioral and profiling data that companies monetize through advertising. She 
explains:
Under the guise of connectedness they [platforms] produce a precious resource: con-
nectivity. Even though the term “connectivity” originated in technology, where it 
denotes computer transmissions, in the context of social media it quickly assumed 
the connotation of users accumulating social capital, while in fact this term increas-
ingly referred to owners amassing economic capital. (van Dijck, 2013, p. 16)
As van Dijck (2013) stresses, platform owners tend to call for more trans-
parency and openness from their users, which ensures “maximum shar-
ing and frictionless online traffic” (p. 21) while failing to apply the same 
transparency standards to their own practices and business models (p. 17).
Corporate Social Responsibility
Within the dynamic of cultivating a community while remaining profit-
able, a company’s corporate social responsibility (CSR), a type of self-reg-
ulation incorporated into its business model with the goal of ensuring its 
ethical behavior, can be a fulcrum in the balance. Cyberbullying policies 
are included in the range of business practices that can be addressed under 
CSR (Haigh, Brubaker, & Whiteside, 2013).
Corporate social responsibility is invoked in the context of duty of 
online service providers to protect minors who use their websites, raising 
the question of whether companies are doing enough (O’Neill, 2013). In 
its strategy on corporate social responsibility, the European Commission 
describes CSR as corporate actions that are “above” their legal obligations 
toward society and environment (European Commission, 2016). The com-
mission also lists “improving self and co-regulatory processes” as part of its 
strategy on CSR. This is particularly important for the information commu-
nications technology (ICT) sector in the context of e-safety (O’Neill, 2013, 
p. 253). Therefore, if companies are not legally obliged to comply with spe-
cific provisions about bullying on their platforms, developing anti-bullying 
provisions in corporate documents and subsequent enforcement mecha-
nisms can be considered as part of their CSR or self-organizational effort 
or their private regulation (for differences between private regulation and 
self-organization vs. self-regulation, see chapter 5).
The importance of getting social media companies to understand pro-
tecting and empowering young users as an investment into their business 
Shaping Company Responsibility: Privatized Public Sphere  51
models that can yield high returns, rather than a necessary evil or liability 
(see Lievens, 2016), is an intended by-product of CSR and self-regulatory 
initiatives. In its CSR strategy, the European Commission has promoted 
ensuring e-safety for children, including abuse reporting, as a children’s 
human right (Lievens, 2016, cf. Shift & the Institute for Human Right and 
Business, 2013). The importance of transparency and accountability of such 
efforts is emphasized in the Council of Europe’s Guide to Human Rights for 
Internet Users, which also calls on companies to ensure that users have 
easily accessible tools to report their rights infringements (Lievens, 2016).
Perhaps in an effort to make the public perceive their platforms as ones 
that put safety first, most companies prefer not to describe their anti-bullying 
efforts as CSR. Rather, they describe cyberbullying policies and enforce-
ment mechanisms as an integral part of what they do, as part of their ethos, 
and not something imposed on the company. While they may not describe 
it as CSR, companies (especially if older and established) seem to under-
stand all too well the performative component of their e-safety efforts (as I 
discuss in chapters 6 and 7).
Limited Liability for Intermediaries
In the following sections I briefly outline some of the legislation in the 
US and EU that exists or is proposed regarding bullying and cyberbully-
ing. These pieces of legislation neither contain provisions regarding social 
media companies nor specify which mechanisms social media companies 
need to develop in order to address bullying on their platforms.
As bullying and cyberbullying started to gain prominence in public dis-
course, sometimes as a result of high-profile incidents (Bazelon, 2013b), 
US states began to adopt laws against bullying which sometimes have a 
“cyberbullying” or an “electronic harassment” component. All states have 
anti-bullying statutes and tend to require an implementation of school 
policy (Stopbullying .gov, 2014; Hinduja & Patchin, 2016). They typically 
mandate investigation of bullying incidents, consequences for children 
who bully, and reporting systems for schools to districts or to states’ depart-
ments of education (Sacco, Silbaugh, Corredor, Casey, & Doherty, 2012).
Efforts which hold school districts accountable for addressing bullying 
can nonetheless perpetuate a bully-victim dynamic because they fail to 
capture the complexity of bullying incidents and require schools to fit the 
information on these incidents into simplified reporting forms (Gilden, 
2013, p. 397). In light of evidence from research that cyberbullying cases 
can be “messy” (Kofoed & Ringrose, 2012), and that there is an overlap 
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between victimization and perpetration (Kowalski, Giumetti, Schroeder, 
& Lattanner, 2014; Görzig & Macháčková 2015), laws and policies that 
demand fitting children into neat “bully-victim roles” may be doing them 
a disservice.
These laws also exhibit a tendency to focus on symptoms and not on 
root causes behind bullying. For example, as of 2012, few states referred 
to funding sources that would enable schools to implement prevention-
related education (Sacco et al., 2012). If limited only to reporting and pun-
ishing individuals—without introducing educational programs aimed at 
character development (Ohler, 2011)—such measures do not target wider 
behavioral patterns that can result in bullying.
In a 2012 review of state anti-bullying legislation, Dena T. Sacco and col-
leagues at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society further found 
that these laws differ in their level of specificity in addressing bullying; they 
observed that “most of the laws go well beyond research-based definitions 
of bullying to encompass a wide range of behaviors, often borrowing and 
modifying language from legal definitions of harassment” (Sacco et al., 
2012, p. 4). Such definitions of bullying open doors to conflation with 
harassment despite the fact that harassment tends to be defined as being 
motivated by distinctive characteristics of the victim (Sacco et al., 2012). 
Small differences in language can significantly change how specific behav-
ior is legally defined: for instance, determining whether these laws refer to 
motivation of the perpetrator or whether the act needs to be “overt” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2011; Sacco et al., 2012) can cause additional 
confusion.
Also, it is notable that as of January 2016, according to the Cyberbully-
ing Research Center, 18 states had criminal sanctions as part of their bul-
lying laws and a number of others had proposed such measures (Hinduja 
& Patchin, 2016). This trend toward “criminalization of certain bullying 
behaviors” (Sacco et al., 2012, p. 9, cf. U.S. Department of Education, 2011) 
may be another indicator of an overall focus on punitive measures sur-
rounding bullying and cyberbullying, which I address in chapter 4.
While among social science and legal scholars “the merits of criminalizing 
bullying behavior are up for debate” (Iowa Supreme Court, 2015, p. 2065, cf. 
Christensen, 2009; Tang, 2013; Albertson, 2014; Bulger, Burton, O’Neill, & 
Staksrud, 2017), such practices as well as shaming of so-called perpetrators 
go against dignity framework and restorative justice approaches I embrace 
in this book. Applying dignity-based solutions could involve leveraging 
educational initiatives and addressing root causes of the problem by teach-
ing children empathy and stressing the fact that every human being has an 
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inherent worth, rather than stigmatizing perpetrators or merely punishing 
them.
US federal laws on cyberbullying have not been adopted, and some of 
the proposed ones, such as the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention 
Act, have followed high-profile cyberbullying cases and generated signifi-
cant controversy, as I further explain in chapter 4. Proposed federal bills do 
not contain provisions regarding responsibilities of social media compa-
nies or online intermediaries.
The First Amendment presents a challenge to cyberbullying legislation 
(King, 2010) as does the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (Goodno, 2011; Sacco et al., 2012). Marwick 
and Miller observed in 2014: “As of yet, there is no consensus on whether 
or not the speech that constitutes ‘cyberbullying’ is protected by the First 
Amendment” (Marwick & Miller, 2014, p. 26, cf. Zetter, 2010; Yellin, 2013). 
These amendments limit the ability of public schools to punish specific 
speech, to apply their provisions to off-campus events, or to search student 
computers and smart phones when conducting investigations. Even so, as 
one legal scholar perceptively observes in the Berkeley Technology Law Jour-
nal: “Even if the statutes did not have potential constitutional issues, the 
statutes would not address the root of the cyberbullying problem. A more 
lasting solution would be to educate children on moral and ethical internet 
use” (Chang, 2010, p. 520).
In the EU, the European Data Protection Legislation can be applicable to 
issues of cyberbullying and harassment in cases where a person engaging 
in cyberbullying discloses personal information of the alleged victim (Con-
federation of Family Organisations . . ., 2013). “While there is no EU legal 
framework regarding violence in schools” (Eighth European Forum . . ., 
2013, p. 4), some member states may have laws that could be applied to 
specific forms of bullying. States could also have laws on harassment, stalking, 
and defamation that could be used in cyberbullying cases (Confederation 
of Family Organisations . . ., 2013). In the UK law, for instance, a number 
of existing laws such as Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Defama-
tion Act of 2013, or Malicious Communications Act of 1988 (Legislation 
 -gov .uk, n.d.c, n.d.a, n.d.b, respectively) can be applicable in cyberbullying 
incidents (Cybersmile Foundation, 2015).
Issues Regarding Intermediary Liability
In 1996 the Communications Decency Act became the first large-scale 
attempt of the US to control pornographic content on the internet. Section 
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230 of the CDA, which in that context was protective of freedom of expres-
sion and innovation, includes the following provision especially relevant 
to the responsibilities of online intermediaries:
Immunizes providers and users of “interactive computer services” from liability for 
information “provided by another information content provider.” In other words, 
where an entity has provided a forum for online speech, that entity shall not be held 
liable for tortuous speech of others who may use the forum for harmful purposes. 
(Lipton, 2011, p. 1132; see also Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C., Section 
230; Lipton, 2013)
Some legal scholars suggest that such a state of affairs should be changed, 
as the victims may be left without legal remedies for harassment acts, espe-
cially in cases where anonymous perpetrators cannot be found: “Section 
230 has had the practical effect of preventing courts from engaging in 
meaningful discussions of the standard of care that might be expected 
of these service providers absent the statutory immunity” (Lipton, 2011, 
p. 1132; see also Leither, 2010; Levmore, 2010).
Some authors propose that social networks’ liability should be increased 
as compared to other online intermediaries because of the large amount of 
personal information that users reveal on these websites (Monaghan, 2011).1 
Introducing “a heightened standard of care” for intermediaries, which would 
include “traceable anonymity,” in the form of logging users’ IP addresses, 
employing screening software that would limit the amount of harmful mate-
rials on their websites, and some form of duty to monitor content depend-
ing on the size and nature of the intermediary, are among some proposed 
solutions (Gilden, 2013, p. 389; see also Citron, 2014a). I address some of 
these initiatives, many of which already exist as part of companies’ private 
self-organization, in chapter 6.
Some legal scholars who address issues concerning online communication 
and social media recommend introducing measures similar to a provision 
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Stalla-Bourdillon, 2009; Poole, 
2013).2 The procedure would be executed in the following way, according 
to an article in the University of San Francisco Law Review:
When cyberbullying adversely affects teens and preteens, service providers should 
have a duty to act. . . . Section 230 of the CDA should be amended to require ISPs 
[internet Service Providers] and websites to remove bullying and defamatory con-
tent about children. The least imposing way to do this would be to implement a 
notice and takedown system similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA). . . . When an ISP or a website is notified that a child . . . is being bullied 
or attacked on their site, the service provider should be obligated to remove the of-
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fending post and/or cut off the offender’s access to the site. The notifier should have 
to certify that he or she is either the person or a parent of the person being bullied 
and that the content being requested for removal is bullying, defamatory or inten-
tionally causes emotional distress. The service provider will then have a reasonable 
amount of time, perhaps 48 hours, to remove the material. (Poole, 2013, p. 250)
The author of the article also proposes that a “good faith” exemption 
should be granted to ISPs who did not take all of the content down because 
they could not locate all the copies of the bullying content on their plat-
form. In the concluding chapters of the book I discuss the usefulness of this 
proposition in light of findings and other surveyed research.
This approach could be useful for some types of bullying such as bla-
tant, persistent bullying or what companies might perceive as harassment, 
when it is apparent that such abuse is taking place and content removal 
or blocking would make it stop (at least on that particular platform and 
at least online), while making a point that humiliation is not sanctioned 
and socially acceptable. It may, however, be less effective in cases of rela-
tional bullying where social positioning and power imbalances play a role, 
situations that I elaborate further throughout the book. Also, based on the 
findings I later present, it is highly unlikely that the self-regulatory envi-
ronment, either in the US or EU, would favor such an approach, especially 
in light of the availability of blocking and reporting mechanisms provided 
by the companies, which purport to do just that (the effectiveness of which 
I examine and critique in subsequent chapters).
In response to the article I excerpt above (Poole, 2013, p. 250), I would 
add that the person who posted the allegedly bullying content would need 
to be notified and given the right to complain (as with similar provisions of 
the DMCA), which would put the company into the difficult position of 
making decisions about torts that are “notoriously ambiguous” (Chang, 
2010, p. 522).3 But that’s not all: it would add another layer of bureaucracy 
that could provide the incentive for companies to just keep the content 
down or the user blocked—unless such takedowns (especially if they become 
pervasive) negatively affected the company’s business model (as I examine 
in chapters 6 and 8). The negative impact on the business model could 
happen through users’ dissatisfaction, for instance, by limited access to 
content as a result of removals, which could turn them away from the plat-
form. Such restrictive actions could also potentially and negatively affect 
“frictionless sharing” and data collection for advertising purposes.
Hence, such a measure could have speech implications—companies 
being private entities whose interests may not be aligned with public inter-
est would have an incentive to take even constitutionally protected speech 
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down to avoid liability. Additionally, it is questionable to what extent par-
ents and caregivers (who could request such removals) are in the position 
to make informed and constructive choices in such situations, which also 
illustrates the difficult task of striking the balance of children’s rights to 
protection versus participation (as I discussed in chapter 2), and issues of 
privacy.
Anonymity of the perpetrator is another issue with prosecuting cyber-
bullying cases. In a well-known case, Liskula Cohen, a celebrity model, 
sued Google to obtain information about an anonymous harasser who 
published defamatory information about her. She argued that the content 
posted about her “impugn(ed) her chastity and negatively reflect(ed) on 
her business as a professional full-time model” (Wolf, 2012, p. 604).
Cohen could not sue the anonymous blogger for the content because 
she did not know who he/she was; the court eventually ordered Google 
to reveal the identity of the blogger on the grounds that the content was 
defamatory. However, while “statements of factual nature are considered 
defamatory under tort law, mere expressions of opinion, no matter how 
insulting, abusive or negative, are not actionable” (Wolf, 2012, p. 605). 
Cyberbullying often involves precisely such hurtful statements that are 
opinions and not facts, which—in the US at least—may not be actionable 
under defamation law. Another tort that may apply to cyberbullying cases, 
“intentional infliction of emotional distress,” was also characterized as dif-
ficult to prove.
Children have been prosecuted in the past on cyberstalking accounts. 
The case of Megan Meier (see chapter 4) may have brought an increase in 
legislative activity whose goal was to make “cyberbullying” a crime (Delta & 
Matsuura, 2013). In another case, two teenagers from Florida were arrested 
after posting doctored images of their classmate on a fake Facebook page 
created in her name. One photo showed the classmate’s head on a nude 
girl’s body with a teasing caption. Subsequently, a judge sentenced the girls 
to 21 days of home detention on cyberstalking charges. Yet another exam-
ple involved two girls in Texas, one 12 and another 13, who were arrested 
on felony charges for online impersonation for creating a fake Facebook 
page of a classmate and then using that account to bully other students 
(Delta & Matsuura, 2013). Specific disciplinary actions may be supported 
by research in such circumstances. But labeling children as criminals and 
punishing them without adequate educational initiatives can hardly be 
considered as a research-based recommendation.
Despite limited liability, there have been attempts to sue social media 
companies on grounds of cyberbullying. In Finkel v. Facebook, the plaintiff 
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sued for defamation and negligence (Digital Media Law Project, 2009a, 
2009b) after a private Facebook group was created about a teenager whose 
authors “asserted or implied,” among other things, that she had “contracted 
the HIV virus” and was “of dubious morals.” The complaint alleged that 
Facebook should be held liable for publishing defamatory content because 
the company “should have known that such statements were false and/or 
have taken steps to verify the genuineness of these statements” (Digital Media 
Law Project, 2009a).
The plaintiff argued that Facebook’s TOS, which grant the company 
“ownership interest” in what was described as “defamatory content,” made 
the “CDA 230 inapplicable” (Digital Media Law Project, 2009a). (Note that 
the impact of ownership interest is worth examining when thinking about 
a company’s intermediary status.) Parents of the children who posted this 
defamatory content were accused of negligence, having failed to supervise 
their children. The court dismissed the case, deciding the company was 
nonetheless immune from liability under the Section 230 of the CDA. It is 
perhaps worthwhile to observe that the complaint did not state whether the 
bullied teenager (or someone on her behalf) had reported (flagged) the alleg-
edly defamatory content to Facebook and whether Facebook responded in 
due time (thus raising concerns about Facebook’s reporting tools, which are 
a component of the company’s private anti-bullying enforcement mecha-
nisms) (Digital Media Law Project, 2009b).
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
A number of social media companies stipulate in their TOS that children 
under the age of 13 are not allowed to use their platforms. While social media 
companies report not to approve of underage use, and to move swiftly 
to remove detected unauthorized users, this issue nonetheless remains a 
significant problem (O’Neill, 2013) because age is self-reported and can be 
falsified.
While some companies have 17 or 18 as their minimum age, the reason 
why 13 is the most commonly used cut-off age is the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a US law that puts company responsibility 
into perspective, and the model for Article 8 of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR Regulation EU 2016/679).4 COPPA, which 
took effect in 2000, passed amid much controversy around children’s 
internet use (Montgomery, 2007), and applies to “operators of websites or 
online services directed to children under 13 years of age and operators 
of other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they 
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are collecting personal information online from a child under 13” (Fed-
eral Trade Commission, n.d., Rule Summary). The law essentially prohibits 
such sites to collect personal information from children under the age of 
13 unless parental consent is given. Rather than allow children under 13 
to access the sites and seek parental consent, most social media sites ban 
access to children under 13 altogether.
During the sign-up process most social media sites then ask users to 
state their age—a requirement that can easily be circumvented by children. 
Research has shown not only that children tend to do so but also that parents 
actively help them in this process (boyd, Hargittai, Schultz, & Palfrey, 2011; 
Livingstone, Ólafsson, & Staksrud, 2011), making the law largely ineffec-
tive for these purposes, at least when implemented in this manner. Plat-
forms not based in the US also need to comply with COPPA if their services 
are directed to children in the US (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). Even 
though a number of children under 13 can be found on social media sites, 
the companies, then, tend to publicly deny “actual knowledge” of having 
such children on their sites. Revised COPPA rules came into effect in 2013 
and expanded the definition of “personal information” to include geoloca-
tion and cookies, among others (Federal Trade Commission, 2013).
A correlative consequence of this age limit puts underage children in 
the position where they remain invisible for platforms not only in terms of 
personal data collection, but in general (they are not the platforms’ “digital 
citizens”)—they do not have any rights (see chapter 2 and the discussion of 
“illegal digital aliens” in chapter 9, cf. Staksrud, 2013a, p.156) and platforms 
are under no obligation to cater to or innovate for them (boyd, 2015).
Another relevant question here in the context of children’s participation 
rights is the extent to which parents or caregivers are able to make construc-
tive decisions about children’s participation in specific online spaces. Are 
parents or caregivers informed enough about specific digital environments, 
or about COPPA/GDPR and why the age limit is 13 (boyd et al., 2011)? 
What about those cases when children suffer from abuse at home or would 
like to participate in sites that cater to, for instance, LGBTQ communities, 
without coming out to their parents (see e.g., boyd, 2015)?
But should companies also be asked to do more in order to not collect 
personal data from those under 13 or, as some would argue, teens in general 
(Montgomery, 2015)? And if this is a public policy goal, should the regula-
tors have the responsibility to design and enforce a law that is more than a 
pretense of a working legislation? This is a complex set of questions. I revisit 
the debate on protection rights on the one hand, versus participation and 
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provision rights on the other (and whether they need to be pitted against 
each other) throughout the book.
Social Media Companies and Affordances
Here I provide a brief overview of the type of companies whose policies 
and anti-bullying mechanisms I analyze in this book. Individual platform 
or app profiles are located in appendix B, including: Facebook, Instagram, 
Twitter, Ask .fm, YouTube, Yik Yak, Secret, Google+, Tumblr, Snapchat, Whis-
per, Voxer, WhatsApp, and Kik. Relying on the concept of “technological 
affordances,” or “actions or uses a technology makes easier” (Earl & Kim-
port, 2011, p. 32), I’ve categorized the selected companies based on the user 
actions they allow for.
Social Media versus Digital Messengers
Digital messengers enable private communication among two or more 
people, similar to SMS or group chat, which happens online. But not all 
digital messengers necessarily consider themselves to be “social media.” 
On the contrary, some strive to build their reputation based on not being 
“social media.”
Within the industry, social media companies can be perceived as particu-
larly conducive to cyberbullying because of their affordances, which allow 
for instantaneous content sharing with a large number of people. Affor-
dances of digital messengers, on the other hand, which primarily enable 
private communication between two or several people, are not perceived 
as favorable to cyberbullying. A representative of one company compared 
social media to radio broadcasting and pointed out the difference in using 
the company’s platform:
You’re broadcasting and that may be to all of your friends or to the entire world, 
you’re like a radio station . . . as opposed to when you make a phone call to someone. 
That’s private communication, that’s not broadcasting, that’s having a conversa-
tion with someone. That’s why cyberbullying typically occurs in social networks / 
social media and particularly those that enable individuals to be anonymous. We 
don’t have any attributes or characteristics of those types of apps and platforms that 
enable those types of behaviors. (Anonymous, personal communication with the 
author, November 6, 2014)
Social media platforms provide users with an ability to share content 
simultaneously with multiple friends or followers. Followers differ from 
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friends because one user can “follow” another user’s profile and see posts 
(content as in text/photos/video) from that person in his or her own news-
feed, but that person does not see posts from the follower without follow-
ing him or her back. To “friend,” on the other hand, implies a symmetrical 
relationship, in the sense that “friends” typically follow and receive posts 
and updates from each other.
Digital messengers, on the other hand, are primarily intended to provide 
for communication (via text, photos, or video) between two people or a 
closed group of several people. While Snapchat and Kik used to be primarily 
messengers, they have added functions that allow users to receive updates 
from other people in their networks (similar to “newsfeeds”), which is why 
it could be said that they could be classified as both. This classification is 
relevant because different functions or affordances might call for different 
cyberbullying policies and prevention measures, and they also affect how 
platforms position themselves in relationship to cyberbullying (see table 3.1).
True Identity, Pseudo-anonymity, and Anonymity
The platforms surveyed here allow for varying degrees of anonymity; those 
that allow users to be anonymous can be perceived in the industry as espe-
cially favorable to bullying. Asking users to go by their real-life names on 
the platform is sometimes put forward as an especially safe feature that allows 
Table 3.1
Social media versus private communication (digital messengers)
Social media Digital Messengers Both
Facebook WhatsApp Snapchat
Instagram Voxer Kik
Twitter (Note that many platforms that are in the  
“social media” category on the left, also provide 
some form of direct messaging capacity, e.g. one 
can send a private message on Twitter and  
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transparency and is less likely to encourage bullying. The literature on 
cyberbullying and anonymity indicates that while this may be true on some 
occasions, it is not always the case; a number of victims report to know who 
“the perpetrators” are (Mishna, 2012; Kowalski et al., 2014). Cyberbullying 
can also happen among friends who used to be close but then fell out.
Facebook requires users to go by their real offline names in order to create 
their online profiles, a guideline that users can nonetheless violate. Google+ 
used to ask for the same, but at the time of this research, it allowed pseudo-
anonymity, which means that users can create profiles under names they 
do not use in their real lives. Facebook does not allow impersonation, while 
Twitter allows parody accounts as long as they are clearly labeled as such.
Some platforms that label themselves or are labeled within the industry 
as “anonymous apps” allow for sharing without having a name or a pseud-
onym attached to the content being shared. For instance, on Whisper, one 
could share the following text written over a photo of a gun: “I was just 
diagnosed with severe bipolar and depression . . . my parents bought me 
a gun for graduation” (Dickey, 2013). Such a post might then be shared 
either with random people who are also using the platform or with peo-
ple’s contacts in their phonebook or with users in the geographical vicinity 
(or with some algorithmic combination thereof). The point is that no one 
should know who is saying what, which is why they are called “anony-
mous” platforms. Yik Yak, for instance, started off this way but later moved 
to another model (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Degrees of anonymity
True/Real/Authentic Identity Pseudo-identity Anonymous
Facebook Instagram Secret
Ask .fm Whisper
YouTube Yik Yak (initially anonymous, 
and as of March 2016  
introduced usernames)








62  Chapter 3
The anonymous apps included in this study did not consider themselves 
to be places where users come to post “deep and dark secrets.” Some of these 
platforms are primarily “mobile applications” or “apps”—software applica-
tions designed for use on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. 
Platforms that had been initially designed for use on desktop or laptop com-
puters can also have their mobile app versions. In the case of platforms 
that are primarily designed for mobile use, however, users typically need to 
download them from Google Play or the Apple App Store. This is why, for 
those platforms that are primarily apps, the descriptions in the appendix 
refer to them as such.
Civil Liberties and Liabilities
The increasing role of private companies in regulating cyberbullying raises 
key questions concerning civil liberties in online spaces on the one hand 
and the limited scope of social media companies’ liability for cyberbullying 
incidents on the other. A brief description of the platforms I surveyed in 
this book, which the reader can find in the appendix B, shows how their 
technological affordances are relevant to their handling of cyberbullying. 
All of this lays the groundwork for chapter 4, where I show that despite the 
tendencies toward limited liability of online intermediaries, high-profile 
incidents can result in the public perception that these companies are or 
should be liable for cyberbullying. That in turn influences changes in their 
self-organizational measures, as I explain in chapter 6.5
II Vagaries of Self-Regulation

In this chapter I offer analyses of several cyberbullying incidents that were 
related to suicides. Cases like these, often labeled “high-profile” cyberbully-
ing incidents, have received significant media attention in their respective 
countries, and internationally as well. They illustrate and provide additional 
context for a discussion in this chapter about the dynamics between media, 
policy makers, companies, and other stakeholders that have contributed to 
the current regulatory culture and social media policies.
Imprecise Use of the Term “Cyberbullying”
In chapter 2, I discussed how scholars find it difficult to arrive at a precise 
and comprehensive definition of cyberbullying. A number of the cases I 
describe in this chapter exemplify how “cyberbullying” is similarly used 
in the media in an imprecise manner. For instance, “cyberbullying” is a 
term that primarily refers to peer conflict and peer aggression, but it was 
used in the media to label conflicts in which cyberbullying may have only 
been a component or where the primary issue was sextortion.
For instance, in the case of Hannah Smith, the presence of cyberbully-
ing was impossible to prove by a posthumous police investigation. And 
consider that the case of 13-year-old Megan Meier in 2006, which brought 
significant attention to the concept of “cyberbullying” not only in the US 
but internationally, was not entirely based on peer conflict. It involved an 
adult, a mother, who pretended to be a boy on the MySpace social network, 
and under such guise interacted with the young girl. She committed an act 
of deception that was frequently labeled as “cyberbullying” in the media 
even though, arguably, cyberbullying was only a component of her behav-
ior. Amanda Todd, a 15-year-old girl from Canada, committed suicide after 
her nude photos were exposed online, followed by bullying and slut sham-
ing. She was led into exposing her breasts on a webcam to a 35-year-old 
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man, who was the principal actor in this case. Although this case clearly 
involved an online predator, and cyberbullying per se was not at the heart 
of this issue but rather a consequence, the incident was frequently labeled 
by the media as a “cyberbullying case.” The case of Rehtaeh Parsons began 
with an alleged gang rape, which was photographed with a phone, only to 
result in cyberbullying and slut shaming after the photos were shared on 
social media. While cyberbullying played an important role in this case, as 
the girl was humiliated and harassed by her peers once the photos began to 
spread, the case originated as the crime of sexual offense.
Interrelated Themes in “Cyberbullying” Cases
Several interrelated themes emerged from these cases; all of them are 
important for understanding the context in which cyberbullying policies of 
social media companies are created. They all indicate what can be described 
as the simplified nature of the public debate around these cases and, sub-
sequently, the punitive regulatory measures introduced to address what 
is sometimes imprecisely characterized as “cyberbullying.” (My research-
based evidence in previous chapters argues against such approaches and 
instead stresses the value of educational measures aimed at cyberbullying 
prevention.) A number of these cases drew significant public attention to 
social media companies, both in general and to the platforms specifically 
involved; this resulted in pressures from the public and often ad hoc initia-
tives from dispersed regulators and policy makers, which in turn contrib-
uted to the shaping of the self-regulatory environment. In addition, social 
media companies have sometimes engaged in conducting investigations, 
such as in the case of Amanda Todd. Such examples further demonstrate an 
increasing role of private companies in these processes. Finally, a number 
of laws resulting from these cases were seriously questioned in the media 
coverage on the grounds of impinging on end users’ civil liberties and were 
sometimes characterized by legal experts as “misguided legislation.”
Summaries of the Cases
In the five cases I examine here—the death by suicide of Megan Meier and 
Rebecca Ann Sedwick from the US, Amanda Todd and Rehtaeh Parsons from 
Canada, and Hannah Smith from the UK—the themes I mention above sur-
faced against the backdrop of exaggerated fears over children’s use of digital 
technology, dignity, and children’s rights, all being topics I focus on in part 
I. Perhaps most importantly, these cases (especially as I present them in 
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the context of their aftermaths) demonstrate the mechanisms that can pro-
pel social media companies into revamping their policies, just as they can 
strengthen the public perception that the companies are or should be liable, 
which can in turn influence changes in their self-organizational measures.
Megan Meier
One of the early cases that received widespread media attention, and was 
primarily labeled in the media as “cyberbullying,” was the case of Megan 
Meier, a 13-year-old girl from O’Fallon, Missouri, who committed suicide 
in October 2006, after interacting with her friend’s mother, Lori Drew. 
Drew had pretended to be a teenage boy on the social networking website 
MySpace (Steinhauer, 2008). Megan appeared to be an emotionally sensi-
tive girl, who had struggled with self-esteem and weight issues and had 
been on anti-depression medication before the incident took place (Maag, 
2007; Megan Meier Foundation, n.d.b). A person representing herself as a 
boy named “Josh” added Megan as a friend on MySpace and started talk-
ing to her. Megan liked the boy from the photo, even though she never 
talked to him over the phone or in person throughout the month of what 
Megan’s mother described as “innocent flirtation” (Maag, 2007). Josh told 
her he was home-schooled and had no phone access.
Megan’s mother, Tina Meier, who later founded the Megan Meier Foun-
dation to address bullying, appeared in the US mainstream media to discuss 
her daughter’s case (Megan Meier Foundation, n.d.a). In a previous school 
her daughter had attended, Tina said, Megan had tried “desperately” to 
join popular girls, but she was teased about her weight (Maag, 2007).
Megan had been a friend of Lori Drew’s daughter, but the two had a fall-
ing out (Megan Meier Foundation, n.d.b). As the Guardian reported, Drew 
had been upset that Megan was “spreading lies” about her daughter and 
wanted to “expose her” (Glaister, 2008). The families knew each other, and 
Lori Drew allegedly knew Megan had been emotionally sensitive and was 
on medication; but once Megan switched schools, she got a new group of 
friends, joined the volleyball team, and lost weight, which, according to 
her mother, helped her become accepted in the new community (Megan 
Meier Foundation, n.d.b).
A germane observation in the context of dignity framework can be made 
about the public discussion surrounding this case. Rarely did it adopt a criti-
cal stance toward the proposition that a girl (in this case Megan), women, or 
people in general should derive their self-worth from their looks and popu-
larity status. That a perceived improvement in one’s looks should result in 
a rise in social status is a premise that all too often remains unquestioned 
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in the public and even an individual’s mind. According to dignity frame-
work, every human being has dignity or internal, inherent value that does 
not have to be earned. Striving for social status, social influence, or ways to 
improve one’s appearance as a source of dignity is a classic example of what 
the dignity author Donna Hicks characterizes as “false dignity” (Hicks, 2011, 
see also chapter 3).
Motivated by apparent peer conflict between her daughter and 
Megan, Lori Drew opened an account under the name of “Josh Evans” 
on MySpace, and according to the prosecutors she “bragged” about “the 
prank” (Michels, 2008). Drew’s daughter, her 18-year-old employee, and 
another girl from the neighborhood helped her maintain the false MySpace 
account (Michels, 2008; Collins, 2008).
The Meier family reported that the FBI was looking into the matter after 
Megan’s suicide and the story was kept private, outside of media coverage, 
for a year. The FBI, however, according to the family’s account, could not 
retrieve the last message Megan had received from Josh Evans, which her 
parents reported to have seen by logging into the account after the sui-
cide: “Everybody in O’Fallon knows how you are. You are a bad person and 
everybody hates you. Have a shitty rest of your life. The world would be 
a better place without you” (Megan Meier Foundation, n.d.b). When the 
investigation determined that Drew’s actions may have been cruel but did 
not break any laws (Collins, 2008), Megan’s parents decided to go public 
and talk to the media about the story.
Amanda Todd
Amanda Todd died by suicide in October 2012, a month after posting a 
nine-minute YouTube video called “My Story: Struggling, Bullying, Suicide 
and Self-harm.” Using flash cards, she silently described the events that 
resulted in her situation and followed with a plea for help (ChiaVideos, 
2012). While her mental health was affected by cyberbullying, this case 
also involved child pornography and sexual extortion.
In 2009 and 2010, Amanda used a video chat platform to meet new 
people online, where she received compliments on her looks. One of the 
people she spoke to asked her to flash for him on camera, which she even-
tually did (Riley Huntley, 2012).1 According to the story Amanda tells in the 
video, he later found her on Facebook and threatened that he would send 
the photo of her bare breasts to her teachers, classmates, and family if she 
did not perform for him on camera again. Furthermore, he said he knew 
Amanda’s address, which reportedly made her increasingly anxious. Once 
the anonymous assaulter revealed her photos, Amanda received a notice 
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from the police that her naked photo, constituting a criminal offense of 
child pornography, was circulating on the internet.
Bullying and cyberbullying ensued, not only from her classmates but also 
from anonymous people who had seen the photo. She transferred to a dif-
ferent school but then got involved with drugs and alcohol, which reflected 
that she’d been psychologically affected by the situation. When the assaulter 
resurfaced, asking for another session of nude exposure, he threatened to 
reveal the photo in her new school environment if she did not comply. Fur-
thermore, he made a Facebook page, where the photo of Amanda’s flashing 
was the profile photo. In the confessional YouTube video, Amanda reported 
that she lost respect from her new classmates and was bullied, after which 
she started cutting herself. When she moved to yet a different school, she got 
involved with “an old guy friend” while his girlfriend was on vacation (Riley 
Huntley, 2012). Only a week later, the “old guy friend,” his girlfriend, and a 
group of other people came to Amanda’s school and verbally and physically 
abused Amanda. Bystanders captured the incident on digital cameras, result-
ing in yet another round of bullying and cyberbullying.
Amanda then attempted the first suicide by drinking bleach but was 
rescued and taken to the hospital. Her classmates and some other people 
ridiculed her suicide attempt on Facebook. After that, she moved to another 
city to live with her mother (her parents had been separated). She was cut-
ting, was on anti-depressants, and attended counseling. A month after she 
posted the video on YouTube where she had told her story in silence, using 
flashcards, Amanda killed herself, allegedly by hanging.
Rehtaeh Parsons
Rehtaeh Parsons committed suicide at the age of 17 two years after being 
photographed while reportedly being raped and later bullied when the 
photos were disseminated to friends in school and the community. This 
case, which took place in Nova Scotia, Canada, received significant media 
attention, and was also one in which cyberbullying was conflated with 
child pornography. Although Rehtaeh’s parents reported the case while the 
girl was still alive, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police concluded that they 
had insufficient evidence to press charges, and media coverage to a great 
extent revolved around the issue of responsibility or blame of individuals 
involved in the incident (see e.g., “Rehtaeh Parsons, Canadian Girl . . .,” 
2013). Following the suicide, however, the case was reopened, and the police 
reported to have found new information by conducting investigations into 
the rape allegations and the distribution of child pornography (“Rehtaeh 
Parsons case . . .,” 2013). The incident resulted in criminal prosecution of 
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minors and in a new cyberbullying law in Nova Scotia. The online “hack-
tivist” and social justice group called Anonymous, which threatened to 
reveal the identity of the young men involved in the cyberbullying, may 
have contributed to the reopening of the case (Omand, 2015).
Rebecca Ann Sedwick
Rebecca Ann Sedwick committed suicide in September 2013. According to 
the Polk County sheriff, Rebecca jumped from an abandoned factory in 
Lakeland, Florida, after being bullied; AbcActionNews quoted him as saying, 
“At the end of the day, it wasn’t a school yard fight that led to the demise of 
this young girl. It was bullying online” (Raiche & Williams, 2013). Months 
later, CNN reported that the police file raised questions about evidence for 
the alleged bullying in this case, citing an expert who had reviewed the 
police files and could not find any evidence of bullying for the seven months 
leading to the suicide; the case had by then “garnered national and interna-
tional attention” (Wallace, 2014). As has been apparent with victims in other 
high-profile suicide cases, according to the New York Times, Rebecca had 
been experiencing psychological difficulties and had been cutting herself; 
she would share those cutting images on digital platforms on which she 
would also receive mean comments in reply (Alvarez, 2013b). The day 
she ended her life, Rebecca changed her username on Kik messenger into 
“That Dead Girl” (Alvarez, 2013b). About a month after her death, the sher-
iff charged two girls, 12-year-old Katelyn Roman and 14-year-old Guadalupe 
Shaw, with “aggravated stalking”; they were characterized as Rebecca’s “chief 
tormenters” (Almasy, Segal, & Couwels, 2013; Wallace, 2014). Following 
the suicide, two politicians from Florida introduced “Rebecca’s Law” which 
would make bullying a crime (Dahl, 2014). “The bill would make in-person 
and online bullying a misdemeanor that would carry a year-long prison 
sentence on the second offense,” while bullying involving threats would 
constitute a felony (The Stream, 2014, para 4). The charges were dropped 
after a highly problematic set of sheriff’s actions and investigation, which I 
describe later in this chapter.
Hannah Smith
Hannah Smith, from Leicestershire, England, was 14 when she committed 
suicide after what her family described as “months of torment” on Ask 
 .fm (Robson, 2013). In the weeks before she took her life, Hannah alleg-
edly received messages on Ask .fm that criticized how she looked and urged 
her to kill herself (“Hannah Smith: Ask .fm ‘happy to help police,”’ 2013). 
Her father had tried to keep her away from Ask .fm after Hannah’s school 
Perils of Politics-Driven Regulation 71
warned parents against allowing their children to use Ask .fm, but she 
continued to use the site (Rudd, 2013a). Ask .fm agreed to cooperate with 
the police in determining the cause behind the girl’s death and in reveal-
ing the identities behind the usernames, which the coroner had obtained 
from Hannah’s computer and mobile phone (“Websites could be made to 
reveal . . .,” 2013; Hannah Smith death . . .,” 2013).
A year after the suicide, however, the police investigation revealed that 
the girl had been sending “vile” posts to herself prior to the incident; the 
coroner, looking at messages and their IP addresses, found no evidence that 
the girl had been exposed to online bullying (Davies, 2014; “Hannah Smith 
inquest . . .,” 2014). Her father nonetheless reported that she had been bul-
lied, especially after being attacked at a party by a girl who used to be her 
friend and that her head had been “smashed against a wall” (Davies, 2014). 
Hannah’s teachers reported that she was also involved as “a bully,” and 
the coroner concluded there was no evidence that the school and family 
could have known about her intention to kill herself (Davies, 2014). This 
suicide case is the one that put Ask .fm, a social networking website, in the 
spotlight of UK public attention.
Simplistic Binaries of Finger Pointing
Despite the abovementioned caveat that Megan Meier’s suicide was not 
a typical case of bullying, the extensive coverage of the case in the main-
stream media, and the public outrage that followed, led to what can best 
be described as the vilification of Lori Drew, an adult, as “the bully” (Cel-
izic, 2007; Zetter, 2009). This is not to excuse Drew’s misguided actions for 
their undoubtedly devastating consequences, but merely to suggest that 
the coverage seemed to perpetuate the bully-victim narrative, with little 
recognition of the fact that the relationship between bullying and suicide is 
not at all straightforward and that a suicide tends to result from a complex 
set of factors, such as depression and anxiety, which bullying can exacer-
bate. Consider the ABC online news article, “Parents: Cyberbullying Led 
to a Teen’s Suicide” (2007), based on statements made by Meier’s parents, 
who were convinced that their daughter’s death was the result of a “cruel 
cyber hoax.” The title not only cements the cause-and-effect relationship 
between bullying and suicide, but it also makes the article itself sound like a 
warning message to all parents rather than the report of conclusion arrived 
at by Meier’s parents. Although coverage of the case often recognized that 
Megan had suffered from depression, this evidence was frequently used 
in conjunction with the suggestion that Drew had known about the girl’s 
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depression and hence, should have known better not to engage in “bul-
lying,” again shifting the focus away from cyberbullying complexity and 
onto blame. The neighbors soon turned against the Drews, resulting in fear 
of backlash assaults, as it was described in the media, which in turn made it 
difficult for Lori Drew to run her business and continue living in the area. 
She was harassed online as well (Hamilton, 2007). Mounting accusations 
from the media and the public confirmed and continued to cultivate the 
bully-victim narrative.
After Amanda Todd’s suicide, her case, too, received significant mainstream 
media attention, not only in Canada but internationally. The Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) aired two news documentaries analyzing 
the details behind the case and the subsequent investigation as part of its 
series Fifth Estate: “Stalking Amanda Todd: The Man in the Shadows” (Kelly, 
2014) and “The Sextortion of Amanda Todd” (Kelly, 2013). Extensive media 
debate was frequently focused on the punitive aspects of the issue, rais-
ing questions of who should be held responsible for not assisting Amanda 
prior to the suicide, and the blame was often placed on the failure of the 
police to thoroughly investigate the case—as well as on the school system 
and educators for failing to address systematic bullying and cyberbullying. 
Mainstream media coverage of cyberbullying in the US is frequently limited 
to questions of responsibility to the detriment of capturing the complexity 
behind cyberbullying as a phenomenon (Milosevic, 2015b). For instance, 
questions such as whether these incidents may display a culture-wide pat-
tern of meanness in children’s social relations, or how meanness in popular 
culture may be providing a negative model for youth behavior, are rarely 
examined. All of these could have been raised in reference to the bullying 
and cyberbullying that took place from Amanda’s peers after her nude pho-
tos had been exposed. Interestingly enough, questions of whether Amanda 
tried to report abusive photos and comments to Facebook or YouTube in 
an effort to have the companies remove such content were difficult to find 
in media coverage.
The overall punitive orientation of the public debate seemed to culmi-
nate when the hacker group called Anonymous set out to find the offender 
on their own. As Slate and The DailyDot reported, Anonymous had identified 
a wrong man and exposed his name and address, resulting in subsequent 
threats to and bullying of this individual (Morris, 2012; Murphy, 2012).
According to some media reports, Amanda’s mother had seen the mes-
sages that the sex offender had sent to Amanda, blackmailing her by asking 
to perform for him on camera. She had reported the case to the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police (RCMP) while Amanda was still alive, but they were 
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said not to have taken any action, advising her daughter to stay away from 
the Web and to take caution (“Amanda Todd suicide,” 2013). The e-safety 
experts interviewed emphasized two common points as being problematic 
when engaging with law enforcement officials about cyberbullying-related 
incidents involving minors: the first involves not taking these cases seri-
ously until they have resulted in a tragic outcome; the second concerns an 
insufficient understanding of social media technologies and how pervasive 
online harassment can be. Even in those countries where cyberbullying is 
not defined by the law, harassment-related provisions or other legal acts 
could apply to cyberbullying cases. Furthermore, advising teens to stay off 
the internet is hardly a viable solution to the problem (d’Haenens, Vandon-
inck, & Donoso, 2013). Nonetheless, it is often the question of whether the 
law enforcement is ready to become involved in such incidents. Finally, 
the question of whether punitive actions are able to solve the issue at all is 
rarely examined in public discourse around cyberbullying.
Much like Amanda Todd’s case, the incident involving Rehtaeh Parsons 
resulted in a criminal prosecution, of minors in this case. While the names 
of the alleged offenders had not been revealed in the media because they 
were minors at the time when the reported rape occurred, Anonymous hac-
tivists once again attempted to take justice into their own hands by trying 
to find and reveal the names of the perpetrators. In an attempt to prevent 
the blame-gaming rally, Rehtaeh’s family urged the group not to reveal the 
boys’ identities, and Anonymous temporarily withheld them (“‘Anony-
mous’ won’t release names,” 2013). By January 2015, two men tried in the 
case who admitted to creating child pornography were sentenced to proba-
tion (MacDonald, 2015). According to the Canadian law, Rehtaeh’s name 
should not have been disclosed in the media either, but the family insisted 
that this ban be lifted because they wanted her name to be known.
With Rebecca Sedwick’s case, the sheriff revealed the names of the two 
girls accused of bullying even though they were minors, because this felony 
charge required that the names be made public. But according to media 
reports, only a month later the charges had been dropped due to the lack 
of evidence necessary to establish a stalking case. CNN quoted cyberbully-
ing expert Nancy Willard, who described the case as “yet another example 
of law enforcement and the media being quick to make a judgment that 
bullying caused a suicide when other factors might have been at work” 
(Wallace, 2014). According to Rebecca’s mother, who spoke to the New York 
Times, Rebecca had been bullied for months prior to her suicide, and her 
mother had complained to school officials, whom she said did little to 
alleviate the situation. She then moved Rebecca to a new school, allegedly 
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closed her Facebook page, and took her cell phone away. The New York 
Times reported that the girl was using social media unbeknownst to her 
mother (Alvarez, 2013b). The charges were dropped when the State Attor-
ney’s office, “after weeks of investigation” and “an analysis of thousands of 
Facebook messages” (Alvarez, 2013c), could not provide enough evidence 
to support the charges.
The girls accused of bullying Rebecca were treated in a less than dignified 
manner and in complete disagreement with research-supported evidence 
that no actors in this process should be stigmatized (Morrison, 2002; Ahmed 
& Brathwaite, 2006). Such treatment also obscured the complexity of the 
case as presented to the public. The two girls’ lawyers said it was “outrageous” 
that the sheriff had arrested them and dragged their names and images into 
the media coverage while failing to provide the evidence to back criminal 
charges. Some of those who criticized such actions raised concerns that sher-
iff had been driven by a personal agenda (Alvarez, 2013c; Bazelon, 2014). 
Katelyn, who appeared on NBC’s Today Show to tell her side of the story 
(Stump, 2013) was expelled from school, and her family was threatened 
and insulted. The girls had been labeled as bullies while the investigation 
found no evidence of bullying for seven months leading to Rebecca’s death 
(Wallace, 2014).
The time following Rebecca’s suicide was difficult for Katelyn, who 
reported feeling self-doubt and guilt even though she did not bully Rebecca 
during the year before the suicide (Pesta, 2014). Katelyn’s mother also 
recounted how difficult it was to see her daughter’s face all over the media 
and the internet as she was accused of being “a bully”—a digital footprint 
that would not easily go away. Katelyn underwent counseling as a result of 
post-suicide events (Pesta, 2014).
Some media outlets pointed out that cyberbullying did not directly 
cause, but may have only contributed to, the girl’s suicide, and that she 
did suffer from depression and self-harming tendencies, part of it result-
ing from her family situation. However, with such actions of the sheriff, it 
was nonetheless difficult to avoid the “bully-victim narrative,” where the 
alleged bullies were vilified, and the complexity behind the alleged bully-
ing case unjustifiably simplified. Such narratives were well documented 
in Emily Bazelon’s analysis of cyberbullying cases, which sought to give 
voice to all the participants involved in the selected high-profile incidents 
that she investigated (Bazelon, 2013b). Her study described how the com-
plexity of peer relations during adolescence tends to be reduced in sensa-
tionalist media coverage; and how the behavior that could be addressed 
using educational efforts is increasingly criminalized, a factor that does not 
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necessarily help address future bullying cases (see Suski, 2016, cf. Bradshaw, 
2013).
Social Positioning: The Problem of Oversimplified  
Bully-Victim Narratives
The story of Rebecca’s suicide told from the perspective of one of the 
accused girls, Katelyn, provides more nuance to the media-told narrative 
that revolved around the arrests. Her story, which she narrated to the popu-
lar women’s magazine Cosmopolitan, reveals an aspect of such incidents 
that tends to get lost in media coverage: how cyberbullying can be a part 
of social positioning, power imbalances, and the resulting complexity of 
adolescents’ everyday lives and social relations (Pesta, 2014).
According to this article, Katelyn and Rebecca had been good friends in 
the fifth grade. In the sixth grade, Katelyn became friends with Guadalupe, 
the other girl who was arrested in the case, whom the article described as a 
“queen bee,” an expression used to refer to a popular girl in a group (Wiseman, 
2009). Guadalupe grew up with her father, saw her mother infrequently and 
sometimes had to take care of her siblings; her lawyer described her less-than-
model upbringing as one of struggle. Guadalupe happened to be interested in 
a boy who used to be Rebecca’s boyfriend. Worried that he still had feelings for 
Rebecca, Guadalupe managed to turn about a dozen girls against her, although 
Guadalupe’s lawyer said that she denied those charges (Pesta, 2014). Katelyn 
appeared to succumb to the peer pressure as well; everyone around her, she 
said, was calling Rebecca a liar, and she didn’t know what to do.
The pressure on Katelyn became so strong that she was forced into phys-
ically fighting Rebecca at school one day. The teachers eventually broke 
up the fight. Around the time of the fight, which, according to Katelyn 
happened a year before the suicide, the girls exchanged a couple of heated 
text messages but their communication did not resume after that. When 
in the summer before she died, Rebecca texted Katelyn, asking her to be 
friends again, Katelyn gave her a polite no. After the suicide, the police used 
one piece of exchange between “the bullies”—Katelyn and Guadalupe—as 
a proof of their complicity. The girls wrote to each other that they felt guilty 
and they wished it had been them instead of Rebecca. However, another, 
allegedly Guadalupe’s post, said she did not care that she had bullied 
Rebecca and that the girl died (there is evidence that Guadalupe did not 
write this and that her account had been hacked). Katelyn, in a separate 
exchange with another girl, expressed feeling guilty, implying it was her 
fault (Pesta, 2014).
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Such complexity and nuance of youth social relations and the role of 
other factors (such as family circumstances) fail to come across in simpli-
fied “bully-victim” narratives. Most importantly, omission of this aspect of 
the story in the public discussion can result in failing to invoke solutions 
that may actually help children build necessary resilience and adopt a more 
dignified way of treating each other.
How Blame Gaming Influences Policy
While some cases resulted in blame gaming of the individuals involved 
in cyberbullying, in others, the limited narrative revolved around blam-
ing social media companies. Such public narratives may have more lasting 
effects than the immediately observable consequences for one social media 
company. They can influence the development of a set of preferred self-
organizational policies and company narratives industry-wide.
After Hannah Smith’s death had garnered a significant amount of media 
attention for Ask .fm, large advertisers on the social networking website 
pulled their ads, Vodafone and Save The Children being among the organi-
zations to do so (Robson, 2013). UK prime minister David Cameron called 
Ask .fm a “vile” site and invited users to boycott “websites that allow cyber-
bullying [so as] to help prevent more deaths of young people” (Cushing, 
2013). Such public pressure forced the website “to order an independent 
review of the site’s safety features” by a law firm (Best, 2013); the details as 
to how the review was executed were not publicly accessible.
This instance of the cancelation of advertising is perhaps good evidence 
for what Douglas Leeds, the CEO of the company that purchased Ask .fm in 
2014, meant when he said that “safety is good business” (Magid, 2014). In 
order for a social media company to ensure its legitimacy and to be publicly 
considered as an acceptable venue for teens, it needs to put safety and the 
perception of safety as its primary value (Magid, 2014). Furthermore, users 
will only keep coming back to a platform if they enjoy their experiences 
there, and bullying, the argument goes, is not conducive to a pleasant 
experience (an argument I revisit in chapter 8). The Latvian owners signed 
non-disclosure agreements with Ask .com after the company purchased the 
site and were therefore not available for an interview. This case illustrates 
how social media companies can become easy targets in this “blame-gam-
ing” process. Some of the e-safety experts I interviewed observed that in 
high-profile cases, e-safety issues have the potential to become politicized. 
Taking the strong stand against Ask .fm adopted by Prime Minister Cam-
eron, then, can also be analyzed from the perspective of securing support 
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and votes of parents and caregivers, who are particularly vested in ensuring 
the safety of their children.
How Privatization of the Digital Public Sphere  
Affects Personal Freedoms
The involvement of social media companies in police investigations can 
further illustrate the implications of corporate actions for civil liberties. 
In cases related to child protection, while companies should assist law 
enforcement when provided with lawful requests, such actions should 
nonetheless take into account children’s privacy—which was not the 
case when investigating Rebecca Sedwick’s death. The following account 
also draws attention to how such cases can increase the involvement of 
private corporations in processes that are normally in the domain of law 
enforcement.
Consider the role of one social media company, Facebook, on the inves-
tigation process that followed the case of Amanda Todd’s suicide. In May 
2014, almost two years after the suicide, a suspect was caught in the Nether-
lands. His lawyer told the Canadian newspaper the Globe and Mail: “I don’t 
think the police made this case. I think Facebook made this case. They put 
it all together” (White, 2014a). He also added, “Who is to say that Facebook 
did this investigation correctly? We will have to go over all their work.” Face-
book declined to comment on its involvement in this case except to state 
that it followed strict guidelines for working with the police to deal with 
child pornography cases (White, 2014a). The investigation and prosecution 
benefitted from a constellation of efforts involving Facebook, who provided 
the IP address to law enforcement (Surbramaniam & Whalen, 2014). Col-
laboration among international agencies resulted in the arrest of a Dutch 
man of Turkish descent, Aydin Coban, who was charged with “extortion, 
internet luring, criminal harassment and the possession and distribution of 
child pornography” (“Amanda Todd: police alerted . . .,” 2014).
The means used to incriminate and arrest the alleged perpetrator were 
characterized in the media coverage as controversial from the standpoint of 
civil liberties. Once they decided to investigate, the covert Dutch police broke 
into the suspect’s bungalow and installed tracking software onto his com-
puter. The Globe and Mail reported, “While the tracking software—called ‘a 
keystroke logger’—is common among investigative arsenals in other coun-
tries, its use is rare and contentious in the Netherlands” (White, 2014b). 
The investigators had nonetheless received a court approval prior to install-
ing the software. This move produced evidence of Coban’s blackmailing 
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Amanda and a number of other victims. The Canadian RCMP sought his 
extradition to Canada.
The increasing role of the companies in this process seems evident in 
Rebecca Sedwick’s case as well. The girl was allegedly bullied on Ask .fm, Kik, 
and Voxer (Alvarez, 2013b). According to CNN, the sheriff’s office quit try-
ing to obtain the data from the companies once the state attorney declined 
to file charges (Wallace, 2014), which is especially interesting considering 
that initially the sheriff had placed the primary blame for Rebecca’s death 
on online bullying (Raiche & Williams, 2013). In the interview with Voxer, 
another app through which Rebecca was allegedly bullied, the company 
representative explained that the app was probably not related to the bul-
lying incident and it likely just happened to be on her phone. Rather than 
absolving companies from responsibility when cyberbullying cases actually 
happen on their platforms, the discussion here serves to underscore that 
cyberbullying is complex both in its causes and in its manifestations.
The investigators did analyze Facebook posts, one of which allegedly 
came from Guadalupe Shaw, the girl charged with aggravated stalking, and 
it read: “Yes ik I bullied REBECCA and she killed herself but IDGAF” (Alvarez, 
2013a; Pesta, 2014).2 Guadalupe claimed she did not post it herself, that 
her account had been hacked (Wallace, 2014). According to the sheriff’s 
investigation of Rebecca’s phone as reported in the New York Times, she 
had received messages such as “why are you still alive?” and “you’re ugly!” 
(Alvarez, 2013b).
In light of evidence that the charges against the girls had been unfounded 
and largely exaggerated, the manner in which the case was handled, by 
retrieving the girls’ private messages and publishing them in the media, 
reflects an attitude on behalf of the authorities that does not take into 
account youth privacy. In terms of social media companies’ responsibility, 
this case is also important since Rebecca Sedwick was 12 at the time she 
used these platforms, and according to the TOS on a number of platforms, 
children under the age of 13 are not allowed to access them.
Another important point to acknowledge is the difficulty of designing 
policies and mechanisms on these platforms to assist children in resolving 
the cases that arise as a consequence of the complexity and volatility of 
their social relations. While a button to report bullying may be a mini-
mum requirement, social media companies are engaging a number of other 
mechanisms I describe in the following chapters. Despite protection under 
CDA 230, which is based on not getting involved with content, social 
media companies are nonetheless forced to find ways to become involved 
with content in order to address bullying.
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In the Aftermath: Ad Hoc Actions by Regulators and Policy Makers
Prime Minister Cameron’s actions regarding Ask .fm (in the Hannah Smith 
case), as well as the sheriff’s handling of the investigation in the case of 
Rebecca Sedwick, point to the ways in which personal and political agen-
das can get in the way of shaping effective social media policy. But the 
best examples of what a number of scholars and interviewees for this book 
would characterize as largely misguided regulatory actions took place in the 
aftermath of the Megan Meier, Amanda Todd, and Rehtaeh Parsons cases.
In the Megan Meier case, after a local investigation determined that 
Lori Drew did not commit a crime, Thomas O’Brien, the US attorney in Los 
Angeles, in what the New York Times labeled as “a highly unusual move” 
prosecuted the case himself (Steinhauer, 2008). Although O’Brien was not 
a state attorney general, in the US, state attorneys general have exhibited a 
tendency to initiate actions against social media companies in the context 
of high-profile incidents. Attorney generals in specific states may act indi-
vidually (Bodley, 2014) or they can join together to investigate activities of 
individual social media companies. MySpace was the focus of one such com-
bined action in 2008 (Proskauer, 2008) at the time when the case of Megan 
Meier received significant attention in the media and around the time when 
MySpace found itself in the center of a “technopanic” (Marwick, 2008) con-
cerning online predators. Social media companies and the concept of Web 
2.0 were new at the time, and once several high profile internet safety-related 
incidents emerged, the policy makers reacted to the public pressure.
In November 2008, a federal jury issued “what legal experts said was the 
country’s first cyberbullying verdict” (Steinhauer, 2008) in the Meier case. 
The charges were reduced from felonies to misdemeanors based on violation 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which had been amended several 
times since being enacted in 1986. The decision was considered problematic 
because the use of the act was broadened to apply to new technology with 
wider implications (see Steinhauer, 2008). Under these guidelines, Drew 
was found guilty of accessing a computer without authorization—because 
she signed into her account using a fake name, and thus violated the site’s 
TOS. Hence, this was the first time that a federal act used to address com-
puter crimes was applied in the prosecution of TOS violations. If Drew were 
to be found guilty, the case could open doors to social media-related litiga-
tion at a large scale. Consider, for instance, that numerous minors violate 
TOS on a daily basis by lying about their age and accessing social media 
websites even when they are under 13 years of age, which many websites 
do not allow (boyd, Hargittai, Schultz, & Palfrey, 2011).
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In 2008 Lori Drew filed motions to dismiss the indictment on the grounds 
of “failure to state an offense, vagueness, and unconstitutional delegation 
of prosecutorial power” in United States v. Drew (Digital Media Law Project, 
2008). The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Berkman Klein Center 
for Internet and Society at Harvard University filed amicus briefs to dis-
miss the case. The public pressure around this case was perhaps evidenced 
by the fact that the judge, while allowing evidence of Megan Meier’s sui-
cide on trial, had to emphasize to the jurors that Drew was not charged 
with causing the suicide. Eventually, in July 2009, in the light of all the 
concerns around setting a precarious precedent, Drew was cleared of all 
charges.
This case resulted in a legislative effort as well, of the kind that was cri-
tiqued previously for its punitive orientation. Representative Linda Sanchez 
(D-CA) proposed a piece of legislation called the Megan Meier Cyberbullying 
Prevention Act (2009) that stipulated up to two years in prison for electronic 
speech whose aim was “to coerce, intimidate, harass or cause substantial 
emotional distress to another person.” Wired reported the bill “was met with 
little enthusiasm” by the House Judiciary Committee (Kravets, 2009) and 
it never made it into law. Bipartisan fears around the bill, expressed in a 
hearing on September 30, 2009, conducted by the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism and Homeland Security, included the danger to constitutionally 
protected free speech. An opinion in response to the hearing submitted by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) read:
Criminalizing free speech online is unconstitutional and will be ineffective. Ha-
rassing speech will either continue online in violation of the law, or it will simply 
shift to other spheres within which it simultaneously exists. Moreover, the scope of 
“bullying” speech is likely to fall short of the constitutional standard requiring the 
existence of “a true threat.”. . . The focus should be on the bullying and harassing 
behavior and not on the means by which it is communicated. (American Civil Liber-
ties Union, 2009)
Such concerns over civil liberties, and questions as to whether criminal-
izing the internet as a means of communication is effective in solving prob-
lems that frequently originate or persist offline, illustrate perils that emerge 
in attempts to regulate cyberbullying. This reference to “true threat” is a 
good example of the difficulty of enforcing such regulation. In a number 
of cases the Supreme Court has stated: “The government cannot punish 
violent words—even ‘vehement, caustic’ or ‘unpleasantly sharp attacks’—
unless they are ‘true threats.’ The problem is identifying what, exactly, 
counts as a ‘true threat’” (“What is a true threat on Facebook?,” 2014).
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Consider how a recent online harassment case that garnered significant 
media attention exhibits this dilemma (Dewey, 2014). In December 2014, 
in a hearing of US v. Elonis, the Supreme Court weighed whether posts that 
Anthony Elonis posted on Facebook in the form of a rap song, in which 
he threatened his ex-wife with death, amounted to the standard of “true 
threat” (Citron, 2014b). More specifically, the jurors were struggling to deter-
mine if the standard for assessing whether such speech amounts to a “true 
threat” should be based on the speaker’s subjective intent to harm the per-
son, or if a reasonable listener would interpret the threat as a serious intent 
to harm (Citron, 2014b).
The opinion expressed by the ACLU in reference to the Megan Meier 
Cyberbullying Prevention Act coincided with the opinions of a number of 
e-safety NGO representatives and e-safety experts, some of whom partici-
pated as expert witnesses in this congressional testimony, such as Nancy 
Willard, at the time the director of the Safe and Responsible Internet Use 
in Eugene, Oregon, who attached a statement of opposition to the bill that 
had been signed by “all of the nation’s leading authorities on the issue 
of cyberbullying” (“Digital media safety . . .,” 2009). The letter stated that 
“trying to make this a federal criminal offense is ludicrous.” Another expert 
witness on the issue explained that criminalization would not help in effec-
tively addressing the issue of cyberbullying for children.
Bill C-13: Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act
Another piece of legislation whose grounds have been critiqued from the 
civil liberties point of view is Bill C-13, which was largely brought about by 
the Amanda Todd case. The bill was proposed by the Conservative govern-
ment and was sometimes labeled “Conservatives’ cyberbullying legislation” 
(Boutilier, 2014). The essential underpinning of Bill C-13 was to update 
the lawful access provisions of the Criminal Code, which allow the state to 
obtain access to electronic communication. It creates a new criminal offense 
for nonconsensual distribution of intimate images. The bill is also relevant 
from the standpoint of privatization of digital public sphere theory, how-
ever, as it allows telecom, internet, and social media companies to “volun-
tarily” disclose data on user information without a court order, and grants 
them immunity from criminal and civil lawsuits for such disclosures; it also 
increases police authority in data access and search (Geist, 2013).
The meaning of “voluntarily” was debated in the media, but there 
would still have to be a warrant from the police for a company to reveal the 
data (Dyer, 2014). Critics of the bill pointed out that it resembled another 
bill (Bill C-30) that had failed in 2012 due to surveillance concerns, and 
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which allowed for “warrantless mandatory disclosure of basic subscriber 
information” (Dyer, 2014). Toronto Star labeled Bill C-13 as having “little to 
do with cyberbullying, the bill’s proposed target” (Austin, Stewart, & Clem-
ent, 2014).
With “reasonable suspicion” police authorities could now access “trans-
mission data” (including deep packet inspection) and “tracking data” using 
new types of warrants. These new warrants, critics said, “fall below the usual 
requirements for a search warrant” (Austin, Stewart, & Clement, 2014). 
Furthermore, they argued, the amount of data that could be accessed in 
this manner surpassed in scale personal information about the suspect 
and could constitute surveillance of people other than the suspect. Even 
Amanda Todd’s mother expressed concerns about “provisions that allow 
warrantless access to Canadians’ personal data,” which are executed in the 
name of her daughter and other victims in similar cases (Boutilier, 2014).
Nova Scotia Law
Similarly, the Toronto Star labeled the Nova Scotia law, which took effect 
in August 2013, as “inspired by Rehtaeh Parson’s suicide”; the law allowed 
people “to sue or seek a protection order from the courts if they or their 
children are being cyberbullied” (“Cyberbullying law inspired . . .,” 2013). It 
also allowed victims to seek assistance from an investigative unit that would 
help them identify the perpetrator, in the case of an anonymous one, and 
research the case; in event of a lawsuit, parents could be held liable for dam-
ages if the perpetrator was a minor (Bill 61: An Act to Address and Prevent 
Cyberbullying, 2013). The Globe and Mail editorial spoke out against the 
law (“Nova Scotia Cyberbullying Law goes too far,” 2014). According to the 
newspaper, the law was unnecessary because in many similar cases the vic-
tim could seek a restraining order or rely on libel provisions. Furthermore, 
because the law would cover a single phone call that distressed the accuser 
in the same manner as if the harassment were repetitive, it was said to define 
cyberbullying too broadly. Also, because the accused did not have to be a 
named person, charges could be pressed against an internet address, and any 
device capable “of connecting to it” (for instance, the phone or computer of 
an accused teen’s parent) could be confiscated permanently and disposed of, 
the law was even more problematic from a civil liberties standpoint.
The first application of this law attracted significant media attention and 
it involved adults, much to the surprise of even the victim in that case, who 
had thought that the law had been principally designed to protect minors; 
in this case, the female victim reported a man who was posting “negative 
and threatening comments about her and her family on Facebook” (Judge 
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orders end to Facebook cyberbullying . . .,” 2014). The investigative unit 
conducted research on the subject and determined that cyberbullying 
took place. A Nova Scotia judge then “granted a cyberbullying prevention 
order” that required the perpetrator to cease all future cyberbullying and 
take down comments that had already been on the site, in addition to 
paying $750 in court costs. From the standpoint of research findings on 
cyberbullying, these laws define cyberbullying broadly and employ puni-
tive measures of which alleged effectiveness is not necessarily supported by 
research. The Nova Scotia law has since been struck down by the Supreme 
Court of Nova Scotia, which called it “a colossal failure” (Ruskin, 2015).
An incident similar to those of Rehtaeh Parsons and Amanda Todd hap-
pened in California to a girl named Audrie Pott, who was also allegedly 
raped while passed out at a party; the photos were then posted online and 
the girl was severely bullied, after which she died by suicide (“US teen’s 
death . . .,” 2013). Audrie’s family pressed charges against three US teens 
who were then arrested for sexual battery (“Three US teens arrested . . .,” 
2013). The boys received sentences of 30 to 45 days and the case resulted 
in a state bill that stipulated stricter punishment for juveniles committing 
sexual assault but no anti-bullying law was relied on in the case (“Law-
maker modifies . . .,” 2014).
International Consequences for Social Media Companies
The pattern of events that includes bullying, cyberbullying, slut shaming, 
and prosecution of minors seems to be taking place more frequently all 
around the world, which will no doubt elicit further legal responses as vari-
ous countries and continents address who can be accountable for those 
acts. At the time of this writing, the US, Canada, and the EU did not have 
legislation that would specify the mechanisms that social media compa-
nies need to have in place to address cyberbullying incidents, outside of 
cooperating with law enforcement when investigating individual cases. 
This means that (outside of the provisions specified above) companies are 
not legally required to proactively monitor content on their platforms in 
an attempt to prevent bullying. They are also not legally obliged to take 
down content that users report to them as “bullying,” although companies 
can decide to do so if they determine that the reported incident constitutes 
“bullying” in their view and thus goes against their TOS; and they do not 
face penalties if they do not respond to users’ requests in a timely manner.3
Similar high-profile incidents in Australia, however, may have contrib-
uted to creating a piece of legislation that specified the responsibilities of 
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social media companies in addressing cyberbullying (“Charlotte Dawson’s 
death . . .”, 2014). In December 2014, the Australian government intro-
duced a bill into the Parliament that would appoint a Children’s E-safety 
Commissioner who would have the power to order large social media com-
panies to remove offensive material posted online (Lannin, 2014). Under 
the bill, which has since been adopted, titled “Enhancing Online Safety for 
Children Act” (Parliament of Australia, n.d.), if the commissioner deter-
mines that a post should be taken down and a social media company does 
not do so, it faces a fine of $17,000 per day, while individuals face prosecu-
tion under criminal law.4 Parents can file a report on behalf of their children. 
Microsoft and Google opposed the law, and so did the Australian Human 
Rights Commission, citing freedom of speech concerns (Lannin, 2014). At 
the time of this book’s writing, Yahoo!, Facebook, Facebook-owned Insta-
gram, and Twitter would also be affected; however, what were described 
as “smaller” social media companies that did not have local offices and 
employees in Australia, such as Snapchat, would not (Vaas, 2014). One rea-
son, according to the Australian Parliament Secretary for Communications, 
was the impossibility of enforcing laws against overseas firms (“Snapchat 
not covered . . .,” 2014).
Several e-safety experts interviewed stressed that governments interna-
tionally were reluctant to introduce demanding regulation on social media 
and the technology industry for fear of stifling technological innovation 
and driving away technology-associated investments. This concern was 
particularly important for start-ups and less established media companies. I 
discuss the tension between the impulse to introduce Command and Con-
trol regulation and the support for self-regulation in chapters 5 and 6.
Toward a Greater Dignity-Based Policy Debate
As the cases I examined here indicate, the shaping of cyberbullying policies 
of social media companies can take place in a context where this complex 
social and psychological phenomenon is unduly simplified and reductive 
regarding questions of responsibility and blame (Bazelon, 2013b; Milose-
vic, 2015b). In case of Rebecca Sedwick, law enforcement’s decisions to arrest 
minors contributed to the creation of a largely fabricated bullying narrative 
cast in a bully-victim binary.
High-profile cyberbullying incidents can be politicized in nature, and 
can contain elements of technopanics, resulting in laws that can miscon-
strue cyberbullying and raise significant concerns for individual freedoms. 
Such policy-making practices seem to do little in the way of helping youth 
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navigate complex processes of social positioning and building resilience 
while growing up. This conclusion has been voiced by e-safety NGOs and 
experts in some of the congressional testimonies referenced here, but also 
by a number of respondents in this book’s sample as well. Mob vigilante 
actions reinforce and perpetuate these binaries.
Such situations open doors to the process of privatization of the digital 
public sphere as exemplified in social media companies’ cyberbullying poli-
cies, sometimes leaving these companies with little guidance and oversight 
as they struggle to do their best to protect children but also to deflect nega-
tive publicity and regulatory actions against their businesses. As I show 
in the case of Ask .fm, once companies face public pressure, safety policy 
becomes as much an ethical issue as a prerequisite to staying in the social 
media business.
These blame-gaming narratives fail to honor the dignity of every actor 
in this process and thus miss a valuable opportunity to address the heart 
of the problem. Perhaps most importantly, by neglecting to raise questions 
about how contemporary culture normalizes humiliation, these public 
debates fail to examine larger societal issues at play. For instance, rather 
than blaming technology for the problem of cyberbullying, a more dignity-
oriented debate might ask: What makes the culture of humiliation so popular? 
What are humiliation patterns that youth adopt (sometimes by modeling adults 
and media) and reinforce in their own behavior—and consequently in digital 
environments where their lives unfold?

High-profile incidents and their influence on the development of anti-
bullying mechanisms may misleadingly overemphasize the reactive nature 
of regulation and policy developments. In this chapter I look at how the 
concepts of alternative regulatory instruments (ARIs) such as self- and 
co-regulation (Lievens, 2010, 2016) apply to social media companies’ cyber-
bullying policies; I provide an overview of regulatory and historical circum-
stances in which a preference for self-regulation emerged in the US and 
Europe, and end the chapter with a description of self-regulatory initiatives 
relevant to cyberbullying in the US and EU.
Traditional regulation in the US and at the level of the EU does not 
oblige these companies to develop anti-bullying policies and enforcement 
mechanisms. But companies nonetheless develop them on their own, or 
as a consequence of policy makers’ initiatives and encouragement, in an 
effort to exhibit responsible behavior toward their users, parents, educators, 
and other stakeholders. The term “self-regulation” broadly covers these 
initiatives in the context of cyberbullying.1 The historical context in which 
these initiatives emerged, and the rationales behind choosing self-regula-
tion over relying on traditional regulation to make the companies develop 
such policies, are important for understanding the design of anti-bullying 
policies and for assessing their effectiveness.
By no means in this brief chapter can I address the extensive range of 
policy documents that concern protection of minors from harmful content 
online in the EU and the US.2 Nor do I claim to provide a comprehen-
sive recount of differences in self-regulatory efforts in the field of e-safety 
and child protection online in these locations. Rather, I refer only to those 
developments and documents of most immediate relevance for under-
standing cyberbullying policies of social media companies.
5 Industry Self-Regulation in the US and in the EU
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The Promise of Technological Innovation and Investment
Forms of self- and co-regulation that fall under the category of “alternative 
regulatory instruments (ARIs)” (see Lievens, 2010) or “alternative modes of 
regulation” (Latzer, Just, & Saurwein, 2013) have become more widespread 
since the mid-1990s, as galloping Internet development tested the limits 
of traditional regulation (see Lievens, 2010). For instance, consider (among 
many possible examples), that speech deemed illegal in one country can 
be hosted on a website in another where it is legal, thus undermining the 
ability of countries to enforce their national laws in an effective manner or 
to address the problem of editorial responsibility (Newman & Bach, 2004). 
The Vietnam War–era photo that I used to introduce chapter 3 well illus-
trates the relevance of editorial discretion.
A preference for self-regulation in the field of child protection online 
can hardly be understood outside of the context of the stated intent to 
protect digital innovation—self-regulation that serves the industry while 
meeting policy goals. The introduction of safe harbors for online interme-
diaries, such as CDA 230 and similar provisions in the European eCommerce 
Directive, as well as DMCA notice and takedown procedure in the US, were 
born out of the same concerns for innovation.
Historical Context
The historical context behind opting for self-regulation in matters regarding 
free speech and the protection of children from harmful content online 
started to take shape in the early to mid-1990s, with court cases that forced 
regulatory authorities to grapple with changes brought forth by digital 
environments. These changes were outlined in the influential Bangemann 
Report (1994), a study commissioned by European Council and conducted 
by experts, which urged the EU to “put its faith in market mechanisms 
as the motive power to carry us into the Information Age.” The report 
signaled a peril frequently voiced in e-safety-expert circles: new digital tech-
nologies have the potential to render existing regulatory measures obso-
lete. Also decisive, as Elisabeth Staksrud and Sonia Livingstone write, was 
the reasoning that the industry knew its technology best, as parents did 
their children (Staksrud, 2013a, p. 90, cf. Staksrud & Livingstone, 2009). 
This increasing delegation of the burden of responsibility onto parents and 
caregivers, whose often questionable understanding of technology may 
undermine their ability to support their children’s best interests, may be 
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problematic.3 I further examine parental roles in children’s use of technology 
in the upcoming chapters of part II as well as in part III.
In a 1995 high-profile case, the Bavarian government prosecuted Com-
puServe, a major Internet service provider at the time, for its role as a third-
party host of pornography, which was in violation of German obscenity law. 
The case further prompted the European Commission, fearful of the specter 
of “potentially incompatible” national frameworks regulating the Internet 
in Europe, to call for EU-wide solutions that would empower consumers 
by allowing them to filter out undesired content on their own (Newman & 
Bach, 2004, p. 400, cf. Commission of the European Communities, 1996).
United States v. Thomas in 1994 could be seen as the US counterpart to the 
Bavarian case, which saw prosecution of a couple in California that ran an 
online adult bulletin board (Newman & Bach, 2004). Congress then stepped 
in with the Communications Decency Act (CDA, see chapter 3), which came 
into force in January 1996 only to be struck down by the Supreme Court a 
year later, in ACLU v. Reno. The full act defined the concept of indecency too 
broadly, and the reversal served as an alert against overly stringent govern-
ment intervention, leaving only CDA 230 in place.
Although regulation may be difficult to define specifically, it can be 
said to refer to “various means of achieving public policy objectives” (e.g., 
reducing children’s experience of bullying) (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 77). These 
means may include Command and Control regulation (commonly defined 
as the regulation of an activity through legislation that states what is legal 
and what is not and specifies sanctions, and also referred to as “classical” 
or “traditional” regulation) or various forms of ARIs such as co-regulation 
and self-regulation (Lievens, 2010).4 It is, in essence, a function of corporate 
policy and practice development to ensure that the way a company con-
ducts its business is within public policy parameters.
Limitations of Traditional Regulation
In light of the challenges of constantly evolving technology, Command and 
Control regulation is said to run the danger of not only being “rigid” but 
also “suffering from a knowledge gap” (McLaughlin, 2013, pp. 78–79), 
as it provides little space for input from non-state actors (such as NGOs, 
consumers and citizens, and independent experts). If the industry agrees 
on a public policy objective, then there is a greater likelihood of compli-
ance, but also increased cost-efficiency for the state, as parts of the costs 
are transferred to other actors (such as industry or NGOs) (de Haan, van 
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der Hof, Bekkers, & Pijpers, 2013). Robert Madelin, the former director-
general of the European Commission, who has extensive experience in self-
regulation, cites the successful self-regulatory efforts in the food advertising 
industry, whereby provision of nutrition labeling was the desired goal:
There was a stage at which some of the very big [industry] players decided to give nu-
tritional information—product by product—and they did this thing, which public 
health groups [e.g., NGOs and independent experts] were asking for, faster than the 
legislator could create a legal obligation to do so. So that, for me, is the proof of [the] 
concept [of effective self-regulation]—if you get the right way to get the consensus, 
companies are able to do this thing for which there is an agreement [public policy 
objective] faster than the law could do it. (Madelin, personal communication with 
the author, September 5, 2016)
“International forum shopping” is another limitation of traditional regu-
lation; it refers to “ascertaining the jurisdiction with the most favorable legal 
regime for a particular activity and the anchoring of that activity within 
that particular regime” (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 79). Hence, in theory, if 
a country had a cyberbullying law with negative implications for online 
intermediaries, companies could escape it by anchoring their activity else-
where. Consider that the Australian cyberbullying law (mentioned in chap-
ter 4), which demanded that companies take down cyberbullying content 
upon request from the Children’s E-safety Commissioner, was said to apply 
only to companies that had “Australian employees or advertising revenue” 
(Vaas, 2014, para. 3). This is why developing a set of industry-wide stan-
dards and getting the industry to agree on them is seen as a more effective 
approach.
While these views on the downsides of Command and Control regula-
tion may not be entirely agreed upon (see, e.g., Svantesson, 2005), they 
seem to have opened up the space to a preference for self-regulation when 
it comes to the social media industry.
Differences in the US and the EU Self-Regulatory Environments
Some authors argue that the tension between different government branches 
in the US (namely judicial and legislative) leads to a form of “regulatory 
uncertainty,” a term that can be seen as a defining feature of the self-
regulatory system in the US (Newman & Bach, 2004, p. 401). For instance, 
while the striking of the CDA resulted in a preference in the executive 
branch toward industry solutions and filtering—which had been pursued 
in the EU—the legislative branch in the US responded with another set of 
restrictive regulations—the Child Online Protection Act (COPA, struck 
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down in 1998, and which was the precursor to Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act) and the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of 2000. 
CIPA is still in place, and it mandates all US schools and libraries that wish 
to receive funding from specific federal government programs to use online 
filtering aimed at protecting children online (Federal Communications 
Commission, 2016).5
Hence, despite a seeming agreement in both the EU and US that ARIs 
were necessary, the approach to implementation of these differed. In the 
US, some authors suggest, self-regulation became largely reactive and enacted 
“through the threat of stringent formal rules and costly litigation, should 
industry fail to deliver socially desirable outcomes”—resulting in “legalistic 
self-regulation” (Newman & Bach, 2004, p. 388). On the other hand, in 
Europe, the public sector (through the voice of the European Commission) 
engaged proactively with the industry through meetings and agreements 
on “a joint course of action,” or so-called “coordinated self-regulation” 
(p. 391). While Europeans might interpret self-regulation in the US as lais-
sez-faire, to Americans self-regulation in Europe may appear as government 
intervention (p. 406). However, rather than intervention, the EU approach 
may be better seen as “a guided or directed legal framework which actively 
fosters and encourages self-regulation” (p. 176). This look at the disparities 
of implementation of otherwise agreed-upon principles of regulation fur-
ther illustrates the complexities of developing viable regulatory policies for 
the global social media industry.
In the EU, self-regulatory initiatives in the area of child online safety 
(which encompass cyberbullying) were actively fostered and convened 
by the European Commission (EC) via programs such as Safer Internet for 
Children, while such standing convening initiatives in the US were, to a 
great extent, wanting. Thus the EC actively fostered the creation of the 
several initiatives and coalitions: the Safer Social Networking Principles 
initiative; the CEO Coalition (even the description of the initiative said 
that the EC vice president and the companies agreed to “cooperate—not 
compete—for a Better Internet for Kids”) (Digital Single Market, 2014); and 
the ICT Coalition (all discussed later in the chapter). These were all efforts 
to convene major industry players not only from the EU but also from the 
US—given that this was where the leading social media companies came 
from—such as Google (YouTube) and Facebook.
In the US, on the other hand, such convening initiatives can only be 
found in few examples. One is Online Safety and Technology Working 
Group (Collier & Nigam, 2010) at the Department of Commerce in 2010.6 
Another is the Internet Safety Technical Task Force at the Berkman Klein 
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Center for Internet and Society in 2008, which was convened pursuant to 
investigations revealing that MySpace had inadequate safety measures in 
place (Berkman, 2008, 2010; National Association of Attorneys General, 
2008). Hence, in the US, self-regulatory initiatives relevant to cyberbullying 
regulation tend to be more sporadic and reactive—resulting from investi-
gations or threats of legal interventions—whereas the EU has what could 
perhaps be described as a more unified regulatory voice (i.e., the EC) whose 
aim is to bargain for consensus. In the US, attorneys general (AGs) may 
investigate individual companies on their own and the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) can also initiate actions (at least when privacy is concerned) 
(Bodley, 2014; Maryland Attorney General, 2014; New York State Attorney 
General, 2014). Nonetheless, as some authors observe, the FTC is “severely 
limited in its ability to manage business practices proactively” relying on 
“reactive strategy” designed to “produce large cost for firms that take the 
wrong step” (Newman & Bach, 2004, p. 405).
Legalistic Self-Regulation: The Case of Facebook
Consider that in 2007, the AG of New York State reached a settlement with 
Facebook (then only a three-year-old company), which provided guide-
lines for the creation of some of the mechanisms discussed in chapter 6 
(Mathews, 2007; McMillan, 2007). The office of the AG was investigating 
the company based on allegations that it had failed to meet the claims made 
to the public about protecting minors. Facebook denied any wrongdoing.
While this action did not seem to take place specifically in response to 
cyberbullying or a high-profile cyberbullying case, the provisions reached as 
part of the agreement address, among other issues, abuse and harassment on 
the platform. The company pledged to make its safety efforts publicly avail-
able on its website, to address complaints of harassment via links and email 
designated specifically for that purpose, and to handle complaints in 72 hours.
Most importantly, the AG was to approve a third-party office called the 
Independent Safety and Security Examiner whose purpose was to evalu-
ate complaints in reference to Facebook’s handling of abuse reports, but I 
could not find the evidence of the work that this body produced.
What could be described as a robust abuse reporting and community man-
agement system (see also chapter 6), has gradually emerged and significantly 
developed at Facebook since 2007. As the company became more established, 
its relationship with regulators moved toward a more collaborative one, with 
fewer investigative instances of this kind. With Maryland’s attorney general it 
proposed to launch a pilot project called the Educator Escalation Channel in 
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2012, when Facebook was an eight-year-old, more established company; the 
project can be seen as a particularly good example of how established compa-
nies can develop a more collaborative relationship with regulators.
Established Companies: Toward More Collaborative Patterns
As a pilot project the Educator Escalation Channel was designed to work 
with schools to “streamline reporting of potential cyberbullying occurrences 
on Facebook that may not be resolved through Facebook’s normal process 
or [which may] demand more immediate attention” (Maryland Attorney 
General, 2013). According to an informant from the AG office in Maryland, 
at the time of its proposed launch in 2012, the Educator Escalation Chan-
nel was not a response to perceived ineffectiveness of Facebook’s report-
ing tools; rather, Facebook officials felt that their systems and processes 
in place for cyberbullying reports were already strong. Whether Facebook 
initiated the move, or the AG did, was not clearly specified.
This project would allow schools the opportunity to “escalate” a case to 
the company’s attention.7 Every school system in Maryland identified one 
point person, whom all schoolteachers should be familiar with, to be respon-
sible for direct communication with Facebook. If the schoolteachers noticed 
a case of cyberbullying, they were first urged to report it to Facebook using 
its regular reporting service for abusive content. If the issue was then not 
resolved within 24 hours, they could contact the designated point person for 
their school district who could then escalate it to Facebook. Facebook was 
testing this project in Maryland and, according to a representative from the 
attorney general’s office, the company intended to implement it throughout 
the country. The project had no government funding; Facebook covered all 
costs, which were described as minimal.
The project could result in a faster resolution of those subtle bullying 
cases in which the company may not have sufficient evidence to establish 
it as one that constitutes cyberbullying. For instance, if throughout a bul-
lying incident a number of students call their classmate a “cow,” and then 
several of them write “Moo” on the classmate’s wall, Facebook may not be 
able to establish that such a seemingly benign comment represents bully-
ing. However, a teacher witnessing bullying on school premises may trace 
its connection to the incident on Facebook, and use the Educator Escala-
tion Channel to try to ensure that the content is taken down.
Nonetheless, there did not seem to be any evidence to suggest that the 
company launched this project in an effort to avert legislation or a lawsuit, 
although when the Educator Escalation Channel was in the development 
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stage, online bullying and harassment appeared to be an important area of 
concern for the AG, particularly in 2012.
In 2013, a cyberbullying law called Grace’s Law, which stipulated that 
bullying someone under the age of 18 could lead to a fine of up to $500, or 
up to one year in prison (Ames, 2013), was passed in Maryland in response to 
the bullying case of 15-year-old Grace McComas, who committed suicide 
in April 2012. This high-profile incident might have put the public pressure 
on regulators in the state to take action, thus providing additional, politi-
cal incentives for the development of the Educator Escalation Channel in 
order to demonstrate to the public that the regulators were indeed doing 
their best to address future suicides. At this time, Facebook had been con-
sidering opening up their site to children under 13 (Troianovski & Raice, 
2012). Although the company had nonetheless decided not to pursue that 
option, word of it might have drawn further attention to the company. The 
AG reported being in close conversation with Facebook at the time (Com-
municators with Doug Gansler, 2012).
It appears that, rather than resulting from potential confrontation, the 
company partnership with the regulator was very cooperative, illustrating 
an evolutionary pattern in industry-regulator relationships as companies 
became more established—away from adversarial and toward more collab-
orative patterns.
The project characterized Facebook’s effort to make the reporting of abu-
sive content on the site more effective by personalizing it (by providing 
schools with direct personal contact with the company). But, if direct com-
munication with Facebook had been an option available to all teachers, 
rather than to just the point people designated as “escalators,” the company 
may have been flooded with reporting requests, the opposite effect of what 
had been intended with the project.
 Language that reflects the benefits a company offers its users—expressed 
in terms like “personalization” and “intimacy”—helps to ensure the effec-
tiveness of a company’s enforcement policy, just as it serves the additional 
purpose of making the work of the company more streamlined and effi-
cient. In chapter 6, I examine the relationship between a company’s policy 
effectiveness and its efficiency.
Protecting Online Intermediaries from Liability—Ensuring Innovation
Several pieces of legislation enacted from mid-1990s to the early 2000s in 
the US and EU reflected the recognition that technological development 
and market competitiveness needed to be protected by shielding online 
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intermediaries from liability, thus providing various forms of safe harbors 
for online intermediaries. I discuss two of them below.
Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive)
The European E-Commerce Directive8 provides liability protections for online 
intermediaries in the way the CDA 230 does in the US: on the grounds of 
companies being intermediaries only, having no knowledge of illegal con-
tent, and when given awareness or knowledge, promptly removing it (Direc-
tive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council).
However, as the legal scholars Urs Gasser and Wolfgang Schulz argue, 
unlike Section 230, the protections that the E-Commerce Directive ensures 
are limited. The system does not cover injunctions, for example. And there 
is a degree of uncertainty about how to apply exemptions which in turn 
relates to uncertainties about how to classify various social media compa-
nies, given that the Directive specifies only “abstract prototypes,” such as 
“caching providers” or “host providers” (Gasser & Schulz, 2015) or as a 
“mere conduit” (Angelopoulos, 2013) for others’ content. These circum-
stances resulted in a degree of fragmentation in applying liability exemptions 
(Gasser & Schulz, 2015).
Most of the companies I analyze for this book, however, originated 
in a non-EU or “third country” (i.e., the US) and are established there, 
which would imply that the E-Commerce Directive does not apply to 
them (Wauters, Lievens, & Valcke, 2016, p. 40). But if the companies “pro-
vide their services in the EU market,” and “operate in the EU,” and “have 
their offices and personnel in the EU,” then they “could possibly fall under 
the scope of the E-Commerce Directive” (Wauters, Lievens, & Valcke, 2016, 
p. 240).
The E-Commerce Directive provides basic guidelines for illegal content. It 
does not explicitly regulate liability for content that can be harmful to minors 
(and online bullying can be an example of such content). For the content 
that can be harmful to minors, the Directive encourages, but does not make 
obligatory, “codes of conduct for the protection of minors and human dig-
nity” (Wauters et al., 2016, p. 242). Although social media companies can 
voluntarily introduce “editorial control” in the form of filters, for instance, 
some scholars argue that such actions are “risky” because companies can then 
“be assumed to be active instead of passive players and may consequently lose 
their exemption from liability” (Wauters et al., 2016, p. 242, cf. Lievens, 2010, 
p. 361). One can legitimately wonder to what extent companies are editorial-
izing already with various examples of decisions I discuss in this book, and 
numerous content-related interventions I outline in chapter 6.
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US implemented two 1996 
treaties of the World Intellectual Copyright Organization (WIPO) and crim-
inalized circumvention of technologies designed to protect digital copies of 
copyrighted materials (software, music, or video). This gave rise to numer-
ous high-profile lawsuits against young people and their caregivers (Mont-
gomery, 2007).
DMCA Section 512 shields intermediaries from liability for copyright 
infringements on their networks as long as they “promptly” (Civic Impulse, 
2016) block or remove infringing content once notified. They need to do so 
“without trying to assess the lawfulness of the contents at stake,” and yet they 
must provide content creators with an opportunity to complain, “unless copy-
right holders file an action seeking a court order” (Stalla-Bourdillon, 2009, p. 
156); this dynamic is sometimes referred to as “mandatory self-regulation.”
Types of ARIs—Pros and Cons
One might be hard-pressed, as the legal scholar Eva Lievens has noted, to find 
an agreed-upon definition for the terms “self-regulation” and “co-regulation,” 
but the numerous options contain similar elements. Bearing in mind these 
definition-related difficulties, Lievens made a useful suggestion for overcom-
ing such disagreements by using “ARIs” (alternative regulatory instruments), 
a term that captures the way self-regulation (with little or no government 
involvement) moves in a continuum toward co-regulation with increasing 
government intervention (Lievens, 2010). Individual drafters of these instru-
ments, and the experts who advocate them, can then explain what their spe-
cific example entails but still refer to them under the broad category of ARIs.
Some scholars, for instance, have grouped alternative regulatory instru-
ments by the range of actions and characteristics they encompass, such 
as: “co-regulation,” “state-supported self-regulation,” “collective industry 
self-regulation,” “single company self-organization,” and even “self-help 
restriction by users including rankings to impose restrictions on access to 
content” (Marsden, 2012, p. 215, see also Latzer, Price, Saurwein, & Ver-
hulst, 2007). In the following sections I examine the pros and cons of 
self- and co-regulation, as well as how they both overlap and vary.
Self-Regulation
Eva Lievens defines self-regulation as including “the creation, implementa-
tion and enforcement of rules by a group of actors, industry in particular, 
with minimal or no intervention by the state” (Lievens, 2016, p. 77, cf. 
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Lievens, 2010). But, as I mention above, scholars tend to vary their descrip-
tions of the term’s parameters.
Some emphasize that self-regulation tends to involve more than one 
company and thus define it this way: “collective, voluntary activity involv-
ing market participants who agree to abide by joint rules much like a club 
membership” (Latzer et al., 2013, p. 376).9 Others argue that this voluntary 
industry self-regulation can involve one company only and can refer to “cor-
porate governance and corporate social responsibility” and is sometimes 
called “self-organization” (Latzer et al., 2013, p. 376) or “individualized self-
regulation” (Puppis, 2010, p. 141, cf. Black, 1996).
In self-regulation, the state refrains from intervening in the regulatory 
process “assuming that social mechanisms will ensure that the objectives 
of regulation are met,” and that with such a broad definition, even the 
market “may be considered a form of self-regulation” (Schulz and Held 2004, 
p. 6). Wolfgang Schulz and Thorsten Held (2004) thus broadly characterize 
self-regulation as explicit or intentional (where one or more actors agree to 
observe sets of rules or define codes of conduct) and implicit (where the 
regulatory outcome is not a result of actors’ intentions and is influenced by 
market and corporate culture).10
Not everyone would agree: ARIs in general, some authors argue, are none-
theless “distinct from pure market coordination driven by the private inter-
ests of individuals and organizations, because regulation refers to intentional 
restraints on the conduct of market players with the goal of achieving public 
objectives” (Latzer et al., 2013, p. 376, emphasis added). And so self-regulation 
itself may be a “misnomer” in this view, “because self-regulation by the indus-
try only rarely exists without a contribution from the state” (p. 377).
Co-regulation
Co-regulation, on the other hand is thus conceptualized as a way to imple-
ment the law, a rather “top-down approach” whereas self-regulation is 
“bottom-up” as “an alternative to regulation” (Lievens, 2010, p. 169 cf. Sen-
den, 2005).11
The scholars Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone (2012) note that in both 
self- and co-regulation “firms set their own standards and police their own 
activities as reputable firms, often under the guidance of trade associations” 
(p. 24, e-book edition). They nonetheless propose four characteristics of 
co-regulation:
1. “The system is established to achieve public policy goals targeted at social 
processes.”
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2. “There is a legal connection between the non-state regulatory system 
and the state regulation.”
3. “The state leaves discretionary power to a non-state regulatory system.”
4. “The state uses regulatory resources to influence the outcome of the 
regulatory process (to guarantee the fulfillment of the regulatory goals).” 
(Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, p. 24, citing Held, 2007, p. 357)
Lunt and Livingstone contend that under the conditions where the second 
and the fourth feature are not present, the system becomes self-regulatory.
Self-Regulation in the Context of Cyberbullying Policies
In the context of the cyberbullying policies and enforcement mechanisms 
that I discuss in chapter 6, one can observe that a number of individual 
companies I analyze in this book have never participated in any explicit, 
voluntary, industry-wide initiative (convened by either a government body 
or an industry association) either in the US or in the EU, whereby they 
would explicitly commit to agreed-upon measures to prevent bullying on 
their platforms. This is not to say that they have no anti-bullying policies 
and enforcement mechanisms—on the contrary.
Some of these companies created anti-bullying policies by learning from 
the more established companies, whether through existing industry good 
practice guides or discussions at e-safety conferences (UK Council for Child 
Internet Safety, 2010). Or, they were sparked by high-profile cyberbullying 
incidents, or, indeed, by fearing possibilities of future incidents or nega-
tive publicity in relationship to bullying. Hence, it could be said that they 
did so through market mechanisms because they were pursuing their private 
interests as organizations (by assuming corporate social responsibility—even 
when they prefer not to label their efforts as CSR) and they never formally 
committed to preventing bullying on their platforms as part of a public policy goal 
within a self- or co-regulatory initiative.
Only a handful of companies out of the 14 I analyze in this book partici-
pated in any self-regulatory initiative in the US and EU relevant to bullying 
(e.g., the Safer Social Networking Principles, the CEO Coalition, the ICT 
Coalition, or the Internet Safety Task Force). Hence, when discussing TOS 
and other corporate policies that refer to bullying, I use the term “private 
regulation” or “self-organization” rather than “self-regulation.” The more 
established companies (see chapter 6) have been part of self-regulatory ini-
tiatives in the US and EU that formulated the first industry-wide standards 
for bullying intervention (e.g., reporting mechanisms), which many of the 
younger companies then informally adopted via corporate social responsi-
bility efforts, rather than by formal self-regulatory initiatives.12
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Drawbacks of ARIs
Despite the stated advantages, self-regulation and other ARIs can have 
several drawbacks that are particularly relevant to consider. These include 
insufficiently effective enforcement, limited sanctions for those that fail 
to abide by agreed-upon pledges, less transparency and accountability—all 
of which can contribute to ordinary citizens’ general sense of democratic 
deficit and an inaccessibility to regulatory procedures (de Haan et al., 2013; 
McLauglin, 2013; Latzer et al., 2013).
Also, favoring private interests over public interests is a particular concern 
(consider this point in reference to citizen vs. consumer rights in chapters 
7, 8, and 9); assigning too much responsibility to the industry, especially to 
key industry actors, can lead to privatized governance and the potential for 
having too much influence over the regulatory process (Tambini, Leonardi, 
& Masden, 2008; Lievens, 2010; McLaughlin, 2013).
Regulation by Raised Eyebrow and Regulatory Legitimacy
Proper monitoring and regular public reporting was an essential feature for any self-
regulatory system to be effective. And that remains a central plank in the (European) 
Commission’s doctrine on self-regulation. (Robert Madelin, Director General, Eu-
ropean Commission DG Connect, 2010–2015, personal communication with the 
author, September 5, 2016)
The importance of monitoring and evaluating the success of ARIs is per-
haps best illustrated by the description of self-regulation as “regulation by 
raised eyebrow”—meaning that when policy makers are dissatisfied with 
an issue they indicate in an ambiguous way the possibility of legislative 
intervention, which acts as an incentive for industry to improve its efforts 
(McLaughlin, 2013).
The European Commission outlined the following guidelines in a 2006 
report:
Making public the key performance indicators will reassure public opinion that the 
system is working effectively. Independent evaluations carried from time to time 
out by external institutions to measure SROs (self-regulatory organizations) against 
objectives can also reinforce public opinion perception. (Report of the Round Table 
on Advertising, 2006, pp. 19–20)
In chapter 6, I pay particular attention to whether social media companies 
make their “key performance indicators,” or standards of effectiveness of 
anti-bullying mechanisms, available to the public.
If ARIs are not transparent, and if there is little evidence of their effec-
tiveness, then their legitimacy can come into question. “Input legitimacy” 
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refers to how an alternative regulatory instrument embodies “democratic 
standards such as participation and accountability,” for example of citi-
zens, consumers, NGOs, the public.13 (See chapter 7, where I discuss this in 
the context of NGO ability to provide independent voice.) “Output legiti-
macy” refers to whether (or the extent to which) alternative regulatory 
modes are able “to contribute to the achievement of public objectives,” 
and “hence [why] performance evaluation is a central but rather difficult 
task for research” (Latzer et al., 2007; Latzer et al., 2013, p. 375).
In light of the professed importance of regular monitoring and evalu-
ation, there have been surprisingly few independent evaluations of self-
regulatory effectiveness (that which concerns cyberbullying) within the US 
and EU. A continuous independent evaluation that would assess the effec-
tiveness of the companies’ anti-bullying efforts—and how that effective-
ness might be defined—does not seem to exist. Policy makers sometimes 
cite unavailability of funding—the issue of who would pay for evaluation 
when, in times of austerity, it can be difficult to gather funds for evaluat-
ing even Command and Control regulation, let alone ARIs. Some policy 
makers might find an evaluation of the effectiveness of a company’s anti-
bullying enforcement mechanisms, which company pays a third party to 
conduct, as an “independent audit.”14 It should be argued that a stricter 
criterion for independent evaluation depends on it being commissioned by 
a regulator and not paid for or executed by the company itself.
The European Commission raised the issue of “inconsistency” and 
“ineffectiveness” of self-regulatory measures in its 2011 report on the 
implementation of recommendations made in 1998 and 2006 regarding 
the protection of minors and human dignity. Although the EC maintained 
its commitment to self-regulation, it indicated that legislation would be 
considered if self-regulation failed to deliver (McLaughlin, 2013, p. 87).
Examples of Self-Regulatory Initiatives
Some examples of self-regulatory initiatives in the EU that concern digi-
tal bullying include the Safer Social Networking Principles (SSNP), the 
CEO Coalition, and the ICT Coalition for Children Online, with notable 
involvement of NGOs and e-safety experts. These initiatives typically work 
by pledging the signatory companies that become initiative members to 
uphold specific agreed-upon standards or principles regarding child or teen 
protection online. A number of signatory companies may not be social 
media companies necessarily but broadly belong to the ICT sector, such as 
telecoms and ISPs.
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Within SSNP, the following principles were of direct relevance to cyber-
bullying: “raising awareness of safety education messages and acceptable 
use policies to users, parents, teachers and caregivers in a prominent, clear 
and age-appropriate manner,” “work[ing] towards ensuring that the services 
are age-appropriate for the intended audience,” “providing easy-to-use mech-
anisms to report conduct or content that violates the Terms of Service,” and 
“assessing the means for reviewing illegal or prohibited content/conduct” 
(European Commission, 2009).
Independent evaluation of mechanisms that social media companies 
provide to address bullying was conducted as part of two self-regulatory 
frameworks in the EU and one self-regulatory initiative in the US. As part 
of SSNP, independent researchers analyzed self-declaration statements 
and tested a number of services offered by these companies (Staksrud & 
Lobe, 2010). A follow-up evaluation was conducted a year later (Donoso, 
2011). The goal was to examine the extent to which the signatory social 
media websites adhered to the principles they had signed as part of that 
self-regulatory effort. Of the 14 websites studied by the independent 
researchers— just Facebook and YouTube overlap with the 14 I analyzed 
for this book— evaluations overall found that the companies were slow to 
respond to users’ complaints (Staksrud & Lobe, 2010; Donoso, 2011).
While the overall findings for Facebook concluded that the company 
had implemented most of these self-regulatory principles “very satisfac-
torily” or at least “rather satisfactorily” (Donoso, 2011), the findings also 
indicate that “reports of inappropriate content/contact are not answered,” 
“the mechanisms to avoid re-registration of underage users are inefficient,” 
“not all sections in the Terms of Service are easy for children to under-
stand,” and there was a “lack of concrete information, especially targeted 
at children on the consequences of breaching the terms” (Donoso, 2011, 
p. 24). These findings go back to 2010 and 2011, and are by now dated, 
especially because youth have migrated to new platforms in the meantime.
The most recent independent evaluation in the EU was conducted as 
part of the ICT Coalition for Children Online in 2014 (ICT Coalition, n.d.; 
O’Neill, 2014b). Among the signatory companies included in this sample 
were Ask .fm, Google (Google+ and YouTube), Facebook, and Twitter. The 
ICT Coalition agreed to honor six principles concerning the protection of 
minors using their services, among which Principle 3, “Dealing with abuse/
misuse,” asks companies to develop the capacity to report abusive content 
and ensure that they “implement appropriate procedures for reviewing user 
reports” (ICT Coalition, n.d., Principles, p. 2). Principle 6, among other pro-
visions, asked companies “to provide access to information that will help 
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educate parents, caregivers, teachers and children about media literacy and 
ethical digital citizenship” (ICT Coalition, n.d., Principles, p. 4), which is 
best reflected in companies’ development of Safety and Help Centers, which 
I discuss in chapter 7. The evaluation of this initiative pointed to the need 
for improvement in reporting in reference to mobile platforms. But in this 
case, although the evaluation was said to provide testing and evaluation of 
site safety (see O’Neill, 2014b, Methodology, p. 62–63), it did not carry out 
actual tests on the tools provided by the companies (Lievens, 2016).
Neither was testing of the sites conducted as part of Internet Safety 
Technical Task Force (Berkman Center for Internet & Society 2008, 2010), 
which convened at Harvard University’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
and Society. This self-regulatory initiative resulted from the settlement of a 
group of state attorneys general with MySpace (Berkman Center for Inter-
net & Society, 2010); it is one of the few self-regulatory initiatives relevant 
to bullying in the US that involved some form of independent evaluation. 
The companies that were members of the Task Force, among them the 
social networking sites Facebook, MySpace, and Bebo, were asked to deliver 
an overview of e-safety measures they were providing on their platforms 
at the time, including those to prevent harassment or bullying. The Task 
Force concluded that all eight social networking sites that participated in 
the Task Force evaluation provided technological tools for users to report 
abusive content.
If a website reported that it was committed to handling all reports of 
incidents within 24 hours, however, such specific information was not 
tested. The results of the Task Force’s study were published in the end of 
2008 (Berkman Center for Internet & Society, 2008), and since that time 
the social media landscape has significantly changed. As of the writing of 
this book, there have been no other government-initiated efforts of this 
scope that have asked social media companies to provide a description 
of measures they were taking to address bullying on their platforms; and 
which would then also include an independent evaluation of these social 
media companies’ efforts.
One of the few initiatives of this kind in the US, the 2010 Online Safety 
and Technology Working Group (Collier & Nigam, 2010), convened by the 
US Department of Commerce, did analyze the industry’s e-safety efforts, 
but its goal was not to provide an independent evaluation of the social media 
companies’ cyberbullying policies. The Working Group included assistance 
from prominent members of the e-safety NGO community in the US, some 
of which I interviewed for this book.
Industry Self-Regulation in the US and in the EU 103
Toward Mechanisms of Value to Children and Young Users
A continuous (“standing”) independent evaluation does not exist either in 
the US or in the EU. Two factors contribute to the lack of a sustained study. 
First, given the fast-paced development of technology and children’s shift-
ing preferences, a number of sites tested in the studies referenced above 
are no longer the most popular social networking sites for children (e.g., 
MySpace and Bebo), and the majority of social networking platforms that 
are popular with children as of this writing in 2016 and 2017—Instagram, 
Snapchat, or Kik, to name just a few—have never been subject to evalu-
ation in this manner. Second, although the study produced by the ICT 
Coalition was relatively recent (2014), it only evaluated two of the four 
social networking sites or companies that provide such services (Facebook 
and Google), even though the other two (Ask .fm and Twitter) were listed as 
members at the time of this writing (see O’Neill, 2014b).15
Third and most importantly, the usefulness of these mechanisms has 
not thus far been independently tested with children and young users. Hence 
the issue at stake is not only whether the companies have the promised 
mechanisms in place and whether these mechanisms are doing what the 
companies state they are doing—although this is an important issue—but 
also whether young users find these mechanisms useful and effective in 
solving bullying issues and why this may or may not be the case.

It was a sunny Sunday morning in November 2014. I was standing in front 
of a building in San Francisco, eyeing one of the many floors on which 
the start-up company I was hoping to interview should have been located. 
I had tweeted its representative earlier—having found no personal email 
addresses on the app site—and he was more than kind to answer (some-
thing that few did when contacted without a reference). He gave me his 
address, to which I emailed the interview questions. After several back and 
forth attempts and little success in setting up a mutually convenient time for 
the interview, the representative sent a brief message: “I should have some 
time on Sunday,” he wrote, leaving me wondering when on Sunday, exactly, 
because that day would be the last one of my stay in the city. So, I took 
my chances by showing up at the doorstep of the building, semi-uninvited, 
thrilled to recognize the name of the company on the intercom. I rang the 
bell and began to explain myself after hearing a male voice at the other end. 
He let me in, into what I remember as a light, spacious office that belied the 
covert reputation the company had acquired in the media.
This story reflects substantially more availability than I experienced in my 
early attempts to interview people from many other companies; it seemed 
nearly impossible to reach the human beings behind generic contact info on 
websites, never mind finding a company phone number. Of course, social 
media representatives are too busy to talk to researchers—imagine if they had 
to answer dozens or hundreds of queries (or more?) from researchers daily—
and I acknowledge how impractical that would be. When I was allowed in, 
I considered myself lucky, even when I learned very little.
The person whose kind willingness to help began to open the industry’s 
doors for me was Sonia Livingstone, a professor at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. As a well-known academic and founder of 
the EU Kids Online, a network of more than 150 researchers in 33 countries 
in Europe who research children and digital media, Livingstone reached 
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out to some of the company representatives and e-safety experts, asking if 
she could put me in touch regarding the interviews.
Until then, I had not fully appreciated the extent of nontransparent 
behavior, perhaps best exemplified in the widespread practice of non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs) that many companies would ask visitors to 
sign upon entering their premises, and an overall lack of perception of 
any obligation to explain their operational policies to the public. Several 
e-safety advisers to companies told me that they, too, had to sign NDAs; 
even they were not always privy to companies’ operational policies. If the 
advisers were expected to provide critiques on companies’ policies, they 
may have found it difficult to fulfill their role under such circumstances. 
It further appeared that this situation was accepted as the (perhaps lam-
entable) “way things are” in the community of e-safety experts (with few 
exceptions: see Carr, 2013b), NGOs, policy advisers, and regulators.
In the context of the differences between legalistic versus coordinated self-
regulation discussed in chapter 5 (Newman & Bach, 2004), some policy advis-
ers in the EU thought that just getting the US companies to the table as part 
of the self-regulatory effort had been a significant sign of accomplishment— 
given that such actions were not something that the US companies had 
necessarily been accustomed to. Soliciting the good will and cooperation 
from the industry, as one e-safety expert observed, was important for the 
EU’s economic competitiveness. But asking US companies to provide more 
transparency might have been too high of a bar, especially given that they 
were regarded primarily as private businesses—and less as public utilities or 
venues where the public sphere unfolds.
As I explained in earlier chapters, each company tailors its intervention 
and prevention tools to its specific technological affordances, but there are no 
written rules or minimum standards to which every company must adhere. 
These minimum standards and sometimes very elaborate policy and enforce-
ment mechanisms tend to emerge nonetheless as part of the self-regulatory 
and self-organizational efforts that I analyze in this chapter.
Broader questions I pose about this process include: What can be known 
about the companies’ efforts to address cyberbullying and about the com-
panies’ policy enforcement mechanisms? What do companies consider as 
an effective policy and enforcement mechanism, and why? What assump-
tions about the nature and occurrence of bullying on their platforms do 
companies’ documents and representatives make? How do they explain the 
rationales about the particular tools of enforcement they use and react to 
perceived ineffectiveness?
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What Does It Mean to Moderate Content?
In the summer of 2016, YouTube came under fire when some of its pop-
ular channels accused the company of having “vague” TOS and “a selec-
tive approach to moderation” (Kiberd, 2016). (Companies use in-house or 
outsourced employees as moderators, whose role is to look into content 
reported for TOS or Community Guidelines/Standards/Rules violations 
and decide which action to take if the content is determined to violate the 
company policy.) The allegations made by the channels were elaborated 
in a video titled “The YouTube Rant (I’m getting banned off YouTube),” 
which allegedly inspired many others of its kind. The video—which had 
been uploaded by what a news article posted on the Vice Media platform 
Motherboard described as an “already infamous” YouTube “’commentary’ 
channel” called LeafyIsHere—had at that time already gathered more than 
5 million views (LeafyIsHere, 2016). According to the article, it had previously 
been common to see smaller channels shut down for “roasting”1 and “occa-
sional parody,” whereas bigger channels “consistently . . . got away with it” 
(Kiberd, 2016). In an apparent change of policy, however, YouTube was now 
said to have become stricter in its moderation practices and perhaps more 
consistent, given the video’s allegation that now even some bigger channels 
were receiving warnings and restrictions on their platform activity (so-
called strikes) for violating its Community Guidelines (Kiberd, 2016).
The interplay of any platform’s business model with its policies on tak-
ing down abusive content may be difficult to discern, and it is a particularly 
interesting question that seems rarely discussed in public. For instance, 
does the shutting down of widely popular accounts or removal of their 
content negatively affect any platform’s commercial interests, and if so, to 
what extent and in which ways? I raise questions such as these throughout 
this chapter.
Problems regarding the ways in which moderation is put into practice 
with respect to abuse, harassment, and bullying are by no means peculiar 
to YouTube; most companies struggle with these behaviors in one way or 
another.
Definitions, Behaviors, and Levels of Transparency
Most social media platforms include some sort of anti-bullying, anti-abuse, 
or anti-harassment provisions in their TOS or other corporate documents, 
whether they’re labeled Community Standards, Community Guidelines, 
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Rules, or Principles. (Some companies do not make any references to “com-
munity,” however, a factor that notably emerged in my analysis.)
Such documents rarely provide a more specific or detailed level of expla-
nation for what these companies consider to be “bullying” on their plat-
forms. Some companies provide examples of related behaviors that they 
consider to be “bullying,” such as “abuse” or “harassment,” but these 
instances are less common. A company may sometimes elaborate on bully-
ing in its Safety or Help Center, but, as I discuss later in the chapter, not all 
companies have Safety Centers.
Some corporate documents that did stipulate examples include the 
following:
Twitter: “Some of the factors that we may consider when evaluating abu-
sive behavior include: if a primary purpose of the reported account is to 
harass or send abusive messages to others; if the reported behavior is one-
sided or includes threats; if the reported account is inciting others to harass 
another account; and if the reported account is sending harassing messages 
to an account from multiple accounts” (Twitter, 2016d).
Facebook: “We don’t tolerate bullying or harassment. We allow you to 
speak freely on matters and people of public interest, but remove content 
that appears to purposefully target private individuals with the intention 
of degrading and shaming them” (Facebook, 2016f).
Facebook had been updating its Community Standards to provide more 
specific explanations of what the company considered to be “bullying and 
harassment,” The document explains further:
This content includes, but it is not limited to: pages that identify or shame private 
individuals, images altered to degrade private individuals, photos or videos of physi-
cal bullying posted to shame the victim, sharing personal information to blackmail 
or harass people, and repeatedly targeting other people with unwanted friend re-
quests or messages (Facebook, 2016a).
YouTube’s specified examples of “harassment and cyberbullying” include:
Abusive videos, comments, messages . . . making hurtful and negative comments/vid-
eos about another person . . . deliberately posting content in order to humiliate some-
one . . . revealing someone’s personal information . . . maliciously recording someone 
without their consent . . . incitement to harass other users or creators . . . [and] un-
wanted sexualization, which encompasses sexual harassment or sexual bullying in any 
form. (YouTube, 2016)
Ask .fm specified that content containing “rude words or . . . intended 
to embarrass anyone” was not allowed, but this was not clustered under 
Untangling the Companies’ Motives and Actions 109
“bullying” in the company’s policy, and “mean” content, or content intended 
to “harass, scare or upset,” was not allowed either (Ask .fm, 2016a).
These four companies had the most specific examples to be found as I 
conducted my research, but they still fell short of providing guidelines as 
to how the companies put them into practice. What would count as “abu-
sive”? Or, how are “purposeful targeting” and “deliberate humiliation” 
assessed in practice? What counts as “hurtful” or “shaming”?
Company documents did not explain whether bullying captured the 
concept of power imbalance among children, whether the action had to 
be repeated, what would constitute repetition, or how the company went 
about determining whether it had been repeated. “Bullying” and “harass-
ment” were often used interchangeably. But, as I discussed earlier in this 
book, these nonetheless distinct terms may also carry different legal conse-
quences in various geographic locations.
Twitter preferred to use a broader term, “abuse,” rather than “bullying,” 
a decision that the company explained as part of its effort to protect freedom 
of speech by not becoming involved with the content on the platform. 
Laying out very specific provisions for “bullying” would demand content 
mediation (such as removing tweets in bullying cases), an action that may 
infringe on freedom of speech and that the company preferred not to 
undertake: “Regarding the accounts whose sole purpose is to be abusive, 
we wouldn’t necessarily want to take down tweets, we just want to remove 
the entire account,” explained Patricia Cartes, the head of Global Trust and 
Safety Outreach, Public Policy at Twitter, in our personal communication. 
The company has other strategies, which I detail later in the chapter.
It was typically the representatives of more established companies who 
provided an explanation for the language found in their policies.2 They 
specified that the decision not to include definitions of the word “bullying” 
reflected the similar difficulties of researchers: if the academic community 
could not arrive at a single, agreed-upon definition of what constituted bul-
lying or digital bullying, it would not be helpful for companies to be bound 
to one or guided by one.
None of the interviewed companies reported to publicly disclose the 
guidelines that their respective (or outsourced) moderators used to deter-
mine whether a case constituted bullying (and hence whether to act on it 
or not, i.e. take such content down or leave it on the platform due to pos-
sible violation of the company’s Terms).
As a rationale for not disclosing these guidelines, the representatives of 
some (especially more established) companies explained that determining 
whether a case constituted bullying was done case by case, and the decision 
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was almost entirely context-dependent, which is why it was difficult to 
draw such generalizations. Furthermore, the guidelines for moderators were 
characterized as complex, extensive, and involving long training, which is 
why they could not be easily regurgitated into simple explanations for the 
public. I wondered if companies would consider a post as “bullying” even if 
it were one post only without evidence of repeated bullying communication. 
One representative of an established company explained that they would 
take into account repetition and power imbalance. But if a single post was 
reported, they still might consider it to be bullying and take it down; with-
out knowing if such activity is part of offline bullying, they would prefer to 
err on the side of caution.
For YouTube, bullying was used interchangeably with “harassment,” 
and a single post could qualify:
We can take it down even if it’s just one comment, or one video, for instance; 
if it crosses that line that we consider as harassment—and this is a case-by-case 
 situation—we don’t have a clear “that word is harassment and that word isn’t harass-
ment” [policy]. It doesn’t work that way. It’s always case by case – who is attacking 
who and in which manner. (YouTube representative, personal communication with 
the author, November 12, 2014)
In a 2014 interview, an Ask .fm representative said they believed one 
mean comment would not be enough for the company’s moderators to 
determine that a case constituted bullying; it would have to be repeated 
commenting. But two years later, in my communication with Justin Patchin,3 
a well-known cyberbullying expert who acted as an e-safety adviser for the 
company, I learned that in practice it was nonetheless context-dependent, 
and that one comment could be enough (e.g., if it was accessible to others 
or if someone had created a public profile about someone else and made a 
single post). He observed that companies in general tend to be interested 
not in definitions but in behaviors. Because moderation was outsourced to 
one or more companies, he said, specific guidelines (including those for 
filtering) might have been left at their discretion and there may not have 
been a formal, company definition of bullying. As I stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, very few companies provide examples of specific behaviors 
that they consider as “bullying.”
Furthermore, under such circumstances where context was the deter-
mining factor, it became increasingly important to use human moderators 
rather than an automatic detection system (despite its levels of sophistica-
tion). Several companies that preferred not go on record provided another 
rationale for not disclosing their moderation guidelines: they would not 
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want to make it easy for users who wanted to abuse the policy to circum-
vent the rules.
Through my interviews I learned a great deal about what companies 
consider to be bullying, much of it not detailed on the companies’ web-
sites. This was especially the case with smaller start-ups.
The Evolution of Self-Organizational Efforts
The more established a company was, or if it found itself at the center of a 
high-profile incident, the more likely it was to provide a greater degree of 
elaboration of its policy and enforcement tools.
In 2014, among the documents of relevance to bullying (as well as 
harassment or abuse), some of the surveyed companies merely had Terms 
of Service. Nonetheless, by 2016, they had gone on to develop more docu-
ments in the form of Principles, Community Standards/Guidelines/Rules, 
or Safety Centers. These further elaborated the companies’ anti-bullying 
policies and enforcement mechanisms, or referred users to NGOs, or pro-
vided more information about bullying.
Safety Centers sometimes exhibited videos and educational texts about 
bullying that the companies developed with the assistance of NGOs. The 
companies who had such features characterized them as an important part 
of their self-organizational effort and as an example of an evolving com-
pany policy.
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter seemed to lead the way: Facebook first 
introduced “Community Standards,” YouTube had “Community Guide-
lines,” and Twitter had “Twitter Rules.” Other companies followed suit, often 
with remarkably similar wording. Facebook had also developed a “Bullying 
Prevention Hub,” a section of the company’s website containing informa-
tion about how to prevent bullying.
From the standpoint of self-regulation, it is important to observe that 
the development of these online documents, Safety Centers, and enforce-
ment mechanisms was not a self-regulatory requirement for all the com-
panies surveyed here, as a number of them had never taken part in any 
formal self-regulatory initiative related to bullying. Some of the established 
companies may have submitted these texts and enforcement mechanisms 
as best-practice evidence within self-regulatory initiatives in Europe, such 
as ones I discussed in chapter 5 (Safer Social Networking Principles, CEO 
Coalition, and ICT Coalition), and in the US (Internet Safety Task Force). 
Consider, for instance, that Principle 6 of the ICT Coalition specifically 
advised the companies to provide educational provisions and “links to 
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other sources of relevant, independent and authoritative advice for parents 
and carers [sic], teachers and for children” (ICT Coalition, n.d., p. 4), which 
Safety Centers illustrate. But other companies that did not participate in 
such initiatives could develop and adopt these provisions via informal 
industry-wide collaboration or simply by observing the model of the more 
established companies.
The Spillover of Expertise
Representatives of these younger companies attended e-safety conferences, 
such as the Family Online Safety Institute’s (FOSI) annual conference, which 
brought together industry and NGO representatives as well as educators, 
academics, government representatives, and other interested parties to dis-
cuss relevant issues in the e-safety field. These younger companies could 
thus create contacts with the older companies and even hire people who 
had previously worked for them in a process that was sometimes described 
as “the spillover of expertise.”
Establishing contacts with e-safety NGOs who may later advise them 
can also happen at these conference venues, and exemplifies how self-orga-
nization evolves. Companies could hire people who had previously worked 
for state attorneys general offices. Some very new platforms that offered 
similar types of affordances (e.g., anonymity) reported that some of their 
competitors were not so willing to share best practices among themselves.
A possible reason why some older companies, such as Voxer, or other 
companies such as WhatsApp, did not have Safety Centers at this time 
was that they might not have had the need to develop them, and might 
not have been publicly perceived as having the properties of social media. 
Given that their platforms were primarily enablers of private chats between 
two or several people, they might not have seen their platforms as condu-
cive to bullying either. (See table 6.1.)
Technological Affordances and Varieties of Bullying
Varieties of technological affordances among these platforms can account 
for quite different types of bullying. Many informants observed that bul-
lying on Facebook and Twitter tends to be subtler than on anonymous 
platforms, such as Ask .fm. On Facebook, children can communicate in less 
straightforward ways than by writing mean comments or swear words on 
each other’s profiles; they can tag the target in a post that contains an 
ironic photo, for instance. Or, they can easily exclude someone by creating 
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Table 6.1
Presence of Community Guidelines/Principles/Rules/Standards and Safety Centers at 




Facebook 2004 Yes Yes
YouTube 2005 Yes Yes
Twitter 2006 Yes Yes (within Help 
Center)










2009 Referred to but not 
apparent in 2014; yes in 
2016.
No in 2014 but yes 
in 2016
Ask .fm 2010 Yes Yes
Instagram 2010 Yes Yes (as part of Help 
Center)
Google+ 2011 Yes in 2014 but not 
apparent in 2016
Yes
Snapchat 2011 Yes Yes (significantly 
smaller scale in 
2014 than in 2016)
Whisper 2012 Yes (in 2014, there were 
Community Guidelines 
but not as a separate 
document from TOS). In 
2016, there was a sepa-
rate document (Whisper, 
2016b)
No
Yik Yak 2013 No in 2014 but Yes in 
2016. They were just 
called “Guidelines” 
rather than “Community 
Guidelines” (Yik Yak, 
2016b)
No in 2014 but Yes 
in 2016
Secret 2014 Yes No
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closed groups or by ignoring that person in conversations. In all instances 
it might be especially difficult for a platform to discern that bullying is in 
fact taking place, and thus hard to take action to remove the content or 
block the offending user. Similar subtleties can be seen on Twitter in a prac-
tice called “subtweeting,” which refers to tweeting about someone without 
using their handle and mentioning them, often in a mocking or derisive 
way.
On Ask .fm, however, swear words and openly mean questions were 
more common. As I discussed in chapter 2, anonymity can disinhibit users. 
It can be easier to bully someone online than in person, and easier still on 
an online platform that allows anonymity or the use of a pseudonym. This 
is why the affordances of anonymous apps such as Whisper, Secret, or Yik 
Yak are seen as conducive to what some informants characterized as more 
“blatant” bullying.
Delegating the Reporting to the Community
One of the functional purposes of these corporate documents was to convey 
the idea that e-safety is an effort of the entire community of users on a given 
platform. This ability of the platform to get the community to “regulate/
moderate/police itself” was understood by some informants as an “advanced 
or evolved” self-regulatory mechanism and cyberbullying policy. Such self-
directed language also tries to convey the idea that the company does not 
want to interfere in free speech on the platform unless it “decides” or “feels” 
that it is necessary (e.g., regarding a violation of Community Guidelines), 
and that, when it comes to bullying, it is primarily the responsibility of the 
community to regulate itself rather than have the company regulate the 
community. Here are examples from YouTube and Facebook:
Respect the YouTube Community:
We’re not asking for the kind of respect reserved for nuns, the elderly, and brain 
surgeons. We mean don’t abuse the site. Every cool, new community feature on You-
Tube involves a certain level of trust. We trust you to be responsible, and millions of 
users respect that trust. Please be one of them. (YouTube, n.d.a).
Facebook gives people around the world the power to publish their own stories, see 
the world through the eyes of many other people, and connect and share wherever 
they go. The conversation that happens on Facebook and opinions expressed here 
mirror the diversity of people using Facebook. To balance the needs and interests of 
a global population, Facebook protects expression that meets the community standards 
outlined on this page (Facebook, 2016a, emphasis added.).
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Such messages can convey that bullying is not a norm but an outlier on 
the platform, and that the community comprises participants who do not 
bully. Belonging to the community implies self-moderating by refraining 
from bullying:
Have Fun: The language below is meant to support this rule. It allows us to continue 
providing and improving our Services, and it helps ensure that a few mean users 
don’t ruin the fun for everyone else. Your part in that is simple. Just use common 
sense—keep sending awesome Snaps to your friends and please don’t send Snaps 
that they don’t want to receive. (version of a guideline formerly on Snapchat; em-
phasis added) .
Newer Companies: Liability, Community, and Freedom of Speech?
When companies did not have Community Guidelines and Safety Centers— 
whether it was because they were in an early stage of e-safety development 
or just didn’t see the need to develop such policies—they were more likely 
to provide anti-harassment provisions without making specific references to 
“bullying.”
These provisions were typically stipulated in TOS and housed under 
the sections of company websites labeled “Legal.” Indeed, their purpose 
seemed geared to outlining the legal responsibility of the company and 
protecting it from possible liability in case harassment took place—quite a 
different task than establishing a sense of community. In such cases com-
panies may have even openly emphasized their discretional right to take 
action on the content they considered to be in violation of TOS.
Apps allowing anonymity faced particular pressure from media reports 
about the alleged severity of cyberbullying on their platforms. That is why, 
especially if they were newly established, they addressed the negative media 
attention by emphasizing that they did not hesitate to take down question-
able content.
Guaranteeing freedom of speech, then, was not a rationale they used to 
avoid taking action in certain circumstances while gearing the company’s 
efforts toward creating a community that can manage itself. The guidelines 
that these companies followed when they did take down content were not 
publicized either. Takedowns were resolved on a case-by-case basis, which 
again points to the question of the power that private companies have 
over the digital public sphere. But the longer the company maintained its 
presence on the market, and especially if its name appeared in the media 
in relation to bullying, the more likely it was to abandon this discretionary 
discourse.
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Community Autonomy and Transparency
Companies that rely on the language of community responsibility appear 
to convey the idea that users have a voice in delineating what is allowed on 
their platforms. While such wording may imply user empowerment, it also 
appears to downplay the extent to which the companies really are the final 
arbiters on what takes place on their platforms.
Facebook, in particular, the oldest company and the one in the sample 
with the largest number of users, presented itself as a platform with par-
ticipatory governance. It had a Site Governance Page (Facebook Site Gov-
ernance, n.d.) where users could leave feedback to any announced changes 
to the company’s TOS, which Facebook termed “Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities” (Facebook, 2015f).
In this regard, Facebook behaved like a government entity that created 
a public debate prior to introducing a new law. Users were portrayed as 
having a significant amount of leverage over values and norms the com-
pany embraced—as exemplified in the debate on nudity. While Facebook 
had initially prohibited breastfeeding images, it changed its policy in 2014 
to allow photos of mothers breastfeeding on the platform. The company 
posted then its decision with the following explanation:
We agree that breastfeeding is natural and beautiful, and we’re glad to know that it’s 
important for mothers to share their experiences with others on Facebook. The vast 
majority of these photos are compliant with our policies (Facebook, 2015b).
This suggests (perhaps much like the Vietnam War photo explanation) 
that the company imbues its own values as to what amounts to “natu-
ral” or “beautiful.” According to a Tech Times article, Facebook’s decision 
arrived only after the pressure from feminists and breastfeeding advocates, 
clustered primarily around #FreeTheNipple movement (Arce, 2014; Esco, 
Richards, & Azuelos, 2015). Whether the company acceded to the pressure 
from advocacy groups, or the decision had little to do with it, is not at 
all clear and transparent. What matters when explaining the logic behind 
cyberbullying policies, however, is the idea that such discourse promotes 
the notion of user autonomy, participation, and shared governance.
According to “Facebook Principles,” a document that the TOS and Com-
munity Guidelines are based on, transparency is the cornerstone of the 
company’s ethos:
We are building Facebook to make the world more open and transparent, which we 
believe will create greater understanding and connection. Facebook promotes open-
ness and transparency by giving individuals greater power to share and connect and 
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certain principles guide Facebook in pursuing these goals. Achieving these principles 
should be constrained only by limitations of law, technology, and evolving social 
norms (Facebook, 2016b).
This statement suggests that Facebook understands itself or wishes to be 
understood not merely as a corporate entity, or a brand whose purpose is 
to provide a satisfying product to its users, but as a platform with a mis-
sion to enhance human connection as embodied in “sharing culture” and a 
focus on the inherent value of “sharing,” as José van Dijck aptly explains:
Facebook’s business model is most certainly a contentious balancing act between 
stimulating users’ activity and exploiting it; its success ultimately depends on cus-
tomers’ willingness to contribute data and allow maximum data mining. . . . Values 
of connectedness and community are equated with connective values, smoothly 
aligning business models with user interests. (van Dijck, 2013, p. 64)
Based on what social media companies publicly reveal about their mod-
eration practices, it is difficult to tell how content moderation (e.g., taking 
posts down because of cyberbullying) may reflect on their business models 
and revenue. Might it affect user satisfaction or even the process of data 
collection? And how does investment in safety relate to company revenue? 
These aspects of the discussion are carefully elided in company discourse 
that focuses on user benefits, autonomy, and community empowerment. 
In the following chapters I return to some of the relevant points.
Enforcement: From Formal Document to Practical Operation
When it comes to enforcing policy, much like with defining terms such as 
harassment and cyberbullying, what is formally written in the company doc-
uments may only be a fraction of what actually takes place at the operational 
level. Most companies provide users with the ability to report or flag abusive 
content, or at least to contact customer service. The companies will only take 
action on reported content if the moderation process establishes that the 
content constitutes bullying, harassment, or abuse, thereby violating TOS / 
Community Guidelines (see also Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). Most compa-
nies provide their users with tools to block abusive users or posts, which can, 
under some circumstances, lead to an account suspension.
Some companies at one point provided a form of filtering for the words 
and phrases that were not allowed on the platform (e.g., Ask .fm, Secret, 
Whisper, Yik Yak), and some reported doing so in different languages in 
markets where they had significant numbers of users (although what “sig-
nificant” meant in exact numbers was not necessarily specified).4
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The companies whose discursive cornerstone was freedom of speech 
were reluctant to employ filtering. Companies did not disclose whether 
they had moderators for every language represented in their user base, how 
many such moderators they employed (or outsourced moderation to), or 
what criteria they used to decide that they needed to introduce a modera-
tor for a specific language.
The more experienced social media companies tended to provide more 
elaborate explanations of their tools for enforcing the policy. Some of them 
also invested heavily into research on optimizing enforcement tools, which 
seemed to be especially the case with Facebook and Twitter, although no 
company revealed any details about the scale of financial investment. Despite 
more extensive explanation, the information necessary for determining 
how the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms was measured nonethe-
less remained largely undisclosed.
Lessons Learned from Facebook
Given that the e-safety experts I interviewed frequently characterized Face-
book as the company leading the self-regulatory effort when it came to 
cyberbullying, I analyze Facebook’s policies in more detail here, and use 
the company as an illustration how industry-wide policies in this area have 
evolved.
Facebook’s relationship with regulators in the US and the EU seemed 
to be going rather smoothly while I was writing this book. But, as I briefly 
outlined in chapter 5, and as the following case of “panic button” illustrates, 
this may not have always been the case. Early in their development, com-
panies have the potential to trigger fears in regulators and the public, espe-
cially if their user base outgrows the e-safety awareness of their leadership 
and consequently their companies’ e-safety capacities.
Once they adopt a visible e-safety strategy (e.g., Safety Centers, NGO 
partnerships, or Community Guidelines), however, and start developing the 
language of advanced policies, they can successfully attenuate these fears 
and build a collaborative relationship with relevant stakeholders.
In May 2017, as this book was being completed, The Guardian leaked 
some of Facebook’s previously undisclosed operational policies, including 
instructions the company gave to its moderators on how to handle some 
types of abuse. The content of these files caused significant criticism for 
the company and even calls on behalf of some policy makers in the UK 
for the company to become more transparent in how it handles its con-
tent moderation (Grierson, 2017). Citing these documents, The Guardian 
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reported the company even allowed “the ‘sharing of footage of physical 
bullying’ of children under seven” as long as such sharing was done with-
out a caption (Hopkins, 2017, para 7; see also Hopkins & Wong, 2017). 
These documents revealed that Facebook’s operational policy for modera-
tors defined bullying broadly as “an attack on private persons with the 
intent to upset or silence them,” and one is a private person if they are not 
a public figure (Hopkins, 2017). It will be most interesting to see how the 
company will respond to the public reactions in terms of policy changes 
and whether this incident will affect the company’s relationship with regu-
lators internationally.
“The Panic Button”
The introduction of the reporting button (“flag”) on this platform did not 
take place without a public debate that illustrates how e-safety design can 
be important for any platform’s business model, and how little is publicly 
known about this dynamic. The ways in which a platform’s business inter-
ests may be related to the choice and design of the preferred e-safety tools 
rarely finds its way into public discussions around e-safety.
The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Center (CEOP), a com-
mand within the UK’s National Crime Agency, is a body that works primar-
ily on protecting children from sex offenders and child pornography, but 
also engages in other e-safety issues.5 In 2010, CEOP wanted to ensure that 
major social networks introduced a standardized “safety button,” dubbed 
as “the panic button,” which would be located on the profile page of every 
user who was under 19 (Facebook refuses to add safety buttons, 2010). By 
clicking on that button, the report would go directly to CEOP. Furthermore, 
the button allowed 10 different reporting options. For instance, if a child 
did not want to report to the police they could receive help via phone from 
counselors working at an NGO charity called Childline.
As the UK Telegraph reported, at the time Facebook was confronted with 
“mounting pressure” from parents and the UK government to improve its 
safety strategy (“Facebook refuses to add safety buttons,” 2010). Facebook 
agreed on the point that allowing users to report cases to CEOP directly 
should be instituted on the platform. Yet they did not agree on the design of 
the button and the wording that should be used to report offensive content. 
According to the Telegraph, the company representatives said that in their 
experience users disliked big buttons and that such graphics “intimidate 
and confuse people,” thus lowering the likelihood of reporting. Instead, 
Facebook preferred to include its own “report abuse” link and allow users 
the option to report to CEOP directly as well as to company moderators.
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Bebo, a social networking site that was popular with young people at 
the time but whose user base had been rapidly declining, had adopted the 
CEOP report button (Barnett, 2009). CEOP criticized Facebook for refus-
ing to do the same. How increasingly stringent safety measures may have 
influenced Bebo’s popularity is a debate I will revisit in chapter 8, adding 
Ask .fm and Formspring to the list of examples. Microsoft’s MSN chat and a 
number of websites also introduced the button.
At the time, the Telegraph reported, CEOP was receiving as many as 10,000 
clicks per month, which resulted in 5,000 criminal investigations (the 
article did not specify how many were in reference to bullying vs. other 
e-safety issues). It also reported that the number of complaints to the police 
in reference to Facebook had “almost quadrupled” at that time in compari-
son to the previous year, which was why CEOP deemed it was especially 
important to have Facebook adopt the procedure (“Facebook refuses to add 
safety buttons,” 2010).
Facebook delivered its rationale to the public for not adopting the but-
ton’s design, saying that its own testing showed such action would decrease 
the likelihood of reporting; the Times newspaper, on the other hand, 
reported that according to the CEOP director, Facebook’s reason for not 
adopting the button may have been the possible impact of such an action 
on the company’s advertising revenue (Monaghan, 2011, cf. Fresco, 2009). 
Whether there would be any tangible impact on advertising is not a topic 
that frequently finds its way into public discussions, and the company to 
my knowledge does not disclose such information.
Other Options for Addressing Abuse
In addition to reporting abusive posts to Facebook, if some content both-
ered users but did not violate Community Standards, Facebook recom-
mended that users block or unfriend people, hide them from their Newsfeed 
(updates users received from their friends), or send them a message and try 
to resolve issues on their own. Most companies provided a variation of at 
least some of these options (typically significantly more modest, unless the 
company was established), which had been adapted to the technological 
affordances of their particular platforms.
A detailed diagram explaining how the reporting worked was available 
on Facebook (Facebook Reporting Guide, n.d.), which stated Facebook had 
“hundreds of team members” working in 24 languages located in Menlo 
Park, and Austin in the US, and in Dublin, Ireland, and Hyderabad, India 
(Facebook Reporting Guide, n.d.). Moderators were then divided across 
four teams: the Safety Team, the Hate and Harassment Team, the Abusive 
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Content Team, and the Access Team. The majority of reports were handled 
within 72 hours, according to the diagram.
Difficulties Determining the Details
Similarly to other companies surveyed here, at the time of my research 
Facebook did not disclose information about the exact number of staff and 
moderators working on each team across its four offices; such information 
was classified, as was all documentation regarding the number of reports 
that were processed as “bullying” by the company’s moderators in a given 
period of time and evidence that all or the majority of reports were indeed 
handled in 72 hours.
Companies with a longer history typically emphasize in their discourse 
that their users’ safety is paramount to them, assuring that a robust e-safety 
effort is in place:
At Facebook, nothing is more important than the safety and security of the people 
who use our service. With a community of over 901 million people, Facebook main-
tains a robust reporting infrastructure made up of dedicated teams all over the world 
and innovative technology systems. (Facebook Reporting Guide, n.d.)
Nevertheless, specific criteria of effectiveness, evidence of effectiveness, 
or the details behind how the effectiveness of this effort is measured remain 
difficult to determine in the case of established and new companies alike.
Support Dashboard
Some of the e-safety experts I interviewed characterized Facebook’s “Sup-
port Dashboard” as an important move made by the company to address 
complaints that it was taking too long to respond to reports about inappro-
priate content (e.g., Donoso, 2011; Bazelon, 2013b), and to introduce more 
transparency about its handling of these reported cases.
Having reported the content in question, the user would receive a link 
to what in 2014 was called Support Dashboard and in 2016 the Support 
Inbox. The dashboard/inbox explained whether the reported post was 
being reviewed, and, once it had been, notified the user about the modera-
tors’ decision (Facebook, 2016e). In 2014, the time span in which Facebook 
made its decisions was not specified; in 2016, it stipulated in a section titled 
“What to expect now” that the reported content would be assessed against 
Community Standards the same day.
Some e-safety experts, who believed the dashboard to be an important 
move on Facebook’s part toward fostering transparency, said that from their 
purely anecdotal experience, its introduction appeared to coincide with 
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fewer complaints about Facebook’s flagging tools. Statistics as to whether 
or how the introduction of this tool has improved the effectiveness of the 
company’s reporting system, however—either provided by the company or 
from any other source of evaluation or publicly available document—were 
not readily available at the conclusion of my research. Neither was such 
information provided by NGOs that I had the opportunity to interview and 
that were members of Facebook’s Advisory Board at the time of my research.6
Moderation 2.0: Toward Advanced Policies
As social media platforms began to introduce flagging or reporting options 
for users, part of the responsibility for moderation was transferred to users—
and hence the discourse on safety as a joint effort evolved, as summed up 
in this quote from an NGO representative:
Because in this world of web version 2.0 it is in fact the users who are moderators—
their reports first alert service providers of content that breaks the rules and when 
people start losing confidence in that (reporting tools), then there is a problem. 
(Anonymous, personal communication with the author, June 30, 2014)
The difficulties of moderating vast amounts of reported content while 
avoiding the loss of user confidence—for instance, in cases where the effec-
tiveness of the moderation was not to their liking—led companies to 
move toward more “advanced policies” that attempted to empower users 
by further deferring moderation to them. Such a move might also allow 
some companies to hire or subcontract fewer moderators. Consider an 
explanation given by one company representative:
But we have a lot of users and the ratio we have with the number of moderators 
is very good because we make sure the community polices itself. So as these com-
munities get bigger you’ll see them “moderating” each other quicker. (Anonymous, 
personal communication with the author, November 12, 2014)7
Social Reporting and Community Empowerment
Social reporting is an example of a policy that relies on the logic of com-
munity moderation. It seeks to empower users by providing them with 
tools designed to help them resolve conflicts among themselves, thereby 
delegating part of the responsibility for conflict resolution onto users. After 
extensive research, Facebook introduced the social reporting tool in an 
effort to better address the needs of its users; the company had noticed 
that moderators kept receiving a large number of reports they could not act 
upon because they could not establish that a case constituted bullying and 
had thus violated company policy.
Untangling the Companies’ Motives and Actions 123
For instance, the company may not necessarily be able to act if it receives 
a report of a photo of two girls smiling at each other, with no mean com-
ments underneath. Even after looking into the context behind the post, the 
information provided might not be sufficient for moderators to determine 
that a case constitutes bullying. By taking such a photo down, the per-
ceived peril for the company is that it would be curbing users’ freedom of 
expression.
Facebook introduced “social reporting” in 2011 (Facebook, 2016d). It 
allows users to send a message to the person whose content they think is 
bullying or abusive in an effort to try to resolve the issue without report-
ing it to the company’s moderators. In other words, when social reporting 
takes place, it happens without any notice being provided to the compa-
ny’s moderators. It is primarily intended as a remedy for the content that 
users mind or think constitutes abuse or bullying, but that may not qualify 
as such according to corporate policy.
Social reporting also allows users to reach out to a third party (e.g., par-
ent/caregiver, teacher, friend) in order to seek help when one feels bullied. 
As part of social reporting, Facebook also provided “premade” (prewritten) 
messages (see examples in the next section) that a user could send when 
reaching out to another user who may have bullied them, or to a third 
party.
Social reporting was perceived as a more advanced enforcement tool than 
the simple content takedown because it could help address conflicts that 
could persist or originate offline. Facebook provided pages called “Details 
on Social Reporting” and “What is Social Reporting,” which outlined the 
entire process (Facebook Safety, 2011; Facebook, 2016d) and provided step-
by-step explanations on how to report (Facebook Help Center, 2016b).
Infrastructure for Community Autonomy
Facebook didn’t provide a separate “social reporting” button. Rather, when 
users wanted to report (e.g. by clicking on “report” option), they were led 
through a series of prompts (“flows”) which asked them to specify why 
they were reporting. At the time of this book’s writing, not all of these flows 
would lead to the option of reporting the post to the company’s moderators 
(i.e. “regular reporting”). Depending on which options the user decided to 
choose in these flows to explain to the company why they were reporting, 
at the end of the flow they would be given one or more of the following 
options: report to the company (i.e., “regular reporting,” by which the con-
tent is supposed to go to the company’s moderation system for inspection); 
engage in social reporting (i.e., reach out to the person who posted the 
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abusive content, in an attempt to resolve the issue, or to a trusted person, 
in a plea for help or advice); or they would be given both options: to report 
to the company and engage in social reporting (then they could choose 
which one they prefer). At the end of the flow, users were also typically 
advised they could block, unfollow, or unfriend the person whose content 
they dislike.
For example, when I clicked on a post to report it, a dialog box opened 
with the following prompt (referred to by the company as “a flow”): “Help 
us understand what’s happening.”8 I could then choose: (a) “It’s annoying 
or not interesting,” (b) “I think it shouldn’t be on Facebook,” (c) “It’s about 
me and I don’t like it” (provided as an option in 2014 and 2015 but not in 
2016), and (d) “It’s spam.”
Consider the next level of choices: If I clicked on “It [the content] 
shouldn’t be on Facebook,” the following dialog box opened: “What’s wrong 
with this post?” and I could then choose: (a) “It’s rude, vulgar or uses bad 
language,” (b) “It’s hurtful, threatening or suicidal,” (c) “It’s private informa-
tion like my phone number or address,” (d) “It goes against my beliefs,” and 
(e) “Something else.”
If I chose “(a)” I would then be able to send a message to the person who 
posted the content, unfollow them, or submit the post to Facebook for 
review. If I chose “(b)” I would see a different dialog box, which said, “Help 
us understand the problem: how is it harmful?” I could then choose one of 
the following options: “It’s mean,” or “It offends gender, race, sexual ori-
entation or ability,” or “It’s threatening or violent,” or “I think they might 
hurt themselves.” If I chose “It is mean,” (the option perhaps very likely 
to correspond to bullying content), I would not be offered the choice to 
report the content to Facebook. I could only message the person, unfriend 
her, or reach out to a friend to resolve the issue. Hence, not all options in 
dialog boxes that the user might choose would necessarily result in the 
option to report the content to Facebook. This is why, perhaps, some of the 
content that could constitute bullying might not have the opportunity to 
be reported to the company.
The exact wording of these flows was said to vary based on the user’s age 
(e.g., teens see different texts in these flows than adults do) and it was said 
to be tweaked regularly (sometimes every few weeks) based on extensive 
research, in an attempt to optimize the flows in a way that would match 
the language users employ to describe bullying behavior. In August 2016, a 
flow that a 14-year-old user might see, which is very different from the flow 
I described above, looked like the illustration in figure 6.1)
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As seen in figure 6.1., the word “bullying” may not come up in the flows. 
This reflects the finding that teens tend not to identify with either the word 
“bullying” or with “bully–victim” roles (see chapter 2).
Interplay of Effectiveness and Efficiency
Facebook’s organization of the reporting flows is designed to minimize the 
number of reports that users would file regarding content that does not 
violate the company’s Community Guidelines, and about which Facebook 
could potentially do nothing about. It is an attempt to increase reporting 
efficiency.
The increase in efficiency is considered to be effective because users tend 
to understand the context of the conflict and are therefore perceived as 
best positioned to solve the cases for which the company cannot estab-
lish to have violated the company policy (Milosevic, 2015a). Community 
autonomy, then, implies that users participate in keeping the platform safe. 
Safety is portrayed as a coordinated effort between the users and the plat-
form. The process of creating the community implies taking responsibility 
for one’s actions and helping others; the entire e-safety onus does not fall 
entirely on the company:
We believe safety requires a coordinated effort from everyone—whether by reporting 
inappropriate behavior or making sure your account and passwords are secure. Let’s 
work together to create an environment where we can all share comfortably. (Face-
book, 2015e, emphasis added)
“Sharing comfortably” ensures “frictionless sharing” and seamless func-
tioning of the company’s business model—not just for Facebook, but also 
for social media companies in general (van Dijck, 2013)—and can be seen 
as another connotation behind such wording.
Scale of Effort
The wording used in social reporting flows is by no means arbitrary. Face-
book partnered with psychologists and neuroscientists at the Yale Center 
for Emotional Intelligence, as well as with the Greater Good Science Center 
at the University of California, Berkeley, to develop the language for social 
reporting as well as for Facebook’s cyberbullying prevention initiative, the 
“Bullying Prevention Hub” (Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence, 2013). 
In the view of some e-safety experts, such extensive effort was affordable 
primarily to large companies such as Facebook.
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Figure 6.1
Reporting Flow
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Compassion Research Day
In 2013 a team headed by an engineering director at Facebook organized 
an annual event called Compassion Research Day as a way to present, on 
a regular basis, the results of Facebook’s research and collaboration with 
Yale, Berkeley and other academic institutions; Facebook also organized an 
in-house “compassion team” in order to help sociologists, psychologists, 
and neuroscientists, among other researchers, “conduct experiments” and 
“implement (their) findings on the network,” all “funded in part via sti-
pends from Facebook” (Tsui, 2014).
There seems to be an understanding among companies that users will 
not return to their sites if the platforms are infested with bullying or harass-
ment. In line with this thinking, Bonnie Tsui summed up her report about 
Facebook’s efforts to facilitate the ongoing Compassion Research Days: “If 
people enjoy their experience more, Facebook will do better as a business” 
(Tsui, 2014). But as the controversy over the “panic button” perhaps illus-
trates, a legitimate question (for any company) to ask might be: How 
does a company’s business model benefit from its preference for using cer-
tain moderation tools rather than those methods characterized as ineffec-
tive, or as threatening to freedom of speech?
A researcher who consulted with teams at Facebook on social reporting, 
explained that one of the difficulties in providing statistics on effectiveness 
was that this research did not have a “typical before and after.”
We say, “hey let’s tweak this little thing,” [referring to wording in social reporting 
flows]. We don’t always tweak only that one thing and have the opportunity to 
evaluate just the change that that one little thing was able to impart upon people’s 
completion rates. (Anonymous, personal communication with the author, Decem-
ber 3, 2014)
For example, a question in one of the platform’s flows would ask the 
person who reported disliking the photo, “How does this photo make you 
feel?” The prefilled messages would read: “embarrassed,” “sad,” and so forth, 
with each option naming a particular emotion. The Facebook team found 
that a subtle change in the wording from “embarrassed” to “it’s embarrass-
ing,” resulted in a lot more people completing the flow.
The data collected over 30 days of research revealed that of all the 
teens entering this flow, 76% were reporting photos and 24% were report-
ing posts (textual content). (The sample was collected in the US and con-
sisted of “all 13–16 year olds who entered [the] resolution tool within a 
thirty-day period” see Compassion Research Day, 2013.) Within this sample, 
15% selected the option “it’s bullying” while 66% selected the option “it’s 
Untangling the Companies’ Motives and Actions 129
annoying” (suggesting that perhaps teens might not find the word “bully-
ing” to be helpful or to accurately reflect what they were trying to report).9
Out of the 25% of teens who used the flows, 90% messaged the per-
son who posted the content they had a problem with, and 10% messaged 
a trusted adult or a friend. As many as 75% used prewritten messages as 
opposed to tailoring them themselves—which suggests that these were use-
ful to teens.
Once the content creators were contacted, 75% of them were reported to 
respond back. Statistics relating to the type of response provided—whether 
it was favorable to the person who felt bullied or not—were not readily avail-
able. However, 37% of them deleted the problematic content upon request.
Community Autonomy Efforts by Twitter, YouTube,  
Google+, and Tumblr
Twitter, another more established company, has also developed a reporting 
system that was explained in detail on the company’s website (Twitter, 2016a, 
2016c). The company created a Trust and Safety Council, a partnership with 
advocacy groups, e-safety experts, and researchers working to prevent abuse 
(Twitter, 2016b), similar to Facebook’s Safety Advisory Board (see chapter 7).
Using the word “targeted abuse” in its policy rather than “bullying” 
allowed the company to intervene in those cases that met the conditions 
for targeted abuse rather than develop guidelines for specifically cyber-
bullying tweets. The company’s focus on freedom of speech permeates its 
abuse policy discourse:
At Twitter we look at abuse from a holistic perspective. Other tech companies fol-
low a different approach and break down their policies very granularly. You may see 
hate speech, cyberbullying, etc. called out on their policies. When we outlined our 
Twitter Rules, which are our content boundaries, we emphasize behavior; we look 
at the intent of accounts. It’s important to bear in mind that [they were] built on the 
principle of freedom of speech. We want the tweets to flow. (Patricia Cartes, head of 
Global Trust and Safety Outreach, Public Policy at Twitter, personal communication 
with the author, June 17, 2014, emphasis added)
As of the summer of 2016, the closest options to bullying in the report-
ing queues (comparable to Facebook’s flows) were “abusive or harmful” 
content, which then prompted users to choose among a number of sub-
options, such as “targeted harassment” and “disrespectful or offensive con-
tent.” Just like Facebook, Twitter provided users who wanted to report a 
tweet with means to explain why they were reporting it.
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This approach, whereby Twitter prefers to warn users rather than to take 
down specific cyberbullying tweets, is also conceptualized as effective, plac-
ing trust in the community’s ability to autonomously regulate itself when 
provided with the right tools by the platform. But if the case is not one of 
a temporary fall-out between people, and when an account’s sole purpose 
is judged to be abusive, the platform prefers to shut down such an account.
When we contact the person and give them a warning or even permanently sus-
pend them we see in the very vast majority of cases—people will remove the tweets 
that they deem abusive. We see that people react to warnings and educational mes-
sages: in the great majority of cases there is no bad intent. You have two friends 
who fall out and one starts tweeting in a way that is not constructive. That type of 
user reacts very well to our educational messaging and our warnings and rectifies 
their behavior. (Patricia Cartes, Twitter, June 17, 2014, personal communication 
with the author)
Similarly, Google-owned YouTube provides for reporting abusive vid-
eos, and it relies on the logic of user autonomy and the user’s ability to 
self-regulate:
You may not like everything you see. Some of the content here may offend you—if 
you find that it violates our Terms of Use, then click the button that says “Flag” 
under the video you’re watching to submit it to YouTube staff. If it doesn’t, then 
consider just clicking on something else—why waste time watching videos you don’t 
like? (YouTube, n.d.a)
A “how to” video explains how to flag content, emphasizing that YouTube 
depends on its community to make sure that the Guidelines are respected. 
The rationale behind this shared responsibility for preventing abuse relies 
on the volume of user posts: with so much content being uploaded to You-
Tube, the company could not possibly be expected to monitor all the content 
on its own.
Users are warned again that “mildly annoying” content should be 
ignored rather than reported. Yet, specific guidelines on what YouTube will 
consider as “mildly annoying” were not publicly explained.
Google+ provided for similar procedures. User Content and Conduct 
Policy contained links explaining how to report content. Much like on 
the other social networks I’ve examined here, when clicking on the post 
to report it, you were asked to choose one option to explain why you were 
reporting the post, and led to subsequent options thereafter. Finally, you 
could choose to ask the owner of the post to remove it; remove the user 
from your circles (block the user); or report the post for review to Google. 
While Google+ did not label the procedure of asking the other person to 
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remove the post as “social reporting,” the idea behind this process appears 
to have been the same as with Facebook’s social reporting tool.
Google+ also emphasized, similar to other companies, that while users 
may not like some content, or they may think it is mean or negative, 
Google+ would only remove it if it violated its “Content and Conduct 
Policy” (Google, 2016b, cf. Google, n.d.). A link to a webpage with more 
information on how to protect oneself from online bullying was provided 
(Google, 2016b). The webpage contained standard recommendations on 
what to do if one was involved in a bullying case, including channels for 
reporting, and an admonition to not retaliate.
At the time of this research, Tumblr was an older company that exhib-
ited surprisingly little of the standard evolutionary trajectory in terms of 
cyberbullying policies and little of the discursive turn toward community 
autonomy I discuss in this chapter.10 Because of its age, one might have 
expected it to have had a more elaborate Safety Center (Tumblr, n.d.a); in 
2014 nothing resembling a report button was apparent next to posts on the 
platform itself. The Guidelines only specified that one should not harass or 
try to circumvent the “ignore feature”; they did not seem to explain what 
“ignore feature” meant and what it allowed users to do, or give examples 
of circumventions that it had referred to (the term was later changed to 
“block” [Tumblr 2015]). The Guidelines also specified that users could 
report any violation thereof to Tumblr, but no further explanation was 
given, outside of a link that was supposed to specify what the reporting 
options were, but the link only provided an email address to which users 
could report abuse.
By 2016, after updates to the platform, the Community Guidelines spec-
ified that “bullying” was not allowed, but much like on other platforms, 
the company provided no explanation for what “bullying” was specifically 
considered to be (Tumblr, 2016). “Targeted abuse” and “harassment” were 
defined as “sending you unwanted messages or reblogging your posts in an 
abusive way” (Tumblr, 2016). In the reporting flow, harassment was speci-
fied in a playfully vague manner (as “being a jerk”) and as “circumventing 
the ignore feature in order to send someone mean or hateful messages” 
(Tumblr, n.d.c). When I clicked “report harm to minors” there appeared 
a follow-up notice that further defined such harm as “sexually suggestive 
or violent depictions of minors, or bullying even by another minor” (Tum-
blr, n.d.d, emphasis added)—which is an interesting distinction given that 
bullying is a term more often used to refer to conflict that happens pre-
cisely between minors. Elsewhere on the website, the company provided 
links to counseling services with helplines through which users could seek 
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professional help (Tumblr, n.d.a.). The company never responded to inter-
view requests.
Interventions on the Anonymous Platform Ask .fm
After Tinder owner InteractiveCorp (IAC) bought Ask .fm in 2014, and into 
early 2015, the platform’s abuse policy specified that enforcement included 
blocking, reporting, and filtering. The words that were to be filtered, how-
ever, or any guidelines as to what determined whether the content would 
be filtered, were not apparent. Swear words typed in the search box, in an 
attempt to define them as filterable, yielded zero results. Suggestive terms, 
such as “hang yourself,” also yielded zero results.11
Responding to public pressure, the company had been forced to adopt 
the discourse of a more established company early on, when the new owners 
pledged they would cut down on bullying. In 2016, the Ask .fm Community 
Guidelines specified: “Respect is the foundation of our community” (Ask .fm, 
2016a). The company had already been partnering with well-known experts 
in the field of e-safety, with NGOs, and with other organizations (Ask .fm, 
2016c, 2016f).
 The focus that Ask .fm places on the shared responsibility for e-safety 
makes the platform particularly interesting. The company uses terms broader 
than “community” to reinforce that a complex phenomenon such as bully-
ing is a wide-ranging social problem:
Rather than searching in vain for a safety silver bullet, ASK .fm leadership is commit-
ted to doing the hard work of digging deep into the potential causes behind the complex 
issues that online platforms like ours face with respect to safety. Where does bullying 
start? How is it defined? Where are we successful as a society at combatting this issue 
in the offline world, and how can we best apply a holistic lens to addressing this 
issue to our digital platform? These aren’t just technical or product design ques-
tions, they are societal ones. Only by working together across communities, educators, 
government, law enforcement and industry can we find the most effective answers. 
(Ask .fm, 2016b, emphasis added throughout)
It is notable that information about how effectiveness of enforcement 
was defined and measured was not explained on this platform either. 
Although it provided detailed screenshots and instructions about reporting 
tools (Ask .fm, 2016d), along with links to e-safety expert organizations and 
individuals (e.g., Ask .fm, 2016c), it was difficult to tell how this “digging 
deep” took place, at least based on publicly available information.
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Secret, Whisper, and Other Anonymous Apps
Other platforms that allowed anonymity, especially those early in their 
existence, provided even less information about policy enforcement and 
what the company did to handle reports of abuse.
Despite media reports about the company’s moderation process, the 
anonymous app Whisper nonetheless disclosed very little information 
about how it regulated cyberbullying cases. In 2014 and 2016, the only ref-
erence to enforcement was that a violation of TOS and Community Guide-
lines could result in a termination of one’s account or blocking of future 
access to the service.
Secret, an app that closed down in 2015, similarly did not provide an 
explanation in its corporate documents about how it enforced its policy 
and how it made sure that cyberbullying did not take place. Its Community 
Guidelines mentioned the option to report bullying content but did not 
explain how the reporting system worked or how the company handled 
such posts. Although it was not published or explained in detail to the pub-
lic, an elaborate system for handling such posts did exist, as I discovered in 
an interview with Secret. A legitimate question to ask, therefore, is to what 
extent do other young companies employ elaborate enforcement mecha-
nisms that they are under no obligation to discuss publicly, and whether 
additional disclosure or full transparency should be a requirement.
Secret’s Proactive Moderation Procedures
As part of its bullying prevention initiative, Secret employed “advance 
screening” or “sentiment analysis” which was “automatic.” Since the plat-
form was strictly anonymous, no personal names were allowed on the plat-
form. When someone wanted to post a name or a bad word, the system 
automatically checked the post against a pre-made database of first and 
last names and curse words. If the system detected a name or a bad word, it 
prompted the user with questions such as: “Are you sure you want to post 
this,” or “say something kind?” Or it warned: “This is not a place where 
you should post negative things.” Such prompts were meant to act as deter-
rents to posts that could violate Community Guidelines. The system also 
screened the post for its “severity level,” and if it was determined to be 
“high” or “significant,” the post was not published but instead withheld 
and sent to a human moderator for further review. The guidelines and stan-
dards for determining the severity level were not available to the public.
Once a post was published, a button could be used to report inappropri-
ate content, a process called “community flagging.” If a post was reported 
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by numerous accounts, it was taken down automatically—a procedure that 
the companies focusing on freedom of speech would find invasive. Accord-
ing to Secret, every time a case was reported, it was reviewed by a human 
moderator. The moderators had a checklist to determine if a case consti-
tuted bullying. The details of the checklist were not available to the public 
but every case was said to be heavily dependent on context.
Typically, if a post contained a personal name, once it was reported, it 
would be taken down. If a user’s post was taken down, that account was tem-
porarily suspended. Suspension meant that the user was not able to post and 
comment on things but could be present on the platform and could “like” 
other posts. If a person’s posts were reported two to three times, the person 
was permanently blocked from the platform.
These decisions were described to me as contextual, decided on a case-by-
case basis, as there were no clear-cut rules. The blocked person could appeal 
the decision and file a complaint. Because each user was registered on the 
platform with either a phone number or a Facebook account, or both, the 
user could only open another account with a new phone number or a new 
Facebook account. According to Secret, such a situation would rarely occur, 
as it constituted too high of a barrier.
Yik Yak’s Trajectory
Similarly, Yik Yak did not publicize the details of its policy enforcement 
procedures at the time I spoke with company representatives in late 2014. 
But my interview revealed an elaborate system that was otherwise not 
explained publicly, and the representative asked that I not publish it in this 
book because it had become outdated.
In 2016, however, some of the mechanisms that existed at the time of 
my interview were explained by company policy documents; the platform 
moved, to an extent, away from anonymity, adopting the discourse of a more 
established company with a Safety Center and partnerships with e-safety 
expert organizations. Much like the other companies, Yik Yak’s definition of 
bullying remained undisclosed to the public except for the following com-
mand: “Do not bully or specifically target others. This includes but is not 
limited to, defaming, abusing, harassing, stalking and threatening others” 
(Yik Yak, 2016b).
An automatized tool that could also be considered a form of advanced 
policy—as it allows users to solve conflicts among themselves by providing 
them with the infrastructure adapted to particular technological affordances 
of the given platform—was the ability to “upvote” and “downvote,” similar 
to the option to “like” and idea behind “dislike”). Five downvotes on Yik Yak 
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brought the content down automatically. “Downvoting” and “upvoting” is 
illustrated in figure 6.2, whereby downward arrows indicate “downvotes” 
and upward arrows “upvotes.”
In February 2015, TechCrunch ran a story alleging that Yik Yak was “sys-
tematically” downvoting “mentions of competitors” on its platform (Con-
stine, 2015). Yik Yak responded that this happened with a lot of other sites 
and games and not just competitor apps because “when we see repeated 
posts that say ‘Go get this (app)’ or ‘go download this’ we consider it spam” 
(DeAmicis, 2015). Whatever the case may be (see ThirdParent, 2015), it 
illustrates the potential interplay between e-safety policies and companies’ 
business models, which is less understood in the absence of transparency.
Digital Messengers: Affordances Informing Enforcement
Apps that were primarily messengers or that did not perceive themselves 
as social media also provided little explanation as to how their bullying 
Figure 6.2
Downvoting
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policies were enforced. Furthermore, they did not necessarily have flag/
report buttons the way that previously analyzed companies did.
In the case of Voxer, in 2014, I could not locate a report button that, when 
strategically placed next to a message for instance, would have allowed users 
to report abusive content. Nevertheless, users could report abusive messages 
to Voxer by contacting customer service. The company had two primary 
ways in which it addressed bullying and abuse: by allowing users to block 
other users and by enabling “privacy mode,” also illustrated on the com-
pany’s website (Voxer n.d.a). Any user could turn on the “privacy mode,” 
which meant that only those people who had that person’s email could 
find the person on the platform. The user could sign up either with an 
email address or with a phone number. According to the company repre-
sentative, a vast majority of users signed up with their emails. They could 
therefore change the email address in case of harassment and enable the 
privacy mode. Blocking prevented abusive users from sending any further 
messages to a user who had blocked them. If the abusive user went through 
the trouble of creating another account to continue the harassment, the 
victim could create an account with another email unknown to the abuser, 
and enable the privacy mode. The company considered such measures to 
be effective, given that it did not perceive itself as social media and hence 
not as a platform that was particularly conducive to harassment or bullying.
An option to report abusive messages to WhatsApp was not apparent at 
the time of this research; users could, however, block each other, and an 
account could be temporarily banned from the service. This could happen, 
among other reasons, if a user was blocked by “too many people in a short 
period of time” (WhatsApp, 2016a). A permanent ban could result from 
“being annoying to other users.” At one point, its TOS even playfully stated 
that “an annoying person is anyone who is (capriciously or not) determined 
to be annoying by authorized WhatsApp employees, agents, subagents, 
superagents or superheros” (WhatsApp, 2016b). WhatsApp was a rare com-
pany that between 2014 and mid-2016 seemed to make no move toward 
establishing the e-safety discourse discussed above or explaining e-safety 
mechanisms in its corporate documents. Its TOS mentioned harassment, 
but did not reference bullying.
Kik’s policy in 2014 only seemed to provide options to block an abusive 
user or report someone’s message “as spam.” Any reporting provisions spe-
cific to cyberbullying were not apparent. However, in 2016, there was an 
option to report a user based on “being abusive” (see Kik Interactive, 2016a, 
2016b).
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In an August 2016 email to me, Kik reported that it was “still in the 
early stages of formalizing policies” and requested that I contact the com-
pany in October 2016. When I initiated the follow-up communication, Kik 
declined to provide an interview at that time as well. It is particularly inter-
esting to observe how a company whose e-safety issues were the repeated 
subject of mainstream media coverage since 2013 would not feel more pres-
sured to have developed a policy several years later.
Snapchat in late 2014 did not provide a detailed explanation on how its 
enforcement mechanisms worked, but it did allow a user to report abusive 
content or the user who posted it, and to submit a written explanation about 
the incident to the company directly. Over time, the company developed 
a Safety Center, partnered with e-safety NGOs that created e-safety guides 
for the platform and started to employ the discourse of a more established 
company with an emphasis on community (Snapchat, n.d.a, n.d.b; Con-
nectSafely, n.d.). Bullying was mentioned in its 2016 TOS: “you may not 
upload, post, send or store content that: bullies, harasses or intimidates” 
(Snapchat, 2016); however, the TOS did not specify the behaviors that 
defined these terms, and neither did the Community Guidelines, which 
under the section “harassment, bullying or spamming” said: “This one 
should be simple: Do not bother or make other people feel bad on purpose. If 
someone blocks you, it’s not okay to contact them from another account” 
(Snapchat, n.d.a).
There was no explanation as to how the company decided a user was 
bothering someone and making them feel bad, apart from circumventing 
the blocks. A cyberbullying guide detailing how children can stay safe on 
Snapchat, developed by ConnectSafely .org, a well-known NGO in the US 
e-safety community, said that the platform was “not the most likely ‘place’ 
for cyberbullying to occur because a lot of what is shared in the app isn’t 
public, doesn’t stick around long, and is usually shared only among friends, 
or—in the case of Stories — fans or people who care about what you’re shar-
ing” (ConnectSafely, n.d., para 2). While these features may limit public 
humiliation, bullying can also happen among one-time friends, as discussed 
earlier in the book (and as some company representatives pointed out). On 
the “Snapchat Support” website, one could “Report a Safety Concern” (Snap-
chat, n.d.c) using options to report various types of content on Snapchat 
such as Stories, Snaps, or Chats. Similar options were provided inside the 
app itself.
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Degrees of Content Moderation
One significant factor that cannot be ignored in the consideration of e-safety 
policies is that the amount of content uploaded on these platforms is vast. 
Perhaps YouTube is an excellent illustration, with 300 hours of uploaded 
video per minute (Dormehl, 2015). At one point, 20,000 questions were 
asked on Ask .fm platform per minute (Ask .fm Safety Guide for Schools and 
Educators, 2017). Although no company revealed how many bullying-
related reports it received in a particular timeframe (given the volume of 
sharing on each platform), one can assume that moderating the services can 
be extremely difficult and costly, especially if humans do the moderating.
Many companies I surveyed for this book tended to emphasize that 
the reported content was, to a large extent, reviewed by humans and not 
by automated means. Typically, though, they could not guarantee that a 
human reviewed every piece of reported content—not even the companies 
with substantial resources could make that claim. Companies emphasized 
that because bullying cases are so context-specific, they need to be reviewed 
by humans. Most companies do not disclose the numbers of in-house and 
outsourced moderators they employ, who they outsource their moderation 
to, and the amount of financial resources they invest in moderation and 
e-safety in general.
No company provided a breakdown of its moderator base according to 
language expertise. When users speak a variety of languages, it can become 
increasingly difficult to moderate bullying cases, which require moderators 
to understand the subtleties of context. For example, with a global user base, 
more than 80% of Facebook’s daily active users were from outside the US 
and Canada (Facebook, 2015a). Having such expertise for every language 
where a company operates can become quite costly.
Some companies reported that even if they were to publish how many 
moderators they employed, there would always be those to whom these 
numbers would appear insufficient when compared against millions of 
users. Therefore, revealing these numbers was not deemed to be conducive 
to a constructive public debate (Milosevic, 2015a).
Outsourcing Moderation
Although the companies I researched tended to use some degree of in-
house moderation, the vastness of this effort often required them to out-
source their moderation services, and this was overwhelmingly done in 
Untangling the Companies’ Motives and Actions 139
developing countries, resulting in a number of media reports about mod-
eration, which accused the companies of poor outsourcing practices.
In 2012, the UK newspaper the Telegraph wrote that Facebook outsourced 
its moderation to companies abroad where moderators were paid $1 per 
hour, and that there were no security measures in place to prevent modera-
tors from uploading and sharing this content further or from accessing user 
data (Barnett & Hollingshead, 2012). According to the Telegraph reporters, 
Facebook had previously disclosed: “No user information beyond the con-
tent in question and the source of the report is shared.”
The Telegraph claimed, however, that the names of those tagged in the 
reviewed posts (as well as the users who uploaded the posts) had been 
clearly visible; as per the article, Facebook explained that such user data 
was necessary to provide context for the moderators’ decisions. Citing an 
interview with a moderator conducted by Gawker, and previous Facebook 
policy statements as well, the Telegraph reported that when moderators in 
places like Africa or Asia review the content, they can ignore it, delete it, 
or escalate it to employees in California (Barnett & Hollingshead, 2012). 
The article stated that such moderation was widespread across the Silicon 
Valley.
Twitter told the Telegraph that it had in-house moderation but would 
not answer the question on outsourcing for the article. An anonymous 
Facebook moderator also alleged in a blog post that outsourced moderators 
were paid $1 per hour unless they were American, in which case they were 
paid $30 (TheInternetOffendsMe, 2013; see also Solon, 2017). This mod-
erator further suggested that Facebook received about 250,000 reportable 
issues (those that actually violated Community Standards) per hour and that 
the company relied on automation in the moderation process, so a number 
of reports were not handled by human moderators.
Facebook reported having very strict rules regarding its outsourced 
moderation. Its contractors were subject to rigorous quality controls and 
the company had implemented several layers of safeguards to protect the 
data of those using their service. Outsourced moderators addressed only 
simple, clear issues or false reports and forwarded any potentially conten-
tious ones to in-house moderators. No exact numbers of either in-house or 
outsourced moderators were provided (Milosevic, 2015a). YouTube did not 
disclose such details and neither did Ask .fm. I asked some of the companies 
if I could witness the moderation process, but I was not allowed to, and my 
understanding based on this research is that the companies rarely allow 
non-employees to observe the moderation process (see Bazelon, 2013b; the 
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author had the opportunity to witness Facebook’s moderation process and 
describe it in her book).
It would seem that the less established companies that allowed for ano-
nymity would be even less likely to discuss their moderation practices. Yet 
one such company, Whisper, was a rare example of a company willing to 
speak publicly about the exact numbers of moderators it had employed and 
its moderation process in general. Whisper told Mercury News in 2014 that 
it employed 120 human moderators to sift through posts in real time (Ortu-
tay, 2014). Articles on the website Gigaom and in the Guardian alleged that 
Whisper was using TaskUs, an international outsourcing company with 
a team in the Philippines (DeAmicis, 2014; Lewis & Rushe, 2014 respec-
tively), and the San Francisco-based Metaverse Mod Squad to outsource its 
cyberbullying moderation (DeAmicis, 2014). As the Gigaom reporter dis-
closed, “Moderators delete the bad stuff, shuffle cyberbullies into ‘posts-
must-be-approved-before-publishing’ category and stamp suicide Whispers 
with a ‘watermark,’ the Number for the National Suicide hotline” (DeAmi-
cis, 2014).
According to a Wired article from October 2014, Whisper allowed the 
reporter to view the moderation process and was one of the few companies 
that practiced “active moderation, an especially labor-intensive process in 
which every single post is screened in real time” (Chen, 2014). The article 
did not specify if all real-time screening was conducted by humans. If it 
was automated, then Whisper was not the only company providing such 
moderation; Secret did something similar, as I discussed above (at the time 
of that interview, all of Secret’s moderation was outsourced to companies 
in Guatemala and the Philippines). According to Secret, the moderators 
received a few days of training until they learned the workflow and were 
never shown images, just text; according to the company representative, 
that diminished the peril of their transgression (e.g., taking someone’s per-
sonal photo and sharing it on another platform).
Another start-up revealed that it had employed six in-house modera-
tors for its then couple of million users, the exact number of which the 
company preferred not to reveal. In addition to employing in-house mod-
erators, the process was also outsourced to a company in the Philippines 
whose name could not be revealed.
Proactive Moderation, Machine Learning, and AI
The type of moderation that occurs if users must first report content, and 
then wait for moderators to examine it and determine whether it constitutes 
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bullying, can be described as “reactive moderation.” On the other hand, 
“proactive moderation” implies the screening of content—even when it is 
not reported— as a means of cyberbullying prevention.
In September 2016, Wired magazine introduced Google’s project Jigsaw, 
which had been developing a set of open-source tools called Conversa-
tion AI (artificial intelligence) to end harassment through algorithmic 
learning. Wired wrote that if Jigsaw were to find a way through “free speech 
paradox . . . it will have pulled off an unlikely coup: applying artificial 
intelligence to solve the very human problem of being nicer on the internet” 
(Greenberg, 2016). Informants representing the more established compa-
nies that invoked free speech protections would not necessarily see these 
proactive approaches as effective tools when childhood bullying is con-
cerned (I discuss the particulars in the following paragraphs). Nonethe-
less, it will be interesting to observe how Jigsaw’s strategy with respect to 
AI pans out, now that Google has seemingly embraced this approach and 
made it open source. Many interested parties wonder whether Google, a 
multinational for-profit company with a hand in digital public sphere, will 
gain financially from these apparently altruistic Jigsaw tools, as Google 
eventually hopes to do. Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, raised 
similar concerns about the fact that Jigsaw is run by Jared Cohen, a former 
State Department employee, implying that Cohen is extending govern-
ment interests via Google (Greenberg, 2016). The downsides of supervised 
machine learning that the informants lay out below are said to hold for 
Google’s Conversation AI as well (see Greenberg, 2016).
Supervised machine learning in the context of bullying is a form of pro-
active content moderation: automatic crawling (monitoring) of the net-
work that would allow for detection of cyberbullying cases as they happen 
(Dinakar, Jones, Havasi, Lieberman, & Picard, 2012; Xu, Jun, Zhu, & Bell-
more, 2012). Hence, the content could be flagged for moderators’ attention 
as “potentially cyberbullying” even if a user does not report it to the com-
pany. This approach can involve the development of an algorithm, a form 
of automated system to search the content on a given platform for bullying 
indicators (Dinakar et al., 2012).
Companies that prefer not to use such proactive moderation, may adopt 
a common rationale to defend their choice. Bullying is context-dependent 
and varies from case to case, which is why supervised machine learning 
may result in many false positives (cases misidentified as “bullying”), thus 
infringing on users’ free speech. Consider, for instance, that young people 
sometimes use the word “bitch” to mean “friend or mate” which can result 
in the following problem:
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When we were looking at the amount of tweets we were seeing where the word 
“bitch” was used in an abusive way, the percentage was tiny. It was surprisingly 
small. . . . It’s just hard to determine the factors [behind bullying], because, as I said 
before you can have subtweeting, you can have abuse through images not just the 
key words. . . . So I don’t think we would be satisfied at this time that there’s an auto-
mated way to deal with cyberbullying. . . . I think if that technology was extremely 
accurate so if you could flag an extremely tiny percentage of false positives then per-
haps we would consider it. (Patricia Cartes, Twitter, personal communication with 
the author, June 17, 2014)
But in August 2016 the Verge ran a story about Twitter’s use of an algo-
rithm to filter out abuse from responses to a question-and-answer session 
with the then US president Barack Obama, “and potentially” from another 
session with Caitlyn Jenner, a former Olympic gold medalist who under-
went a sex change. Some tweets were said to have been moderated manu-
ally as well (Robertson, 2016). Twitter’s erstwhile CEO, Dick Costolo, denied 
such accusations in a tweet as “sensationalist nonsense” (Robertson, 2016). 
In November 2016, in a follow-up conversation with the author, Twitter 
representative Patricia Cartes reported that Twitter did analyze patterns of 
behavior and at times would decrease visibility of certain tweets (however, 
primarily in connection to violent and extremist behavior). She reported 
Twitter had used “propriety spam tools to see if we (Twitter) could prevent 
abuse before it even happens.” This tool, however, was not based on “spe-
cific words” but rather on “patterns of behavior” and it was distinct from 
“supervised machine learning” or “algorithmic learning.” She said Twitter 
had never done any “manual manipulation of results.”
The company was also accused of banning conservative voices on Twitter 
after a rightwing blogger, who the Guardian described as a “notorious troll,” 
was permanently banned from the platform on grounds of abusive tweets 
(Hunt, 2016). The blogger responded by claiming that the platform was 
engaging in editorializing its content (Yiannoppoulos, 2016).
Bullying does not have to involve swear words; it can be subtle and 
involve ironic comments or hidden mockery—all cited as another reason 
why designing an accurate supervised machine learning system would be 
difficult. I conducted an interview with an academic who researched exten-
sively the use of machine learning for preventing bullying, and who noted 
that the sophistication of this particular technique was not yet at the level 
where it could catch such subtle forms of bullying. However, as the infor-
mant explained, waiting for a perfect tool is not the right approach on 
behalf of the companies: “I think what should happen is you go fight with 
the army you have, not the army you wish [to have].”
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Companies report that privacy concerns are another reason why they pre-
fer not to apply these proactive approaches; they are wary of giving users the 
idea that they monitor content on the platform, especially the content that 
is not shared by users publicly but only among their friends. This point was 
reinforced in interviews with NGO representatives and e-safety consultants 
as well.
Efficiency is also cited as a problem when trying to apply proactive tools: 
given the large volume of content shared on these platforms, screening it 
in advance, especially using human moderators, would be almost impos-
sible, as YouTube and Twitter acknowledged.
We don’t do any proactive monitoring on the platform. You know—300 hundred 
hours of uploaded videos per minute—it’s nearly impossible to do this sort of large 
crawling that is automatic. (YouTube representative, personal communication with 
the author, November 12, 2014)
When it comes to digital messengers, because of the private nature 
of such communication, employing proactive content moderation was 
regarded by some companies as not only undesirable, but also as unethical, 
in the words of one company representative:
This is private communication. We’re not Facebook; we’re not Twitter. Because these 
are not public forums . . . not only is there not a responsibility for us to monitor but 
we think it would be unethical for us to monitor what’s going on. These are private 
conversations. (Anonymous, personal communication with the author, November 6, 
2014)
Toward Transparency and Evaluation of Effectiveness
A number of important details that emerge behind the scenes in online 
intermediation by private companies can have significant implications for 
resolving the cyberbullying incidents that occur on their platforms and 
affect as well their efforts to create a more dignified paradigm of social rela-
tions among youth.
The more established companies realize the value of e-safety for the suc-
cess of their business models and tend to invest significant research-based 
efforts into policy enforcement. This value of e-safety is reflected in the 
ability of the company to assure its users that the platform is a safe one, but 
also in the ability to cite these efforts in front of the public and the regula-
tors as evidence that the company is doing its best to address cyberbullying.
Company documents sometimes single out transparency as an impor-
tant aspect of the policy and its enforcement. But even the more established 
144  Chapter 6
companies provide little or no palpable evidence for the effectiveness of their 
enforcement tools. Even the results of in-house evaluation efforts tend to 
be sporadic and not readily available to users.
The promised transparency also belies what the companies do not reveal: 
the guidelines that their moderators use when deciding whether a case con-
stitutes bullying (or harassment and abuse), for instance, or how many 
reports are received and processed per unit in time, or what percentage 
of reports are handled by humans (a point especially relevant for address-
ing subtle bullying), or any details about the amount the companies invest 
in e-safety measures. Many companies do not even stipulate what they 
mean by “bullying,” such as the specific behaviors that their understand-
ing or definitions of bullying, harassment, or abuse entail, which makes it 
difficult to understand how they approach and practice enforcement.
Particularly important is the move toward “advanced policies,” those 
that allow the community of users to moderate itself. The language adopted 
for such policies tends to represent the user as an empowered actor and 
emphasize the shared nature of responsibility in addressing cyberbullying 
between users and platforms. The discourse of shared responsibility also 
signals that part of enforcement responsibility is delegated to users, caregiv-
ers, educators, law enforcement (if necessary), and NGOs (see chapter 7). 
These policies are described as effective because the companies themselves 
are not always able to determine that a reported case constitutes bully-
ing and hence whether to act on it; a takedown may not solve the offline 
problem; and users are said to be best positioned to handle such conflicts 
because they understand the context behind the incident.
A policy that is defined as effective in this way, however, also tends to be 
efficient for the companies not only because it can cut down on the amount 
of non-actionable reports, but also because of the responsibilities and amount 
of work delegated to users. In the absence of an independent evaluation, or 
even in-house evaluation in the majority of the cases, the public, however, 
cannot know against which standards of effectiveness these policies and 
enforcement mechanisms are evaluated, and—in the light of such standards—
how effective they are, especially from users’ perspective.
What such discourse elides, despite the promise of transparency, is how 
the various enforcement mechanisms could affect the companies’ business 
models and how such considerations may influence the decisions as to 
the preferred enforcement mechanism or the one described as “effective.” 
For example, consider the case of the companies that invoke freedom of 
speech: Might active content mediation (takedowns, filtering, and proac-
tive content moderation such as in the application of supervised machine 
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learning) negatively affect their business models (user satisfaction but also 
data collection)? And how might these considerations play a role in decid-
ing which policy will be adopted and characterized as effective?
Such use of advanced policies also seems to secure less independent 
scrutiny for the companies who adopt it. The more established a company 
is, the greater the likelihood that it will have adopted the logic of advanced 
policies (by using a greater degree of what companies describe as empower-
ment, and by providing tools for delegation). Some of the newer compa-
nies that garnered negative media attention in the context of e-safety may 
liaise with the more established companies in order to acquire this exper-
tise, or they may partner with e-safety NGOs or hire professionals who are 
aware of the value of e-safety for the company’s business model.
Because the user base of the new companies can grow very quickly, and 
faster than the necessary e-safety policies they attempt to put in place, 
these companies tend to be perceived by experts and sometimes regulators 
as in need of a greater scrutiny. While this may be the case, the more estab-
lished companies that tend to have a greater skill at ensuring the percep-
tion of e-safety are not independently evaluated either.
This is not to say that the policies in place at more established companies 
are necessarily ineffective; there is evidence based on some of these com-
panies’ in-house research that specific measures, such as social reporting, 
could be helping some young users solve their conflicts. Nonetheless, until 
the industry considers the potential for independently established stan-
dards of effectiveness and evaluation—and those standards may indeed be 
different for each company if they aim to take into account of diverse tech-
nological affordances—it will remain difficult to even discuss this concept.

The cooperation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is frequently 
visible in companies’ Safety or Help Centers and in digital citizenship 
education—all of these being a part of advanced policies that exhibit the 
logic of user empowerment by providing tools for users to help themselves. 
In this chapter I examine various ways in which NGOs work with social 
media companies in an effort to address cyberbullying as part of self-regula-
tory and self-organizational structures. I use examples from US and Europe-
based NGOs (some of which may, nonetheless, work internationally).
When discussing the role of NGOs in “global governance processes,” the 
international politics scholar Daniel Drezner writes that they can provide 
“the activities that aid the monitoring and enforcement of existing sets of 
global standards” (Drezner, 2007, p. 69, cf. Mitchell, 1998). I analyze in this 
chapter whether and to what extent NGOs are in a position to provide criti-
cal monitoring and evaluation of efforts that social media companies make 
toward effective enforcement of policies against cyberbullying. I also exam-
ine how company discourse about effective monitoring and enforcement 
portrays and acknowledges the involvement of NGOs. While NGOs play a 
substantial role in helping companies to better their enforcement mecha-
nisms, I argue that they can also assist them in being seen as making an effort 
(in the public and before the regulators). This is especially the case with more 
established companies, and is well illustrated by Facebook’s anti-bullying 
event, which I discussed in chapter 1 (Facebook London Showcase, 2014).
In order to understand current NGO and companies’ efforts toward pre-
venting cyberbullying via digital citizenship, it is useful to examine what could 
be considered its predecessor—e-safety education—as briefly foreshadowed 
in the reference to the Washington Post article “They Call it Bunny Hunt-
ing” (Gibson, 2016). The article, which I discuss at the beginning of chap-
ter 2, hints at some of the downsides of using scare tactics in e-safety- and 
consequently digital-citizenship education.
7 The Roles of NGOs in Search of Transparency  
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The European Commission organizes its projects on child safety in digi-
tal environments around a program that was originally called Safer Inter-
net and is currently called Better Internet for Kids (BIK), in which NGOs 
play an active role. For instance, “27% of all participating entities” within 
Safer Internet were NGOs (Taraszow, 2013, p. 181). NGO assistance with 
respect to goals of “awareness raising” and providing third-party input for 
the social media industry (Staksrud, 2013a, p. 127; Taraszow, 2013) are par-
ticularly important for anti-bullying efforts and are both illustrated in the 
companies’ Safety/Help Centers or Bullying Hubs.
In the US, e-safety NGOs have provided expertise or third-party advice in 
self-regulatory initiatives such as the Internet Safety Technical Task Force, 
or in the Online Safety and Technology Working Group at the Department 
of Commerce (see chapter 5).1 NGOs served similarly in congressional com-
mittee hearings in connection to e-safety, as in the case of Megan Meier 
Cyberbullying Prevention Act (chapter 4).
In the field of e-safety, an increasing number of NGOs emerged in the 
US against the backdrop of fear-driven discourse around children’s Inter-
net use (see e.g., Collier, 2008, 2013; Marwick, 2008). Some e-safety experts 
observed that the coverage of youth and technology, especially at the time 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) and the Deleting Online 
Predators Act of 2006 (DOPA), was frequently inaccurate in its exaggeration 
of risks, which threatened to make caregivers increasingly fearful (Connect-
Safely, 2012; Marwick, 2008).
Some NGOs have attempted to counterbalance this protectionist dis-
course and e-safety education, emphasizing that research-based evidence 
for such risk estimates had largely been missing (ConnectSafely, 2012; see 
Finkelhor, Mitchell, & Wolak [2000], for one of the early e-safety studies, 
funded by the US Congress and published in 2000). They also took the 
position that children have rights to participation and provision, which 
can enable them to capitalize on digital opportunities (Collier, 2014a). This 
debate will become increasingly relevant in the context of digital citizen-
ship discussed later in this chapter and in chapters 8 and 9.
When delivered to children by various law enforcement officers, e-safety 
education in the US overwhelmingly focused on dangers of the Internet, 
leveraging scare tactics and dramatic statements (see Jones, Mitchell, & 
Walsh, 2013; Gibson, 2016).2 As independent evaluation and interviews con-
firmed, such messages may not resonate well with children and could even 
have an off-putting effect (Jones et al., 2013; Jones, Mitchell, & Walsh, 2014).
In 2009 the US Department of Justice commissioned one important effort 
at evaluating such e-safety education, which was executed by the Crimes 
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against Children Research Center (CCRC) at the University of New Hamp-
shire (Jones et al., 2013). This evaluation assessed the materials that the law 
enforcement officers had been using when delivering e-safety education, 
including cyberbullying, to children in US schools. The report was based on 
a content analysis of the youth Internet safety curricula characterized as the 
most developed and long-standing available at the time and examined the 
extent to which such e-safety education was based on academic research.
It brought forth a number of critiques, the first being that e-safety educa-
tion conflated disparate topics—from cyberbullying and grooming to illegal 
downloading, spam, and sexting—even though the knowledge and skills that 
youth need to develop in order to address each of these are very different. 
Developing a capacity to address cyberbullying may require social-emotional 
learning, which is quite distinct from fairly straightforward instructions nec-
essary to avoid spam (Jones et al., 2013). Bullying prevention, the report 
concluded, is a lot more complex than delivering a list of “dos and don’ts.”
While children typically know that they should not be “nasty” and that 
they should report to parents or educators when they or others are bullied, 
they would nonetheless choose not to follow this advice (Jones et al., 2013). This 
means that teaching anger management or pointing out ways to resist the 
social pressure to “join in” nasty behavior might be a more effective tool 
(Jones et al., 2013, p. xiv). Addressing some of the risk or causal factors 
behind bullying, which also differ across age groups, and then tailoring 
interventions to address those factors, might have been a more effective 
strategy. I discuss this evidence in greater detail in the context of digital 
citizenship education later in this chapter.
NGOs as Third-Party Advisers
NGOs can play a number of roles when a social media company sets out 
to design or implement its cyberbullying policy. They can become the test 
pilots for a platform’s new features, such as the tools for reporting cyberbul-
lying or the user guides that explain e-safety measures.
Other NGOs play an advisory role based on their e-safety expertise and 
their work with children, thus providing feedback to a company about 
which tools are considered to be effective from the children’s perspective, 
or which tools are supported by academic research. NGOs can also act as 
industry organizers, convening international conferences to discuss e-safety 
or provide companies with advice on the changing regulatory climate. 
Some NGOs work with users directly and offer information about reporting 
tools and cyberbullying policies to children, caregivers, and professionals 
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working with children, such as educators or counselors. Running helplines 
that assist people when they need help in reference to e-safety, bullying, 
and cyberbullying problems on social media platforms is one example of 
such assistance.
NGOs can develop relationships with companies which allow them to 
“escalate” a case to the companies’ attention or ask the companies to pay 
particular attention to a piece of content that may breach Community 
Guidelines and should be taken down. Such NGOs can have special com-
munication channels with the companies—either contact forms desig-
nated for the NGOs or direct phone lines. The term “escalate” is also used 
in the name of the Educator Escalation Channel, a project of the Maryland 
attorney general’s office (see chapter 5).
Despite this special status, NGOs have a limited power in the sense that 
they cannot ask the companies to take down content that does not violate 
TOS or Community Guidelines. An NGO might bring a case to a company’s 
attention, however, and if a company takes too long to handle the report, 
the NGO may request the company to accelerate action, if it considers it 
to be necessary.
In spite of the language of partnerships exhibited in the policies, the 
companies are the ultimate arbiters on whether the content violates TOS 
and Community Guidelines. For the most part the NGOs that conduct this 
type of work neither spoke about individual cyberbullying cases (lest they 
infringe on the privacy of these individuals) nor provided data on the rate 
of resolution of such cases, which would constitute concrete evidence 
about the effectiveness of such tools of enforcement.3
NGOs and the Facebook Safety Advisory Board
The more established a company is, the more likely it is to foster partnerships 
with NGOs. Companies that face negative media attention in the aftermath 
of high-profile cyberbullying incidents (or a series of smaller ones) can also 
adopt the partnership strategy. Companies respond to pressure from the pub-
lic to improve their e-safety efforts and, importantly, to demonstrate to the 
public and relevant stakeholders (shareholders, parents, educators, and policy 
makers) that they have done so by establishing partnerships with NGOs.
In my interviews with social media company representatives, they 
referred to their NGO collaboration as evidence of their companies’ con-
tinuous work toward achieving effectiveness in the area of cyberbullying. 
These companies recognized that they could not be considered experts in 
the field of e-safety or psychology; they cited their NGO collaboration as 
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evidence that they valued independent advice and assessment concerning 
the effectiveness of their policies and tools of enforcement.
Facebook, the company that many interviewees perceived as the leader 
in the industry’s e-safety efforts, formalized its NGO cooperation in Decem-
ber 2009 by creating a body called the Facebook Safety Advisory Board 
(Facebook Newsroom, 2009). The company may have been under public 
pressure before the board had been created, which might have been a fac-
tor when deciding to establish it. This took place right before media reports 
alleging that Facebook had refused to implement “the panic button” 
designed by CEOP and opted to adopt its own reporting design instead (see 
chapter 6). The congressional testimony in reference to the Megan Meier 
Cyberbullying Prevention Act had also taken place several months before 
the announcement of the establishment of the board, which also drew 
public attention to cyberbullying. Although it is not clear whether and to 
what extent these developments may have influenced the creation of the 
board, this context is important to acknowledge nonetheless.
At the time when some of my research was conducted in 2014 and 2015, 
the Facebook Safety Advisory Board comprised five (non-governmental) 
organizations: Childnet International, ConnectSafely, WiredSafety, the 
Family Online Safety Institute, and the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence (Facebook, 2015g). In 2017, when this book was going to print, 
WiredSafety was no longer listed but two other NGOs had been added—
Centre for Social Research (CSR) and Telefono Azzurro (Facebook, 2017).
Very little specific detail or evidence about how these NGOs helped 
Facebook measure the effectiveness of its mechanisms was forthcoming 
from either the company or the NGOs on the board that I had the oppor-
tunity to interview. Several e-safety experts observed that internal policies 
of many companies in the industry are rarely shared even with the com-
panies’ own trust and safety advisers, and given the omnipresence of non-
disclosure agreements in the industry (see Carr, 2013b), non-governmental 
organizations and e-safety experts are often not allowed to say much. I 
briefly profile below three NGOs on the Facebook Advisory Board that have 
been on the Board since its foundation, and in each one address a different 
aspect of how an NGO fulfills its role as a board member.
Childnet International
Founded in 1995, Childnet International, a UK-based NGO, provided advice 
to Facebook by gathering feedback from children and school professionals 
where the NGO operated. The NGO was also appointed by the European 
Commission to coordinate the UK Safer Internet Center.4
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Being a member of the Board gives us the opportunity to feed that [feedback] into 
the heart of Facebook if you’d like, to share that experience. And for us, that’s in 
the mission of our organization to make the internet a great and safe place for our 
children. If we can help influence environments which are so popular with children, 
then we are. . . . That’s exactly what we need to be doing. (Will Gardner, Childnet 
representative, personal communication with the author, June 30, 2017)
Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI)
Founded in 2007, the Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI) is a major inter-
national e-safety nonprofit with activities around the world that “convenes 
leaders in industry, government and the nonprofit sectors to collaborate and 
innovate new solutions and policies in the field of online safety” (Family 
Online Safety Institute, 2017). FOSI provided international, policy-related 
advice for Facebook as part of its service to the Facebook Safety Advisory 
Board. FOSI organizes a large annual conference that brings together stake-
holders interested in e-safety (companies, researchers, policy makers, educa-
tors, etc.). I reference the conference throughout the book as a place where 
social media companies can acquire e-safety advice and network with NGOs. 
FOSI’s organizational origins go back to 2007 and it evolved from the Inter-
net Content and Rating Association (ICRA) (Staksrud, 2013a).5
ConnectSafely
In 2005, two long-standing and reputable participants in the e-safety com-
munity of NGOs, Anne Collier and Larry Magid, founded the California-
based NGO called ConnectSafely .org (2015).6
According to Collier7, representing ConnectSafely .org on the Facebook 
Safety Advisory Board involved providing feedback “on products and fea-
tures and to talk about and hear about new developments.” The NGO also 
provided similar services (advising on new products before and after their 
release) to other companies—for example, Google and Snapchat, mobile car-
riers, and app developers. Advising can also be informal—an individual work-
ing for one of these companies and knowing Collier might personally reach 
out to her for comments. The work broadly described as “product advice” 
varied from company to company and from request to request. According to 
Collier, the NGO could receive funding from a platform for project-specific 
work but ConnectSafely .org was not financially compensated specifically for 
being on the Facebook Safety Advisory Board.
Blogging at NetFamilyNews .org, which she founded in 1999, Col-
lier called for an attempt to balance an alarmist and protection-oriented 
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discourse—one that veered toward a preference for restrictive practices—
with the need to understand technology in the context of children’s rights 
to provision and participation (Collier, 2014a, 2014b, 2016).
Independent Advisers/Monitors or Consultants?
The question of NGOs’ independence from companies is a complex one. 
Tatjana Taraszow, who researched NGO work in the context of child safety 
in the EU, writes that a “crucial challenge lies in the fact that NGOs often 
seek financial support from industry stakeholders with implications for the 
essential values of transparency and accountability that legitimize NGOs” 
(Taraszow, 2013, p. 189). Contractual details of relationships between com-
panies and NGOs that specified any financial benefits were not forthcoming, 
and these tend not to be disclosed publicly. Some informants recognized that 
NGOs might also find their reputations boosted by their association with 
the established companies, especially if the market was saturated with NGOs 
providing similar services.
All the NGOs are keen to be referenced on Facebook, on the [Bullying] Hub, so that’s 
the trade off for us—it gives us more visibility. (Representative of an NGO featured 
on the Hub, personal communication with the author, July 2014)
In a 2010 testimony to the US House of Representatives Committee on 
the Judiciary hearing on the subject of “online privacy, social networking, 
and crime victimization,” Joe Sullivan, Facebook Chief Security Officer at 
the time, characterized the body as a “global” board of “outside experts who 
advise us, and on occasion, our community, about how to keep teens safe 
online”; the members of the board were described as “leading online safety 
organizations” that provide “independent advice” on online teen safety (US 
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 2010, p. 12). The estab-
lishment of the board was cited as evidence of the company’s effort to drive 
collaboration among key stakeholders in the online safety community.
John Carr, an internationally recognized e-safety expert and a member 
of the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), noted in a blog post 
from 2013 that the board could not be characterized as “global” since it 
only included NGOs from the US and the UK and that it could not be clas-
sified as providing “independent” advice without disclosing the details of 
the partnership.8 In that same post he wrote: “I do not know if all of the 
organizations on the Safety Advisory Board receive money or other types of 
material assistance from Facebook but at least two out of the five do” (Carr, 
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2013a). In Carr’s view, instead of framing the board as an independent 
advisory body, Facebook should label the NGOs as “consultants.”
You know they used to refer to the existence of that Independent Advisory Board as 
if its existence validates anything and everything that they’re doing as a company. 
So, they are using the fact that those five organizations sit on their Board as evidence 
that they must be doing the right thing, because, ‘hey look, we’re working with these 
child safety organizations.’ (John Carr, personal communication with the author, 
July 3, 2014)
Carr further observed that he could not cite any examples where the 
board’s existence impacted Facebook policy. There were no guarantees as 
to whether the NGOs on the board were “involved at a high enough level” 
during the company’s decision-making process, or whether the company 
presented their decisions to the NGOs as a fait accompli (Carr, 2013b).
Childnet, however, reported that Facebook would make decisions in 
response to NGOs’ feedback, but explained why it would nonetheless 
be difficult for the NGO to provide examples of how it influenced the 
policy:
Citing you a particular example where we have influenced policy would be impos-
sible, because in order to discuss the new and upcoming ideas/services, we sign an 
NDA with Facebook, but also it would be impossible because there are a number of 
people on the [Advisory] Board and we discuss particular issues and Facebook has 
to make a decision as a result of what they hear. (Will Gardner, Childnet, personal 
communication with the author, June 30, 2014)
Transparency Concerns
Originally, there was another NGO on the Facebook Safety Advisory Board: 
Common Sense Media. According to an article in the New York Times Maga-
zine, Common Sense Media left the board because it disagreed with Facebook 
on privacy issues; the Times quotes the CEO of Common Sense Media as say-
ing: “‘When we disagreed with them [Facebook] on privacy, they wanted us 
to keep quiet’” (Bazelon, 2011). The NGO insisted that they talked publicly 
about what they perceived as a deteriorating state of teenager privacy on the 
platform. This article by Emily Bazelon, a well-known legal scholar who also 
wrote a book about cyberbullying (Bazelon, 2013b), drew attention to the 
possible conflict stemming from any material benefits that may be provided 
to the NGOs. There was no evidence of any formal contracts between com-
panies and NGOs available to the public and NGOs overall preferred not to 
discuss such specifics. The few NGOs that discussed funding details openly 
reported that the industry would not fund their overhead expenses. Rather, 
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if there was any funding involved, the companies would fund specific proj-
ects for the NGOs.
Delegating the Work for Effectiveness and Efficiency
Some NGO informants saw themselves as actors with the potential to lighten 
the industry workload by handling problems that users may be having on the 
platform and fulfilling requests for information about the companies’ cyber-
bullying policies. Consider the example of an NGO that provided helpline 
services for educators and counselors working with children. When profes-
sionals working with children had a problem with an incident on a platform, 
they could call the helpline for advice. The helpline staff had a thorough 
knowledge of the relevant companies’ policies and they could then look into 
a case to investigate. Only if the helpline felt that a case breached corporate 
policy would they instruct the callers to report the case to the company, and 
if the company did not react in time, the helpline could escalate the case to 
the company’s attention, as an NGO representative explained:
The first thing is—the relationship we have [with companies] is built on trust. Very 
much so. And the secret of our success is that the companies trust that we have fully 
investigated and exhausted all opportunities before we go back to them for help. So 
we never inundate them. So to give you a flavor: about half of our reports are about 
Facebook but in only 10 percent of them do we actually go back to them [Facebook] 
to deal with [the reports]. So we’re doing a lot of work on their behalf. (Anonymous 
NGO representative, personal communication with the author, July 11, 2014)
This type of NGO support could contribute to more efficient handling 
of the reporting process for the companies, and it links to the argument 
previously discussed on the interplay of effectiveness and efficiency. While 
NGO partnerships are considered a token of both a social media company’s 
policy effectiveness and its public visibility efforts, they also contribute to 
efficiency.
Perhaps a legitimate question to ask reflects the perception of some infor-
mants I interviewed, and it goes back to the debate about whether the 
NGOs serve as independent advisors or consultants: Is it, to some extent at 
least, the responsibility of the industry to provide some compensation for 
the work that the NGOs do? One e-safety expert observed that the compa-
nies might be reluctant to pay the NGOs since such action would imply 
consulting rather than the provision of independent advice and assistance, 
thus tipping the balance of the relationship.
Companies and NGOs may develop mutually beneficial partnerships 
whose inner workings may not be entirely disclosed to the public, or whose 
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entire range of benefits for each party may not be clear. Reputation build-
ing, both for companies and NGOs, appears to be important here too, even 
if no financial compensation is involved, and even if work is delegated to 
some extent from companies to NGOs, as in the following example.
Facebook offered training to another NGO that provided helpline services, 
part of which was intended for the helpline managers to learn about Face-
book’s reporting tools. Details behind the financial aspects of the relation-
ship, if there were any, were not forthcoming from the NGO, other than that 
there was no “written agreement,” that “the partnership developed organi-
cally” as the two organizations “share the common vision,” and that the 
company was “a natural partner” of not just this, but any helpline. Although 
according to the NGO, Facebook had offered the training, the NGO repre-
sentative wrote to me, in response to my email query about its collaboration 
with the company, with the following assessment: “There was a joint deci-
sion that child helplines would find it useful to receive training on the tools 
offered by the company,” given that they may not always know how to assist 
children on the platform.
 Such examples, in practice, support the proposition that companies 
provide training for NGOs in order to benefit from the NGOs’ enhanced 
potential to handle the cases that raise questions on company platforms, 
thus delegating part of the workload onto NGOs.
Summing Up the Company/NGO Relationship
NGOs play a number of important roles in helping companies address cyber-
bullying. Caveats regarding transparency are important to acknowledge in a 
system that operates in a relatively tight circle of players exhibiting close-knit 
relationships with interdependent actors. It might be difficult to characterize 
NGO advice as independent given a paucity of publicly available evidence 
on the nature of the relationships. Nonetheless, the companies that rely on 
such relationships appear to derive from them a degree of visible legitimacy 
for their policies and tools of enforcement in front of users, government 
regulators, and the wider public. Based on available information, it remains 
difficult to understand to what extent the NGOs can influence the decision 
making of these companies regarding cyberbullying and e-safety in practice, 
especially in respect to adopting those policies that may clash with the com-
panies’ business interests.
The process of delegation that occurs via advanced policies (such as 
partnerships with NGOs) could also allow the companies to handle their 
work more efficiently, as illustrated with helplines. The existence of these 
NGOs depends (to some extent) on social media companies because the 
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cyberbullying cases that take place on social networks constitute a rationale 
for their work. While e-safety NGOs may not always be remunerated for 
the number of important roles they play, the possible reputational benefits 
from their association with social media platforms can be an important 
currency as well (see figure 7.1).
Safety Centers as Hubs for Digital Citizenship?
Bullying prevention can also take place through social media companies’ 
educational initiatives, which established companies tend to feature clustered 
around Safety Centers or Bullying Hubs, the sections of companies’ websites 

























and, depending on the NGO, 
one of the following:
–no funding;
–in-kind help;
–funding for specific projects
Figure 7.1
E-safety NGO functions
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Safety Centers tend to be developed with the help of NGOs and may 
contain educational articles about bullying prevention, typically written 
by or in cooperation with the NGOs that the company partners with. They 
can also contain educational videos, instructions on how to report content, 
and explanations of what the company does to resolve bullying, as well as 
links to the NGOs’ websites. It is in these Safety Centers that the concept of 
“digital citizenship” or “digital citizens” comes up frequently.
Whereas the rationale for the companies’ partnerships with NGOs is to 
solicit their expertise, the companies that describe users as their partners 
in ensuring safety on their platforms ask them to be good digital citizens or 
community members, giving them a sense of ownership in the prevention 
or regulation of cyberbullying.
Digital citizenship is also perceived as an advanced form of policy, some-
times described as the ability to teach or lead the community to moder-
ate itself on its own. Getting the community of users to self-moderate or 
self-police also tends to be efficient for the company, which is why digital 
citizenship also follows the pattern of effectiveness as efficiency.
Facebook and Digital Citizenship
The video titled “Facebook Stories: We Are All Daniel Cui” once opened the 
Bullying Prevention Hub. This section of the company’s site provides edu-
cational advice along with instructions on how to report bullying; it refers 
young users to expert organizations, primarily NGOs, more than 30 of those 
as of August 2016, where they could seek further help. The video narrative 
depicted Daniel Cui, a freshman soccer goalkeeper from California, who, 
after a streak of his team’s losses, failed to keep the opponent’s ball out of his 
net at a decisive moment (Facebook, 2015c). Soon after, a photo assembly of 
his failures tagged as “the worst goalie ever” emerged on Facebook, generat-
ing attention at the school. After the situation got worse and Daniel, being 
bullied and feeling depressed, started skipping classes. His soccer teammates 
made a key turn by posting a photo of Daniel where he made a save, along 
with a message in support of him, as their profile pictures. This created a 
ripple effect across the school, taking Daniel from the position of a bullied 
teen to a hero—an exemplary event for promoting digital citizenship.
Conveying the message that Facebook can be used for bullying but also 
for empowerment, the Hub asks young users to be good digital citizens 
while informing parents, caregivers and educators that the platform can be 
leveraged for good. When it was created in 2013, the Bullying Prevention 
Hub drew from the Compassion Research Day–related research (Compas-
sion Research Day, 2013, see chapter 6).
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Another important message on these pages explained that the platform 
could not take down content unless such content had violated Community 
Guidelines. Therefore, the focus of the Hub was on helping users build social 
and emotional learning skills, conflict resolution skills, and the ability to 
discern in which cases it is necessary to report bullying to Facebook, as well 
on providing instructions for how to do it.
A non-governmental organization listed on Facebook’s Bullying Preven-
tion Hub, as one of the company’s Partners in Action, was the Education 
Development Center (EDC). The EDC had received Facebook’s Digital Citi-
zenship Research Grant and produced a study whose goal was to evaluate 
the role of social media platforms in addressing bullying (Schneider, Smith, & 
O’Donnell, 2013b). The study revealed that most students had not been 
aware of social media companies’ efforts to address cyberbullying, such as 
standard reporting mechanisms. Those who had been aware doubted that 
these mechanisms would be effective, and some even feared retaliation if 
other users were to learn of their reporting.
In light of these findings, the study called for social media companies to 
develop guides for schools on how to incorporate a more positive use of social 
media in the classroom (Schneider, Smith, & O’Donnell, 2013b, p. 25). It also 
concluded that a successful cyberbullying prevention approach requires 
a “trifold” action from parents, schools, and social media, whereby the 
sites should ensure they were raising the visibility of their reporting 
efforts and enhancing bullying education initiatives that promote digital 
citizenship.
While the findings appear to support the actions already illustrated in the 
Hub—tools for users to solve their conflicts (e.g., social reporting), leverag-
ing digital citizenship, and ensuring that the reporting mechanisms were 
well explained—these company efforts are yet to undergo independent 
evaluation of effectiveness. Furthermore, given that the EDC research had 
apparently been funded through the company’s grant, it would be helpful 
if the company provided more information on its relationship with this 
third party.
Twitter, Google, and the YouTube Digital Citizenship Curriculum
In a manner similar to Facebook, Twitter partnered with a number of selected 
NGOs in different countries within its program titled “Twitter for Good” 
(Twitter, 2017), which the representative characterized as the company’s 
main program for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Despite labeling 
this strategy as CSR, the representative, similarly to other companies, did not 
perceive it as an obligation but rather as part of the daily work the company 
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did. The partnering NGOs could receive grants from Twitter and the com-
pany could promote these NGOs’ projects.
Twitter’s NGO partners engaged in a number of activities—from run-
ning a helpline for children on a variety of e-safety issues and escalating 
these to the company, to providing Twitter with feedback on the wording 
in its “reporting queues,” or in the articles that the company publishes on 
its Safety Center page.
Empowering NGOs by training them and then delegating part of the 
work and responsibility, appears to take place here as well:
As part of my role I travel around the world and I train these safety partners in our 
policies and procedures, since a lot of them run helplines and face reports from the 
public on a regular basis. That means that over time they develop a strong expertise 
on the Twitter policies, and in most situations they can find a resolution to the cases 
themselves. When they can’t, they have a dedicated reporting mechanism and get 
specialized support from our safety partner support team (Patricia Cartes, Twitter, 
personal communication with the author, June 17, 2014).
Just like Facebook’s and Twitter’s Safety Centers, the jointly developed 
Google/YouTube Safety Center, bearing the logos of e-safety NGOs Com-
mon Sense Media and ConnectSafely .org, relied to a great extent on the con-
cept of digital citizenship. The tips for educators included in the YouTube 
Digital Citizenship Curriculum explained, in a visually engaging way, how 
to report and flag content and provided specific lesson plans that covered 
the use of “Google products” in the classroom (Curriculum: Understanding 
YouTube . . . Lesson 4., n.d.; YouTubeCurriculum, 2012; Google, 2015b).9
Toward Developing Standards of Effectiveness
When providing either cyberbullying and harassment-related tips or digital 
citizenship education, some Safety Centers nonetheless included prescriptive 
messages such as “think before you post,” and “tell a parent or trusted adult 
(report cyberbullying when you see it).” Cyberbullying was also sometimes 
covered together in one lesson with other e-safety issues, which, according 
to the previously cited evaluation, required distinct educational measures 
(Google, 2015a). Some Centers warned that cyberbullying had reached “epi-
demic proportions” and reminded parents of high-profile cyberbullying inci-
dents that contributed to suicides. These could be classified as scare tactics, as 
I discussed earlier in this chapter, which the independent evaluation warned 
against (Jones et al., 2013). One NGO reported that when it pilot-tested some 
of the online documents in such centers with children, the children did not 
always have the patience to read through them.
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While widely acknowledged in the e-safety community as important 
and commendable, Safety Centers may nonetheless benefit from an estab-
lished and specific set of effectiveness standards, against which they could 
be evaluated on a regular basis by an independent body.
Digital Citizenship: Empowerment Tool or Branding Strategy?
The process described as empowerment through digital citizenship education 
can hardly be understood outside of social media companies’ struggle, as 
one e-safety expert observed, to not only do their best but also to be seen as 
doing their best. Some company representatives would refer to digital citi-
zenship using the term “e-safety product,” contributing to the wider debate 
on the commercialization of citizenship. Digital citizenship, while arguably 
a commendable effort, is part of the companies’ branding strategy, too, 
as instilling confidence in their users that the platform is safe becomes 
increasingly important for its commercial success.
Empowerment conferred via digital citizenship education also implies 
a delegation of responsibility for e-safety to young users who are asked by 
the platforms to be good digital citizens and to refrain from bullying, while 
being given educational and sometimes advanced reporting tools to do so.
Underlying digital citizenship education (see chapter 2) is the idea that 
restricting technology use and punishing students are approaches that merely 
attend to the symptoms behind the problem of cyberbullying and not the 
root causes (Ohler, 2011; Family Online Safety Institute Annual Confer-
ence, 2013; Schneider, Smith, O’Donnel, 2013b). Rather, educators in the 
broader community should focus on character-building education, which 
includes honest talks about technology and—of immediate relevance to 
cyberbullying—leveraging empathy (Ohler, 2011).
Perhaps most importantly, digital citizenship—at least conceptually—
should ensure that not only children’s right to protection, but also to par-
ticipation and provision, are ensured (see Livingstone, 2016, and chapter 
2). Ideally, by being good digital citizens, children can participate in online 
environments, and have access to digital opportunities, while being safe.
Several e-safety NGO informants from both the US and EU expressed 
their concerns that the term “digital citizenship” ran the danger of being 
used by various stakeholders merely as a rebranded or more appealing phrase 
for “e-safety,” or as “a tool for classroom management” (see also Collier, 
2014a)—that is, as a term reflecting the plethora of ineffective and scare tac-
tics that have developed a negative reputation. Such tactics had also been 
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traditionally applied to a wide range of e-safety issues that each required 
distinct educational methods. In the words of two informants:
All of us who work in this field, we are all very well-meaning, we think we know 
what’s best for young people. The minute you talk to a young person about what’s 
best for being a digital citizen, you have lost them. It’s so uncool, they do not want 
to think about that. . . . We can teach them but we need to do it in a way that they 
do not know that we are teaching them. So this [digital citizenship] is just [the] sort 
of stuff you teach in the class, and they say “yes miss, yes miss” and then they go, 
and go and do the opposite. It’s not relevant to them. (NGO representative, personal 
communication with the author, July 11, 2014)
It’s about not providing lists of rules—often people are not doing something wrong 
because they don’t know what the right steps are—there’s a whole range of other 
reasons. . . . It has to be about exploring, I suppose, skills rather than just knowledge. 
Let’s say: “I shouldn’t talk to strangers.” When might that be a problem and how do I 
recognize when I’m in a situation where actually this is fine? Because there are plenty 
of forums where you can go online and talk to strangers, and 99% of the time it’s go-
ing to be absolutely fine. (E-safety expert, personal communication with the author, 
June 30, 2014)
While no single agreed-upon definition of digital citizenship emerged 
from interviews with NGOs and e-safety experts, and there is an acknowl-
edgment that digital citizenship may be construed differently in various 
cultures, respondents nonetheless tended to agree that it centers on the 
idea that users should behave online as they would offline—the same rules 
of respect and civility apply in both spaces.
Some interviewees described digital citizenship as “a powerful tool in the 
preventative language.” Or, in the context of cyberbullying, they define it as 
teaching children to stand up for the bullied ones. But evidence as to how 
the concept of digital citizenship worked in practice, and why it was con-
sidered an effective way to address cyberbullying, was not readily available.
One evaluation of digital citizenship proposed putting digital citizen-
ship education into practice by focusing on the ability of youth to exercise 
respectful behavior and civic engagement online (Jones & Mitchell, 2015); 
its authors proposed that should educators indeed embrace digital citizen-
ship as the way forward, the concept needs to be well defined and “target 
specific educational goals and outcomes” (p. 2074).
Company Responsibility and Self-Regulatory Effectiveness
Bearing in mind the vast number of incidents that take place on social 
media platforms—which may or may not amount to bullying, and many 
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of which originate offline—it can become difficult to imagine an effective 
way for companies to assist in every case where two children have a fall-
ing out and send mean comments to each other one day, only to become 
friends again the following day.
However, some informants explained that these pervasive conflicts, 
which might seem mundane and perhaps even trivial from an adult perspec-
tive, are also very important in children’s lives. In the following chapters I 
discuss why reframing the problem as one of culture and dignity rather than 
focusing narrowly on e-safety might shed light on innovative solutions. Fur-
thermore, if the companies and policy makers respond to these conflicts of 
“falling out just to be friends again” by providing users, caregivers, and edu-
cators with tools and the necessary help to handle them on their own, then 
the tools and the help should be evaluated against agreed-upon standards of 
effectiveness from young users’ perspective.
From their experience of working with children, several NGOs noticed 
another obstacle standing in the way of the companies’ efforts at develop-
ing effective reporting tools: no matter how easy the companies make it for 
users to report, the most vulnerable children, those that are at the greatest 
risk of self-harm when cyberbullying happens, tend not to report bullying 
incidents or even reach out to trusted adults or peers.10 This is precisely why 
it may be important to think about ways in which these children could be 
assisted proactively, and not merely by providing them with generic helpline 
contacts. I make some pertinent suggestions in the following chapters.
No Perceived Alternative to Self-Regulation
Most NGO representatives I interviewed worked with companies in some 
capacity and had a constructive relationship with the industry. Among 
those informants who expressed their attitude on industry self-regulation, 
no one could see an alternative to self-regulation when it comes to cyber-
bullying. They did not think that government laws could keep up with 
fast-paced technology developments, and they saw cyberbullying prob-
lems as originating offline, which is why taking content down would not 
get to the heart of them. Negative implications behind criminalizing chil-
dren’s behavior (see chapters 3 and 4 in particular) were another expressed 
concern. Due to such misgivings of Command and Control regulation, the 
NGOs I interviewed would not call for government laws as part of their 
activism.
Several informants observed that some NGOs that did call for govern-
ment regulation of the industry did so in a way that did not necessarily help 
further the debate or the policy:
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Some anti-bullying NGOs . . . make it their business to be critical of social networks 
whether they’re right or not. Because they want somebody to be the bad guy and 
it’s nice and easy to blame the industry for things, rather than trying to work with 
industry to improve. And we see that a lot. (NGO representative, personal commu-
nication with the author, July 11, 2014)
My attempts to secure an interview with BeatBullying, a UK-based NGO 
(charity) that called for legislation and criticized social media companies for 
their handling of bullying, met with little success. The issue of ineffective-
ness when criminalizing children’s behavior was occasionally raised in 
media coverage of BeatBullying’s calls for legislation (Wilkinson, 2009; 
Whitworth, 2010). Another voiced a concern that although the UK law at 
the time did not define cyberbullying, a number of other laws could apply 
to cyberbullying cases; and that not having a law to address cyberbullying 
specifically did not necessarily leave users without possible remedies (see 
my discussion of these issues in chapter 3). Enforcement could be a factor 
as well: the police may be reluctant to intervene in cyberbullying cases 
unless an incident had reached a certain level of severity.
This NGO eventually closed down when the UK Charity Commission, 
a governmental body that registers and regulates charities in England and 
Wales (Charity Commission, n.d.) reported that the NGO did not comply 
with its reserves policy (Hillier, 2014). The Independent observed that the 
demise of the “award winning charity,” which provided various types of 
bullying-related counseling to children, left UK children who relied on its 
services “in despair” (Dearden, 2014).
Is Self-Regulatory Effectiveness a Process or an Outcome?
Julian Coles is a long-standing e-safety consultant formerly with the BBC 
and a working member of the UK Council for Child Internet Safety, which 
is often characterized as a “multi-stakeholder” body that brings together 
government representatives, industry, NGOs, and other e-safety experts to 
address child safety online.11 Coles has participated in several self-regulatory 
initiatives in the UK and at the EC level, including the UK-led project 
in which US social networking companies with global reach (including 
Yahoo, My Space, Facebook, YouTube, and Bebo, as well as AOL and MSN) 
collaborated on the Good Practice Guide for Social Networking Services 
in 2008.
In discussing the self-regulatory dialogue around moderation, Coles pro-
posed re-focusing the discussion about self-regulatory effectiveness on the 
value of the process itself, rather than merely focusing on the document 
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at the end of it (outcome effectiveness). According to Coles, NGOs had 
come into the meetings about moderation with key moderation points 
on their agenda. For example, they wanted industry to show what form 
of moderation (e.g., technical vs. human, pro-active or reactive) was being 
used in specific spaces; industry was resisting because they thought this 
would be “a hostage to fortune – the lawyers weren’t at all keen.” After 
what was described as robust negotiations12 with NGOs and other stake-
holders, Coles explained the industry recognized that some measure of 
transparency about the form of moderation being used would be of great 
value to parents. At the same time, the NGOs realized why some of their 
other demands may have been difficult to operationalize: for example, 
why (from the industry’s perspective) it wasn’t feasible to publish a stan-
dard maximum response time to user reports when, for instance, third-
party moderation might need to be involved. It is this educational process, 
whereby every stakeholder is able to see the situation from the perspective 
of another, arriving at a level of middle ground, which might be consid-
ered as one key part of an effective self-regulatory process—in his view at 
least:
You did find that sometimes you changed your view about what was possible or 
desirable as you were doing this . . . the experience of going through it was almost as 
important as the outcome (Julian Coles).
Furthermore, in this view, there is sometimes a risk that legislators may 
try to pass laws that go further than they may themselves have intended 
and may even reduce the incentives for active self-regulation. For example, 
the UK government wanted to create a legislative requirement for modera-
tors (where the moderation was being done in the UK) to undergo a criminal 
background check (e.g., to prevent child sex offenders from engaging in 
moderation). Coles reports there was a danger that some companies might 
decide that moderation itself was so risky (what if one of their moderators 
did “groom” a child from a position of trust?) that they would give up 
on moderation altogether or outsource their moderation services to other 
countries where standards were lower—the process previously referred to 
as “the international forum shopping” (see chapter 5). In the end, the leg-
islation was more narrowly drafted than many people had feared and what 
Coles characterized as “the perverse incentive not to moderate at all” was 
significantly reduced.
E-safety experts and NGOs realized it was better to have some modera-
tion than none at all and to trust that the companies involved would see 
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that it was done properly, with the Good Practice Guidance on modera-
tion becoming the recognized benchmark (UK Council for Child Internet 
Safety, 2010). Specific measures for what effective moderation is (and evi-
dence thereof) are still not deployed, as Coles recognizes, but having some 
moderation with the good practice guidance as a standard setter was seen 
as better than none at all. Bearing in mind that the companies seemed to 
have been facing even less pressure in the US to establish benchmarks, the 
middle ground achieved by the guidance on moderation and social net-
working was considered as part of a successful educational (self-regulatory) 
process for the relevant stakeholders.
While Command and Control regulation was not perceived as a rec-
ommendable solution, at least among the NGOs that cooperated with the 
industry, an independent evaluation of social media companies’ cyberbul-
lying policies was perceived by some informants as an important self-reg-
ulatory tool, not only for assessing whether government regulation was 
needed, but also for the sake of sustaining the companies’ business models. 
Furthermore, a widely reported attitude was that if bullying was present on 
the platform, it would likely turn users away from it—a proposition I ques-
tion in the following chapter.
Tracking the Effectiveness of the NGO/Company Collaboration
NGO partnerships, predominantly a factor among the more established com-
panies or those that suffered in the face of high-profile incidents, serve an 
important set of functions in assisting the design and enforcement of social 
media companies’ cyberbullying policies. Such partnerships with NGOs can 
also provide the companies’ policies and enforcement mechanisms with legiti-
macy in front of government regulators, users, and the wider public by act-
ing as an assurance that the platform is safe.
Companies can cite their collaboration with NGOs that have an e-safety 
expertise or a track record of working with children as evidence in front of 
relevant stakeholders that they are doing their best, thus implying that the 
policies are effective even when they are not being continuously and inde-
pendently evaluated. To what extent such NGO advice can be considered 
independent might be questionable, given the paucity of publicly available 
evidence on the details behind the partnerships.
Digital citizenship, often a key component in companies’ Safety Cen-
ters and a widely commendable effort in what it professes to achieve, was 
also critiqued from the standpoint of effectiveness and commercialization. 
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Concerns were raised that it should not be used merely as “a rebranded 
term for e-safety,” a signal of increasing delegation of responsibility away 
from the companies and onto young users (or caregivers and educators), or 
solely as a branding strategy for companies struggling to be seen as doing 
their best. An independent evaluation of effectiveness of digital citizenship 
messages that companies put into practice is advisable (see the policy solu-




Cyberbullying policies of social media companies have not been a frequent 
object of academic study. My goal in researching and writing this book was to 
uncover the logic behind policy-making efforts. Now, I would like to explain 
what can be known about the strengths and limitations of the current self-
regulatory environment as well as the self-organizational efforts of individ-
ual platforms. As such, this book should complement the current body of 
knowledge about online intermediation processes by private companies.
Advocating for Policy Effectiveness
Social media companies have come up against various pressures that con-
tributed to the current design of cyberbullying policies and enforcement 
mechanisms. To explain these challenges I provide examples of what could 
be characterized as “misguided” pieces of government regulation (Marwick, 
2008) that do not necessarily help youth solve their conflicts, but they do 
have serious implications for freedom of speech and the privacy of adults.
Advanced policies can position these platforms strategically in front of 
the public and policy makers, resulting in less independent scrutiny. Not 
only do the texts of these policies help elide a significant lack of transpar-
ency in how companies enforce their policies, but they also obscure the 
companies’ profit-pursuing interests in specific policy design (Gillespie, 2010, 
2015; van Dijck, 2013; Crawford & Gillespie, 2016).
However, the status quo—where standards of effectiveness are vague 
and not fully articulated and operationalized, nor regularly measured and 
evaluated—allows all multi-stakeholder actors in this space—the industry, var-
ious regulators in the US and EU, and NGOs—to participate in a system that 
appears to be working without necessarily taking responsibility when it is not.
With these findings in mind, this book should signal the importance of 
conducting independent evaluation of social media companies’ enforcement 
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mechanisms. The current self-regulatory framework provides guidelines for 
the minimum measures that social media companies should have in place in 
order to address bullying on their platforms. Establishing specific effective-
ness criteria, however, in terms of what standards of effectiveness mean in 
the context of technological affordances of every platform, and then evaluat-
ing every platform’s enforcement mechanisms against these standards, has 
yet to be undertaken.
The research I cite in this book should also make a strong case against 
criminalization of youth behavior or regulation that under the guise of pro-
tecting minors affects adult civil liberties, or indeed privacy and free speech 
of children themselves, without actually serving its intended purpose of 
addressing cyberbullying.
A constructive, nuanced, and collaborative effort toward solutions that 
work for children is a lot more complex than blaming the industry for not 
being able to solve users’ behavioral or psychological problems. Yet, the 
industry should not use this rationale to avoid taking responsibility for 
bullying that occurs on its platforms. The industry’s proposition—that in 
a large number of cases, or at least when behavior cannot be established to 
violate company policy, bullying can be well addressed through infrastruc-
ture that requires young users and their caregivers to handle bullying on 
their own—should be examined via independent evaluation.
While advanced policies involve delegating the ways in which incidents 
are handled to users, caregivers, and NGOs, the more important point here is 
their connotation, which delineates the responsibility of the industry: there 
is only so much the industry can do, and providing the infrastructure is said 
to be an effective and efficient way for the industry to fulfill its duties and 
take its portion of responsibility. Despite some companies’ emphasis on the 
fact that they do take down content that needs to be taken down, the lack 
of transparency as to how this is done and evidence of effectiveness makes it 
difficult (if not impossible) to verify such claims.
How Restrictive Policies Might Affect Platform Popularity
Social media companies operate in a competitive environment: e-safety 
and cyberbullying policies play a particularly important role in it, by gaining 
and sustaining user confidence and ensuring the perception of their plat-
form’s brand as a safe one. Cyberbullying-free environments are conceptu-
alized as part of pleasant, positive user experiences, which are vital for the 
commercial success of the platform.
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The logic behind this claim is that cyberbullying, harassment, or abuse-
infested spaces will repel users, especially young ones, and frighten their 
parents and caregivers—a logic confirmed by various stakeholders (compa-
nies, NGOs, independent e-safety advisers, and policy experts). The most 
recent speculations about the demise of Twitter and the case of Ask .fm, 
both discussed in this book, may support this point. The implication is that 
the platforms that are successful are probably also doing something right 
in terms of e-safety.
But a different possibility might be worth entertaining as well. A piece of 
evidence that is only anecdotal, yet germane to this point, emerged in my dis-
cussion with Justin Patchin, a professor of Criminal Justice at the University 
of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, and the co-director of the Cyberbullying Research 
Center who, at the time, served as an e-safety adviser to Ask .fm. Although 
bound by a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) as to how much he could reveal, 
he observed that the company had introduced strict enforcement mecha-
nisms. And among those, filtering, which appeared to be effective in banning 
wording that was associated with bullying from the platform (the specific 
guidelines for such filtering had not been made available by the company 
to him either). Coincidentally, however, with this tightening of restrictive 
e-safety enforcement mechanisms—based on the purchase of Ask .fm by IAC, 
and its reported significant investment into e-safety—the company’s popu-
larity began to decline. Formspring, a site that used to provide similar affor-
dances to Ask .fm, and had shut down in 2013, was speculated to have seen 
its demise coming due to enhanced restrictive safety measures (Taylor, 2014).
This demise, of course, can be due to numerous factors, and any possi-
ble relationship here entirely spurious. Yet the following proposition may 
be worth entertaining: restrictive policies (such as filtering and content 
removal) can significantly and negatively impact platform popularity and 
may be a reason for some companies’ reluctance to use or strengthen such 
mechanisms. The argument here is not that these mechanisms would 
necessarily be effective (as I explain later in the chapter), but merely that 
such factors should be taken into consideration. While corporate policy 
documents characterize safety of young users as a paramount value for the 
company, ensuring platforms’ commercial success is the less discussed and 
understood side of the policy coin. Patchin proposes a related question for 
future research: whether there is an inverse correlation between safety pro-
tections and youth participation on these platforms.
Another possibility worth entertaining is that Ask .fm was more popular 
when it had few policies and enforcement mechanisms in place precisely 
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because it was an unregulated Wild West of sorts, where young users could 
escape the watchful eye of adults and exercise their right to be transgres-
sive, even if that meant being hurtful and mean to others. This point may 
help introduce the discussion around bullying being a wider cultural and 
social problem: a problem of humiliation vs. dignity.
Some companies and e-safety experts may be inclined to say that there 
always has been and there always will be bullying, and that platforms can 
do little about it. Yet this observation reduces platforms’ responsibility for 
providing venues (if not facilitating) such behavior (and monetizing it). 
Others say that Ask .fm, Yik Yak, or Secret spin-offs will surface in the future.
This is precisely why there should be a discussion about which minimum 
standards need to be in place when it comes to future start-ups. But the bur-
den of evidence should also be placed on the more established companies 
to demonstrate concrete evidence for the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
they consider as advanced. Further, raising questions about social and cul-
tural factors contributing to digital bullying can pave the way to avoiding 
techno or media panics.
Toward a Collaborative Relationship with Regulators
Investing significant resources and e-safety expertise to address cyberbully-
ing is important not only for keeping users satisfied, but also for citing the 
existence of such policies in front of regulators as evidence that company 
self-organization is working. Advanced policies appear to ensure less govern-
ment scrutiny for the companies that adopt them. Although most e-safety 
experts would agree on the need to establish minimum e-safety standards 
for start-ups, which are seen as more problematic, few perceive the need for 
greater supervision and evaluation of the more established companies.
A frequently observed pattern seems to be the following: start-ups that 
quickly develop large numbers of young users, garner negative media atten-
tion, and subsequent public anxieties over cyberbullying can then trigger 
an investigation by a government entity. But as the companies become more 
established and continue to adopt advanced policies, they tend to develop 
more collaborative relationships with regulators and are less frequently 
subjected to independent scrutiny.
Politics and Policy Makers
Perhaps it is fair to observe that policy makers, too, who are constrained by 
limited time and funding, are forced to prioritize. If the established com-
panies stay out of media coverage for high-profile cyberbullying incidents 
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and are able “to be seen [by regulators and the public] as doing something,” 
as one e-safety expert phrased it, then there may not be too much effort 
on behalf of regulators to scrutinize the effectiveness of that “something.”1
The two self-regulatory environments in the US and the EU are very dif-
ferent (see chapter 5), and the European Commission can be said to play a 
proactive role of an industry convener, but they both exhibit a relative scar-
city of independent evaluations. Investigations into Ask .fm or Snapchat in 
the US on behalf of the Attorneys General can better be characterized as 
examples of legalistic self-regulatory tradition in the US (Newman & Bach, 
2004, p. 388) than efforts to establish a continuous examination of the 
industry’s mechanisms.
Contradictions in Regulatory Environment
There is nonetheless a strong commitment to self-regulation in both the US 
and EU, and most informants do not see an alternative to self-regulation 
given that laws are seen as too slow for the fast-paced technological devel-
opments. Effective alternative regulatory measures, as some of the policy 
makers I interviewed observed, allow the companies to create adequate mea-
sures faster than traditional regulation would. The dangers of criminalizing 
youth behavior, problems around separating bullying and cyberbullying, 
and around defining cyberbullying, were other cited reasons as to why creat-
ing regulation can be problematic. Perhaps, as one e-safety expert observed, 
the ideological commitment to self-regulation, at least in the EU, may be a 
consequence of fearing to drive away technology investment by instituting 
demanding regulation, and of an inaccurate perception by governments that 
they do not necessarily have the expertise to create effective regulation.
Interestingly, this preference for self-regulation in the policy-making com-
munity stands in conspicuous opposition to tendencies for the “knee-jerk 
regulation” (Staksrud, 2013b) I discussed in chapter 4, which emerged from 
high-profile cyberbullying incidents. The self-regulatory framework with 
respect to cyberbullying allows (to an extent, at least) for a largely unregulated 
but nonetheless, (to an extent, at least), user-responsive industry, combined 
with periodic calls for laws that focus on punishment of so-called bullies 
(even criminalizing youth behavior) or for restrictions on youth access to 
technology. Research and educators caution against such approaches (see 
Ohler, 2011; Bulger, Burton, O’Neill, & Staksrud, 2017). Laws that focus on 
punishments and restrictions may do little to support dignified relationships 
among youth but they tend to be the preferred solutions, perhaps because 
they can be politically popular for those who sponsor them. Policy makers 
should be particularly wary of such efforts and focus their involvement on 
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supporting a prevention-oriented, educational, infrastructure. Furthermore, 
government authorities should be responsible for ensuring regular indepen-
dent evaluations of industry self-regulatory efforts and work toward the laws 
that provide funding for educational initiatives.
Establishing the Case for More Transparency
While companies see the need to handle incidents in a timely manner, for 
example by removing the content that violates TOS/Guidelines, they would 
not provide specific evidence of such effectiveness, nor would they publish 
the guidelines that they use for evaluating effectiveness of their own mecha-
nisms. Some companies may say that on average all incidents are handled in 
24 to 72 hours, but the evidence of such effectiveness is not provided. Most 
companies would also not disclose if all the cases of reported content are 
handled by humans, and if not, which percentage of these are automated. 
This is especially relevant for bullying, whereby incidents may be subtle, and 
relying on expertise of a human being might be crucial for determining 
the context behind the case and hence whether it violates TOS/Guidelines 
or not.
Facebook, the company often cited as leading the self-regulatory effort, 
does provide some statistics regarding its more advanced policy—social 
reporting—based on its in-house or contracted research. Such statistics show 
the percentage of teens who, after using social reporting to reach out to the 
person who bullied them, received a response from that person; as well as 
the percentage of teens who took such allegedly bullying content down 
when being told that it was hurtful.
These statistics were, however, based on a sample of US teens, while Face-
book operates globally, and were not cited in the company’s corporate doc-
uments, but were provided in video presentations that may not be readily 
available to end users. It might be beneficial for the company and other 
companies that conduct similar efforts to have such data readily available. 
Such statistics are not a result of an independent evaluation but of research 
conducted in-house or by the experts who consult for the company.
At the time I was writing this book there was no standing, independent, 
government-initiated or third party effort (either in the US or EU) to evaluate 
social media companies’ cyberbullying policies according to a set of pre-estab-
lished principles. The limited number of government-initiated, independent 
evaluation efforts of social media companies’ tools to address abuse were 
dated, even at the time of my research, given that the social media landscape 
keeps changing significantly (Staksrud & Lobe, 2010; Donoso, 2011; O’Neill, 
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2014b). Most importantly, there has not been an effort to continuously eval-
uate these mechanisms across the industry from the perspective of children.
Other aspects of companies’ activities that might provide such evidence 
of effectiveness are far from fully transparent either. The companies would 
typically not disclose the numbers of moderators they employ, the num-
bers of bullying-related reports they receive per unit in time, or the amount 
of financial investment they make into their e-safety and bullying-related 
efforts specifically.
While some companies explain that these numbers may be difficult to 
provide for logistical reasons, there is also the perception acknowledged 
by some companies that providing these numbers may not be helpful in 
furthering the public debate; upon seeing the numbers, the media and the 
public could always dismiss them as being too meager an effort in address-
ing issues that involve millions of users.
Perhaps most importantly, by not revealing how many moderators the 
companies employ with the expertise in specific languages, it becomes diffi-
cult to conceptualize how the companies handle reports of bullying in a wide 
variety of languages. These companies being global entities, their user base 
is often, to a large extent, located outside of the Anglo-Saxon speaking area 
and cultural domain. Bullying is a context-dependent occurrence; having not 
only language but also cultural expertise may be crucial for effective modera-
tion. Moderation is often outsourced to companies in developing countries, 
which has been a subject of controversy in media coverage, putting the 
 reliability of the outsourced moderators handling user data in question.
Sharing best practices in terms of policy enforcement can sometimes 
be subject to intercompany competition. While some companies willingly 
share their expertise with other, especially newer, companies, other plat-
forms that may not be as established, and that may provide similar techno-
logical affordances, may not necessarily be willing to do so.
It may be therefore advisable for policy makers to consider requiring the 
companies to disclose data on how they exercise enforcement.
What the Language of Free Speech and Privacy Elides
The companies that place particular value on freedom of speech in their poli-
cies would not consider systems such as notice and takedown or supervised 
machine learning (advance crawling of the platform for bullying content 
ahead of it being reported) as effective tools in addressing cyberbullying on 
their platforms. They see notice and takedown as possibly leading to false 
reports and thus resulting in free-speech infringements. Likewise, algorithmic 
learning was characterized as largely ineffective by such companies because 
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of the vastness of shared content on platforms and because the technology 
currently available cannot detect subtle forms of bullying.
This situation is one of those instances where the business motives for 
preferring some policies over others may not be clear and where an indepen-
dent evaluation of effectiveness may be particularly relevant. Some of the 
bullying that happens on social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter 
is described as more subtle than blatant. Supervised machine learning tools 
available at the time of this book’s writing, were said not to be able to iden-
tify such forms of subtle bullying and could pick up on a lot of false positives. 
This is why some companies would not consider these tools to be effective 
as their application may result in false warnings and wrongful takedowns.
It is questionable, however, whether companies should wait for a “per-
fect tool.” Rather, they may consider using the existing tools nonetheless 
as a way to flag potentially harmful content, which could then be further 
examined by human moderators. It will be most interesting to observe 
how other social media companies will position themselves with respect to 
using various forms of AI for bullying and harassment in light of Google’s 
recent announcement that it is pursuing such options with its project Jig-
saw’s open-source tools called Conversation AI (Greenberg, 2016).
Another reason cited for not using proactive forms of content monitor-
ing were fears over end users’ privacy. Users are perceived as not wanting 
to have the content they share on these platforms among their friends 
(the content that is not necessarily shared with the settings set to “public”) 
crawled by the company and potentially its moderators, a concern said to 
be particularly germane in the post-Snowden era.
Language that focuses on the protections of civil liberties such as freedom 
of speech and privacy elides not only the discussion of how such proactive 
forms of moderation may negatively impact users’ “frictionless sharing,” 
but also the ability of companies to profit from users’ sharing practices (van 
Dijck, 2013).
Taking content down, flagging, or perceived surveillance might lead to 
users’ dissatisfaction with the platforms, and thus negatively impact the 
companies’ business models. Perhaps more importantly, such efforts may 
disrupt frictionless data collection. Users understand little about how compa-
nies “utilize their data to influence traffic and monetize engineered streams 
of information” (van Dijck, 2013, p.12).
The platforms on which bullying is less subtle and more blatant, or the 
newer companies that found themselves in the midst of abuse-related con-
troversies, tend not to invoke concerns about civil liberties as much in their 
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discourse and report providing proactive, often automatic screening and fil-
tering tools (although the degree of “automatic” is not specified). The scale 
of their efforts, however, is typically not elaborated on in their policies or 
on their websites; but it should be noted that especially the new companies 
tend to conduct more operational effort than they formally specify in public.
Such evidence should provide further grounds for policy makers to con-
sider creating a requirement for the companies to publish their operational 
tools of enforcement.
Transparency and Privatization of the Digital Public Sphere
A particularly problematic point is that no company (not even an estab-
lished one, perceived by policy makers as well-behaving) releases to the 
public the guidelines that its moderators use to investigate whether a case 
constitutes bullying (see the discussion in chapter 6 on the leaking of Face-
book’s operational policies). The companies that had a rationale for the 
decision not to disclose the guidelines reported that, given the extensive 
nature of their moderators’ training, such information can hardly be sum-
marized into a piece that can be easily shared in such manner. Other con-
cerns include the fact that bullying is so context-specific that such decisions 
are determined on a case-by-case basis and could not be easily generalized.
This is where the process of privatization of the digital public sphere 
and the tension between the need to protect from cyberbullying while also 
ensuring free speech is most evident. If the content cannot be taken down 
following a cyberbullying or a harassment-related law that may apply to 
cyberbullying cases, the final arbiter on the case is the particular private 
company in question.
The company’s decisions work both ways—as much as it can leave users 
without remedies, the company can also wrongly decide that a case con-
stitutes cyberbullying and infringe upon other user’s freedom of speech. 
In the absence of sufficiently transparent information on how most com-
panies make decisions in such cases, there is little that the public can do 
but trust that the companies are doing their best. This lack of complete 
transparency is particularly relevant for those cases where abuse or bullying 
reports may be used to take some valid content down that has little to do 
with bullying, and where such abuse of reporting tools may constitute an 
attack on politically unpopular speech (MacKinnon, 2012).
Creating a requirement for the companies to publish details on their 
moderation systems could provide another avenue for policy makers to 
take toward evaluating a policy’s effectiveness.
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Can NGOs Serve as Independent Advisers?
I was able to find little evidence to suggest that NGOs that collaborate with 
companies are providing independent assessment of effectiveness of com-
panies’ anti-bullying enforcement mechanisms. The NGOs that work with 
social media companies on developing these policies sometimes conduct 
pilot testing of the companies’ cyberbullying intervention and prevention 
tools, but the results of these are not apparently published. They could also 
be difficult to classify as independent evaluation since the relationships 
between the companies and the NGOs may involve economic, in-kind, or 
reputational benefits, the details behind which are typically not disclosed 
publicly. The NGOs that collaborate with social media companies on the 
development of their cyberbullying policies play a number of significant 
roles in this process, but they also convey a sense of legitimacy to the com-
panies’ cyberbullying policies—they serve to instill confidence in their users 
and validate the companies’ e-safety efforts in front of regulators. At the 
same time, the very existence of these companies provides some work for 
NGOs (and possibly other benefits). Although this tight-knit ecosystem can 
secure important services to children, parents, and educators, independent 
evaluation would help ensure that the mechanisms are effective from the 
perspective of children.
On the other hand, concerns were raised that NGOs calling for govern-
ment regulation, and those critical of the companies in a negative rather 
than a constructive way, can have a fraught relationship with the industry 
and even a vested interest in being critical. A requirement for a heightened 
level of transparency on what NGO-industry partnerships actually entail 
in terms of benefits and obligations of every stakeholder could help under-
stand the position of independence of NGO as a stakeholder.
Ensuring transparent funding for NGOs from the industry along with 
monitoring and evaluation of industry and NGO efforts should be a pre-
ferred policy solution to any efforts to criminalize youth behavior (Chris-
tensen, 2009; Sacco, Silbaugh, Corredor, Casey, & Doherty, 2012; Tang, 2013; 
Suski, 2016, cf. Bradshaw, 2013; Bulger et al., 2017).
Partnering with academic institutions in conducting independent evalu-
ations of companies’ enforcement mechanisms could also constitute an 
option for the future. Such institutions could bring their own funding for 
evaluation purposes when regulators are unable to do so. Alternatively, if 
the industry is to fund its own evaluation, a self-regulatory or governmen-
tal body should ensure the independence (i.e., the impartial nature of the 
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results) of the third party conducting such evaluation. Provided that trans-
parency and sound research design are ensured, such efforts could be exe-
cuted in partnerships with NGOs as well. NSPCC, a UK charity, conducts 
surveys with children and parent panels to ask if they are aware of block-
ing and reporting mechanisms on the most popular platforms, and in some 
cases whether children find these tools to be helpful. NSPCC then rates the 
companies accordingly in a simple way for parental and children’s informa-
tion (NetAware, 2017).
Researchers could consider creating fictitious profiles of child users on 
various platforms in an attempt to test enforcement mechanisms (Staksrud & 
Lobe, 2010).2 Surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews, participant observa-
tion, or more innovative methods (Barbovschi, Green, & Vandoninck, 2013), 
with the goal of understanding how children use these enforcement mecha-
nisms and think about effectiveness, could also inspire a proactive solution.
The Digital Citizenship Debate
Digital citizenship education, often a key component of companies’ Safety 
Centers, was characterized as an advanced policy and referred to as “the way 
forward.” Yet a number of respondents, among them internationally rec-
ognized e-safety experts, voiced their concerns about the perceived effec-
tiveness of this approach, noting that it should do more than rebrand the 
term “e-safety,” which has a negative reputation (in the US at least) pre-
cisely because of its instructional tone and educational tactics that were not 
always found to resonate with youth (see Jones et al., 2013; Collier, 2014a).
A factor that appears to influence social media companies to adopt digital 
citizenship is yet again that they are under a lot of pressure to make an effort 
regarding e-safety but also to be seen as making an effort. With such implica-
tions, corporate social responsibility may be a more suitable term for digital 
citizenship, even when companies report that they do not perceive it as CSR.
Perhaps most importantly, this policy also signals delegation of responsi-
bility away from companies and onto young users, educators, parents, and 
NGOs. It is up to young users to be good digital citizens, and if companies 
provide the tools (such as Safety Centers) for young users to learn how to be 
good digital citizens (together with tools that allow the community of users 
to self-moderate or self-police), then bullying will become less of a problem—
or at least become the users’ problem. After all, in companies’ corporate pol-
icy discourse, the problem of bullying is sometimes described as one of “few 
mean users,” not as behavior that is pervasive on their platforms. Referring 
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young users, parents, caregivers, and educators to NGOs for digital citizen-
ship and bullying advice in general constitutes another aspect of delegating 
both the actual work and responsibility.
To further compound this point, digital citizenship was sometimes 
described by company representatives as “e-safety product.” This apparent 
consumerization of the concept of citizenship is worth exploring further 
and mirrors the debate on users as citizens versus consumers. As consum-
ers, children are afforded a more circumscribed set of rights than as citizens 
(Staksrud, 2013a, pp. 151–155; see also Drotner & Livingstone, 2008). 
Elisabeth Staksrud writes, “As a consumer, our participatory rights are not 
secured. Our rights are not linked to us as subjects but to the product in 
question and our relationship with it, given that we are able to, and choose 
to, procure it” (Staksrud, 2013a, p. 154). But when applied to social media 
platforms, which, despite their scale, remain private companies and not 
public utilities, such conflation becomes problematic. This debate links to 
the question of protection versus participation rights (see chapter 9) and is 
important lest digital citizenship becomes a term that is largely commodi-
fied and stripped of meaning—used merely for companies to be seen as 
doing something in front of the public and the regulators.3 It is, further, 
especially important in the context of underage users and the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) discussed in chapter 9.
Perhaps in contrast with a fairly decisive embrace of digital citizenship 
as a way forward, there have been surprisingly few studies to examine its 
effectiveness when applied in the context of e-safety education (Jones & 
Mitchell, 2015). Developing effective strategies to address the complex psy-
chological and developmental phenomena such as bullying and cyberbul-
lying requires more than a brief set of instructional messages; rather, at the 
very least, it demands a sustained effort at social-emotional learning.
Industry as “Judge and Jury”
A valid question to ask is whether users and governments would want the 
industry to be the “judge and jury,” as one informant phrased it, of cyber-
bullying cases on the platforms. This is why providing users with tools to 
resolve bullying incidents among themselves, rather than having the com-
panies decide on the incidents, was described as an effective way of dealing 
with the problem. But as it stands now, even with the advanced policies, 
the companies are still the final arbiters, on what constitutes cyberbullying 
on their platforms and thus violates their corporate policy, while the details 
of how this decision-making is done are largely kept away from the public.
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Private Platforms versus the Public Sphere
Some government regulators may not fully recognize that social media plat-
forms are indeed venues where the digital public sphere unfolds, and that 
they have taken on the nature of public utilities. Instead, regulators see plat-
forms primarily as businesses that the government is legally prohibited from 
interfering with, unless they are of course in violation of the law, which may 
further contribute to regulators’ preference for little or no involvement. Such 
a situation seems further compounded by regulators’ fear that by becom-
ing involved in the companies’ work, they could be perceived as interfering 
in the free-speech arena. Hence, they may not see it as problematic that 
the details behind private companies’ decision-making processes on what is 
taken down and what stays on the platform are not transparent.
A relevant illustration or test case as to what can happen when legisla-
tion places decision-making responsibilities concerning takedown requests 
made to a private company is the aftermath of the “Right to be Forgot-
ten” ruling by the European Court of Justice. It gave individuals the right 
to ask the Google Search Engine to consider delisting content that may 
poorly reflect on these individuals from its search results. Google then has 
to weigh the public interest in knowing such information against the dam-
age made to a particular person if it were to publicize such information.
While Google has thus far complied with a number of delisting requests, 
“this has been done without disclosing its internal processes, removal criteria 
or how it is prioritizing cases” (Powles & Chaparro, 2015). The decision-
making process has been characterized as “idiosyncratic,” and Google was 
said to have shaped the interpretation to its own corporate ends.
Google tried to legitimize this process by creating an advisory council 
comprising reputable experts on the issue (an idea remarkably similar to 
Facebook’s Safety Advisory Board or Twitter’s Safety Council), which accord-
ing to the Guardian was an attempt to “insulate the process with a veneer 
or authenticity” (Powles & Chaparro, 2015).
If legislation were to institute similar demands on social networking sys-
tems for cyberbullying, the result may be a deluge of complex situations 
from a legal standpoint. The law may also miss its initial purpose of help-
ing children in resolving their bullying-related issues. A content takedown 
model could be useful for specific types of bullying (see the mention in 
this chapter regarding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], as 
well as discussions in chapters 1 and 3), but it should take into account an 
understanding of the complexity around creating a privatized bureaucracy 
for these purposes.
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Another content takedown model illustrated in this book is the Australian 
bill “Enhancing Online Safety for Children Act,” which created an Office of 
the Children’s e-Safety Commissioner designed to help users complain if 
a social media company did not take down the content reported as bully-
ing within 48 hours after a user had reported it. If the commissioner then 
issued a takedown request, the social media company would be obliged to 
respond or pay a fine of AU$17,000 for every day that the content remained 
on the site (Sharwood, 2014, 2015; Office of the Children’s eSafety Commis-
sioner, n.d.). The law arguably limits negative implications for the freedom 
of speech for adults as it only applies to cyberbullying content affecting “an 
Australian child.” Nonetheless, cyberbullying material is broadly defined 
in a way that is very much subject to interpretation as “the material [that] 
would be likely to have the effect on the Australian child of seriously threat-
ening, seriously intimidating, seriously harassing or seriously humiliating 
the Australian child” (Parliament of Australia, n.d., please see page 7 in this 
document for the complete definition). The boundaries of “serious” are pre-
sumably left at the discretion of the commissioner and the extent to which 
such a solution actually helps children is yet to be the subject of research.
What impact this law might have on the process of “frictionless shar-
ing” and companies’ business models through advertising and data col-
lection is a question rarely raised in the public discourse concerning such 
actions. Perhaps there is little doubt that calls to action about cyberbully-
ing in the aftermath of high-profile incidents will continue to be met with 
public approval (and hence be politically popular). But ensuring regular 
evaluations of effectiveness of these takedown provisions from the per-
spective of children is crucial for understanding the value of such actions, 
especially if some of the most vulnerable and self-harm-prone children are 
not likely to report abusive content, as some informants observed. On the 
other hand, government regulation that would leverage public funding for 
educational purposes may hold more promise of effectiveness, yet it seems 
far less politically popular among politicians and policy makers.
Addressing the Anonymity Issue
Another element in some sites’ cyberbullying policies and practices is ano-
nymity. Although it can be a valuable asset in protecting controversial opin-
ions, in light of the findings that in many cases victims of cyberbullying or 
harassment know the so-called perpetrators (Mishna, 2012; Kowalski, Giu-
metti, Schroeder, & Lattanner, 2014), anonymity is not necessarily the key 
component of the problem. Rather than thinking that platforms allowing 
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anonymous users are inherently more conducive to bullying, it may be more 
helpful to think of them as venues where different types of bullying take 
place.
While incidents on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube 
may be more subtle, using fewer swear words and more ironic videos, allu-
sive references or “subtweets,” the bullying on Ask .fm, Secret, Whisper, 
Yik Yak, or other (largely) anonymous platforms may be more blatant and 
sometimes, perhaps, easier to identify and take action on. What we choose 
to think of and label as cyberbullying can become a tool in framing cer-
tain platforms as conducive to bullying versus not conducive to bullying, 
leading to further simplification in an understanding of the phenomenon’s 
nuances. Consider that some digital messaging apps see themselves as pro-
viders of “private communication.” As such, they do not think of them-
selves as platforms likely to witness bullying—which can absolve them, and 
future platforms providing similar services, from duty to develop specific 
children- and bullying-oriented policies and enforcement mechanisms. 
Cyberbullying can take various forms, and if content is not shared publicly 
but only among friends, or even if it does not “stick around long” (Con-
nectSafely, n.d.) that may not necessarily mean that cyberbullying is less 
likely to occur. Rather, when cyberbullying happens, it will, perhaps, take 
different forms.
Consider also the research indicating that it may be easier for bystand-
ers to express support when they perceive themselves to be anonymous 
(Macháčková, Dedkova, Ševčíková, & Cerna, 2013). Until there has been 
an independent audit on whether and how exactly “the real name culture” 
contributes to diminished bullying on various platforms, calls to ban ano-
nymity should be regarded with caution. No platform publishes any statis-
tics on rates of incidents of bullying, and it is hard to assess how pervasive 
various types of bullying are on each of them.
Policy Recommendations
Based on these findings, several recommendations emerge that might be 
useful for guiding the policy, granted that the subsequent passages may 
reflect the following difficulty:
Policy makers may be sceptical about recommendations from researchers who fail to 
grasp the political necessity of forging consensus among rival constituencies, where-
as researchers may see policymakers as too quick to compromise on issues where 
such tactics are not supported by empirical findings. (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, 
p. 156 citing Kunkel, 1990, p. 116)
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When Publishing Policy Guidelines, Define and Disclose
In an effort to ensure more transparency, companies should publish their 
policies and provide more information about what they consider to be 
cyberbullying, specifically in the context of their platforms’ technological 
affordances: how they define it, for example, meaning the specific behav-
iors their moderators would consider to be cyberbullying; what counts on 
their platforms as “repetition”; what contextual factors they take into con-
sideration; and how they proceed with deciding whether a case constitutes 
cyberbullying.
Given that platforms tend to outsource their moderation, they may 
leave these criteria at the discretion of the outsourced companies or con-
sider it proprietary information and therefore feel no obligation to make it 
public. Such circumstances illustrate the complexity of leaving the gover-
nance of the public sphere and the provision of children’s rights—as a mat-
ter of protection, but also participation—primarily in the hands of private 
companies.
Similarly, companies should consider publishing how many bullying 
reports they receive per unit in time and how quickly they handle them in 
practice, and what percentage of these reports is handled by humans versus 
automated learning. Furthermore, publishing which specific enforcement 
mechanisms they use and whether they use proactive algorithmic crawling 
on their platforms (e.g. some application of methods similar to supervised 
machine learning), and how they execute it, could be another step toward 
a more transparent framework that may not have to hurt companies’ busi-
ness models and could actually instill greater confidence in users.
The less established companies should provide explanations as to which 
enforcement mechanisms they have in place and how these work, and they 
should also provide clear and specific guidelines for caregivers and adults 
working with children to help them understand how the given platform 
attends to e-safety. Ensuring that venture capital firms that fund social media 
start-ups understand some of the minimum e-safety requirements in con-
nection to children and cyberbullying, and making these minimum stan-
dards a prerequisite for providing funding, could be a step in this direction.
In the case of established companies: provide evidence of effectiveness 
of the companies’ enforcement mechanisms in ways that are more readily 
available to users. For instance, the companies that already conduct in-
house research on effectiveness of their tools of enforcement could display 
this evidence in a clear and prominent manner. Such efforts could also be 
favorable to the companies’ business models, of which e-safety is an impor-
tant component.
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As long as companies do not disclose specific evidence of effectiveness 
of their policies (in accordance with how they define this effectiveness for 
their specific platform), and as long as various regulators do not conduct 
continuous monitoring and evaluation of this effectiveness, it will be diffi-
cult to assess the success of the self-regulatory and self-organizational work.
Make “Safety by Design” a Requirement for Start-Ups
Some informants voiced the perception that every company in the indus-
try affects not only the strength of self-regulation but also the industry’s 
reputation. If smaller companies and start-ups are not doing enough, their 
behavior affects the perception of the entire industry, even the more estab-
lished companies. A concern with the smaller companies is that their 
popularity and user base grow quickly while their e-safety expertise may 
be lagging behind.
In an attempt to address this issue, the UK Council for Child Internet 
Safety (UKCCIS) created “A Practical Guide for Providers of Social Media 
and Interactive Services” (Gov .uk, 2016). According to Julian Coles, a work-
ing member of UKCCIS and a long-standing e-safety consultant formerly 
with the BBC, the idea behind it is to encourage businesses, including start-
ups, to think about “safety by design” to help make their platforms safer 
for children and young people under 18. One way to spread the message is 
to see that the guide is distributed to venture capital (VC) firms interested 
in funding social media start-ups, with the aim that some of these good 
practices in the guide could in effect become preconditions for funding the 
newer, smaller social media platforms and services in the future—helping to 
protect the VC investment and the young social media brand’s reputation.
It is worth noting, however, that these guidelines are based on input and 
best practices of established social media companies with Safety and Help 
Centers that had, nonetheless, not been independently tested for five years 
at the time of this book’s writing (since Donoso, 2011; see also O’Neill, 
2014b with the caveat that this evaluation did not include specific testing 
of the sites, as I elaborated in chapter 5).
Establishing Specific Criteria of Effectiveness
Currently, any discussion of the effectiveness of cyberbullying policies 
takes place in the absence of specific criteria of what is considered an effec-
tive tool of enforcement. Following self-regulatory guidelines, social media 
companies should have “simple and robust reporting tools for users” (Stak-
srud & Lobe, 2010; Donoso, 2011; Lievens, 2016). What is considered to be 
“robust” and “simple,” however, is not specified in relation to the particular 
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technological affordances of specific platforms, especially bearing in mind the 
swiftness with which new platforms gain popularity among youth. Given 
the great variability in technological affordances of these companies, estab-
lishing a one-size-fits-all definition may not be advisable. This is why hav-
ing an independent evaluation agency develop specific criteria for each 
platform (in cooperation with the platform itself and with the help of vari-
ous stakeholders such as the NGOs) could be helpful.
Options for Establishing a Standing Body as an Independent Evaluator
Policy makers could consider establishing a standing body (agency) whose 
purpose would be to conduct independent oversight and evaluation of the 
companies’ policies and tools of enforcement. An independent evaluation 
would not be commissioned by, paid for, or executed by the companies 
themselves or by any related bodies that might have financial, in-kind, or 
reputational benefits from the companies. Alternatively, if commissioned 
and paid by a company, this body (agency) or a government regulator should 
assert the ability of the third party conducting the evaluation to provide 
impartial evidence and advice. Given that evaluations were described as 
costly and that it may be difficult for policy makers to find funding even for 
standard regulatory instruments, let alone alternative ones, then encourag-
ing independent researchers and academic institutions to engage in such 
research could be an avenue to consider.
Consider Independent Evaluation of Digital Citizenship Advice
Conducting an independent evaluation of the content of social media com-
panies’ Safety Centers might be a useful next step in further driving this 
aspect of advanced policies. If education and digital citizenship advice pro-
vided in the centers is indeed a way forward, there should be evidence to 
support this claim.
Caution with Regulatory Requirements
This book calls for a more nuanced understanding of what responsibility 
means when it comes to platforms and against introducing government 
regulation that is not supported by research. Establishing traditional forms 
of regulation (which should be research-based) that actually work for chil-
dren and teens when it comes to bullying can be very difficult. I suggest 
focusing on several factors that are infrequently considered when contem-
plating regulation.
Platforms significantly differ in terms of their technological affordances 
and definitions of online behaviors; the term “cyberbullying,” for instance, 
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is frequently conflated with harassment and cyberstalking, or indiscrimi-
nately applied to children and adults. Cyberbullying is used to denote 
everything from violent threats and trolling, to the cases of relational bul-
lying or drama.
And while all can be equally harmful, companies can consider rela-
tional bullying as too pervasive, ineffective, and inefficient for them to 
police; rather they deem it best handled by parents, educators and children 
themselves. Any regulatory effort would need to begin with a thorough 
understanding of what the companies consider to be bullying (or harass-
ment or abuse) on their platforms, an examination of what this means in 
practice when it comes to children and teens, and, consequently, the scale 
at which each type is present on each platform. Such an understanding can 
be achieved by asking for a greater degree of transparency on behalf of the 
companies.
Pros and Cons of Notice and Takedown
For those cases where cyberbullying is meant to signify blatant harassment 
(e.g., one or more users repeatedly targeting another, a whole page devoted 
to harming someone’s reputation, or where violent threats are involved) 
rather than relational bullying, a DMCA-like notice and takedown could 
work for some children under such circumstances. Such a tool could be 
prone to abuse, but mishandled reporting could be addressed through addi-
tional human moderation. The downside of such an effort would be that, 
especially for start-ups with fewer resources and little means to invest in 
human moderation, it might inadvertently serve as an incentive to keep 
even non-bullying content down to shield from possible liability. Further-
more, such an effort may also present a peril to the companies’ business 
models by affecting users’ satisfaction with the platforms. This is why 
proposing any such solution should be handled with great caution and a 
robust research effort ahead of considering any legislation.
For instance, we need to be able to understand to what extent and under 
which circumstances taking content down actually helps young users 
(Van Royen, Poels, & Vandebosch, 2016). Such content takedowns may 
be effective for those online spaces that the legal scholar Brian Leiter called 
“cyber-cesspools,” which are “devoted in whole or in part to demean-
ing, harassing, and humiliating individuals.” Not surprisingly, Leiter sees 
them coupled with “implied threats of physical or sexual violence, “non-
defamatory lies and half-truths about someone’s behavior or personality,” 
“demeaning and insulting language,” “tortuous defamation,” and “inflic-
tion of emotional distress” (Leiter, 2010, p. 155; see also Citron, 2014a).
190  Chapter 8
I would argue, however, that bullying among children is a phenom-
enon that more often than not requires more layered solutions than merely 
content takedowns. Whereas repeated abuse of an individual could require 
content takedown to make a point that such action is not sanctioned and 
to stop the abuse, solving relational problems requires more complex 
solutions.
Further, based on the findings I present in this book, it is highly unlikely 
that the self-regulatory environment, either in the US or EU, would favor 
such an approach, especially given the availability of blocking and report-
ing mechanisms provided by the companies, which purport to do just that 
(yet whose evidence of effectiveness they nonetheless do not provide). 
And finally, it is questionable to what extent parents and caregivers (who 
could request such content takedowns) are in the position to make educated 
and constructive choices in such situations that place children’s rights to 
protection and participation in conflict.
What about Filtering and Supervised Machine Learning?
Filtering may be more suitable for the platforms where bullying tends to be 
blatant and open, and this mechanism is particularly interesting given its 
above-discussed relationship with platforms’ business models. As long as 
companies chose not to publish the details of how filtering is implemented, 
it will be difficult to assess its implications for free speech. If the compa-
nies were willing to measure and disclose the incidence of reported bullying 
incidents before and after the introduction of filtering, such statistics may 
improve public understanding as to the extent to which such tools could be 
considered as effective. Consider also some of the research findings suggest-
ing that filtering specific words may fail to deliver due to users’ ability to 
leverage “lexical variations” in order to circumvent restrictions (Chancellor 
et al., 2016). While Instagram may filter search results for hashtags typi-
cally associated with eating disorders, users who wanted to tag such content 
quickly found ways to bypass the restrictions by turning “anorexia” into 
“anorexiaa” and “thigh gap” into “thyghgapp” (see Chancellor et al., 2016).
Despite a number of companies’ reluctance to employ supervised machine 
learning because the algorithms are described as unable to detect subtle bul-
lying through irony, for instance, using these tools to crawl publicly shared 
information on the platforms (thus minimizing privacy infringements) 
could be effective enough at preventing these conflicts from escalating by 
flagging some content in advance for the moderators’ review.
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Ensuring Help for the Most Vulnerable Children
A number of laws I examine in this book, had been proposed or passed on 
the grounds of preventing future self-harming incidents in connection to 
suicides, implying they would ensure assistance for the most vulnerable chil-
dren, those at the highest risk of self-harm. But as I discussed earlier, rather 
than necessarily providing such help by specifically targeting children at 
high risk of harm, they even threatened the personal freedoms of adults.
It will be crucial to evaluate the extent to which future legislation pro-
posed in the name of preventing suicides would actually and specifically 
identify and target children at high risk of self-harm. In addition, other 
solutions may include the following: On behalf of the industry, ensuring 
that products are tested with vulnerable children is important, as reported 
by some NGOs. Joint public and industry funding for mental health profes-
sionals to engage with children who share self-harming content on social 
networks could be another proposed solution. Rather than merely provid-
ing a helpline number, they could engage in conversations with children.
Such public health monitoring can be ethically problematic in its pri-
vacy implications, and this point should be acknowledged, especially if it 
were to be applied to the communication that is shared with the settings 
set to “private” or “limited” or on messaging apps rather than publicly. It is 
precisely the regulation that would provide funding for education or user 
empowerment that is much needed, and was largely missing from various 
proposals for the regulation that I discussed earlier in this book.
Finally, ensuring that helplines receive some funding from the industry 
for their overhead expenses in a manner transparent to the public could 
reflect the process of work delegation in a more equitable manner.
Tax-Based Incentives?
Once there is an agreed-upon set of standards of effectiveness established via 
self-regulatory initiatives, the regulators could entice companies to comply 
by providing “tax rebates or grants [. . .] to shape firms’ behavior in direc-
tions desired by governments or the public” (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, p. 
25, cf. Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Such actions could be used to motivate firms 
to comply with, for instance, providing evidence of effectiveness of their 
reporting tools, or funding educational measures previously evaluated as 
“effective” —not only for children but for parents and caregivers, too, espe-
cially in light of how much onus is placed on parental responsibility (con-
sider COPPA and the GDPR). While the industry may argue that providing 
social media guides for parents is enough, such methods should be evalu-
ated against previously agreed upon measurable standards of effectiveness.
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The most recent debates over how much taxes social media companies 
should pay in countries where they physically operate are relevant here 
(Sandle & Humphries, 2013; Gibbs, 2016), and in light of this question, a 
more difficult one arises: Should the provision of educational measures (as 
long as these measures are research-based and regularly evaluated against 
established standards of effectiveness) be mandated rather than merely rec-
ommended or left to the companies’ good will?
Social Reporting–Type Tools for Use among Peers
As for the cases where cyberbullying is a problem that takes place in the 
context of peer relationships and social positioning, social reporting tools or 
similar mechanisms could be well positioned to address this issue by facili-
tating proactive coping strategies and thus helping children build resilience 
(d’Haenens, Vandoninck, & Green, 2013). These tools may actually help 
children in the process of social positioning by addressing the origin of the 
problem, which could be offline. In any event, tools of this kind should be 
regularly and independently evaluated, and regulators and the public might 
wish to pay attention as to how advanced mechanisms can be discursively 
leveraged by platforms to delegate responsibility for cyberbullying away from 
their companies and onto young users, caregivers, educators, and NGOs.
Against the context of the dignity framework I discussed in chapter 2, a 
number of punitive measures outlined in this book do not appear to address 
the heart of the bullying and cyberbullying problem: the relational dynamic 
among young people. Removing content, punishing individuals involved, 
criminalizing behavior, or having the companies pay fines without investing 
in education or psychological counseling seem merely to address the symp-
toms, rather than the root causes of the problem.
Toward Dignity-Based Solutions
Fostering conditions where dignity is more than part of a catchphrase 
(i.e., occasionally invoked in policy circles without concrete implications 
attached to it) requires a research-based effort to understand what is effec-
tive for youth. This is especially pertinent as they struggle to navigate the 
process of social positioning, which is part of their development but which 
persists into adulthood as well.
The normative framework of dignity can help elucidate how the struggle 
for popularity among a group of teens—where good looks, money, branded 
clothing, or any criterion of “coolness” are a measure of success—may not be 
much different from the world of adults where individuals are encouraged to 
derive their self-worth from high-ranking and well-paid jobs, or other insig-
nia of social status (Fuller, 2003, 2006; Fuller & Gerloff, 2008; Hicks, 2011). 
The struggle for popularity among teens may result in exclusion of certain 
children from a group, or even in drama or cyberbullying, just like the more 
severe examples of adults striving and struggling for power can escalate into 
mobbing or workplace bullying. Or perhaps either may leave little trace or 
symptoms other than quiet suffering—which nonetheless, I would argue, 
warrants the question of what kind of a society we want to live in, and if this 
is the best we can do. Although such questions may be dismissed as utopian 
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(the observation that “there always has been and there always will be bul-
lying” cropped up during this research process time and again), it is also 
true that as long as we continue to perceive and treat them as utopian, they 
will continue to be so. Asking such normative questions can allow us to go 
beyond seeking faults or deviance within individuals, and merely stigmatiz-
ing “bullies” or “perpetrators” and casting them against “helpless victims,” 
by noticing wider social and cultural patterns at play.1
Introducing these discussions into school curricula may be a good place 
to start, as well as asking the industry to convene workshops or other venues 
where young people could discuss how they see these problems or how their 
platforms could be used to facilitate such discussions. Introducing skill-based 
education to children on how to detect “warning signs of rankism” (Fuller 
& Gerloff, 2008) or imagining what it would look like in practice to think 
and live by the ten elements of dignity proposed by Donna Hicks (2011)—
both of which I discuss in chapter 2—could constitute a way forward and 
become a component of digital citizenship education. What is important 
here is not to impose any normative conclusions onto children lest such efforts 
backfire in a way that prescriptive e-safety messages did—or as digital citi-
zenship may, when used merely as a rebranded term for compliance as com-
promise (Collier, 2014a). Such skill-based education needs to be adapted to 
target children’s respective age groups, and it can take place through play or 
fun exercises. Prior to their introduction into the curricula or incorporation 
into self-regulatory initiatives, these educational strategies should be tested 
through research for their ability to resonate with children.
Facebook could, perhaps, argue that the company is already moving in 
this direction: the Bullying Prevention Hub provides examples of how the 
platform can be used to combat bullying and promote prosocial behav-
ior. They could also cite the Anti-bullying Ambassadors Program Showcase 
event, which I refer to in chapter 1, as a program that speaks the language 
children understand, thus succeeding at making it cool not to be a bully. But 
if efforts like these are to be adopted as models for successful multi-stake-
holder interventions, they need to be continuously independently evalu-
ated, and the companies must also be able to provide concrete evidence of 
effectiveness of their reporting and other anti-bullying enforcement mech-
anisms. Companies should use these multi-stakeholder initiatives as more 
than public image boosters: in other words, for more than the appearance 
of “doing something,” while ensuring that their particular platform is per-
ceived as both safe and cool among young users, their parents, caregivers, 
educators, and regulators.
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This debate is closely connected to the issue of rights, and to what it 
means in practice to ensure that children have the rights to protection but 
also to provision and participation, and what platforms’ responsibilities are 
in ensuring those rights. Despite the growing evidence that scare tactics in 
e-safety education tend to backfire, it still appears to be difficult, at least in 
the US, to move away from fear-infused rhetoric (Gibson, 2016). The ques-
tion of how to ensure safety in the face of online risks while also enabling 
children to capitalize on digital opportunities is the challenge that lies ahead. 
Research findings from the EU Kids Online network indicate that restrictive 
practices may perhaps ensure less exposure to online risks from harms such 
as cyberbullying, but the more exposure to risks children face, the more they 
may also be likely to capitalize on opportunities in online environments, 
such as the acquisition of digital skills and access to learning that digital 
environments can afford (EU Kids Online, 2014; Livingstone, Mascheroni, & 
Staksrud, 2015; Livingstone, Mascheroni, & Staksrud, 2017). Furthermore, a 
certain amount of exposure to risk may be necessary for building resilience, 
which is also part of the learning process. Rather than vilifying certain apps, 
or advocating for their banishment, or introducing provisions that interfere 
with civil liberties, those who channel their energies on laws that purport 
to prevent future suicides should focus on identifying vulnerable children, 
especially those that are most likely to resort to self-harming practices, and 
on ensuring that they receive the right help before the problems escalate.
Rights versus Company Responsibility
Whatever a good balance of protection versus provision and participation 
looks like in theory, let alone in practice, is far from straightforward and 
is perhaps well illustrated in the most recent vehement debate around the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), adopted in 2016 and com-
ing into effect in 2018. GDPR introduces a provision like the much older 
COPPA regulation in the United States that prohibits social media compa-
nies from collecting personal information specifically from children under 
a certain age (Fernback & Papacharissi, 2007; Montgomery, 2015). After 
what was characterized as an opaque and behind-closed-doors GDPR nego-
tiation process—lacking impact assessment (Carr, 2016; Collier, 2016) that 
did not seem to honor children’s right to participation by soliciting their 
opinions on the subject—age 16 emerged as the minimum proposed age 
to use a social media platform (the equivalent was age 13 under COPPA), 
perhaps much to the irritation of the companies (boyd, 2015).2
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Such a measure would effectively require social media companies to ban 
access to those under 16, as they would now to those under 13, or go through 
what could be a tedious process resulting in more data collection to ensure 
verifiable parental consent from those under 16. Eventually, the European 
Commission decided to leave it open to individual member states to settle 
on a specific age (between 13 and 16) within their jurisdiction—possibly 
making matters worse as the companies would now have to be mindful of 
the differences between the EU countries.
It is questionable how the GDPR could be more effective than COPPA 
when overwhelming evidence in both the US and EU shows that numerous 
tweens (10-to-12-year-olds) or even younger children are using social media 
(boyd et al., 2011; Livingstone, Olafsson, & Staksrud, 2011). One may also 
legitimately ask if the idea behind obtaining parental consent is justified if 
few parents understand the process of data collection, and giving them the 
power of consent may not make them more informed (boyd, 2015). This 
can also become problematic when LGBTQ children need access to some 
social media sites, they may not wish to let their parents know about their 
sexual orientation; let alone abused children who may turn to social media 
platforms to escape such abuse and seek help from peers (boyd, 2015; Hin-
duja, 2016).
Companies, of course, report to remove underage accounts when notified 
and, when asked how many underage children they have on their platforms, 
respond with “none that we are aware of,” as the law absolves them from 
liability if there is no awareness.
Perhaps they do not know how many, but they are surely aware that there 
are many—at the very least there is research to support such observations 
(boyd et al., 2011; Livingstone, Olafsson, & Staksrud, 2011). An e-safety 
expert observed that anonymous platforms could do little in the way of 
knowing who the underage users were given the technological affordances 
of such platforms. Yet, I wonder to what extent this can be considered as 
an accurate observation, considering the current level of sophistication of 
data processing for advertising purposes.
When the European Commission proposed 16 as the minimum age, the 
companies, as well as some members of the e-safety community, raised the 
issue of participation and provision rights, emphasizing that teens should 
not be banned from social media platforms in the name of protection with-
out even being consulted—which is, indeed, a legitimate concern. There’s 
another question that could be asked here: If social media companies care 
about children’s rights in practice, should they not be equally worried about 
their underage users who, given that they are using platforms in violation of 
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the policy, are invisible to the platform (even as consumers let alone as citi-
zens)? This is what Elisabeth Staksrud aptly calls “illegal digital aliens” (see 
Staksrud [2013a, pp. 156–163]). Or, put differently, what kind of a regulatory 
mechanism do we need in order to encourage the companies to innovate for 
children under 13 if COPPA prompted them to stop doing so (boyd, 2015)? 
As it stands now, cyberbullying policies and enforcement mechanisms are 
not even designed with illegal digital aliens in mind, and social media com-
panies have no responsibility for ensuring their right even to protection from 
cyberbullying.
Here are other pertinent questions to ask, perhaps: What does a commit-
ment to digital citizenship, provision, and participation rights on behalf 
of the platforms entail, beyond merely discursively deploying these terms 
when doing so favors companies’ interests? What are the practical implica-
tions behind companies’ commitment to digital citizenship? In the case of 
GDPR and COPPA, this might mean ensuring in practice that data is not col-
lected from those under 13. Would platforms have an incentive to formally 
allow those under 13 on their platforms if it had to be guaranteed that 
their personal information was not collected in order to honor their digital 
citizenship and full spectrum of rights—protection, provision, and partici-
pation? Perhaps not, because platforms are indeed private companies even 
when they acquire the scale and substance of public utilities.
Using privacy policy as an illustration, ensuring the full spectrum of 
rights, therefore, is a shared responsibility of the social media industry and 
of regulators in designing a law that actually accomplishes its goal (if a ban on 
collecting personal information from those under 13 is indeed what regula-
tors wish to achieve), rather than creating a law that provides only nominal 
safeguards. Honoring the full spectrum of rights and dignity in the context 
of digital bullying is to ensure that the mechanisms provided (be it report-
ing, or advanced “products” such as “digital citizenship”) are actually effec-
tive from young people’s perspective, and understanding what effectiveness 
means for young people may be a good place to begin.

Chapter 6 is an analysis of social media companies’ Terms of Service (TOS) and Com-
munity Standards/Principles/Guidelines, as well as any other cyberbullying-related 
policies that the companies may have in their corporate documents; the companies’ 
corporate statements and blogs; the media coverage these policies have received; the 
legislation that surfaced in relationship to the platforms; and the interviews with 
company and NGO representatives and e-safety experts.
My initial research and analysis was conducted, together with the majority of the 
interviews, as part of my doctoral dissertation research, in 2014 and 2015, and updated 
between May and October 2016 to reflect relevant changes, where applicable. Some 
of the most recent media-related developments from 2017 have been added in the 
meantime. Thus my account attempts to provide a longitudinal perspective as well. 
For my doctoral research, I interviewed representatives from the following companies: 
Facebook and Facebook-owned Instagram, Twitter, Ask .fm, YouTube, Voxer, Secret, 
and Yik Yak. I edited, or omitted from the manuscript altogether, some or all of the 
information from the interviews upon the request of certain companies or due to the 
inability to obtain a written release from a non-disclosure agreement for the purpose 
of this book. I do not disclose the names and specific titles of the representatives to 
protect their anonymity (unless they provided explicit written permission for use of 
their names); the representatives either held high-ranking positions at their respective 
companies’ Safety or Policy teams or held high-ranking positions in their company 
leadership (such as CEO positions). Other companies either did not reply to repeated 
interview requests over the two-year period of time or replied but did not provide an 
interview.
The e-safety NGOs and organizations I interviewed as part of doctoral dissertation 
research or as part of the book writing process include: two members of the UK Coun-
cil for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) who did not speak on behalf of the organization 
but in the capacity of independent e-safety experts and consultants; a representative 
of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Center (CEOP), a National Crime 
Agency Command in the UK that works specifically on child protection online; the 
UK-based NGO Childnet; the NGO Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI), based in 






1. Facebook 1.39 billion monthly active users, October 2014 (Protalinski, 
2014). 
1.71 billion monthly active users, June 2016 (Newsroom .fb .com, 
2016)
2. YouTube More than 1 billion users, October 2016 (YouTube, n.d.b).
3. WhatsApp 700 million monthly active users, January 2015 (Statista, n.d.a.).
4. Google+ 300 million monthly active users January 2015 (Smith, 2016). 
However, the status of this network’s popularity is contested  
(e.g., Gallagher, 2015).
5. Tumblr 420 million users, not specified if it was active monthly, October 
2014 (Dredge, 2014). 305 million blog accounts, July 2016 
(Statista, n.d.b).
6. Instagram More than 300 million, not specified if monthly active, Decem-
ber 2014 (Statista, n.d.c). 500 million monthly active users, June 
2016 (Smith, 2016).
7. Twitter 284 million active monthly users, end of 2014 (Statista, n.d.d). 
313 million monthly active users, September 2016 (Twitter, 
2016g).
8. Kik 200 million monthly active users, January 2015 (Kik, 2015). 300 
million registered users as of May 2016, (Statista, n.d.e).
9. Ask .fm 180 million active users per month (according to my interview 
with the company representative, November 2014). 150 million 
“monthly uniques,” September 2016 (Ask .fm, 2016e).
10. Snapchat 100 million monthly active users, August 2014 (Shontell, 2015). 
150 million daily active users, June 2016 (Ingram, 2016).
11. Whisper 20 million monthly users, December 2015 (Kosoff, 2015).
12. Yik Yak Almost 2 million monthly active users, December 2014, allegedly 
dropped to under two million in 2016 (Constine, 2016).
13. Voxer 70 million users, according to some sources, in 2012 (Phaneuf, 
2012).
14. Secret Did not release numbers but was included in the study based on 
controversial reputation in the media regarding cyberbullying 
(see Woollaston, 2015).
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names I omit here to protect quote anonymity; the Brussels-based NGO European 
Schoolnet, which through its coordination of the European Commission’s InSafe pro-
gram operates throughout Europe; a representative of the Attorney General of Mary-
land’s office; the San Francisco–based NGO NoBully; the Washington, DC–based NGO 
iKeepSafe; the San Jose, California–based NGO ConnectSafely.org; the Greater Good 
Science Center at the University of California, Berkeley; and an e-safety consultancy 
organization Third Parent. Other e-safety experts interviewed were either academics or 
consultants working on cyberbullying and e-safety related issues, policy makers (e.g., 
the former Director General in the European Commission), or were not affiliated with 




Founded in 2004, Facebook is the oldest among the companies examined in this 
book, and one regarded by a number of interviewees (NGO representatives, e-safety 
experts, and some other companies) as the one with the most extensive cyberbul-
lying policy, the details behind which I analyze in chapter 6. It is also sometimes 
described as an economically powerful company with an established reputation. As 
such, Facebook has set what many informants perceive as high standards in terms of 
self-regulatory effort for other companies. Users need to be 13 years old to access the 
platform and the platform asks for a user’s age at the sign-up process.
Once users are “friends” they can (unless they set specific restrictions) see other 
users’ content via a function called the “newsfeed,” which provides for simultane-
ous sharing with a number of other users. Facebook algorithmically curates its users’ 
newsfeeds, which means that based on the information that Facebook collects on 
users, some of a user’s friends have a greater likelihood of appearing in her newsfeed 
than others (Facebook, 2014). Users can also live-chat privately or message each other 
privately.
Instagram
Instagram is an image- and video-sharing platform on which users can also post 
comments. It is primarily an app but also a website that is owned by Facebook, yet 
it has different features from Facebook. While Facebook requires its users to go by 
their real names on the platform, Instagram allows for pseudo-anonymity. Users can 
also follow each other so that relationships are asymmetrical—they do not need to 
be friends but one can follow without being followed back. The app has the reputa-
tion for being popular among teen and preteen users (i.e., “tweens,” typically ages 10 
to 13 but sometimes the term is used to include 8- and 9-year-olds) (Shamberg, 2013; 
Blaszczak-Boxe, 2014; Simmons, 2014). Instagram has been in the news for alleged 
bullying cases (see Boroff, 2014; “Watertown teens arrested . . .”, 2014). Users needed 
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to be 13 to access the platform but were not asked to provide their age during the 
sign-up process at the time of this research.
Twitter
Twitter is a social network, or a “microblogging platform,” which allows users to post 
messages or “tweets” composed of 140 characters of less. Like Instagram, it allows 
for pseudo-anonymity as well as asymmetrical relationships (Larson, Nagler, Ronen, 
& Tucker, 2016). Users can favorite each others’ tweets, retweet each other, or send 
direct messages. They can also use a function called “hashtag” (#) which assigns a 
topic to a tweet. Users can post a tweet, and by adding a hashtag (e.g., #WorldCup), 
all users who search for that hashtag can see these tweets (even if they are not fol-
lowing the users who posted them). Hashtags can be used on some other platforms 
as well, such as Instagram, Facebook, Google+, or Tumblr. Twitter does not appear to 
be as popular with teens and tweens as some other platforms featured here (e.g., see 
Elgersma, 2016; Gauthier, 2016) and it has been in the news a number of times for 
cyberbullying (see Dewey, 2015).
Leaked emails from Dick Costolo, the company’s CEO at the time, cited him as 
admitting that he felt “ashamed and embarrassed” by how his company handled 
bullying and harassment on the platform (McGrath, 2015). Cyberbullying, harass-
ment and trolling were cited as a reason that the company’s user base and subse-
quent financial success were in decline. This was a rare occasion at the time, to have 
the discussion of effectiveness of a company’s cyberbullying policies in the media 
tied to the implications for its business model (an issue I discuss in chapter 6).
In mid-2016, Twitter’s ability to handle abuse and harassment came into the lime-
light again, so much so that rumors began to spread about the company’s projected 
closing in early 2017, even prompting a trending hashtag, #SaveTwitter. BuzzFeed 
even ran a story on Twitter’s failure to effectively handle abuse provocatively titled “A 
Honeypot for Assholes: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year Failure to Stop Harassment” (Warzel, 
2016). Twitter denied these allegations (Kapko, 2016).
Twitter used to have a provision in its TOS, which explicitly stated that users 
under 13 were not allowed on the platform. However, this provision was moved to 
its Privacy Policy at the time of this writing; the Privacy Policy only stipulated that 
the platform’s service was “not directed to persons under 13,” that the company does 
not knowingly collect personal information from children under 13, and that if one 
becomes aware of a child under 13 using the service, Twitter would take the steps to 
remove such information and terminate the child’s account (Bennett, 2014a; Twitter, 
2016f).
Ask .fm
Ask .fm is a platform that allows users to post anonymous questions to other users. 
Users could choose to reveal their identity when asking questions, and the system 
of “following” is asymmetrical—it works much like Twitter and Instagram. Users 
can choose to share the answers they give on Ask .fm on their Facebook or Twitter 
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profiles, and such connectivity allows for spillover of potentially bullying content. 
In 2014 it was said to have 180 million active users per month, which in 2016 declined 
to 150 million (Ask .fm, 2016e). At one point, 20,000 questions were asked on the 
platform per minute.
Children under 13 are not allowed on the platform and users are asked to provide 
their age during the sign-up process. Should they provide a date of birth that is under 
the age of 13, they are informed that their registration cannot be processed. The 
network had generated substantial controversy over bullying incidents, as I detail 
in chapter 4.
The company has had as many as three owners. Two Latvian brothers, Ilja and 
Mark Terebin, were the first owners. An American internet company called IAC/Inter-
ActiveCorp bought it in 2014; at the time IAC owned more than 50 brands including 
College Humor, Tinder, Ask .com, and Match .com (IAC, n.d.). IAC, according to one 
informant, allegedly bought Ask .fm because it had been generating negative press 
for its own platform, similarly called Ask .com. The new company owners believed 
that previous owners had mishandled e-safety and demanded that they leave the 
company as part of the acquisition. The price of the sale was not publicly disclosed.
At the time of my interview with the company’s new Chief of Trust and Safety 
Officer, the company was undergoing significant e-safety changes. In an agreement 
struck with the Attorneys General of Maryland and New York in August 2014, Ask .fm 
agreed to revamp its e-safety policy, ensuring that children under 13 were not on the 
platform (Bodley, 2014). It was not clear whether the agreement forced the company 
to make any payments if it failed to make the required improvements within six 
months of the agreement (Perez, 2014).
According to the BBC, in July 2016, IAC sold the company to Noosphere, “an 
asset management firm that specializes in tech,” (“Ask .fm changes hands again,” 
2016). One reason for the sale, as cited by the company, was that Noosphere was 
“a more strategic fit” (“Big news from Ask .fm today,” 2016). While it was not clear 
whether or to what extent e-safety played a role in this second change of ownership, 
the UK child protection charity NSPCC reported in April 2016 that Ask .fm rated 
fourth among the top five sites where UK children and young people reported seeing 
inappropriate content, and Yik Yak rated fifth (News O2, 2016).1
YouTube
The Google-owned video sharing service allows users to share videos and follow each 
other by creating channels. Users can follow (subscribe to) each other’s channels and 
thus receive updates about posted videos. Videos also contain a comments section, 
which is where mean comments or cyberbullying can appear. The platform has a 
reputation for being popular among teens and tweens (Ault, 2014; Bennett, 2014b; 
Brouwer, 2014; Smith, 2016e) and has also been in news accounts of bullying and 
harassment (Kiberd, 2016; Williams, 2016). In most countries, users need to be 13 
to have a Google account, which allows one to sign into YouTube (Google, 2016a). 
The exact wording of the age requirements in YouTube’s TOS varies by country and 
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the terms tend to specify a version of the following warning: “You may not use the 
Service and may not accept the Terms if you are not of legal age to form a binding 
contract with YouTube” (YouTube .au, 2010; YouTube .gb, 2010). I address the most 
recent issues with the company’s bullying and harassment policies in chapter 6.
Google+
Google+ is a social networking service provided by Google. It allows users with Gmail 
accounts to follow other users and label them as “friends,” “family,” “acquaintances,” 
or simply “following.” At the time I selected the sample of companies for this research, 
the platform’s reported large number of users seemed to belie its reputation for being a 
less-popular social network (Grandoni, 2014; Cain Miller, 2014; Elgan, 2015). Google+ 
has been, nonetheless, frequently recognized as a dying platform since (Garcia-Marti-
nez, 2016; Fiegerman, 2015; Morris, 2015).
Snapchat
Snapchat, released in 2011, is an app that allows users to capture photos and videos 
that “self-destruct” in 10 seconds once the recipient opens them (Magid, 2013). The 
company appeared in the news many times, frequently in connection to sexting (it 
had even acquired a reputation as a “sexting app”) as well as bullying (Shontell, 2014; 
Barnes, 2016; Bell, 2016). Over time, it introduced a number of other features, such 
as “Stories”—“compilations of snaps (i.e. photos or videos) that create a narrative” 
(Snapchat, n.d.e) and which could be seen by anyone with whom the user shared 
them for up to 24 hours (Mercury News, 2016). The New York Times reported in 2016 
that this affordance was so popular that Facebook-owned Instagram copied it (Isaac, 
2016). Snapchat also added “Memories” the same year, a feature that allowed users 
to add photos or videos that had been taken outside of Snapchat, to Snapchat Stories 
(Read, 2016).
The platform has witnessed a growing popularity since the time it was introduced. 
In 2016 Forbes and Wired described it as “going mainstream” (Hempel, 2016), from 
its start as a niche “sexting app” to one that appealed to adults, too (Silver, 2016). 
The Pew Research Center reported in 2015 that Snapchat was the third most popular 
social media platform for US teens (Lenhart, 2015).
In June 2014, Snapchat entered a settlement with the Attorney General of Mary-
land who sued the company for “deceptive trade practices” because of Snapchat’s 
claims that snaps “disappear forever” (Maryland Attorney General, 2014). Users 
could take screenshots of images and share them on other platforms. The company 
had also been allegedly in violation of COPPA and was collecting names and phone 
numbers from users’ electronic contact lists, without disclosing such practices to 
consumers (Maryland Attorney General, 2014). As part of the settlement, Snapchat 
agreed to address these issues and pay a fine of $100,000. Snapchat now informs the 
sender if the recipient creates a screenshot of the sent image, although reportedly 
there are ways to circumvent screenshot detection.
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WhatsApp
Founded in 2009, WhatsApp is a Facebook-owned mobile messaging app, which Face-
book bought in 2014 for as much as $19 billion (Statista, n.d.a). WhatsApp is a mobile 
messaging app on which users can exchange text messages, photos, and videos. The 
platform was reported to be popular among teens and young people (Olson, 2013) 
and sometimes associated with alleged bullying (Bullying .uk, n.d.; Espinoza, 2016).
In a revision to its TOS in late August 2016, the minimum age was lowered to 13. 
Before this change, it did not seem to be clear whether users had to be 16 or if they 
could still use the service under the age of 16 as long as they had parental consent. 
On the one hand, the TOS stated that by signing up for the service the user affirmed 
that he or she was “at least 16 years of age as the WhatsApp Service is not intended 
for children under 16” (WhatsApp, 2016c). On the other hand, they also stated that 
the user was “either more than 16 years of age, or an emancipated minor, or pos-
sesses legal parental or guardian consent.”2
Kik Messenger
Founded in 2009, Kik Messenger is the only non-US company profiled in this book. 
It was founded in Canada by a group of University of Waterloo students. As the 
Guardian reported in 2016, Kik claimed as many as 40% of US teens were using the 
app (Wong, 2016).3
Kik relies on usernames rather than telephone numbers for its Kik accounts, which, 
the company says, allows users to “always” be “in complete control of who they talk 
to on Kik” (Kik Interactive, 2016e). But this feature also allows users pseudo-anonymity 
if they choose to be registered with a name that is not their real name or one via 
which their contacts may not be able to associate with their real identity. Users can 
also connect to those they may not know in person (Kik Interactive, 2016b).
The app found itself at the center of controversy when Nicole Lovell, a 13-year-
old girl from the US, chatted with an 18-year-old boy on the app who later allegedly 
killed her (Kobie, 2016). Kik had also appeared in the media as a platform where 
12-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick had allegedly been bullied before she committed 
suicide (see chapters 1 and 4). The platform was mentioned in the news a number of 
times in reference to bullying, and its popularity among teens was widely acknowl-
edged among the interviewees for this book.
Despite these cases, which date to as early as 2013, when I contacted the com-
pany in August of 2016 for an interview, a representative asked if the interview could 
be conducted later in October, as the company was still “in the early stages of formal-
izing its policies.”
The company reports its pride in being backed by venture capital firms that had 
developed other well-known social media companies and gaming platforms such as 
Twitter, Foursquare, and Zynga (Kik Interactive, 2016e). Kik’s TOS prohibit children 
under 13 from using the service and those who are “under the age of majority” at 
the location where they live can use the service only if a parent or guardian agrees 
208 Appendix B
to the terms on their behalf (Kik Interactive, 2016d). At the time of this book’s writ-
ing, however, the age verification procedure for Kik was the same as for many other 
platforms—users needed to provide a birth date during the sign-up process, which, 
of course, allowed them to lie about their age (Hughes, 2016).
Voxer
Launched in 2007, Voxer is a digital messaging service that offers text, photo, and 
location sharing, live and recorded voice, one-on-one chats, and large group chats 
(Voxer, n.d.b). Voxer seems to be particularly used for voice messaging (Dale, 2015) 
and appears to be oriented toward adult users and businesses in particular. But this 
platform, too, was mentioned in the media in relation to 12-year-old Rebecca Ann 
Sedwick’s alleged bullying and suicide (Bazelon, 2013a). The company reported that 
it thought Voxer was only an app on Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s phone, and that it was 
probably not used for bullying that allegedly contributed to this incident. The app 
occasionally surfaced in news media and was described on some parenting online 
resources as popular among teens (Gaggle, n.d.; Birdsong, 2013; Young, 2014) and 
sometimes in relationship to bullying (Alvarez, 2013b), although the company does 
not disclose the numbers of its teen users. Its TOS stipulates that users must be 13 to 
use the service or have parental consent if under 18. I was not asked for age verifica-
tion, however, when I signed up for the service.
Whisper
Released in 2012, the Whisper app allows users to post text laid over photos, which 
appear to be algorithmically suggested to users by the app. I once tried to create a 
message using the name “Michelle” and the suggested photo was that of Michelle 
Obama, even though “Obama” was not the last name used. Users can upload a photo 
of their own, however, so in theory, if users wanted to bully someone, they could 
write a harassing post and plaster it over that person’s photo.
The app uses geolocation to generate users’ newsfeeds. Users do not know if they 
are connected to other people posting content in terms of whether these are contacts 
from their phonebook or whether they are followers or friends on other networks 
(Ortutay, 2014). Users are also given the option to find their school on Whisper and 
communicate with their classmates who are using Whisper while on campus.
The company has been a subject of privacy and bullying-related controversy in 
media coverage (Giantasio, 2014). While the company alleged that it did not track its 
users, the Guardian revealed in October 2014 that the company did track the where-
abouts of its users, despite the existence of an opt-out button, which was appar-
ently not working (Lewis & Rushe, 2014; Rushe & Lewis, 2014). The Register website 
reported that Whisper worked closely with BuzzFeed to help the news service find 
breaking news from anonymous posts, which is why it was important to know the 
geolocation of its users (Thomson, 2014). The Register also reported that it could 
not obtain an interview with Whisper even when the reporters tweeted Whisper 
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leadership team while they were standing in front of Whisper’s office in Los Angeles 
(McCarthy, 2014).
A Change .org petition (REACH of Macon County, 2013) called for the company 
to introduce age verification by asking for the birth date before downloading the app. 
At the time of this research, the minimum age for downloading Whisper was 13, but 
if users were between 13 and 18, the TOS demanded they had consent from parents 
or guardians (Whisper, 2016a). As with many other apps described here, parental 
consent was not verified upon the sign-up process and neither were users asked to 
provide their age during sign-up. The app had the reputation of being popular among 
teens (Elgersma, 2016), although it was not clear how many teen users it had.
Secret
Secret was the youngest company among those I surveyed in this research, but it 
went out of business in 2015, before I had finished writing this book. The app had 
become available on Apple and Android in February 2014, and it also allowed users 
to post content without revealing their identity. According to its CEO, Secret was 
a place where people could talk freely without the burden of their identity lead-
ing to any potentially negative consequences. Secret’s algorithm determined whom 
an anonymous post would be shown to. Anonymous posts were then shared with 
people in their phone books and/or with their Facebook friends, or with friends of 
friends, or with anyone else using Secret.
Users could log in via their Facebook accounts, which meant that Secret had access 
to their Facebook contacts, although sharing on Secret was nonetheless anonymous. 
In Brazil, a judge declared the Secret app to be “unconstitutional for its alleged promo-
tion of bullying,” stressing that freedom of expression provisions in the country do 
not cover anonymous speech (Bernocco, 2014). A court order then asked the Apple 
App Store and Google Play to remove the app, or to otherwise pay a fine for each day 
that the app stayed in their app stores. Google refused to take it down, but Apple com-
plied (Russel, 2014). At the time of the interview, Secret was changing its TOS to allow 
only users who were 17 and older to be on the platform (previously 13 and older). The 
change had allegedly been made in response to the company’s realization that the app 
was more suitable for adult communication.
Yik Yak
Yik Yak was founded in November 2013 and a year later, with app users on 1,500 col-
lege campuses in the US, it ranked among the top 10 social media apps in the Apple 
App Store (Medina, 2014; Rusli, 2014).
Accessing the app allowed users to view the feed—a live stream of anonymous 
messages shared by people in their geophysical vicinity—which is why the app was 
geared toward college campus communities, with students who live in close prox-
imity and have common interests (Yik Yak, 2014). Users could also “upvote” and 
“downvote” content—messages that they liked and disliked. Anonymous messages, 
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so-called Yaks, were organized around specific communities such as Stanford or NYU, 
or around selected topics such as “freshmen advice” or “sports.” In the fall semester 
of 2014, Yik Yak was running a bus tour to promote the product to university cam-
puses on the West Coast (Yik Yak, 2014). By that time, the app had already gathered 
significant media attention for alleged violent threats and bullying (O’Neil, 2014).
As of April 2016, the TOS stipulated that the minimum user age was 18 (Yik Yak, 
2016), yet no age-verification was provided at sign-up. The company was also using 
geofencing, a method that uses GPS location data to ban students from accessing the 
app in specific places (e.g., high schools). Primary and high school students could 
access the app at home, but geofencing effectively kept them from communicating 
with their fellow students unless they were physically close to each other. Schools 
could request Yik Yak to set up geofencing around their campuses, and the app had 
been doing it proactively.
While the app’s age limit and geofencing were meant to prevent students 
younger than college age from accessing the app, incidents involving high school 
students and the app, emerged in the media. These incidents primarily involved 
violent threats, but in media coverage they were sometimes portrayed as cyberbul-
lying, which could further contribute to the public confusion about the term. For 
instance, in November 2014, threats were posted against students at Southeast Polk 
High School in Iowa, after which a shooting occurred nearby (Rusli & Elder, 2014). 
Yik Yak cooperated with the local police and turned over the data on three students 
who posted the threats, but the threats were unrelated to the shooting incident. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, one of the three students arrested in this case 
was only 13 years old (Rusli, 2013). At the same time, a report of a separate inci-
dent involving both threats and name calling at a high school in Hawaii disclosed 
that school officials canceled an already scheduled anti-bullying assembly and noti-
fied the police department of the threats (“Kaiser High School reports cyberbully-
ing . . .,” 2015). (Note that the companies I interviewed preferred not to discuss 
the cases where they revealed identities of users to the law enforcement but always 
emphasized that such provisions were made only after valid requests on behalf of 
law enforcement.)
In 2016, however, Yik Yak introduced usernames or handles to replace the type of 
anonymity described above and users were now also able to mute abusive account 
handles in addition to flagging abusive content that had already been available on 
the platform (Heath, 2016). In early 2016 there were reports that Yik Yak was losing 
popularity and had dropped from being the third most-downloaded app in late 2014 
to number 63 among social networking apps (Kosoff, 2016). Yik Yak closed down in 
April 2017, when this book was going to print (Carson, 2017).
Tumblr
Tumblr is a microblogging platform that allows users to create profiles and share 
content with their followers as well as to follow other users. Yahoo! acquired Tumblr 
in May 2013 for $1 billion (Abbruzzese, 2014). The minimum age for users was 13. 
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Tumblr was mentioned in interviews with NGO representatives a number of times as 
relevant for children’s and teens’ experience, and it was widely perceived as a popu-
lar platform for teens (Bennett, 2013). It also appeared in the news in connection to 
abuse and bullying (Nguyen, 2015). Furthermore, the site was blamed in the media 
for hosting self-harming content. Tallulah Wilson, a 15-year-old girl from London 
who died by suicide was allegedly an avid user of Tumblr, where she posted material 
about self-harming (Rawlinson, 2014).

Chapter 1
1. Throughout the book, I use the terms “child” and “children” to refer to those 
under 18 years of age, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC); what constitutes “a legal minor” may differ in various legal frame-
works. Hence when using the term “children” I refer to teens as well. I specify “teens” 
only when I want to emphasize that the relevant piece of information refers specifi-
cally to those who are 13 years of age and above.
2. This case did not involve only cyberbullying (see chapter 4 for more information).
3. See also Anti-bullying Showcase 2013 at Facebook HQ (2013).
4. Communications Decency Act of 1996, (CDA), Pub. L. No. 104–104 (Tit. V), 110 
Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996), codified at 47 USC 223, 230.
5. See also the work of NSPCC, a UK-based NGO that relies on a survey to ask chil-
dren whether they are aware of reporting and blocking tools on the most popular 
platforms (NetAware, 2017).
6. For a discussion on connotations of multi-stakeholderism, see Raymond & DeNar-
dis (2016).
7. See appendix A for more information on the interviews.
8. No platform discussed in this book allows for “true anonymity” but rather “pseudo-
anonymity” (Kling, Lee, Teich, & Frankel, 1999). True anonymity would mean that 
one’s actions online cannot be traced to the person who executed them, and true ano-
nymity can be achieved using encryption services such as Tor or I2P. Otherwise, one’s 
actions can be traced to their IP address; moreover, one typically needs to use either an 
email address or a phone number to sign up for a platform. Pseudo-anonymity would 
refer to cases where one can use a social network under a name that is not their real 
name (e.g., “Fancy Clouds”). Facebook, for instance, asks users to register with the 
names they hold in the “real life” (even though this provision can be violated), while 
allowing users to access its service via Tor in an attempt to ensure that users who may 
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be living under oppressive government regimes can avoid government tracking. Insta-
gram allows for pseudo-anonymity. So-called anonymous services such as Whisper and 
Secret allow users to share content that is not associated with either a real name or a 
pseudo-name. Nonetheless, users still need to provide an email address or a mobile 
phone number to register or sign up, and hence, the company can trace their online 
activity. For a discussion on anonymity and regulation, see Levmore (2010).
9. For more on trolling, see Phillips (2015).
10. The Todd and Parsons cases included sextortion and child pornography. I discuss 
the problems that stem from describing them as “cyberbullying” cases in chapter 4.
Chapter 2
1. The concepts of “media panic” and “moral panic” are laden with some theoreti-
cal and epistemological issues. For more information on this point, see Buckingham 
& Strandgaard Jensen, 2012.
2. For a comprehensive discussion on online risk see Staksrud (2013a).
3. EU Kids Online is a network of more than 150 researchers in 33 countries in 
Europe. The network conducted a rigorously designed survey of internet and digital 
use habits of European internet-using children (ages 9–16, totaling 25,000 children) 
in 2010. The results were compared to the findings of its sister project, Net Children 
Go Mobile, in 2014. See Net Children Go Mobile (n.d.).
4. American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) used to advise that children under two 
years of age should not be allowed screen time due to a lack of sufficient evidence 
about effects of such exposure/engagement. However, as of 2015, AAP is reconsider-
ing these guidelines, too (Brown, Shifrin, & Hill, 2015).
5. I thank Dr. Patricia Aufderheide for this insight.
6. For a different interpretation of introduction of bullying laws in the US states, 
please see Bullying Symposium 2013 Keynote Speaker Nancy Willard. YouTube. 
Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=8ZlZwX4gqxU.
7. See more on this point in Patchin, 2014.
8. Some have found that this is the case for girls, ages 13–14; see Livingstone, 
Mascheroni, et al., (2014).
9. While definitions of what constitutes a minor vary from country to country, 
UNCRC defines a child as anyone under the age of 18. It is worthwhile noting that 
the US had signed but not ratified the convention and hence it is not bound by its 
provisions, see Humanium (n.d.).
10. “Private sector actors” includes social media companies.
11. See Staksrud (2013a), chapter 7, “From Authority to Advisory.”
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12. While online intermediaries are not content providers or creators, many social 
media companies provide educational materials (e.g., against bullying) or link to 
other content such as games on their platforms (e.g., Zynga’s Farmville on Facebook).
Chapter 3
1. See the section later in this chapter titled “Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (COPPA).”
2. See chapter 5 for the historical context behind the DMCA.
3. Some authors observed that the companies would, in such situations, need to 
make decisions about torts that are “notoriously ambiguous such as negligence and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)” (Chang, 2010, p. 522).
4. I revisit GDPR in chapter 9.
5. See also Bamberger & Mulligan (2015) for a discussion on this point.
Chapter 4
1. Reveal her breasts.
2. The abbreviation involves a swear word and signifies that she did not care.
3. See chapter 3 for further details on liability exemptions for social media compa-
nies and cases where harassment and defamation provisions or specific local laws 
may apply.
4. For the latest version of the Enhancing Online Safety for Children Act, 2015, see 
https: //www .legislation .gov .au /Details /C2016C00781.
Chapter 5
1. When referring to the corporate policies and enforcement mechanisms of the 
companies I analyze in chapter 6, I will use the terms “private regulation,” “indi-
vidualized self-regulation” or “self-organization.” See Latzer et al. (2013).
2. For a comprehensive analysis of these documents, see Lievens (2010, pp. 88–142) 
and Staksrud (2013a, chapter 6, “Regulation as Legitimate Protection”).
3. It is legitimate to ask is: How can parents/caregivers be expected to know every-
thing (and should they) given the increasing number of issues that demand their 
attention in the context of contemporary life and ever-changing technology?
4. Command and Control regulation, in more formal terms, can be defined as: 
“state promulgation of legal rules prohibiting specified conduct underpinned by 
coercive sanctions (either civil or criminal in nature) if the prohibition is violated” 
(McLaughlin, 2013, p. 78, cf. Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 80).
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5. The primary concern motivating this piece of legislation was children’s exposure 
to pornographic material. The implementation of the law’s filtering component led to 
overblocking of legitimate sites (for instance, sites with valuable health information 
that did not contain “obscene” material). The law was subsequently questioned in 
court on grounds of violating the First Amendment and strengthening the digital 
divide—affluent people could have access to any site, because they could afford the 
internet access from home; however, people with limited means who relied on inter-
net access in public libraries could not (Menuey, 2009).
6. Consider, however, that this working group was convened “pursuant to the Pro-
tecting Children in the 21st Century Act,” which is a piece of legislation that Alice 
Marwick described as a “2007 version of DOPA,” the Deleting Online Predators Act 
of 2006, and therefore much criticized (see Marwick, 2008).
7. For more on “escalation” in the context of NGOs, see chapter 7.
8. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on electronic commerce”). Retrieved 
from http: //eur -lex .europa .eu /legal -content /EN /ALL / ?uri=CELEX:32000L0031.
9. For an elaborate classification of activities that self-regulation can encompass see 
Marsden (2012), cf. Black (1996, p. 55).
10. These are, by no means, the only classifications, see Latzer et al. (2013, p. 377), 
who explain that, accounting for different types of government involvement, some 
authors have identified the following, among others: “enforced self-regulation” 
(Braithwaite, 1982); “mandated self-regulation” (Gunningham & Rees, 1997); and 
“regulated self-regulation” (Schulz & Held, 2004).
11. Some authors summarize that co-regulation implies when “self-regulation is 
combined with statutory regulation” (De Haan et al., 2013, p. 111; Lievens, 2010, 
p. 169). Other authors suggest that independent evaluations could be taken as a token 
of co-regulation, and what the EU in its documents refers to as “self-regulation” over-
laps with the concept of co-regulation precisely because of independent evaluations 
(McLaughlin, 2013). But as research strongly indicates, independent evaluations are 
nonetheless rare when it comes to cyberbullying specifically.
12. See also Marsden (2011). At the time of writing, referring to social networking 
sites, the author observed that there was “no cross-sectoral SRO (self-regulatory orga-
nization)” and that “the regulation of these systems takes place at corporate and user 
level, in the same way” (p. 74).
13. For more on “analytical categories for evaluation of self and co-regulation.” see 
Latzer et al. (2007).
14. Ask .fm commissioned a law firm, Mishcon de Reya, to do such an evaluation 
after the Hannah Smith suicide, but I could not find the results of this evaluation in 
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the form of a publicly available report (Rudd, 2013b; Saul, 2013). Via its digital citi-
zenship grant, Facebook funded research that prompted recommendations aimed at 
social media companies. To my best knowledge, however, such studies did not set 
out to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of Facebook’s anti-bullying mecha-
nisms. See the report in Schneider, Smith, & O’Donnel (2013b).
15. Note also that this evaluation did not include any testing.
Chapter 6
1. “Roasting,” a practice sometimes placed under the umbrella of ”cyberbullying,” 
is an event in which one individual is subjected to what can be either ill-intentioned 
or good-natured jokes at their expense, and is typically intended to amuse a wider 
audience (Espinoza, 2016).
2. Given that the oldest companies in the sample originated in the early to mid-
2000s, arguably all social media companies are young. Yet, I refer to older companies 
in this sample that typically had a significant user base and that tended to be per-
ceived in the community of e-safety experts as having significant financial resources 
to invest in e-safety (see Marsden, 2011, p. 81) as “the more established companies,” 
e.g., Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter.
3. Patchin is a professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Wisconsin-Eau 
Claire, and the co-director of the Cyberbullying Research Center. The interview took 
place on Skype on August 31, 2016.
4. Instagram blocked tags that are frequently associated with promoting eating disor-
ders (“pro-ED”), which meant that if one was to search for them on the platform, such 
searches would not return any results; but “banned tags can still be used in posts” 
(Chancellor et al., 2016, p. 1), which implied that filtering took place at the level of 
search results only and that the content itself was not filtered out. For an explanation 
of how such filtering on Instagram can fail to deliver due to users’ ability to leverage 
“lexical variations” to circumvent restrictions, see Chancellor et al. (2016).
5. CEOP’s counterpart in the US is the Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC), a non-profit organization established by the US Congress in 1984.
6. Facebook’s Advisory Board, which I discuss in chapter 7, comprises experts from 
organizations providing e-safety advice for the company.
7. I edited this quote to conceal not only a personal identity but also the company 
in question.
8. Upon checking in 2016, I was not provided with an option to report a post on 
my timeline—I could only report a post in my newsfeed.
9. See also boyd (2014) and Marwick & boyd (2014) as I discussed in chapter 2.
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10. Although older, it is questionable whether the company could be characterized 
as more established. “While Tumblr’s users have increased at a steady pace since its 
acquisition by Yahoo,” it ”did not meet its $100 million revenue target for 2015” 
(Great Speculations, 2016).
11. In the summer of 2016, after the company was sold to its third owner, Noosphere, 
and the design of the platform appeared to have been altered, information about fil-
tering was no longer available. At that time, the platform offered the option to report 
“bullying and harassment.” After clicking on the appropriate button, the flow offered 
an option to further describe the post by choosing one of the following reasons: “this 
post is cruel or hurtful,” or “this post is threatening or aggressive,” or “this image is 
offensive.” The confirmation of the report followed with a message that the company 
would do its best to review it in 24 hours.
Chapter 7
1. The latter was organized around the Department of Commerce’s National Tele-
communications & Information Administration (NTIA).
2. Members of The Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force for example, would 
organize such training.
3. See Matias et al., 2015 for the description of how one organization focusing on 
harassment of women worked with Twitter and p. 19 in this report for statistics on 
how many reports escalated by the NGO the company took action on.
4. Safer Internet Centers are part of a European Commission initiative that estab-
lished a center in every participating European country. The centers contain helplines 
(to help with content harmful to children), hotlines (to help with illegal content in 
relation to child protection), and awareness centers (aimed at educational practices 
regarding online risks). See Digital Single Market (2015).
5. For a more detailed background on ICRA see Staksrud (2013): pp. 97–98, and 
ICRA’s transformation into FOSI: pp.166–168.
6. The NGO is sometimes referred to as ConnectSafely and sometimes Connect-
Safely .org.
7. Anne Collier no longer represented ConnectSafely .org at the time of this book's 
completion.
8. The blog post had been written before Facebook added an NGO from India and 
an NGO from Italy to the Board.
9. The content of the links has changed since (Google, 2015a; 2015b).
10. For a discussion on vulnerable children and the context around reporting and 
using helplines see Hunter, Boyle, & Warden (2004); Fukkink & Hermanns (2009); 
Andersson & Osvaldsson (2011); Livingstone, Ólafsson, O’Neill, & Donoso (2012).
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11. For a discussion on connotations of multi-stakeholderism, see Raymond & 
DeNardis, 2016.
12. The transcripts of which are not publicly available—making them publicly 
available was seen as potentially inhibiting the ability of some stakeholders to dis-
cuss the issues frankly and freely.
Chapter 8
1. The cases that garner high-profile news coverage can force politicians to act, or 
perhaps they constitute too good of an opportunity not to act.
2. For a discussion on ethics regarding fictitious profiles see Staksrud (2015).
3. For a debate on commodification of youth culture (outside of the context of digi-
tal citizenship) see Wasko (2008).
Chapter 9
1. This is not to say that there are no cases where the term “helpless victim” accu-
rately describes a situation or an individual—and such cases, of course, require taking 
a stand against the individuals engaging in bullying or harassment and ensure that it 
stops. The reference here is to point out that social positioning is often at play—and 
this might require a more nuanced approach in addressing the issue.
2. Inspired by COPPA, the EC proposed the age of 13 at first, but then changed it to 
16, apparently inexplicably.
Appendix B
1. The results were based on a survey of 1,725 children, ages 11–18, from 12 schools 
across the UK. It is not clear if the sample was representative (NSPCC, 2016; News 
O2, 2016).
2. “You affirm that you are either more than 16 years of age, or an emancipated 
minor, or possess legal parental or guardian consent, and are fully able and compe-
tent to enter into the terms, conditions, obligations, affirmations, representations, 
and warranties set forth in these Terms of Service, and to abide by and comply with 
these Terms of Service. In any case, you affirm that you are at least 16 years old as the 
WhatsApp Service is not intended for children under 16. If you are under 16 years of 
age, you are not permitted to use the WhatsApp Service” (WhatsApp, 2016c).
3. Note that according to USA Today, 40% of Kik users are US teens, which is a dif-
ferent interpretation of numbers provided by the Guardian (Hughes, 2016).

Abbruzzese, J. (2014, August 22). Report: Tumblr is growing, but not helping Yahoo’s 
Bottom Line. Mashable. Retrieved from http: //mashable .com /2014 /08 /21 /tumblr -not 
-helping -yahoo -numbers.
Adler, P. A., & Adler, P. (1998). Peer Power: Preadolescent Culture and Identity. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Ahmed, E., & Brathwaite, V. (2006). Forgiveness, reconciliation, and shame: Three 
key variables in reducing school bullying. Journal of Social Issues, 62(2), 347–370.
Albertson, A. K. (2014). Note, criminalizing bullying: why Indiana should hold the 
bully responsible, 48 IND. L. REV., 243, 256–261.
Almasy, S., Segal, K., & Couwels, J. (2013, October 16). Sheriff: Taunting post leads to 
arrests in Rebecca Sedwick bullying death. CNN. Retrieved from http: //edition .cnn 
.com /2013 /10 /15 /justice /rebecca -sedwick -bullying -death -arrests /index .html.
Alvarez, L. (2013a, October 15). Felony counts for 2 in suicide of bullied 12-year-old. 
New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2013 /10 /16 /us /felony 
-charges -for -2 -girls -in -suicide -of -bullied -12 -year -old -rebecca -sedwick .html ?_r=1.
Alvarez, L. (2013b, September 13). Girl’s suicide points to rise in apps used by cyber-
bullies. New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2013 /09 /14 /us /sui 
cide -of -girl -after -bullying -raises -worries -on -web -sites .html ?pagewanted=all.
Alvarez, L. (2013c, November 21). Charges dropped in cyberbullying death, but 
sheriff isn’t backing down. New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com 
/2013 /11 /22 /us /charges -dropped -against -florida -girls -accused -in -cyberbullying 
-death .html ?pagewanted=all.
Amanda Todd: Police alerted to extortion suspect before her suicide. (2014, 
December 4). CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /british 




Amanda Todd suicide: RCMP repeatedly told of blackmailer’s attempts. (2013, 
November 15). CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /amanda 
-todd -suicide -rcmp -repeatedly -told -of -blackmailer -s -attempts -1 .2427097.
American Civil Liberties Union. (2009). Re: Subcommittee hearing on “Cyberbully-
ing and other online safety issues for children.” Retrieved from https: //www .aclu 
.org /files /images /asset_upload_file92_41198 .pdf.
Ames, B. (2013, April 11). Grace’s Law, a cyberbullying bill, called ‘landmark legisla-
tion. Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from http: //www .baltimoresun .com /news /maryland 
/howard /ellicott -city /ph -ho -graces -law -passes -20130410 -story .html.
Andersson, K., & Osvaldsson, K. (2011). Evaluation of BRIS’ Internet Based Support 
Contacts. Executive Summary. Sweden: Linköping University. Retrieved from http: //
www .bris .se /upload /Articles /BRIS_evaluation_of_webbased_se.
Angelopoulos, C. (2013). Beyond the safe harbours: harmonising substantive inter-
mediary liability for copyright infringement in Europe. Intellectual Property Quarterly 
(3), 253–274. Retrieved from http: //ssrn .com /abstract=2360997.
‘Anonymous’ won’t release names of Rehtaeh Parsons suspects. (2013, April 12). 
CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia /anonymous 
-won -t -release -names -of -rehtaeh -parsons -suspects -1 .1365232.
Anti-bullying Ambassador School’s Showcase Facebook London 2016. (2016). Diana 
Award. Retrieved June 1, 2017 from: http: //www .antibullyingpro .com /london -show 
case -2016.
Antibullyingpro .com. (n.d.). The Diana Award Anti-bullying Ambassador Training 
Programme. Retrieved from http: //www .antibullyingpro .com /training.
Anti-bullying showcase 2013 at Facebook HQ. (2013, December 3). Antibullying Pro. 
Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=ONi3D6_pk -A.
Arce, N. (2014). Facebook now allows breastfeeding photos, #FreeTheNipple cam-
paign a success. Tech Times. Retrieved from http: //www .techtimes .com /articles /8506 
/20140615 /facebook -now -allows -breastfeeding -photos -freethenipple -campaign -a 
-success .htm.
Arseneault, L., Bowes, L., & Shakoor, S. (2010). Bullying victimization in youths and 
mental health problems: “Much ado about nothing”? Psychological Medicine, 40, 
717–729.
Ask .fm. (2016a). Community Guidelines. Retrieved from http: //safety .ask .fm /com 
munity -guidelines /.
Ask .fm. (2016b). Ask.fm: A View on Safety. Our philosophy: Safety equals collabora-
tion. Retrieved from http: //safety .ask .fm /our -philosophy /.
Ask .fm. (2016c). Contributors. Retrieved from http: //safety .ask .fm /contributors /.
References 223
Ask .fm. (2016d). Safety Tools. Retrieved from http: //safety .ask .fm /safety -tools /.
Ask .fm. (2016e). Ask .com acquires the largest Global Q&A Social Network Ask .fm. 
Retrieved from http: //about .ask .fm /ask -com -acquires -largest -global -qa -social -network 
-ask -fm /.
Ask .fm. (2016f). Safety Center. Retrieved from http: //safety .ask .fm /.
Ask .fm changes hands again (2016, July 4). Ask .fm changes hands once again. BBC 
News. Retrieved from http: //www .bbc .com /news /technology -36702766.
Ask .fm Safety Guide for Schools and Educators. (2017). Ask .fm. Retrieved from 
http: //safety .ask .fm /ask -fm -safety -guide -for -schools -educators /.
Aufderheide, P., & Jaszi, P. (2011). Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in 
Copyright. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ault, S. (2014, August 5). Survey: YouTube stars more popular than Mainstream celebs. 
Variety. Retrieved from http: //variety .com /2014 /digital /news /survey -youtube -stars 
-more -popular -than -mainstream -celebs -among -u -s -teens -1201275245.
Austin, L. M., Stewart, H., & Clement, A. (2014). Bill C-13 has little to do with cyber-
bullying. The Star. Retrieved from http: //www .thestar .com /opinion /commentary 
/2014 /11 /22 /bill_c13_has_little_to_do_with_cyberbullying .html #.
Balkin, J. M. (2004). Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of 
expression for the information society. New York University Law Review, 79(1), 
1–55.
Baldwin, R., and M. Cave. 1999. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Prac-
tice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bamberger, K. A., & Mulligan, D. K. (2015). Privacy on the Ground. Guiding 
 Corporate Behavior in the United States and in Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bangemann Report Europe and The Global Information Society: Recommendations 
to the European Council. (1994). Retrieved from http: //www .cyber -rights .org /docu-
ments /bangemann .htm.
Barbosa, A., B. O’Neill, C. Ponte, J. A. Simoes, and T. Jereissati. (2013). Risks and 
safety on the internet: Comparing Brazilian and European Results. Retrieved from 
http: //www .lse .ac .uk /media@lse /research /Research -Projects /Researching -Childrens 
-Rights /pdf /Barbosa -et -al -(2013).-Risks -and -safety -on -the -internet .-Comparing -Bra 
zilian -and -European -children .pdf.
Barbovschi, M., Green, L., & Vandoninck, S. (2013) Innovative approaches for inves-
tigating how young children understand risk in new media: Dealing with method-
ological and ethical challenges. EU Kids Online Network, London. Retrieved from 
http: //eprints .lse .ac .uk /53060.
224 References
Barnett, E. (2009, November 19). Can Bebo’s Panic Button beat cyberbullying? The 
Telegraph. Retrieved from http: //www .telegraph .co .uk /technology /social -media /6600 
032 /Can -Bebos -panic -button -beat -cyber -bullying .html.
Barnett, E. (2010). Bebo fights back: social media by numbers. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved from http: //www .telegraph .co .uk /technology /social -media /8185101 /Bebo 
-fights -back -social -media -by -numbers .html.
Barnett, E., & Hollingshead, I. (2012). The dark side of Facebook. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved from http: //www .telegraph .co .uk /technology /facebook /9118778 /The -dark 
-side -of -Facebook .html.
Barnes, M. (2016, June 10). Teen kills herself after vicious cyberbullying on Snapchat. 
Rollingout. Retrieved from http: //rollingout .com /2016 /06 /10 /teen -kills -vicious -cyber 
-bullying -snapchat.
Bauman, S., Toomey, R. B., & Walker, J. L. (2013). Associations among bullying, 
cyberbullying, and suicide in high school students. Journal of Adolescence, 36(2), 
341–350. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.12.001.
Bazelon, E. (2011, October 12). Why Facebook is after your kids. New York Times 
Magazine. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2011 /10 /16 /magazine /why 
-facebook -is -after -your -kids .html ?_r=0.
Bazelon, E. (2013a). Bullies taunted Rebecca Ann Sedwick with texts like “Can u die 
please?” and then she did. Slate. Retrieved from http: //www .slate .com /blogs /xx _factor 
/2013 /09 /18 /rebecca_ann_sedwick_suicide_lessons_for_parents_in_the_scary_age_of 
_cyberbullying .html.
Bazelon, E. (2013b). Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscover-
ing the Power of Character and Empathy. New York: Random House.
Bazelon, E. (2014). The Sheriff overstepped. Slate. Retrieved from http: //www .slate 
.com /articles /news_and_politics /doublex /2014 /04 /rebecca_sedwick_suicide_sheriff 
_grady_judd_never_should_have_arrested_katelyn .html.
Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2001). Individualization: Institutionalized Individual-
ism and its Social and Political Consequences. London: SAGE.
Bell, L. (2016, July 7). Snapchat acknowledges sexting as it reveals biggest feature 
update so far. Mirror. Retrieved from http: //www .mirror .co .uk /tech /snapchat -acknow 
ledges -sexting -reveals -biggest -8369395.
Bennett, S. (2013, October 8). Instagram & Snapchat: How teens use social media. 
http: //www .adweek .com /socialtimes /teens -social -media /492148.
Bennett, S. (2014a, September 29). Minimum Age Requirements: Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp, Secret. WebWise. Retrieved from http: //www .web 
wise .ie /parents /ask -fm -a -guide -for -parents -and -teachers -2.
References 225
Bennett, S. (2014b, February, 24). Teens, Millennials prefer YouTube to Facebook, 
Instagram to Twitter. Adweek. Retrieved from http: //www .adweek .com /socialtimes 
/teens -millennials -twitter -facebook -youtube /496770.
Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Freelon, D. (2011). Communicating civic engagement: 
Contrasting models of citizenship in the youth web sphere. Journal of Communica-
tion, 61, 835–856.
Berkman Center for Internet & Society. (2008). Enhancing Child Safety & Online 
Technologies: Final Report of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force. Retrieved 
from http: //cyber .law .harvard .edu /sites /cyber .law .harvard .edu /files /ISTTF_Final _Report 
.pdf.
Berkman Center for Internet & Society. (2010). Internet safety technical taskforce. 
Retrieved from http: //cyber .law .harvard .edu /research /isttf.
Berlin, I. (1958). Two concepts of liberty: An inaugural lecture delivered before the Univer-
sity of Oxford on 31 October 1958. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bernocco, A. (2014, August 21). Brazil bans Secret app as unconstitutional. HNGN. 
Retrieved from http: //www .hngn .com /articles /39823 /20140821 /brazil -bans -secret 
-app -as -unconstitutional .htm.
Bernstein, J. Y., & Watson, M. W. (1997). Children who are targets of bullying: A 
victim pattern. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 12(4), 483–498.
Best, J. (2013). Hannah Smith suicide: Ask .fm announces new safety measures in 
wake of tragic teen’s suicide. Mirror. Retrieved from http: //www .mirror .co .uk /news 
/world -news /hannah -smith -suicide -askfm -announces -2185445.
Big news from Ask .fm today. (2016, July 4). Medium. Retrieved from https: //medium 
.com /@askfm /changes -at -askfm -big -news -from -the -askfm -team -today -askfm -has 
-joined -the -noosphere -family -and -is -60eeecc18398 # .lbyxc9bdk.
Bill 61: An Act to Address and Prevent Cyberbullying. (2013). 61st General Assem-
bly, 5th Session. Retrieved from http: //nslegislature .ca /legc /PDFs /annual%20statutes 
/2013%20Spring /c002 .pdf.
Birdsong, T. (2013, November, 19). 7 things parents need to know about Voxer voice 
app. Retrieved from https: //blogs .mcafee .com /consumer /7 -things -parents -need -to 
-know -about -the -voxer -voice -app.
Black, J. (1996). Constitutionalizing self-regulation. Modern Law Review, 59(1), 24–59.
Blaszczak-Boxe, A. (2014, October 8). Teens ditch Facebook for new social media 
favorite. CBS News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbsnews .com /news /kids -social -media 
-survey -instagram -twitter -facebook.
Bodley, M. (2014, August 14). Ask .fm, Attorney General reach agreement to keep 
children safer online. Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from http: //articles .baltimoresun .com 
226 References
/2014 -08 -14 /business /bs -bz -ask -fm -20140814_1_ask -fm -gansler -maryland -attorney 
-general.
Boroff, D. (2014, January 27). Texas parents to sue 6 cyberbullies for allegedly harass-
ing their teen daughter on Instagram. New York Daily News. Retrieved from http: //
www .nydailynews .com /news /national /texas -parents -sue -cyberbullies -instagram 
-post -article -1 .1592841.
Bostad, I. (2008, June). What are the values that will guide the development of children in 
our schools? Paper presented at Conference of European Ministers of Education, Lju-
bljana, Slovenia.
Boutilier, A. (2014, May 13). Amanda Todd’s mother raises concerns about cyberbul-
lying bill. The Star. Retrieved from http: //www .thestar .com /news /canada /2014 /05 
/13 /amanda_todds_mother_raises_concerns_about_cyberbullying_bill .html.
boyd, d. (2014). It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press.
boyd, d. (2015, December 18). What if social media becomes 16-plus? New battles 
concerning age of consent emerge in Europe. The Medium. Retrieved from https: //
medium .com /bright /what -if -social -media -becomes -16 -plus -866557878f7 # .skvnifxhd.
boyd, d., Hargittai, E., Schultz, J., & Palfrey, J. (2011). Why parents help their chil-
dren lie to Facebook: Unintended consequences of Children’s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act (COPPA). First Monday 16(11). Retrieved from http: //firstmonday .org /ojs 
/index .php /fm /article /view /3850 /3075.
boyd, d., & Marwick, A. (2011, September 23). Bullying as true drama. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2011 /09 /23 /opinion /why -cyber bullying 
-rhetoric -misses -the -mark .html.
Bradshaw, C. (2013). Preventing bullying through positive behavioral interventions 
and supports (PBIS): A multitiered approach to prevention and integration. Theory 
into Practice, 52(4), 288–295. doi:10.1080/00405841.2013.829732.
Braithwaite, J. (1982). Enforced self-regulation: A new strategy for corporate crime 
control. Michigan Law Review, 80, 1466–1507.
Brown, A., Shifrin, D. L., & Hill, D. L. (2015, September, 28). Beyond turn it off: How to 
advise families on media use. American Academy of Pediatrics News. Retrieved from 
http: //www .aappublications .org /content /36 /10 /54 ?sso=1 &sso_redirect_count=1 &nf 
status =401 &nftoken=00000000 -0000 -0000 -0000 -000000000000 &nfstatus description 
=ERROR%3a+No+local+token.
Brouwer, B. (2014, December 4). Study: Tweens choose YouTube as their favorite site. 
TubeFilter. Retrieved from http: //www .tubefilter .com /2014 /12 /04 /youtube -tweens 
-favo rite -site.
References 227
Buckingham, D. (2011). The Material Child. Cambridge: Polity.
Buckingham, D., & Strandgaard Jensen, H. (2012). Beyond “Media Panics,”. Journal 
of Children and Media 6 (4): 413–429.
Bukowski, W. M. (2003). What does it mean to say aggressive children are compe-
tent or incompetent? Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 49(3), 390–400.
Bulger, M., Burton, P., O’Neill, B., & Staksrud, E. (2017). Where policy and practice 
collide: Comparing US, South African and European Union approaches to protect-
ing children online. New Media & Society, 19(5), 750–764.
Bullying Symposium 2013 Keynote Speaker Nancy Willard (2013, March 13). You-
Tube. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=8ZlZwX4gqxU.
Bullying .uk. (n.d.). What to do if you are bullied on a social network. Retrieved from 
http: //www .bullying .co .uk /cyberbullying /what -to -do -if -you -re -being -bullied -on -a 
-social -network.
Cain Miller, C. (2014, February 19). The loyal users of Google Plus say it is no ghost 
town. New York Times. Retrieved from http: //bits .blogs .nytimes .com /2014 /02 /19 
/the -loyal -users -of -google -plus -say -it -is -no -ghost -town / ?_php=true &_type=blogs 
&_r=2.
Carr, J. (2013a). Facebook’s Safety Advisory Board [Blog post]. Retrieved from https: 
//johnc1912 .wordpress .com /2013 /01 /21 /facebooks -safety -advisory -board.
Carr, J. (2013b). Non-disclosure agreements: enforced silence? [Blog post]. Retrieved 
from https: //johnc1912 .wordpress .com /2013 /01 /16 /non -disclosure -agreements 
-enforced -silence.
Carr, J. (2016, March 31). John Carr on the GDPR: Poor process, bad outcomes. 
Retrieved from https: //www .betterinternetforkids .eu /web /portal /news /detail ?article 
Id=687465.
Carson, B. (2017, April 28). The Yik Yak App is Officially Dead. Business Insider 
Nordic. Retrieved from http: //nordic .businessinsider .com /yik -yak -shuts -down -2017 
-4 ?r=US &IR=T.
CBC News. (2013, August 7). N.S. Cyberbullying Legislation Allows Victims to Sue. 
Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia /n -s -cyberbullying -legisla 
tion -allows -victims -to -sue -1 .1307338.
Celizic, M. (2007, December 4). Attorney: Woman didn’t know about online 
taunts. Today News. Retrieved from http: //www .today .com /id /22096427 /ns /today 
-today_news /t /attorney -woman -didnt -know -about -online -taunts / # .V6Swxp N94fE.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2014). Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Health. Retrieved from http: //www .cdc .gov /lgbthealth /youth .htm.
228 References
Chang, C. (2010). Internet safety survey: Who will protect the children? Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 25(1), 501–527.
Chancellor, S., Pater, J., Clear, T., Gilbert, E., & Choudhury, M. D. (2016). #thygapp: 
Instagram content moderation and lexical variation in pro-eating disorder 
communities. Retrieved from http: //www .munmund .net /pubs /cscw16_thyghgapp 
.pdf.
Charity Commission. (n.d.). Charity commission. Retrieved from https: //www .gov 
.uk /government /organisations /charity -commission.
Charlotte Dawson’s death puts cyberbulling back in spotlight. (2014, February 24). 
ABC. Retrieved from http: //www .abc .net .au /news /2014 -02 -23 /charlotte -dawson -death 
-puts -focus -on -cyber -bullying /5277904.
Chen, A. (2014, October 23). The laborers who keep dick pics and beheadings out of 
your Facebook feed. Wired. Retrieved from http: //www .wired .com /2014 /10 /con tent 
-moderation.
ChiaVideos. (2012, October 11). Amanda Todd’s story: Struggling, bullying, suicide, 
self harm [video file]. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=ej7afkypUsc.
Christensen, L. M. (2009). Sticks, stones, and schoolyard bullies: Restorative justice, 
mediation and a new approach to conflict resolution in our schools. Nevada Law 
Journal, 9, 546–579.
Citron, D. K. (2014a). Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Citron, D. K. (2014b, December 3). United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat 
Prosecutions. Forbes. Retrieved from http: //www .forbes .com /sites /daniellecitron /2014 
/12 /03 /united -states -v -elonis -and -the -rarity -of -threat -prosecutions.
Civic Impulse. (2016). H.R. 2281–105th Congress: Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
Retrieved from https: //www .govtrack .us /congress /bills /105 /hr2281.
Cohen, J. (2006). Social, emotional, ethical, and academic education: Creating a cli-
mate for learning, participation in democracy, and well-being. Harvard Educational 
Review, 76(2), 201–237. doi:10.17763/haer.76.2.j44854x1524644vn.
Cohen, J. E. (2012). Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday 
Practice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Cohen, S. (1972). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London: MacGibbon and Kee.
Coleman, J., & Hagell, A. (2007). Adolescence, Risk and Resilience: Against the Odds. 
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Collier, A. (2008, August 14). The latest technopanic. Net Family News. Retrieved 
from http: //www .netfamilynews .org /the -latest -technopanic.
References 229
Collier, A. (2013, January 28). What we know and don’t know about kids’ online 
socializing: key study. Net Family News. Retrieved from http: //www .netfamilynews 
.org /what -we -know -dont -know -about -kids -online -socializing -key -study.
Collier, A. (2014a, October 20). Of young people’s (not just digital) citizenship. Net 
Family News. Retrieved from http: //www .netfamilynews .org /young -peoples -just -digital 
-citizenship.
Collier, A. (2014b, July 18). Proposed “rightful” framework for internet safety. Net-
FamilyNews .org. Retrieved from http: //www .netfamilynews .org /proposed -rightful 
-framework -internet -safety.
Collier, A. (2016, January 10). Europe’s big step backward for youth rights online, 
offline. NetFamilyNews .org. Retrieved from http: //www .netfamilynews .org /europes 
-big -step -backward -for -youth -rights -online -offline.
Collier, A., & Nigam, H. (2010). Youth safety on a living internet: Report of the Online 
Safety and Technology Working Group. Retrieved from http: //www .ntia .doc .gov /report 
/2010 /youth -safety -living -internet.
Collins, L. (2008, January 21). Friend Game: Behind the online hoax that led to a 
girl’s suicide. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http: //www .newyorker .com /magazine 
/2008 /01 /21 /friend -game.
Commission of the European Communities. (1996). Illegal and Harmful Content on 
the Internet. Brussels: European Communities.
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. Retrieved from http: //www .colum 
bia .edu /~mr2651 /ecommerce3 /2nd /statutes /CommunicationsDecencyAct .pdf.
Communicators with Doug Gansler. (2012, August 15). C-SPAN. Retrieved from 
http: //www .c -span .org /video / ?307537 -1 /communicators -doug -gansler.
Compassion Research Day. (2013). Retrieved from http: //new .livestream .com /face 
booktalkslive /events /2564173.
Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Union. (2013). Cyberbul-
lying: an overview. Retrieved from https: //deletecyberbullying .files .wordpress .
com /2013 /02 /euconference -cyberbullying -28 -may -madrid -background -paper 
-coface .pdf.
ConnectSafely. (2012). A very brief history of US Internet safety. Retrieved from 
http: //www .slideshare .net /ConnectSafely /legal -panel.
ConnectSafely .org. (2015). About ConnectSafely .org. Retrieved from http: //www 
.connectsafely .org /about -connectsafely -org /.
ConnectSafely. (n.d.). About cyberbullying. http: //www .connectsafely .org /wp -content 
/uploads /sc_cyberbullying .pdf.
230 References
Connolly, E. J., & Beaver, K. M. (2016). Considering the genetic and environmental 
overlap between bullying victimization, delinquency, and symptoms of depression/
anxiety. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 31(7), 1230–1256. doi:10.1177 /0886260 
514564158.
Constine, J. (2015, February 17). Yik Yak systematically downvotes mentions of 
competitors. TechCrunch. Retrieved from https: //techcrunch .com /2015 /02 /17 /yak 
gate / #abtw9P:b2w.
Constine, J. (2016, April 6). Yik Yak CTO drops out as hyped anonymous app stag-
nates. TechCrunch. Retrieved from https: //techcrunch .com /2016 /04 /06 /yik -yuck.
Corcoran, L., Guckin, C. M., & Prentice, G. (2015). Cyberbullying or cyber aggres-
sion? A review of existing definitions or cyber-based peer-to-peer aggression. Societ-
ies (Basel, Switzerland), 5(2), 245–255.
Corsaro, W. A. (2005). The Sociology of Childhood. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine 
Forge Press.
Craig, W. M., & Pepler, D. (2009). Introduction: Understanding and addressing bul-
lying: An international perspective. In D. Pepler & W. Craig (Eds.), Understanding 
and Addressing Bullying: An International Perspective (pp. xix–xxvi). Bloomington, IN: 
Authorhouse.
Crawford, K., & Gillespie, T. (2016). What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools 
and the vocabulary of complaint. New Media & Society, 18(3), 410–428. doi:10.11 
77/1461444814543163.
Critcher, S. (2008). Moral panic analysis: Past, present and future. Sociology Compass, 
2(4), 1127–1144.
Cruz-Cunha, M. M., & Portela, I. M. (2014). Handbook of Research on Digital Crime, 
Cyberspace Security, and Information Assurance. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
Curriculum: Understanding YouTube & Digital Citizenship: Lesson 4. (n.d.). Retrieved 
from https: //docs .google .com /document /d /1SqtMEWNOkV8Zhr9Qn AHNM4rs8m 8s 
QJddTGrmV_XYans /edit ?pli=1.
Cushing, T. (2013, August 12). UK Prime Minister calls ask .fm a 'vile site,' blames it 
for the behavior of some vile users. Retrieved from https: //www .techdirt .com /arti 
cles /20130808 /17522624116 /uk -prime -minister -calls -askfm -vile -site -blames -it 
-behavior -some -vile -users .shtm.l
Cyberbullying law inspired by Rehtaeh Parsons’ suicide takes effect. (2013, August 
7). The Star. Retrieved from http: //www .thestar .com /news /canada /2013 /08 /07 /cyber 
bullying_law_inspiredly_by_rehtaeh_parsons_suicide_takes_effect .html.
Cyberbullying Research Center. (2013). Cyberbullying: Neither an Epidemic nor a Rarity. 
Retrieved from http: //cyberbullying .org /cyberbullying -neither -an -epidemic -nor -a 
-rarity.
References 231
Cyberbullying Research Center. (n.d.). Cyberbullying facts. Retrieved from http: //
cyberbullying .org /facts.
Cybersmile Foundation. (2015). Cyberbulling & the law. Retrieved from http: //www 
.cybersmile .org /advice -help /category /cyberbullying -and -the -law.
CyberWise. (2014). Digital citizenship. Retrieved from http: //www .cyberwise .org 
/ #!digital -citizenship /c1t53.
Dahl, J. (2014, January 17). “Rebecca’s Law” aims to punish bullying in Fla. CBS 
News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbsnews .com /news /rebeccas -law -aims -to -punish 
-bullying -in -florida.
Dale, B. (2015, August 12). Voice messaging beats phone calls and texts. Observer 
BusinessTech. Retrieved: http: //observer .com /2015 /12 /voxer -zello -heytell -asynch 
ronous -voice.
Damon, W. (2004). What is positive youth development? Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 591(1), 13–24.
Davidson, S. E. (2014). It is never too soon to start teaching digital citizenship. Inter-
national Society for Technology in Education, 41(4), 32.
Davies, B. (2011). Bullies as guardians of the moral order or an ethic of truths? Chil-
dren and Society, 25, 278–286.
Davies, C. (2014, May 6). Hannah Smith wrote vile posts to herself, say police. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from http: //www .theguardian .com /uk -news /2014 /may /06 /hannah 
-smith -suicide -teenager -cyber -bullying -inquests.
DeAmicis, C. (2014, August 8). Meet the anonymous app police fighting bullies and 
porn on Whisper, Yik Yak, and potentially Secret. Gigaom. Retrieved from https: //
gigaom .com /2014 /08 /08 /meet -the -anonymous -app -police -fighting -bullies -and 
-porn -on -whisper -yik -yak -and -potentially -secret.
DeAmicis, C. (2015, February 18). Yik Yak gives a better explanation of downvoting 
allegations. Gigaom. Retrieved from https: //gigaom .com /2015 /02 /18 /yik -yak -gives -a 
-better -explanation -of -down -voting -allegations.
Dearden, L. (2014, October 22). BeatBullying UK and MindFull charities suspend 
services as administrators called in. Independent. Retrieved from http: //www .inde 
pendent .co .uk /news /uk /home -news /beatbullying -uk -and -mindfull -charities 
- suspend -services -as -administrators -called -in -9810142 .html.
de Haan, J., van der Hof, S., Bekkers, W., & Pijpers, R. (2013). Self-regulation. In: 
B. O’Neill, E. Staksrud & S. McLaughlin, Towards a better internet for children? Policy 
pillars, players and paradoxes (pp. 111–129). Göteborg, Nordicom.
d’Haenens, L., Vandoninck, S., & Donoso, V. (2013). How to cope and build online 
resilience? EU Kids Online. Retrieved from http: //eprints .lse .ac .uk /48115 /1 /How%20
to%20cope%20and%20build%20online%20resilience%20(lsero).pdf.
232 References
Delta, G. B., & Matsuura, J. H. (2013). Obscenity cases involving the internet. Chap-
ter 12, Section 3. In: Law of the Internet, third edition. Retrieved via Westlaw database.
DeNardis, L. E. (2012). Hidden levers of internet control: An infrastructure-based 
theory of internet governance. Journal of Information. Communicatio Socialis, 15(5), 
720–738.
DeNardis, L. E. (2014). The Global War for Internet Governance. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
DeNardis, L., & Hackl, A. (2015). Internet Governance by Social Media Platforms. 
Telecommunications Policy. Advance online publication. Retrieved from http: //www 
.sciencedirect .com /science /article /pii /S0308596115000592.
Dewey, C. (2014, December 1). A quick, jargon-free explainer to the Supreme Court 
case that will decide the limits of free speech online. Washington Post. Retrieved 
from http: //www .washingtonpost .com /news /the -intersect /wp /2014 /12 /01 /a -quick 
-jargon -free -explainer -to -the -supreme -court -case -that -will -decide -the -limits -of -free 
-speech -online.
Dewey, C. (2015, February 5). Twitter CEO Dick Costolo finally admits the obvious: 
Site has failed users on abuse. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http: //www 
.washingtonpost .com /news /the -intersect /wp /2015 /02 /05 /twitter -ceo -dick -costolo 
-finally -admits -the -obvious -we -suck -at -dealing -with -abuse.
Dickey, J. (2014, June 26). Meet the brothers behind the web’s most controversial 
social network. Time. Retrieved from http: //time .com /2923146 /ask -fm -interview.
Dickey, M. R. (2013, May 31). These are the secrets people are actually sharing on 
the Whisper App. Business Insider. Retrieved from http: //www .businessinsider .com 
/whisper -app -secrets -2013 -5 ?op=1%3fr=US &IR=T &IR=T #depression -3.
Digital Media Law Project. (2008). United States vs. Drew. Retrieved from http: //
www .dmlp .org /threats /united -states -v -drew.
Digital Media Law Project. (2009a). Finkel vs. Facebook. Retrieved from http: //www 
.dmlp .org /threats /finkel -v -facebook.
Digital Media Law Project. (2009b). Finkel Complaint. Retrieved from http: //www 
.dmlp .org /sites /citmedialaw .org /files /2009 -02 -16 -Finkel%20Complaint .pdf.
Digital media safety and literacy education and youth risk online prevention and 
intervention: Hearings before Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, 111th cong. (2009) (testimony of Nancy Willard). Retrieved from https: //
judiciary .house .gov /_files /hearings /pdf /Willard090930 .pdf.
Digital Single Market. (2014). Better internet for Kids: CEO Coalition 1 year on. 
Retrieved from https: //ec .europa .eu /digital -single -market /en /news /better -internet -kids 
-ceo -coalition -1 -year.
References 233
Digital Single Market. (2015). Safer internet centers. Retrieved from https: //ec .europa 
.eu /digital -single -market /en /safer -internet -centres.
Dinakar, K., Jones, B., Havasi, C., Lieberman, H., & Picard, R. (2012). Common sense 
reasoning for detection, prevention and mitigation of cyberbullying. ACM Transac-
tions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 2(3), 1–30. doi:10.1145/2362394.2362400.
Donoso, V. (2011). Results of the Assessment of the Implementation of the Safer 
Social Networking Principles for the EU. Individual Reports of Testing of 14 Social 
Networking Sites. Retrieved from https: //lirias .kuleuven .be /bitstream /123456789 
/458077 /1 /Individual+Reports+SNS+Phase+A .pdf.
Dormehl, L. (2015, January 28). 300 hours of footage per minute: Google explains 
why policing YouTube is so tough. Fast Company. Retrieved from http: //www .fast 
company .com /3041622 /fast -feed /300 -hours -of -footage -per -minute -google -explains 
-why -policing -youtube -is -so -tough.
Dredge, S. (2014, October 23). Tumblr audience up to 420m as Yahoo predicts $100m 
revenues in 2015. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /tech 
nology /2014 /oct /23 /tumblr -yahoo -revenues -2015 -ads -nsfw.
Drezner, D. (2007). All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Drotner, K. 1999. Dangerous media? Panic discourses and dilemmas of modernity. 
Paedagogica Historica 35 (3): 593–619.
Drotner, K., & Livingstone, S. (2008). International Handbook of Children, Media & 
Culture. London: SAGE.
Dunn, R. (2013). Government to take a safeguarding position against websites like 
Ask .fm. Retrieved from http: //epetitions .direct .gov .uk /petitions /48886.
Durkheim, E. (2002). Moral Education. New York: Dover Publications.
Durlak, J. A., Weissberg, R. P., Dymnicki, A. B., Taylor, R. D., & Schellinger, K. B. 
(2011). The impact of enhancing students’ social and emotional learning: A meta-
analysis of school-based universal interventions. Child Development, 82, 405–432. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01564.
Dyer, E. (2014). Cyberbullying bill draws fire from diverse mix of critics. CBC News. 
Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /politics /cyberbullying -bill -draws -fire -from 
-diverse -mix -of -critics -1 .2803637.
Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet 
Age. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Elgan, M. (2015, July 29). Google+ is alive and well despite persistent media reports. 
Retrieved from http: //www .eweek .com /cloud /google -is -alive -and -well -despite -persis 
tent -media -reports .html.
234 References
Elgersma, C. (2016, February, 26). Snapchat, KIK and 6 more iffy messaging apps 
teens love. Common Sense Media. Retrieved from https: //www .commonsensemedia 
.org /blog /snapchat -kik -and -6 -more -iffy -messaging -apps -teens -love.
Englander, E. (2007). Is bullying a junior hate crime?: Implications for interventions. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 51(2), 205–212. doi:10.1177/0002764207306052.
Englander, E. (2015). What’s bad behavior on the web? Educational Leadership, 72(8), 
30–34.
Enhancing Online Safety for Children Act. 2015. No 24, 2015. Federal Register of 
Legislation. Retrieved from https: //www .legislation .gov .au /Details /C2016C00781.
Esco, L., Richards, H., & Azuelos, L. (Producers). (2015). FreeTheNipple [Motion pic-
ture trailer]. U.S.A. Retrieved from http: //www .freethenipple .com.
Espinoza, J. (2016, July 25). Girls gang up on boys in new cyberbullying craze called 
‘roasting,’ expert warns. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http: //www .telegraph .co .uk 
/education /2016 /07 /24 /girls -gang -up -on -boys -in -new -cyberbullying -craze -called 
-roasting.
EU Kids Online. (2014). EU kids online: Findings methods recommendations (deliv-
erable 1.6). Retrieved from http: //eprints .lse .ac .uk /60512.
European Commission. (2009). Safer social networking principles for the EU. 
Retrieved from https: //ec .europa .eu /digital -single -market /sites /digital -agenda /files 
/sn_principles .pdf.
European Commission. (2016). Corporate social responsibility. Retrieved from http: 
//ec .europa .eu /growth /industry /corporate -social -responsibility_en.
Eighth European Forum on the Rights of the Child. (2013). European Commission. 
Retrieved from http: //ec .europa .eu /justice /fundamental -rights /files /s3_forum_bullying 
_en .pdf.
Evans, N. (2013, August 7). Ask .fm run by Russian playboy brothers who make mil-
lions from troll site used to bully Hannah Smith. Mirror. Retrieved from http: //www 
.mirror .co .uk /news /uk -news /askfm -run -russian -playboy -brothers -2134208.
Facebook. (2014). An update to news feed: What it means for businesses. Retrieved 
from https: //www .facebook .com /business /news /update -to -facebook -news -feed.
Facebook. (2015a). Company Info. Retrieved from http: //newsroom .fb .com /com 
pany -info /
Facebook. (2015b). Does Facebook allow photos of mothers breastfeeding? Retrieved 
from https: //www .facebook .com /help /340974655932193.
Facebook. (2015c). Prevent Bullying. Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com /safety 
/bullying / ?referer=safety_center.
References 235
Facebook. (2015d). Report a violation of Facebook terms. Retrieved from https: //
www .facebook .com /help /contact /274459462613911.
Facebook. (2015e) Safety is a conversation. Retrieved from https: //www .facebook 
.com /safety /philosophy.
Facebook. (2015f). Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. Retrieved from https: //
www .facebook .com /legal /terms.
Facebook. (2016a). Help community: Facebook gives people around the world. 
Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com /help /community /question / ?id=145104 
2831788602.
Facebook. (2016b). Facebook Principles. Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com 
/principles .php.
Facebook. (2016d). What is social reporting? Retrieved from https: //www .facebook 
.com /help /128548343894719.
Facebook. (2016e). What is the Support Inbox? Retrieved from https: //www .face 
book .com /help /545932948823931.
Facebook (2016f). Community standards. helping to keep you safe. Retrieved from 
https: //www .facebook .com /communitystandards #.
Facebook (2017). What is the Facebook Safety Advisory Board and what work does it 
do? Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com /help /222332597793306 /.
Facebook Help Center. (2016). How to report things? Retrieved from https: //www 
.facebook .com /help /181495968648557 ?helpref=faq_content.
Facebook London Showcase. (2014, December 1). AntiBullyingPro. Retrieved from 
https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=MZrwGlLnHbg.
Facebook Newsroom. (2009, December 6). Facebook to enhance user safety through 
formation of Global Advisory Board. Retrieved from https: //newsroom .fb .com /news 
/2009 /12 /facebook -to -enhance -user -safety -through -formation -of -global -advisory 
-board /.
Facebook refuses to add safety buttons saying they “confuse” and “intimidate” users. 
(2010, April 13). Telegraph. Retrieved from http: //www .telegraph .co .uk /technology 
/facebook /7585688 /Facebook -refuses -to -add -safety -buttons -saying -they -confuse 
-and -intimidate -users .html ?mobile=basic.
Facebook Reporting Guide. (n.d.). Retrieved from https: //fbcdn -dragon -a .aka-
maihd .net /hphotos -ak -xpa1 /t39 .2178 -6 /851563_293317947467769_13205028 78 
_n .png.
Facebook Safety. (2011, March 10). Details on social reporting. Retrieved from https: // 
www .facebook .com /note .php ?note_id=196124227075034.
236 References
Facebook Safety. (2012, February 13). Facebook awards $200,000 in digital citizenship 
research grants. Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com /notes /facebook -safety 
/facebook -awards -200000 -in -digital -citizenship -research -grants /348583601829095.
Facebook Site Governance. (n.d.). Retrieved from https: //www .facebook .com /fbsite 
governance.
Facer, K. (2012). After the moral panic? Reframing the debate about child safety 
online. Discourse (Abingdon), 33(3), 397–413. doi:10.1080/01596306.2012.681899.
Family Online Safety Institute. (2017). FOSI Mission and Values. Retrieved from 
https: //www .fosi .org /about /mission /.
Family Online Safety Institute Annual Conference in Washington D.C. (2013, Novem-
ber 6–7).
Federal Communications Commission. (2016, October 25). Children’s Internet Pro-
tection Act. Retrieved from https: //www .fcc .gov /consumers /guides /childrens -internet 
-protection -act.
Federal Trade Commission. (n.d.). Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (“COPPA”). 
Retrieved from https: //www .ftc .gov /enforcement /rules /rulemaking -regulatory -reform 
-proceedings /childrens -online -privacy -protection -rule.
Federal Trade Commission. (2013, July 1). Revised Children’s Online Privacy Protec-
tion Rule goes into effect today. Retrieved from https: //www .ftc .gov /news -events /press 
-releases /2013 /07 /revised -childrens -online -privacy -protection -rule -goes -effect.
Federal Trade Commission. (2015, March 20). Complying with COPPA: FAQ. 
Retrieved from https: //www .ftc .gov /tips -advice /business -center /guidance /comply 
ing -coppa -frequently -asked -questions #General Questions.
Fernback, J., & Papacharissi, Z. (2007). Online privacy as a legal safeguard: The rela-
tionship among consumer, online portal and privacy policies. New Media & Society, 
9(5), 715–734.
Fiegerman, S. (2015, August 2). Inside the failure of Google+. An expensive attempt 
to unseat Facebook. Mashable .com. Retrieved from http: //mashable .com /2015 /08 
/02 /google -plus -history / #UQFRwn6XDPqZ
Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K. J., & Wolak, J. (2000). Online Victimization: A Report on the 
Nation’s Youth. Retrieved from http: //www .unh .edu /ccrc /pdf /Victimization_Online 
_Survey .pdf
Fisk, N. (2017). Framing Internet Safety: The Governance of Youth Online. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Foderaro, L. W. (2010, September 29). Private moment made public, then a fatal jump. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2010 /09 /30 /nyregion 
/30suicide .html.
References 237
Franks, M. A. (2014, August 14). The many ways Twitter is bad at responding to 
abuse. The Atlantic. Retrieved from http: //www .theatlantic .com /technology /archive 
/2014 /08 /the -many -ways -twitter -is -bad -at -responding -to -abuse /376100.
Fresco, A. (2009, November 18). Networking sites fail to protect children from 
abuse, says CEOP head. Times. Retrieved from http: //technology .timesonline .co .uk 
/tol /news /tech_and_web /the_web /article6920945.
Frisen, A., Holmqvist, K., & Oscarsson, D. (2008). 13-year-olds’ perception of bully-
ing: Definitions, reasons for victimisation and experience of adults’ response. Educa-
tional Studies, 34, 105–117.
Frisen, A., Jonsson, A.-K., & Persson, C. (2007). Adolescents’ perception of bullying: 
Who is the victim? Who is the bully? What can be done to stop bullying? Adoles-
cence, 42, 749–761.
Fukkink, R., & Hermanns, J. (2009). Counseling children at a helpline: Chatting or 
calling. Journal of Community Psychology, 37(8), 939–948.
Fuller, R. W. (2003). Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. Gabriola 
Island, Canada: New Society.
Fuller, R. W. (2006). All Rise: Somebodies, Nobodies and the Politics of Dignity. San Fran-
cisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Fuller, R. W., & Gerloff, P. (2008). Dignity for All: How to Create a World without Rankism. 
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Gaggle (n.d.). Top social networks and apps kids use. Retrieved from https: //www 
.gaggle .net /top -social -networking -sites -and -apps -kids -use.
Gallagher, F. (2015, May 6). How many users does Google+ really have? TechTimes. 
Retrieved from http: //www .techtimes .com /articles /51205 /20150506 /many -users 
-google -really .htm.
Garcia-Martinez, A. (Summer, 2016). How Mark Zuckerberg led Facebook’s war to 
crush Google Plus. Vanity Fair. Retrieved from http: //www .vanityfair .com /news 
/2016 /06 /how -mark -zuckerberg -led -facebooks -war -to -crush -google -plus.
Gasser, U., & Schulz, W. (2015). Governance of Online Intermediaries: Observations 
from a Series of National Case Studies. Retrieved from https: //publixphere .net /i /noc 
/page /NoC_Online_Intermediaries_Research_Project_Synthesis.
Gauthier, B. (2016, July 26). What Convention? For some on Twitter “the Bachelorette” 
is a lot more important. The Salon. Retrieved from http: //www .salon .com /2016/07/26 
/what_convention _for _some _on _twitter _the _bachelorette _is _a _lot _more _important.
Geist, M. (2013, November 22). Lawful access returns under cover of cyber-bullying 
bill. The Star. Retrieved from http: //www .thestar .com /business /2013 /11 /22 /lawful 
_access_returns_under_cover_of_cyberbullying_bill .html.
238 References
Geoffroy, M.-C., Boivin, M., Arseneault, L., Turecki, G., Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., et al. 
(2016). Associations between peer victimization and suicidal ideation and suicide 
attempt during adolescence: results from a prospective population-based birth 
cohort. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 55(2), 99–
105. doi:10.1016/j.jaac.2015.11.010.
Giantasio, D. (2014, September 15). Anonymous apps like Whisper and Secret have a 
dark side. Adweek. Retrieved from: http: //www .adweek .com /news /advertising -branding 
/anonymous -apps -whisper -and -secret -have -dark -side -160107.
Gibbs, S. (2016, March 4). Facebook to pay millions more in UK tax. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from: https: //www .theguardian .com /technology /2016 /mar /04 /facebook 
-pay -millions -more -uk -tax -reports.
Gibson, C. (2016, September 6). They call it bunny hunting. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https: //www .washingtonpost .com /lifestyle /style /they -call -it -bunny 
-hunting -how -authorities -warn -kids -about -online -predators /2016 /09 /06 /2044ee40 
-5980 -11e6 -9767 -f6c947fd0cb8_story .html.
Gillespie, T. (2010). The politics of “platforms.” New Media & Society, 12(3), 347–364.
Gillespie, T. (2015). Platforms intervene. Social Media + Society, 1(1), 1–2.
Gillham, B. (2000). The Research Interview. London: Continuum.
Gilden, A. (2013). Cyberbullying and the innocence narrative. Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review. Retrieved from https: //papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers .cfm 
?abstract_id=2208737.
Glaister, D. (2008, November 26). Neighbor found guilty on lesser charges in MySpace 
suicide case. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /world 
/2008 /nov /26 /myspace -suicide -cyber -bully.
Global Kids Online. (2016). A framework for researching Global Kids Online. Forth-
coming report from the GKO research network.
Goode, E., & Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994). Moral panics: Culture, politics, and social con-
struction. Annual Review of Sociology, 20, 149–171. 
Goodno, N. H. (2011). How public schools can constitutionally halt cyberbullying: 
A model cyberbullying policy that considers first amendment, due process, and fourth 
amendment challenges. Wake Forest Law Review, 46, 641–700.
Google. (2015a). Anti-bullying information for parents. Retrieved from https: //support 
.google .com /plus /answer /2402979 ?hl=en.
Google. (2015b). Bring more to class with Google tools. Retrieved from https: //www 
.google .com /edu /training /get -trained / ?utm_referrer=.
Google. (n.d.). Terms and Policies. User Content and Conduct Policy. Retrieved 
from https: //www .google .com /intl /en -US /+ /policy /content .html.
References 239
Google. (2016a). Age Requirements on Google Accounts. Retrieved from https: //
support .google .com /accounts /answer /1350409 ?hl=en.
Google. (2016b). How to stop harassment & bullying on Google+. Retrieved from 
https: //support .google .com /plus /answer /6006895 ?p=harassment &hl=en &rd=1.
Görzig, A. (2011). Who bullies and who is bullied online?: A study of 9–16 year old 
internet users in 25 European countries. London: EU Kids Online, London School of 
Economics and Political Science.
Görzig, A., & Macháčková, H. (2015). Cyberbullying from a socio-ecological perspective: 
A contemporary synthesis of findings from EU Kids Online (Media@LSE Working Paper 
Series). London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from 
http: //www .lse .ac .uk /media@lse /research /mediaWorkingPapers /pdf /WP36 -FINAL 
.pdf.
Görzig, A. (2016). Adolescents’ experience of offline and online risks: Separate and 
joint propensities. Computers in Human Behavior, 56, 9–13.
Gov .uk. (2016, March 1). Child safety online: A practical guide for providers of 
social media and interactive services. Retrieved from https: //www .gov .uk /govern 
ment /publications /child -safety -online -a -practical -guide -for -providers -of -social 
-media -and -interactive -services /child -safety -online -a -practical -guide -for -providers 
-of -social -media -and -interactive -services.
Grandoni, D. (2014, April 25). Google+ isn’t dead. It’s just in a coma and on life 
support. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http: //www .huffingtonpost .com /2014 /04 
/25 /google -plus -dead_n_5212819 .html.
Great Speculations. (2016, March 23). How Yahoo is trying to drive revenues for 
Tumblr? Forbes. Retrieved from http: //www .forbes .com /sites /greatspeculations /2016 
/03 /23 /how -yahoo -is -trying -to -drive -revenues -for -tumblr / #382dad5a18c4.
Greenberg, A. (2016, September 9). Inside Google’s Internet Justice League and its 
AI-powered war on trolls. Wired. Retrieved from https: //www .wired .com /2016 /09 
/inside -googles -internet -justice -league -ai -powered -war -trolls / ?mbid=social_twitter.
Grierson, J. (2017, May 22). “No grey areas.” Experts urge Facebook to change mod-
eration policies. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /news 
/2017 /may /22 /no -grey -areas -experts -urge -facebook -to -change -moderation -policies.
Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997). Industry self-regulation: An institutional per-
spective. Law & Policy, 19(4), 363–414.
Haigh, M. M., Brubaker, P., & Whiteside, E. (2013). Facebook: Examining the infor-
mation presented and its impact on stakeholders. Corporate Communications, 18(1), 
52–60.
Hamelink, C. J. (2003). Statement on Communication Rights. Paper presented at 
the World Forum on Communication Rights.
240 References
Hamilton, K. (2007, November 28). Broken lives on Waterford Crystal Drive. River-
front News. Retrieved from http: //www .riverfronttimes .com /2007 -11 -28 /news /broken 
-lives -on -waterford -crystal -drive /full.
Hannah Smith: Ask .fm “happy to help police.” (2013, August 6). SkyNews. Retrieved 
from http: //news .sky .com /story /1124978 /hannah -smith -ask -fm -happy -to -help -police.
Hannah Smith death: Father says daughter was victim of cyberbullies BBC News 
Leicester (2013, August 6). BBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .bbc .com /news /uk 
-england -leicestershire -23584769.
Hannah Smith inquest: Teenager posted “online messages.” (2014, May 6). BBC News. 
Retrieved from http: //www .bbc .com /news /uk -england -leicestershire -27298627.
Hartling, L. M. (2010). Afterword in honor of Jean Baker Miller and Donald Klein. In E. 
Lindner (Ed.), Gender, Humiliation, and Global Security: Dignifying Relationships from Love, 
Sex, and Parenthood to World Affairs (pp. 175–176). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Hartling, L. M., & Luchetta, T. (1999). Humiliation: Assessing the impact of derision, 
degradation, and debasement. Journal of Primary Prevention, 19(4), 259–278.
Hasebrink, U., Göerzig, A., Haddon, L., Kalmus, V., & Livingstone, S. (2011). Patterns 
of Risk and Safety Online: In-Depth Analyses from the EU Kids Online Survey of 9-to 
16-Year-Olds and Their Parents in 25 European Countries. London: EU Kids Online, 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Hawley, P. H., Little, T. D., & Card, N. A. (2007). The allure of mean friend: Relation-
ship quality and processes of aggressive adolescents with prosocial skills. Interna-
tional Journal of Behavioral Development, 31(2), 170–180.
Heath, A. (2016, March 8). Yik Yak becomes less anonymous as it struggles to remain 
relevant to students. Tech Insider. Retrieved: http: //www .techinsider .io /yik -yak -becomes 
-less -anonymous -2016 -3.
Held, T. (2007). Co-regulation in European Union Member States. Communications, 
32(3), 355–362.
Hempel, J. (2016, January 14). Hey millenials, your mom is about to follow you on 
Snapchat. Wired. Retrieved from https: //www .wired .com /2016 /01 /hey -millennials 
-your -mom -is -about -to -be -on -snapchat.
Henley, J. (2013, August 6). Ask.fm: Is there a way to make it safe? The Guardian. 
Retrieved from http: //www .theguardian .com /society /2013 /aug /06 /askfm -way -to -make 
-it -safe.
Herba, C. M., Ferdinand, R. F., Stijnen, T., Veenstra, R., Oldehinkel, A. J., Ormel, J., 
et al. (2008). Victimisation and suicide ideation in the TRAILS study: Specific vul-
nerabilities of victims. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disci-
plines, 49(8), 867–876. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2008.01900.x.
References 241
Hestres, L. E. (2013). App Neutrality: Apple’s App Store and freedom of expression 
online. International Journal of Communication, 7(15), 1265–1280.
Hicks, D. (2011). Dignity: Its Essential Role in Resolving Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Hill, M. (2014). By removing photos of childbirth, Facebook is censoring powerful 
female images. The Guardian. Retrieved from http: //www .theguardian .com /com 
mentisfree /2014 /oct /22 /facebook -removing -childbirth -female -images.
Hillier, A. (2014, December 11). Former BeatBullying executives, including Ross 
Banford and Sarah Dyer, set up new company a week after liquidation. Third Sector. 
Retrieved from http: //www .thirdsector .co .uk /former -beatbullying -executives -including 
-ross -banford -sarah -dyer -set -new -company -week -liquidation /management /article 
/1326181.
Hinduja, S. (2016, September 29). How social media helps teens cope with anxiety, 
depression and self-harm. Cyberbullying Research Center. Retrieved from http: //
cyberbullying .org /how -social -media -helps -teens -cope -anxiety -depression -self -harm.
Hinduja, S., & Patchin, J. W. (2008). Cyberbullying: An exploratory analysis of fac-
tors related to offending and victimization. Deviant Behavior, 29(2), 129–156.
Hinduja, S., & Patchin, J. W. (2009). Bullying beyond the Schoolyard: Preventing and 
Responding to Cyberbullying. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Hinduja, S., & Patchin, J. W. (2010). Bullying, cyberbullying, and suicide. Archives of 
Suicide Research, 14(3), 206–221. doi:10.1080/13811118.2010.494133.
Hinduja, S., & Patchin, J. (2016). Bullying and cyberbullying laws. Retrieved from http: // 
www .cyberbullying .us /Bullying -and -Cyberbullying -Laws .pdf.
Hopkins, N. (2017, May 22). How Facebook allows users to post footage of children 
being bullied. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /news /2017 
/may /22 /how -facebook -allows -users -to -post -footage -of -children -being -bullied.
Hopkins, N., and J. Wong. (2017, May 21). Has Facebook become a forum for misog-
yny and racism? The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /news 
/2017 /may /21 /has -facebook -become -forum -misogyny -racism.
Hughes, T. (2016, February 5). Kik messaging app scrutinized in wake of Va teen’s 
murder. USA Today. Retrieved from http: //www .usatoday .com /story /news /nation 
/2016 /02 /04 /kik -messaging -app -scrutinized -wake -va -teens -murder /79826224.
Humanium. (n.d.). The Convention on the Rights of the Child. Retrieved from http: // 
www .humanium .org /en /convention /signatory -states.
Hunt, E. (2016, July 20). Milo Yiannopoulos, rightwing writer, permanently banned 
from Twitter. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /technol 
ogy /2016 /jul /20 /milo -yiannopoulos -nero -permanently -banned -twitter.
242 References
Hunter, S., Boyle, J., & Warden, D. (2004). Help seeking amongst child and adoles-
cent victims of peer-aggression and bullying: The influence of school-stage, gender, 
victimisation, appraisal, and emotion. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 74, 
375–390.
IAC. (n.d.). IAC. Retrieved from http: //iac .com.
ICT Coalition. (n.d.). ICT coalition, Principles PDF. Retrieved from http: //www .ict 
coalition .eu.
Ingram, M. (2016, June 2). Snapchat now has more daily users than Twitter does. 
Fortune. Retrieved from http: //fortune .com /2016 /06 /02 /snapchat -twitter.
Instagram. (2013). Terms of use. Retrieved from https: //help .instagram .com /478745 
558852511.
Isaac, M. (2016, August 2). Instagram takes a page from Snapchat and takes aim at it 
too. New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2016 /08 /03 /technol 
ogy /instagram -stories -snapchat -facebook .html ?module=WatchingPortal &region=c 
-column -middle -span -region &pgType=Homepage &action=click &mediaId=thumb_
square &state=standard &contentPlacement=6 &version=internal &content Collection 
=www .nytimes .com &contentId=http%3A%2F%2Fwww .nytimes .com%2F2016%2F08
%2F03%2Ftechnology%2Finstagram -stories -snapchat -facebook .html &event 
Name=Watching -article -click &_r=0.
Iowa Supreme Court holds that evidence of taunting is insufficient to constitute 
criminal harassment. Harvard Law Review, 128(7), 2058–2065. Retrieved from http: //
harvardlawreview .org /2015 /05 /in -re -d -s.
Jenkins, P. (1992). Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain. New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Johnstone, B. (2002). Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell.
Jones, L. M., & Mitchell, K. J. (2015). Defining and measuring youth digital citizen-
ship. New Media & Society, 18(9), 2063—2079. doi:10.1177/1461444815577797.
Jones, L. M., Mitchell, K. J., & Finkelhor, D. (2013). Online harassment in context: 
Trends from three youth Internet safety surveys (2000, 2005, 2010). Psychology of 
Violence, 3, 53–69. doi:10.1037/A0030309.
Jones, L. M., Mitchell, K. J., & Walsh, W. A. (2013). Evaluation of Internet child safety 
materials used by ICAC task forces in school and community settings: Final report. 
Retrieved from https: //www .ncjrs .gov /pdffiles1 /nij /grants /242016 .pdf.
Jones, L. M., Mitchell, K. J., & Walsh, W. A. (2014). A content analysis of youth 
internet safety programs: Are effective prevention strategies being used? Retrieved 
from http: //www .unh .edu /ccrc /pdf /ISE%20Bulletin%202_Contant%20Analysis%20
of%20Youth%20ISE%20FINAL -with%20appendix .pdf.
References 243
Judge orders end to Facebook cyberbullying under new law. (2014, February 11). CBC 
News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia /judge -orders -end 
-to -facebook -cyberbullying -under -new -law -1 .2531764.
June, L. (2016, March 18). Why did Facebook remove this photo of a woman and 
her newborn? New York Magazine. Retrieved from http: //nymag .com /thecut /2016 
/03 /facebook -childbirth -censorship .html #.
Kaiser High School reports cyberbullying threats via social media app. (2015, 
November 22). Hawaii News Now. Retrieved from http: //www .hawaiinewsnow .com 
/story /27449485 /kaiser -high -school -reports -cyberbullying -threats -via -social -media 
-app.
Kapko, M. (2016, August 12). Cyberbullying continues to drag Twitter down. The 
CIO. Retrieved from http: //www .cio .com /article /3107165 /social -networking /cyber 
bullying -continues -to -drag -twitter -down .html.
Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and 
opportunities of social media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68.
Katz, A. (2012). Cyberbullying and E-safety: What Educators and Other Professionals 
Need to Know. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Kelly, M. (2013, November 15). The Sextortion of Amanda Todd. CBC. [online docu-
mentary]. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /fifth /episodes /2013 -2014 /the -sextortion 
-of -amanda -todd.
Kelly, M. (2014, December 5). Amanda Todd: The Man in the Shadows. CBC. [online 
documentary]. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /fifth /episodes /2014 -2015 /stalking 
-amanda -todd -the -man -in -the -shadows.
Kiberd, R. (2016, August 5). YouTube’s trolls are crying censorship over cyberbully-
ing rules. Motherboard. Retrieved from http: //motherboard .vice .com /read /youtubes 
-trolls -leafyishere -are -crying -censorship -over -cyberbullying -rules.
Kik. (2015, January, 29). 200 million users. Retrieved from https: //blog .kik .com /2015 
/01 /29 /200 -million -users.
Kik Interactive. (2016a). I’m being harassed on Kik! What can I do? Retrieved from 
https: //kikinteractive .zendesk .com /entries /23518788 -I -m -being -harassed -on -Kik 
-What -can -I -do -.
Kik Interactive. (2016b). Is there a way to manage messages from new people? 
Retrieved from https: //kikinteractive .zendesk .com /hc /en -us /articles /115006089428 
-Manage -messages -from -new -people.
Kik Interactive. (2016c). Privacy policy. Retrieved from http: //www .kik .com /privacy.
Kik Interactive. (2016d). Terms of service. Retrieved from https: //www .kik .com /assets 
/Uploads /Kik -Terms -of -Service -Uploaded -May -9 -2016 .pdf.
244 References
Kik Interactive. (2016e). Home. http: //kik .com.
Kik Interactive. (2016f). About. https: //www .kik .com /about.
King, A. V. (2010). Constitutionality of cyberbullying laws: Keeping the online play-
ground safe for both teens and free speech. Vanderbilt Law Review, 63(3), 845–884.
Kiss, J. (2010, April 7). Bebo: where did it all go wrong? The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http: //www .theguardian .com /media /2010 /apr /07 /bebo -facebook.
Klein, J. (2012). The Bully Society: School Shootings and the Crisis of Bullying in America’s 
Schools. New York: NYU Press.
Kling, R., Lee, Y., Teich, A., & Frankel, M. S. (1999). Assessing anonymous communi-
cation on the Internet: Policy deliberations. The Information Society, 15(2), 78–90. 
Retrieved from http: //smg .media .mit .edu /library /Kling .AssessAnon .pdf.
Kobie, N. (2016, March 7). Linked to bullying and even murder, can anonymous apps 
like Kik ever be safe? Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /sustainable -business 
/2016 /mar /07 /anonymous -apps -cyber -bullying -security -safety -kik -yik -yak -secret.
Kofoed, J., & Ringrose, J. (2012). Travelling and sticky affects: Exploring teens and 
sexualized cyberbullying through a Butlerian-Deleuzian-Guattarian lens. Discourse 
(Abingdon), 33(1), 5–20.
Kosciw, J. G., E. A. Greytak, M. J. Bartkiewicz, M. J. Boesen, and N. A. Palmer. 
(2012). The 2011 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisex-
ual and Transgender Youth in Our Nation's Schools. Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education 
Network (GLSEN). 121 West 27th Street Suite 804, New York, NY 10001. Retrieved from 
http: //files .eric .ed .gov /fulltext /ED535177 .pdf.
Kosciw, J. G., Greytak, E. A., & Diaz, E. M. (2009). Who, what, when, where, and 
why: Demographic and ecological factors contributing to hostile school climate for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 38(7), 
976–988.
Kosoff, M. (2015, December 11). 20 million people are sharing secrets on anony-
mous app Whisper every month. Business Insider. Retrieved from http: //www .busi-
nessinsider .com /anonymous -app -whisper -has -20 -million -monthly -users -2015 -12.
Kosoff, M. (2016, April 7). Anonymous gossip app Yik Yak is in trouble. Vanity Fair. 
Retrieved: http: //www .vanityfair .com /news /2016 /04 /anonymous -gossip -app -yik -yak -is 
-in -trouble.
Kowalski, R. M., Giumetti, G. W., Schroeder, A. N., & Lattanner, M. R. (2014). Bully-
ing in the digital age: A critical review and meta-analysis of cyberbullying research 
among youth. Psychological Bulletin, 140(4), 1073–1137.
Kowalski, R. M., Limber, S. P., & Agatston, P. W. (2012). Cyberbullying: Bullying in the 
DigitalAage. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
References 245
Kravets, D. (2009, September 30). Cyberbulling bill gets chilly reception. Wired. 
Retrieved from http: //www .wired .com /2009 /09 /cyberbullyingbill.
Kunkel, D. 1990. The role of research in the regulation of US children’s television 
advertising. Science Communication 12 (1): 101–119.
Lampert, C., & Donoso, V. (2012). Bullying. In S. Livingstone, L. Haddon, & A. 
Görzig (Eds.), Children, Risk and Safety on the Internet (pp. 141–150). Bristol: Policy 
Press.
Lannin, S. (2014, December 3). Cyberbulling: Government crackdown to target social 
media sites. ABC. Retrieved from http: //www .abc .net .au /news /2014 -12 -03 /government 
-plans -cyber -bullying -crackdown /5935560.
Larson, R. W. (2000). Toward a psychology of positive youth development. American 
Psychologist, 55(1), 170–183.
Larson, J., Nagler, J., Ronen, J., & Tucker, J. (2016). Social networks and protest par-
ticipation: evidence from 93 million Twitter users. Political Networks Workshops & 
Conference 2016. Retrieved from http: //papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers .cfm ?abstract_id 
=2796391.
Latzer, M., Just, N., & Saurwein, F. (2013). Self- and co-regulation. Evidence, legiti-
macy and governance choice. In E. P. Monroe, S. G. Verhulst, & L. Morgan (Eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of Media Law (pp. 373–397). Oxon: Routledge.
Latzer, M., Price, M. E., Saurwein, F., & Verhulst, S. G. 2007. Comparative analysis of 
international co- and self-regulation in communications markets. Research report 
commissioned by Ofcom, September, Vienna: ITA at http: //www .mediachange .ch 
/media /pdf /publications /latzer_et_al_2007_comparative_analysis .pdf.
Lawmaker modifies Audrie Pott sex-assault bill targeting teens. (2014, June 24). 
Retrieved from http: //www .ksbw .com /news /central -california /hollister -gilroy /law 
maker -modifies -audrie -pott -sexassault -bill -targeting -teens /26644110.
LeafyIsHere. (2016, July 26). The YouTube rant: I’m getting banned off YouTube. 
Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=I5FLhS2YxmY &index=109 
&list=WL.
Leiter, B. (2010). Cleaning cyber-cesspools: Google and free speech. In S. Levmore & 
M. Nussbaum (Eds.), The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lenhart, A. (2015, April, 9). Teens Social Media & Technology Overview 2015. 
Retrieved from http: //www .pewinternet .org /2015 /04 /09 /teens -social -media -techno 
logy -2015.
Lereya, S. T., Winsper, C., Heron, J., Lewis, G., Gunnell, D., Fisher, H. L., et al. (2013). 
Being bullied during childhood and the prospective pathways to self-harm in late 
246 References
adolescence. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 52(6), 
608–618. doi:10.1016/j.jaac.2013.03.012.
Lerner, R. M., Fisher, C., & Weinberg, R. (2000). Toward a science for and of the 
people: Promoting civil society through the application of developmental science. 
Child Development, 71(1), 11–20.
Levin, S., Wong, J. C., & Harding, L. (2016, September 9). Facebook backs down from 
napalm girl censorship and reinstates photo. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //
www .theguardian .com /technology /2016 /sep /09 /facebook -reinstates -napalm -girl 
-photo.
Levmore, S. (2010). The Internet’s anonymity problem. In S. Levmore & M. Nuss-
baum (Eds.), The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Lewis, P., & Rushe, D. (2014, October 17). Whisper app has published its new terms 
of service and privacy policy. The Guardian. Retrieved from http: //www .theguardian 
.com /world /2014 /oct /16 / -sp -whisper -privacy -policy -terms -of -service.
Lievens, E. (2010). Protecting Children in the Digital Era: The Use of Alternative Regula-
tory Instruments. Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
Lievens, E. (2012). Risks for young users on social network sites and the legal frame-
work: Match or mismatch? Paper presented at 23rd European Regional Conference 
of the International Telecommunication Society, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from 
https: //www .b -ccentre .be /download /b -ccentre_legal /B -CCENTRE%20Risks%20
for%20young%20users%20on%20social%20network%20sites%20and%20the%20
legal%20framework .pdf.
Lievens, E. (2016). Is self-regulation failing children and young people? Assessing the 
use of alternative regulatory instruments in the area of social networks. In S. Simpson, 
H. Van den Bulck, & M. Puppis (Eds.), European Media Policy for the Twenty-First 
Century: Assessing the Past, Setting Agendas for the Future (pp. 77–94). New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Lindner, E. G. (2006). Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict. West-
port, CT: Praeger.
Lindner, E. G. (2010). Gender, Humiliation, and Global Security: Dignifying Relationships 
from Love, Sex, and Parenthood to World Affairs. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Lipton, J. D. (2011). Combating cyber-victimization. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
26(2), 1103–1155.
Lipton, J. D. (2013). Cyberbullying and the First Amendment. Florida Coastal Law 
Review, 14(99), 99–130.
Livingstone, S. (2009a). Children and the Internet. Cambridge: Polity Press.
References 247
Livingstone, S. (2009b). A rationale for positive online content for children. Com-
munication Research Trends, 28(3), 12–17.
Livingstone, S. (2016). Reframing media effects in terms of children’s rights in the 
digital age. Journal of Children and Media, 10(1), 4–12. doi:10.1080/17482798.2015.1
123164.
Livingstone, S., & Bulger, M. (2014). A global research agenda for children’s rights in 
the digital age. Journal of Children and Media. doi:10.1080/17482798.2014.961496.
Livingstone, S., Carr, J., & Byrne, J. (2015). One in Three: Internet Governance and 
Children’s Rights. Global Commission on Internet Governance. Retrieved from https: // 
www .cigionline .org /publications /one -three -internet -governance -and -childrens 
-rights.
Livingstone, S., Haddon, L., Vincent, J., Mascheroni, G., & Ólafsson, K. (2014). Net 
Children Go Mobile: The UK Report. London: London School of Economics and Politi-
cal Science.
Livingstone, S., Haddon, L., & Görzig, A. (Eds.). (2012). Children, Risk and Safety on 
the Internet: Research and Policy Challenges in Comparative Perspective. Bristol, UK: The 
Policy Press.
Livingstone, S., Haddon, L. G., Görzig, A., & Ólafsson, K. (2011). Risks and safety on 
the internet: The perspective of European children—Full findings and policy implications 
from the EU Kids Online survey of 9–16 year olds and their parents in 25 countries. LSE, 
London: EU Kids Online.
Livingstone, S., Mascheroni, G., Ólafsson , K., & Haddon, L. (2014). Children’s online 
risks and opportunities: Comparative findings of EU Kids Online and Net Children 
Go mobile. Retrieved from http: //netchildrengomobile .eu /reports.
Livingstone, S., G. Mascheroni, and E. Staksrud. (2017). European research on chil-
dren’s internet use: Assessing the past, anticipating the future. New Media & Society 
January 10:1–20.
Livingstone, S., Mascheroni, G., & Staksrud, E. (2015). Developing a framework for 
researching children’s risks and opportunities in Europe. Retrieved from http: //
eprints .lse .ac .uk /64470 /1 /__lse .ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_
repository_Content_EU%20Kids%20Online_EU%20Kids%20Online_Developing 
%20framework%20for%20researching_2015.pdf.
Livingstone, S., Ólafsson , K., & Staksrud, E. (2011). Social Networking, Age and Privacy. 
London: EU Kids Online.
Livingstone, S., Ólafsson , K., O’Neill, B., & Donoso, V. (2012). Towards a better inter-
net for children. EU Kids Online. Retrieved from http: //www .lse .ac .uk /media@lse 
/research /EUKidsOnline /EU%20Kids%20III /Reports /EUKidsOnlinereportforthe 
CEOCoalition .pdf.
248 References
Long, J. D., & Pellegrini, A. D. (2003). Studying change in dominance and bullying 
with linear mixed models. School Psychology Review, 32(3), 401–418.
Lunt, P., & Livingstone, S. (2012). Media Regulation: Governance and the Interests of 
Citizens and Consumers. London: Sage.
Maag, C. (2007, November 28). A hoax turned fatal draws anger but no charges. New 
York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2007 /11 /28 /us /28hoax .html 
?_r=0.
MacDonald, M. (2015, January 15). Year of probation for second man who pleaded 
guilty in Rehtaeh Parsons case. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http: //www .the-
globeandmail .com /news /national /rehtaeh -parsons -sentence /article22457916.
Macháčková, H., Dedkova, L., Ševčíková, A., & Cerna, A. (2013). Bystanders’ support 
of cyberbullied schoolmates. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 23(1), 
25–36. doi:10.1002/casp.2135.
MacKinnon, R. (2012). Consent of the Networked: The World-Wide Struggle for Internet 
Freedom. New York: Basic Books.
Magid, L. (2013, May 1). What is Snapchat and why do kids love it and parents fear 
it? (Updated). Forbes. Retrieved from http: //www .forbes .com /sites /larrymagid /2013 
/05 /01 /what -is -snapchat -and -why -do -kids -love -it -and -parents -fear -it.
Magid, L. (2014, August 14). IAC’s Ask .com buys Ask .fm and hires a safety officer to 
stem bullying. Forbes. Retrieved from http: //www .forbes .com /sites /larrymagid /2014 
/08 /14 /iacs -ask -com -buys -ask -fm -and -hires -a -safety -officer -to -stem -bullying.
Marsden, C. T. (2011). Internet Co-regulation. European Law, Regulatory Governance and 
Legitimacy in Cyberspace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marsden, C. T. (2012). Internet co-regulation and constitutionalism: Towards Euro-
pean judicial review. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 26(2–3), 
211–228. doi:10.1080/13600869.2012.698450.
Marwick, A. E. (2008). To catch a predator? The MySpace moral panic. First Monday, 
13(6). Retrieved from http: //journals .uic .edu /ojs /index .php /fm /article /view /2152 
/1966.
Marwick, A., & boyd, d. (2014). “It’s just drama”: Teen perspectives on conflict and 
aggression in a networked era. Journal of Youth Studies, 17(9), 1187–1204.
Marwick, A. E., & Miller, R. W. (2014). Online Harassment, Defamation, and Hateful 
Speech: A Primer of the Legal Landscape. Fordham Center on Law and Information 
Policy Report No. 2. Retrieved from http: //ssrn .com /abstract=2447904.
Maryland Attorney General. (2014). Attorney General Gansler secures settlement 
from Snapchat, Inc. Retrieved from http: //www .oag .state .md .us /Press /2014 /061214 
.html.
References 249
Maryland Attorney General. (2013). AG Gansler launches pilot project with Face-
book to address cyberbullying. Retrieved from http: //www .marylandattorneygeneral 
.gov /press /2013 /100313 .pdf.
Masnick, M. (April 28, 2010). Anti-piracy group says: Child porn is great, since it 
gets politicians to block file sharing sites. Techdirt. Retrieved from https: //www .tech 
dirt .com /articles /20100427 /1437179198 .shtml.
Matias, J. N., Johnson, A., Boesel, W. E., Keegan, B., Friedman, J., & DeTar, C. (2015). 
Reporting, reviewing, and responding to harassment on Twitter. Women, Action, & 
the Media. Retrieved from http: //womenactionmedia .org /cms /assets /uploads /2015 
/05 /wam -twitter -abuse -report .pdf.
Mathews, K. J. (2007, October 17). New York Attorney General settlement with Face-
book creates new model to protect children online. Proskauer Privacy Law Blog. 
Retrieved from http: //privacylaw .proskauer .com /2007 /10 /articles /online -privacy /new 
-york -attorney -general -settlement -with -facebook -creates -new -model -to -protect 
-children -online /.
McCarthy, K. (2014 October 24). Whisper tracks its users. So we tracked down its LA 
office. This is what happened next. The Register. Retrieved from http: //www .the 
register .co .uk /2014 /10 /20 /whisper_doorstepping.
McGrath, P. (2015, February 7). Twitter CEO “ashamed” of how company handles 
cyber bullying, revenue growth threatened. ABC. Retrieved from http: //www .abc 
.net .au /news /2015 -02 -06 /twitter -ceo -ashamed -of -cyber -bullying -attacks /6076108.
McGraw, P. (2015, May 6). It’s time to stop the cyberbullying epidemic. Huffington Post. 
Retrieved from http: //www .huffingtonpost .com /entry /stop -cyberbullying_b_6647990.
McLaughlin, S. (2013). Regulation and legislation. In: B.  O’Neill,  E.  Staksrud & 
S. McLaughlin, Towards a better internet for children? Policy pillars, players and para-
doxes (pp. 77–91). Göteborg: Nordicom.
McMillan, R. (2007, October 17). After New York investigation Facebook to beef up 
safety. Retrieved from http: //www .networkworld .com /article /2287089 /lan -wan /after 
-new -york -investigation - -facebook -to -beef -up -safety .html.
Medina, D. A. (2014, November 12). This gossipy social network is getting huge on 
college campuses. QUARTZ. Retrieved from https: //qz .com /291637 /the -rise -of -this 
-anonymous -app -does -not -mean -that -more -are -on -the -way /.
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R.1966, 111th cong. (2009).
Megan Meier Foundation. (n.d.a). Megan Meier Foundation. Retrieved from http: //
www .meganmeierfoundation .org.
Megan Meier Foundation. (n.d.b). Megan’s story. Retrieved from http: //www .mega 
nmeierfoundation .org /megans -story .html.
250 References
Menesini, C., Codecasa, E., Beatrice, B., & Cowie, H. (2003). Enhancing children’s 
responsibility to take action against bullying: Evaluation of a befriending interven-
tion in Italian middle schools. Aggressive Behavior, 29(1), 10–14.
Mercury News. (2016, July 8). Magid: New Snapchat features provide a more lasting 
experience. Retrieved from http: //www .mercurynews .com /2016 /07 /08 /magid -new 
-snapchat -features -provide -more -lasting -experience.
Michels, S. (2008, November 26). Neighbor guilty in MySpace hoax case. ABC News. 
Retrieved from http: //abcnews .go .com /TheLaw /Technology /story ?id=6338498.
Milosevic, T. (2015a). Cyberbullying policies of social media companies: Towards 
digital dignity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
Milosevic, T. (2015b). Framing cyberbullying in US mainstream media. Journal of 
Children and Media, 9(4), 492–509.
Mishna, F. (2012). Bullying: A Guide to Research, Intervention and Prevention. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Mishna, F., Saini, M., & Solomon, S. (2009). Ongoing and online: Children and 
youth’s perceptions of cyber bullying. Children and Youth Services Review, 31(12), 
1222–1228.
Mitchell, R. (1998). Sources of transparency: Information systems in international 
relations. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 109–130.
Mitchell, K. J., Finkelhor, D., & Wolak, J. (2012). Risk factors and impact of online sexual 
solicitation of youth. Journal of the American Medical Association, 285(23), 1–4.
Mitchell, K. J., Ybarra, M., & Finkelhor, D. (2007). The relative impor- tance of 
online victimization in understanding depression, delinquency, and substance 
abuse. Child Maltreatment, 12, 314–324. doi:10.1177/ 1077559507305996.
Mitchell, K. J., Ybarra, M. L., Jones, L. M., & Espelage, D. (2016). What features make 
online harassment incidents upsetting to youth? Journal of School Violence, 15(3), 
279–301. doi:10.1080/15388220.2014.990462.
Monaghan, J. (2011). Social networking websites’ liability for user illegality. Seton 
Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, 21(2), 6.
Montgomery, K. C. (2007). Generation Digital: Politics, Commerce and Childhood in the 
Age of the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Montgomery, K. C. (2015). Youth and surveillance in the Facebook era: Policy inter-
ventions and social implications. Telecommunications Policy. doi:10.1016/j.telpol 
.2014 .12.006.
Montgomery, K. C., Gottlieb-Robles, B., & Larson, G. O. (2004). Youth as e-citizens: 
Engaging the digital generation. Retrieved from http: //www .civicyouth .org /PopUps 
/YouthasECitizens .pdf.
References 251
Morgan, B., & Yeung, K. (2007). An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Mate-
rials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morris, K. (2012, October 19). Inside the sick pedophile ring that blackmailed girls 
like Amanda Todd. Daily Dot. Retrieved from http: //www .dailydot .com /society /sick 
-pedophile -ring -blackmail -amanda -todd.
Morris, I. (2015, July 31). Google+ is officially an endangered species thanks to You-
Tube. Retrieved from http: //www .forbes .com /sites /ianmorris /2015 /07 /31 /google 
-plus -is -dying -thanks -to -youtube / #20286284b670.
Morrison, B. (2002). Bullying and victimization in schools: A restorative justice 
approach. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 219, 1–6.
Moscaritolo, A. (2014, January 22). Study: Facebook to lose 80 percent of users, 
become the next MySpace. PC News. Retrieved from http: //www .pcmag .com /article2 
/0,2817,2429794,00.asp.
Murphy, L. (2012, October 17). Did Anonymous unmask the wrong guy in its hunt 
for the man who allegedly drove a teen to suicide? Slate. Retrieved from http: //www 
.slate .com /blogs /future_tense /2012 /10 /17 /amanda_todd_suicide_did_anonymous 
_dox _the_wrong_guy .html.
National Association of Attorneys General. (2008). Attorneys General announce agree-
ment with MySpace regarding social networking safety. Retrieved from http: //www 
.naag .org /publications /naagazette /volume_2_number_1 /attorneys_general 
_announce_agreement_with_myspace_regarding_social_networking_safety .php.
Navarro, J. N., Marcum, C. D., Higgins, G. E., & Ricketts, M. L. (2016). Addicted to 
the thrill of the virtual hunt: Examining the effects of Internet addiction on the 
cyberstalking behaviors of juveniles. Deviant Behavior, 37(8), 893–903. doi:10.1080/
01639625.2016.1153366.
NetAware. (2017). Sites, apps and games we’ve reviewed so far. NSPCC. Retrieved 
from https: //www .net -aware .org .uk /networks / ?order= -popularity.
Net Children Go Mobile. (n.d.). Home. Retrieved from http: //netchildrengomobile .eu.
Net Family News. (2015). About us. Retrieved from http: //www .netfamilynews .org 
/aboutus .htm.
Newman, A. L., & Bach, D. (2004). Self-regulatory trajectories in the shadow of public 
power: Resolving digital dilemmas in Europe and the United States. Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 7(3), 387–413.
News O2. (2016, April 6). Children reveal riskiest social media sites. Retrieved from 
http: //news .o2 .co .uk / ?press -release=children -reveal -riskiest -social -media -sites -new 
-net -aware -guide.
Newsroom .fb .com. (2016). Stats. Retrieved from http: //newsroom .fb .com /company 
-info.
252 References
New York State Attorney General. (2014). A.G. Schneiderman and IAC announce new 
safety agreement to protect children and teens on newly acquired Ask .fm site. Retrieved 
from http: //www .ag .ny .gov /press -release /ag -schneiderman -and -iac -announce -new 
-safety -agreement -protect -children -and -teens -newly.
Nguyen, C. (2015, November 6). An attempted suicide forced Tumblr community to 
open its eyes about bullying. The Motherboard. Retrieved from: http: //motherboard 
.vice .com /read /an -attempted -suicide -forced -a -tumblr -community -to -open -its -eyes 
-about -bullying.
Nocentini, A., Calmaestra, J., Shultze-Krumbholz, A., Scheithauer, H., Ortega, R., & 
Menesini, E. (2010). Cyberbullying: Labels, behaviors and definition in three Euro-
pean countries. Australian Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 20(2), 129–142.
Nova Scotia Cyberbullying Law goes too far. (2014, February 17). The Globe and Mail. 
Retrieved from http: //www .theglobeandmail .com /globe -debate /editorials /nova -scotias 
-cyber -bullying -law -goes -too -far /article16907312.
NSPCC. (2016, April 6). 50% of children admit to seeing sexual or violent content 
online. Retrieved from https: //nspcc .org .uk /fighting -for -childhood /news -opinion 
/net -aware -reveals -risky -social -media -sites.
Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner (n.d.). The Enhancing Online Safety for 
Children Act 2015. Retrieved from https: //esafety .gov .au /about -the -office /legislation.
Ohler, J. (2011). Digital Citizenship Means Character Education for Digital Age. 
Kappa Delta Pi Record, 48(1), 25–27.
Olson, P. (2013, November 10). Teenagers say goodbye to Facebook and hello to 
messenger apps. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /tech 
nology /2013 /nov /10 /teenagers -messenger -apps -facebook -exodus.
Olweus, D. (2012). Cyberbullying, an overrated phenomenon? European Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 9(5), 520–538.
Omand, G. (2015, August 5). Rehtaeh Parson’s father credits Anonymous for reopen-
ing investigation. CBC. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia 
/rehtaeh -parsons -s -father -credits -anonymous -for -reopening -investigation -1 .3177605.
O’Neil, L. (2014, November 25). “Yik Yak” is the latest anonymous messaging app to 
cause trouble among teens. CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /newsblogs 
/yourcommunity /2014 /11 /yik -yak -is -the -latest -anonymous -messaging -app -to -cause 
-trouble -among -teens .html.
O’Neill, B. (2013). Who cares? Practical ethics and the problem of underage users on 
social networking sites. Ethics and Information Technology, 15(4), 253–262.
O’Neill, B. (2014a). Policy Influences and country clusters: A Comparative analysis of 
Internet safety implementation. LSE. London: EU Kids Online.
References 253
O’Neill, B. (2014b). First report on the implementation of the ICT Principles, Retrieved 
from http: //www .ictcoalition .eu /gallery /75 /ICT_REPORT .pdf.
O’Neill, B., & Staksrud, E. (2012). Policy implications and recommendations: Now 
what? In S. Livingstone, L. Haddon, & A. Görzig (Eds.), Children, Risk and Safety on 
the Internet: Research and Policy Challenges in Comparative Perspective (pp. 339–354). 
Bristol: The Policy Press.
Ortutay, B. (2014, March 24). Anonymous apps like Secret and Whisper find a niche 
in Silicon Valley. San Jose Mercury News. Retrieved from http: //www .mercurynews 
.com /business /ci_25409802 /anonymous -apps -like -secret -and -whisper -find -niche.
Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to a Teen’s Suicide. (2007, November 19). ABC News. 
Retrieved from http: //abcnews .go .com /GMA /story ?id=3882520.
Parliament of Australia. (n.d.). Enhancing Online safety act for children. Retrieved 
from http: //parlinfo .aph .gov .au /parlInfo /download /legislation /bills /r5387_aspassed 
/toc_pdf /14260b01 .pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf.
Patchin, J. W. (2013). Cyberbullying: Neither an epidemic nor a rarity. Retrieved 
from http: //cyberbullying .us /cyberbullying -neither -an -epidemic -nor -a -rarity.
Patchin, J. W. (2014, November 26). The case for including intent in a definition of 
bullying. Cyberbullying Research Center. Retrieved from http: //cyberbullying .org 
/intent -define -bullying.
Patchin, J. W. (2014). Summary of our research (2004–2014). Retrieved from http: //
cyberbullying .us /summary -of -our -research.
Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2012). Cyberbullying Prevention and Response: Expert 
Perspectives. New York: Routledge.
Payton, J., Weissberg, R. P., Durlak, J. A., Dymnicki, A. B., Taylor, R. D., Schellinger, 
K. B., & Pachan, M. (2008). The positive impact of social and emotional learning for 
kindergarten to eighth-grade students: Findings from three scientific reviews. Tech-
nical report. Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (NJ1).
Pearce, N., Cross, D., Monks, H., Waters, S., & Falconer, S. (2011). Current evidence 
of best practice in whole-school bullying intervention and its potential to inform 
cyberbullying interventions. Journal of Psychologists and Counsellors in Schools, 
21(01), 1–21. doi:10.1375/ajgc.21.1.1.
Perez, S. (2014, August 14). IAC agrees to work with regulators on cyberbulling pro-
tections following Ask .fm deal. TechCrunch. Retrieved from http: //techcrunch .com 
/2014 /08 /14 /ask -com -agrees -to -work -with -regulators -on -cyberbullying -protections 
-following -ask -fm -acquisition.
Pesta, A. (2014, April 8). Who are you calling a bully? Cosmopolitan. Retrieved from 
http: //www .cosmopolitan .com /lifestyle /advice /a6303 /twelve -year -old -bully.
254 References
Pew Research Center. (2012). Teens fact sheet. Retrieved from http: //www .pewinter 
net .org /fact -sheets /teens -fact -sheet.
Phaneuf, W. (2012, July 26). Source: Voxer approaches 70M users, encouraged by 
global smartphone adoption. PandoDaily. Retrieved from https: //pando .com 
/2012 /07 /26 /voicetext -app -voxer -expands -encouraged -by -global -smartphone 
-adoption.
Phillips, W. (2015). This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship 
between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Poole, E. (2013). Hey girls, did you know? Slut-shaming on the Internet needs to 
stop. University of San Francisco Law Review, 48(221), 221–260.
Popkin, S. (2009, May 15). Cyberbullying laws won’t save your children. MSNBC. 
Retrieved from http: //www .msnbc .msn .com /id /30751310 /ns /technology_and_sci-
ence -tech_and_gadgets /t /cyberbullying -laws -wont -save -your -children / # .
ULRAYIdfATa.
Powles, J., & Chaparro, E. How Google determined our right to be forgotten. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /technology /2015 /feb /18 /the 
-right -be -forgotten -google -search.
Prensky, M. (2001). Digital natives, digital immigrants. On the Horizon, 9(5). 
Retrieved from http: //www .marcprensky .com /writing /Prensky%20 -%20Digital%20
Natives,%20Digital%20Immigrants%20-%20Part1.pdf.
Preston, P. (2016, September 11). Face it, Mr. Mark Zuckerberg, you’re a news editor 
too. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /technology /2016 
/sep /11 /facebook -news -censorship -stick -to -social -media.
Pritchard, E. D. (2013). For colored kids who commit suicide, our outrage isn’t 
enough: Queer youth of color, bullying and the discursive limits of identity and 
safety. Harvard Educational Review, 82(2), 320–345.
Proskauer. (2008, January 15). State Attorneys General announce agreement with 
MySpace to protect children online [Blog post]. Retrieved from http: //privacylaw 
.proskauer .com /2008 /01 /articles /online -privacy /state -attorneys -general -announce 
-agreement -with -myspace -to -protect -children -online /
Protalinski, E. (2014, October 28). Facebook passes 1.38B monthly active users and 
864M daily active users, with a third now mobile only. Venturebeat. Retrieved from 
http: //venturebeat .com /2014 /10 /28 /facebook -passes -1 -35b -monthly -active -users 
-and -864m -daily -active -users -with -a -third -now -mobile -only /
Prout, A. (2005). The Future of Childhood. Abingdon, UK: RoutledgeFalmer.
Puppis, M. (2010). Media governance: A new concept for the analysis of media 
policy and regulation. Communication, Culture & Critique, 3(2), 134–149.
References 255
Raiche, R., & Williams, C. (2013, September 12). Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd: 
Girl was bullied before jumping to her death. AbcActionNews. Retrieved from http: //
www .abcactionnews .com /news /region -polk /lakeland /polk -county -sheriff -grady 
-judd -to -brief -media -on -death -of -12 -year -old -rebecca -sedwick -of -lakeland.
Rawlinson, K. (2014, January 23). Mother of girl, 15, who killed herself, condemns 
suicide blogs. The Guardian. Retrieved from http: //www .theguardian .com /uk -news 
/2014 /jan /23 /tallulah -internet -suicide -blogs.
Raymond, M., & DeNardis, L. (2016). Multi-stakeholderism: Anatomy of an incho-
ate global institution. CIGI paper series, Retrieved from https: //www .ourinternet .org 
/sites /default /files /publications /Multi_Stakeholderism%20 -%20Denardis%20
et%20al .pdf.
REACH of Macon County. (2013). Change how you handle under-age usage and 
cyber bullying on the Whisper App [online petition]. Retrieved from https: //www 
.change .org /p /whispertext -llc -change -how -you -handle -under -age -usage -and -cyber 
-bullying -on -the -whisper -app.
Read, A. (2016, July 27). Why Snapchat Memories will be pivotal (and why market-
ers are so excited). Retrieved from https: //blog .bufferapp .com /snapchat -memories.
Rebecca Ann Sedwick, 12-year-old Florida girl, commits suicide after online bully-
ing. (2013, December 9). Huffington Post. Retrieved from http: //www .huffingtonpost 
.com /2013 /09 /12 /rebecca -ann -sedwick -bulli_n_3915883 .html.
Rebecca Ann Sedwick suicide: Two arrests made in death of bullied Florida girl. 
(2013, October 15). CBS. Retrieved from http: //www .cbsnews .com /news /rebecca 
-ann -sedwick -suicide -2 -arrests -made -in -death -of -bullied -florida -girl.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance). Retrieved from http: //eur 
-lex .europa .eu /legal -content /en /TXT / ?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679.
Rehtaeh Parsons, Canadian girl, dies after suicide attempt; Parents allege she was raped 
by 4 boys. (2013, April 9). Huffington Post. Retrieved from http: //www .huffingtonpost 
.com /2013 /04 /09 /rehtaeh -parsons -girl -dies -suicide -rape -canada_n_3045033 .html.
Rehtaeh Parsons case to be reopened by police. (2013, April 12). CBC News. Retrieved 
from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia /rehtaeh -parsons -case -to -be -reopened 
-by -police -1 .1309465
Rehtaeh Parsons suicide: Web calls on Anonymous to act after Nova Scotia teen’s 
death. (2013, April 10). The Huffington Post Canada. Retrieved from http: //www 
 .huffingtonpost .ca /2013 /04 /10 /rehtaeh -parsons -suicide -anonymous_n_3052495 
.html.
256 References
Report of the Round Table on Advertising. (2006). Retrieved from http: //ec .europa 
.eu /consumers /archive /overview /report_advertising_en .pdf.
Rey, P. J. (2012, February 1). There is no “Cyberspace.” Cyborgology. Retrieved from 
https: //thesocietypages .org /cyborgology /2012 /02 /01 /there -is -no -cyberspace /
Riley Huntley. (2012, October 15). Amanda Todd—Transcript of video. Retrieved 
from http: //pastebin .com /rMX6fWKU.
Robertson, A. (2016, August 11). Twitter secretly filtered tweets during Obama Q&A, 
says report. The Verge. Retrieved from: http: //www .theverge .com /2016 /8 /11 /1243 
0552 /twitter -barack -obama -askpotus -abusive -tweet -filtering -harassment
Robinson, J. P., & Espelage, D. L. (2012). Bullying explains only part of LGBTQ-hetero-
sexual risk disparities: Implications for policy and practice. Educational Researcher, 
41(8), 309–319.
Robson, S. (2013, August 16). A purple coffin and mourners wearing onesies: Heartbro-
ken family and friends gather at funeral for teenage troll victim Hannah Smith. Mail 
Online. Retrieved from http: //www .dailymail .co .uk /news /article -2395484 /Hannah -Smith 
-funeral -Family -friends -gather -cyberbully -victim -Lutterworth .html.
Rudd, A. (2013a, August 19). Hannah Smith suicide: Teenager used Ask .fm in secret 
after being banned from going on it by worried father. Mirror. Retrieved from http: //
www .mirror .co .uk /news /uk -news /hannah -smith -suicide -teenager -used -2184385.
Rudd, A. (2013b, August 9). Hannah Smith suicide: Ask .fm hire law firm to carry out 
independent audit. The Mirror. Retrieved from http: //www .mirror .co .uk /news /uk 
-news /hannah -smith -suicide -askfm -hire -2145631.
Ruedy, M. C. (2008). Repercussions of a MySpace teen suicide: Should anti-cyberbul-
lying laws be created? North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, 9(2): 323–346.
Rushe, D., & Lewis, P. (2014, October 19). Whisper chief executive answers privacy 
revelations: “We’re not infallible.” The Guardian. Retrieved from http: //www .the 
guardian .com /world /2014 /oct /19 / -sp -whisper -chief -executive -on -privacy 
- revelations -were -not -infallible.
Ruskin, B. (2015, December 11). Court strikes down anti-cyberbullying law created 
after Rehtaeh Parson’s death. CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news 
/canada /nova -scotia /cyberbullying -law -struck -down -1 .3360612.
Rusli, E. M. (2014, November 24). Yik Yak, big in schools, is a hit with investors 
too. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http: //www .wsj .com /articles /year -old 
-messaging -app -yik -yak -draws -big -valuation -1416791097 ?mod=WSJ _hpp _sections 
_smallbusiness.
Rusli, E. M., & Elder, F. (2014, November 25). Yik Yak incidents highlight new social-
media risks. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http: //www .wsj .com /articles /yik -yak 
-incidents -highlight -new -social -media -risks -1416965963.
References 257
Russel, J. (2014, August 22). Apple removes Secret from the App Store in Brazil because 
it breaches local free speech law. The Next Web. Retrieved from http: //thenextweb 
.com /apps /2014 /08 /22 /apple -removes -secret -app -store -brazil -breaches -local -free 
-speech -law.
Russo, A., Watkins, J., Kelly, L., & Chan, S. (2008). Participatory communication 
with social media. Curator, 51(1), 21–31.
Sacco, D., Silbaugh, K., Corredor, F., Casey, J., & Doherty, D. (2012). An Overview of 
State Anti-bullying Legislation and Other Related Laws. Retrieved from http: //cyber .law 
.harvard .edu /sites /cyber .law .harvard .edu /files /State_Anti_bullying_Legislation_
Overview_0 .pdf.
Sandle, P., & Humphries, C. (2013, October 30). Tech start-ups bring jobs to low-
tax Ireland. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from http: //articles .chicagotribune .com 
/2013 -10 -30 /business /sns -rt -us -ireland -tech -20131030_1_tax -rate -tax -rules -tax 
-bill.
Saul, H. (2013, August 19). Ask .fm “will be safer from online bullying” as owners 
introduce new features. Independent. Retrieved from http: //www .independent .co .uk 
/news /uk /home -news /askfm -will -be -safer -from -online -bullying -as -owners 
- introduce -new -features -8774234 .html.
Schneider, S. K., Smith, E., & O’Donnell, L. (2013a). Bystander intervention behav-
iors related to cyberbullying in a regional census of high school students. Paper 
presented at 141st APHA Annual Meeting and Exposition, Boston, MA.
Schneider, S. K., Smith, E., & O’Donnell, L. (2013b). Social media and cyberbully-
ing: Implementation of school-based prevention efforts and implications for social 
media approaches. Retrieved from http: //www .promoteprevent .org /sites /www .pro 
moteprevent .org /files /resources /Social_Media_and_Cyberbullying_FinalReport 
-EDC_0 .pdf.
Schulz, W., & Held, T. (2004). Regulated Self-Regulation as a Form of Modern Government. 
Luton, UK: University of Luton Press.
Scott, S., & Isaac, M. (2016, September 9). Facebook restores iconic Vietnam War 
photo it censored for nudity. New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes 
.com /2016 /09 /10 /technology /facebook -vietnam -war -photo -nudity .html ?_r=1.
Senden, L. (2005). Soft law, self-regulation and co-regulation in European law: where 
do they meet? Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 9(1).
Ševčíková, A., & Šmahel, D. (2009). Cyberbullying among Czech Internet users: 
Comparison across age groups. [Journal of Psychology]. Zeitschrift fur Psychologie mit 
Zeitschrift fur Angewandte Psychologie, 4, 227–229.
Shamberg, S. (2013, June 1). Tweens and Instagram: How to do it right? Retrieved: 
http: //www .huffingtonpost .com /scott -shamberg /tweens -instagram -how -to 
-d_b_2992049 .html
258 References
Sharwood, S. (2014, January 22). Australia floats plan for national social media 
regulator. The Register. http: //www .theregister .co .uk /2014 /01 /22 /australia _floats _plan 
_for _national _social _media _regulator.
Sharwood, S. (2015, March 4). Australia’s social media law for children all but passes. 
The Register. Retrieved from https: //www .theregister .co .uk /2015 /03 /04 /australias 
_social_media_censorship_law_for_the_children_passes /.
Shift, & the Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013). ICT Sector Guide on 
implementing the UN guiding principles on business and human rights (for the 
European Commission), Retrieved from https: //www .ihrb .org /pdf /eu -sector -guidance 
/EC -Guides /ICT /EC -Guide_ICT .pdf.
Shontell, A. (2014, Jun 27). 13-year-old describes how kids are bullied on Snapchat. 
Business Insider. Retrieved from http: //www .businessinsider .com /how -kids -are 
- bullied -on -snapchat -2014 -6
Shontell, A. (2015, January 3). Snapchat is a lot bigger than people realize. Business 
Insider. Retrieved from http: //www .businessinsider .com /snapchats -monthly -active 
-users -may -be -nearing -200 -million -2014 -12.
Silver, C. (2016, July 5). Snapchat use rises among adults. Forbes. Retrieved from 
http: //www .forbes .com /sites /curtissilver /2016 /07 /05 /snapchat -use -rises -among 
-adults -to -the -chagrin -of -teens / #51eddd464e47.
Simmons, R. (2014, November 10). The secret language of girls on Instagram. Time. 
Retrieved: http: //time .com /3559340 /instagram -tween -girls.
Slonje, R., & Smith, P. (2008). Cyberbullying: Another main type of bullying? Scan-
dinavian Journal of Psychology, 49(2), 147–154.
Smith, C. (2016a, July 14). By the numbers: 50+ amazing Google+ statistics. Expanded-
Ramblings, DMR. Retrieved from http: //expandedramblings .com /index .php /google 
-plus -statistics.
Smith, C. (2016b, October 1). By the numbers: 180+ Instagram statistics. Expanded-
Ramblings, DMR. Retrieved from http: //expandedramblings .com /index .php /impor 
tant -instagram -stats.
Smith, C. (2016c October 26). 145 amazing YouTube statistics. Retrieved from http: // 
expandedramblings .com /index .php /youtube -statistics.
Smith, J. D., Schneider, B. H., Smith, P. K., & Ananiadou, K. (2004). The effectiveness 
of whole-school antibullying programs: A synthesis of evaluation research. School 
Psychology Review, 33(4), 547–560.
Smithers, R. (2011). Terms and Conditions: Not reading the small print can cause 
big problems. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /money /2011 /may /11 
/terms -conditions -small -print -big -problems.
References 259
Smith-Spark, L. (2013, August 9). Hannah Smith suicide fuels calls for action on Ask 
.fm cyberbullying. CNN. Retrieved from http: //edition .cnn .com /2013 /08 /07 /world 
/europe /uk -social -media -bullying.
Snapchat not covered by cyberbullying laws. (2014). ZDNet. Retrieved from http: //
www .zdnet .com /article /snapchat -not -covered -by -cyberbullying -laws.
Snapchat. (n.d.a). Community Guidelines. Retrieved from https: //support .snapchat 
.com /a /guidelines.
Snapchat. (n.d.b). Safety Center. Retrieved from https: //www .snapchat .com /safety.
Snapchat. (n.d.c). Snapchat Support: I Need Help. Retrieved from https: //support 
.snapchat .com /en -US /i -need -help.
Snapchat (n.d.d) Snapchat Support: Live Stories. Retrieved from https: //support 
.snapchat .com /en -US /about /live -stories.
Snapchat (n.d.e). Snapchat Support: Stories. Retrieved from https: //support .snap 
chat .com /en -US /about /stories.
Snapchat. (2016). Terms of Service. Retrieved from https: //www .snapchat .com 
 /terms.
Solon, O. (2017, May 25). Underpaid and overburdened: The life of a Facebook 
moderator. The Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /news /2017 
/may /25 /facebook -moderator -underpaid -overburdened -extreme -content.
Solove, D. J. (2007). The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Inter-
net. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Solove, D. (2013). Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Stalla-Bourdillon, S. S. (2009). Making intermediary internet service providers par-
ticipate in the regulatory process through tort law: A comparative analysis. Interna-
tional Review of Law Computers & Technology, 23(1), 153–165.
Staksrud, E. (2013a). Children in the Online World: Risk, Regulation and Rights. London: 
Ashgate.
Staksrud, E. (2013b). Online grooming legislation: Knee-jerk legislation? European 
Journal of Communication, 28(2), 152–167.
Staksrud, E. (2015). Counting children. On research methodology, ethics and policy 
development. In H. Ingierd & H. Fossheim (Eds.), Internet Research Ethics (pp. 98–
121). Oslo, Norway: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.
Staksrud, E., and J. Kirksæther. (2013). He who buries the little girl wins! Moral 
panics as double jeopardy. In Moral Panics in the Contemporary World, (pp. 145–167), 
ed. C. Critcher, J. Hughes, J. Petley and A. Rohloff. New York: Bloomsbury.
260 References
Staksrud, E., & Livingstone, S. (2009). Children and online risk: powerless victims 
or resourceful participants? Information, Communication & Society 12(3), 364–387. 
Retrieved from http: //eprints .lse .ac .uk /30122 /1 /Children_and_online_risk_%28L 
SERO_version%29 .pdf.
Staksrud, E., & Lobe, B. (2010). Evaluation of the implementation of the Safer Social 
Networking Principles for the EU, Part 1: General report (Study commissioned by 
the European Commission), Retrieved from http: //ec .europa .eu /information_soci ety 
/activities /social_networking /docs /final_report /first_part .pdf.
Statista. (n.d.a). Number of monthly active WhatsApp users worldwide from April 
2013 to January 2015 (in millions). Retrieved from http: //www .statista .com /statis 
tics /260819 /number -of -monthly -active -whatsapp -users.
Statista. (n.d.b). Cumulative total of Tumblr blogs between May 2011 and July 2016 (in 
millions). Retrieved from https: //www .statista .com /statistics /256235 /total -cumulative 
-number -of -tumblr -blogs.
Statista (n.d.c). Number of monthly Instagram users from January 2013 to June 
2016 (in millions). Retrieved from https: //www .statista .com /statistics /253577 /number 
-of -monthly -active -instagram -users.
Statista (n.d.d). Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide from 1st quarter 
2010 to 2nd quarter 2016 (in millions). Retrieved from https: //www .statista .com /sta 
tistics /282087 /number -of -monthly -active -twitter -users.
Statista. (n.d.e). Number of registered Kik Messenger users worldwide from Novem-
ber 2012 to February 2016. Retrieved from https: //www .statista .com /statistics 
/327312 /number -of -registered -kik -messenger -users.
Steinhauer, J. (2008, November 26). Verdict in MySpace suicide case. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2008 /11 /27 /us /27myspace .html ?_r=1 &hp.
Stopbullying .gov. (2012). What is cyberbullying? Retrieved from http: //www .stop 
bullying .gov /cyberbullying /what -is -it /index .html.
Stopbullying .gov. (March 31, 2014). Key components in state anti-bullying laws. 
Retrieved from http: //www .stopbullying .gov /laws /key -components /index .html.
Strohmeier, D., Yanagida, T., & Toda, Y. (2016). Individualism/collectivism as predic-
tors of relational and physical victimization in Japan and Austria. In P.  K.  Smith, 
K. Kwak, & Y. Toda (Eds.), School Bullying in Different Cultures: Eastern and Western Per-
spectives (pp. 259–279). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stump, S. (2013, November 22). Fla. teen cleared of cyberbullying: I didn’t do “any-
thing wrong.” Today News. Retrieved from http: //www .today .com /news /fla -teen 
-cleared -cyberbullying -case -i -didnt -do -anything -wrong -2D11632710.
Subrahmanyam, K., & Šmahel, D. (2011). Digital Youth: Advancing Responsible Adoles-
cent Development. New York: Springer.
References 261
Surbramniam, V., and J. Whalen. (2014, December 14). Amanda Todd stood up to 
stalker in Facebook conversation. CBC News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news 
/canada /amanda -todd -stood -up -to -stalker -in -facebook -conversation -1 .2860471.
Suski, E. (2016, April 13). You can’t stop bullying just by passing a law. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /commentisfree /2016 /apr /13 /anti 
-bullying -law -punishment -nevada.
Svantesson, D. J.  B. (2005). The characteristics making internet communication 
challenge traditional models of regulation. What every international jurist should 
know about the internet. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 
13(1), 39–69.
Swart, E., & Bredekamp, J. (2009). Non-physical bullying: Exploring the perspectives 
of grade 5 girls. South African Journal of Education, 29, 405–425.
Swearer, S. M., & Espelage, D. L. (2011). Expanding the social-ecological framework 
of bullying among youth: Lessons learned from the past and directions for the future. 
Educational Psychology Papers and Publications. Paper 140. Retrieved from http: //digital 
commons .unl .edu /edpsychpapers /140.
Tambini, D., Leonardi, D., & Marsden, C. (2008). The privatization of censorship: 
Self-regulation and freedom of expression. In D. Tambini, D. Leonardi, & C. Mars-
den (Eds.), Codifying Cyberspace: Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet 
Convergence (pp. 269–289). Abingdon, UK: Routledge/ UCL Press.
Tang, X. (2013). Shame: A different criminal law proposal for bullies, 61CLEV. ST. L. 
REV., 649, 651.
Taraszow, T. (2013). The influence of NGOs on safer internet policy making. In B. 
O’Neill, E. Staksrud, & S. McLaughlin (Eds.), Towards a Better Internet for Children? 
Policy Pillars, Players and Paradoxes. Goteborg: Nordicom.
Taylor, C. (2013, March 15). Formspring, the pioneering “ask me anything,” anony-
mous Q&A platform, is shutting down. TeachCrunch. Retrieved from https: //tech 
crunch .com /2013 /03 /15 /formspring -the -pioneering -anonymous -qa -platform -is 
-shutting -down.
TheInternetOffendsMe. (2013, April 9). The real story behind Facebook moderation 
and your petty reports. [Blog post]. Retrieved from https: //theinternetoffendsme .
wordpress .com /2013 /04 /09 /the -real -story -behind -facebook -moderation -and -your 
-petty -reports.
Thornberg, R. (2015). Distressed bullies, social positioning and odd victims: Young 
people’s explanations of bullying. Children & Society, 29, 15–25.
The Stream. (2014, March 10). Florida advances bill to make bullying a crime. Al 
Jazeera. Retrieved from http: //america .aljazeera .com /watch /shows /the -stream /the 
-stream -officialblog /2014 /3 /10 /florida -advancesbilltomakebullyingacrime .html.
262 References
ThirdParent, T. (2015, February, 19). We still think Yik Yak is manipulating posts 
naming competitors. Retrieved from http: //thirdparent .com /we -still -think -yik -yak 
-is -manipulating -posts -naming -competitors.
Thomson, I. (2014, October 17). Careless Whisper? Anonymous messaging app accused 
of stalking users, blabbing to Feds. The Register. Retrieved from http: //www .theregister 
.co .uk /2014 /10 /17 /careless_whisper_company_denies_its_tracking_anonymized_users.
Three U.S. teens arrested for sexual battery after girl’s suicide. (2013, April 12). CBC 
News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /world /3 -u -s -teens -arrested -for -sexual 
-battery -after -girl -s -suicide -1 .1312171.
Tokunaga, R. S. (2010). Following you home from school: A critical review and syn-
thesis of research on cyberbullying victimization. Computers in Human Behavior, 
26(3), 277–287.
Troianovski, A., and S. Raice. (2012, June 4). Facebook explores giving kids access. 
The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https: //www .wsj .com /articles /SB1000142405
2702303506404577444711741019238.
Tsaliki, L. (2007). The construction of European identity and citizenship through 
cultural policy. In K. Sarikakis (ed.), Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union, 
pp. 157–182. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Tsui, B. (2014, March 19). Friends With Benefits: Inside Facebook’s Compassion 
Research Day. Pacific Standard. Retrieved from http: //www .psmag .com /nature -and 
-technology /friends -benefits -facebook -sociologists -social -media -74781.
Ttofi, M. M., & Farrington, D. P. (2011). Effectiveness of school-based programs to 
reduce bullying: A systematic and meta-analytic review. Journal of Experimental 
Criminology, 7(1), 27–56.
Tuchman, G. (1978). Making news: A study in the construction of reality. New York: 
Free Press.
Tumblr. (2015, June 2). Tumblr staff. Retrieved from: https: //staff .tumblr .com /post 
/120551226975 /hey -tumblr -welcome -to -your -better -blocking.
Tumblr. (2016). Community guidelines. Retrieved from https: //www .tumblr .com 
/policy /en /community.
Tumblr. (n.d.a). Counseling and prevention resources. Retrieved from https: //www 
.tumblr .com /docs /en /counseling_prevention_resources.
Tumblr. (n.d.b). How can we help? Retrieved from https: //www .tumblr .com /help.
Tumblr. (n.d.c). Harassment. Retrieved from https: //www .tumblr .com /abuse /harass ment.
Tumblr. (n.d.d). Harm to minors. Retrieved from https: //www .tumblr .com /abuse 
/minors.
References 263
Twitter. (2016a). Safety center. We’re Committed to building a safer Twitter. Retrieved 
from https: //about .twitter .com /safety.
Twitter. (2016b). Trust and safety council. Retrieved from https: //about .twitter .com 
/safety /council.
Twitter. (2016c). Trusted resources. Retrieved from https: //support .twitter .com /groups 
/57 -safety -security /topics /274 -handling -issues -online /articles /20171366 -trusted 
-resources.
Twitter. (2016d). The Twitter rules. Retrieved from https: //support .twitter .com /arti-
cles /18311 -the -twitter -rules.
Twitter. (2016e). The Twitter for good blog. Retrieved from https: //blog .twitter .com 
/twitter -for -good.
Twitter. (2016f). Twitter privacy policy (effective January 27, 2016). Retrieved from 
https: //twitter .com /privacy ?lang=en.
Twitter. (2016g). About: Company. Retrieved from https: //about .twitter .com /company.
Twitter (2017). Twitter for Good. Retrieved from https: //about .twitter .com /company 
/twitter -for -good.
UK Council for Child Internet Safety. (n.d.). UK Council for Child Internet Safety. 
Retrieved from https: //www .gov .uk /government /groups /uk -council -for -child -internet 
-safety -ukccis.
UK Council for Child Internet Safety. (2010). Good practice guidance for providers 
of social networking and other user-interactive services. Retrieved from https: //www 
.gov .uk /government /uploads /system /uploads /attachment_data /file /251456 /indus 
try_guidance_social_networking .pdf.
Underwood, M. M., Rish-Scott, M., & Springer, J. (2011). Bullying and suicide risk: 
Building resilience. Social Work Today, 11(5):10. Retrieved from http: //www .social 
worktoday .com /archive /092011p10 .shtml.
UNICEF. (2014). 25 Years of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Is the World a 
Better Place for Children? New York: UNICEF. Retrieved from www .unicef .org /publica 
tions /files /CRC_at_25_Anniversary_Publication_compilation_5Nov2014 .pdf.
U.S. Department of Education. (2011). U.S. Education Department releases analysis of 
state bullying laws and policies. Retrieved from http: //www .ed .gov /news /press -releases 
/us -education -department -releases -analysis -state -bullying -laws -and -policies.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Hearing on: Online Privacy, Social Networking, 
and Crime Victimization 112th cong. (2010) (testimony of Joe Sullivan). Retrieved 
from https: //judiciary .house .gov /_files /hearings /pdf /Sullivan100728 .pdf 
264 References
U.S. teen’s death eerily similar to Rehtaeh Parsons’s story. (2013, April 12). CBC 
News. Retrieved from http: //www .cbc .ca /news /canada /nova -scotia /u -s -teen -s -death 
-eerily -similar -to -rehtaeh -parsons -s -story -1 .1371319.
Vaas, L. (2014, October 30). Snapchat escapes Australian cyberbullying crackdown, 
for now. Naked Security. Retrieved from https: //nakedsecurity .sophos .com /2014 /10 
/30 /snapchat -escapes -australian -cyberbullying -crackdown -for -now.
Vaidhyanathan, S. (2011). The Googlization of Everything: (and Why We Should Worry). 
Oakland: University of California Press.
van der Zwaan, J. M., Dignum, V., Jonker, C. M., & van der Hof, S. (2014). On tech-
nology against cyberbullying. In J. van den Hoven, N. Doorn, T. Swierstra, B. J. Koops, 
& H. Romijn (Eds.), Responsible Innovation 1, Innovative Solutions for Global Issues no. 
1 (pp. 369–392). Dordrecht: Springer.
van Dijck, J. (2013). The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Geel, M., Vedder, P., & Tanilon, J. (2014). Relationship between peer victimiza-
tion, cyberbullying, and suicide in children and adolescents: A meta-analysis. JAMA 
Pediatrics, 168(5), 435–442. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2013.4143.
Van Royen, K., Poels, K., & Vandebosch, H. (2016). Help, I am losing control! Exam-
ining the reporting of sexual harassment by adolescents to social networking sites. 
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 19(1), 16–22.
Vandebosch, H., & Van Cleemput, K. (2009). Cyberbullying among youngsters: Pro-
files of bullies and victims. New Media & Society, 11(8), 1349–1371.
Vandoninck, S., d’Haenens, L., & Roe, K. (2013). Online risks. Journal of Children and 
Media, 7(1), 60–78. doi:10.1080/17482798.2012.739780.
Victor, D. (2016, August 3). Instagram posts may have escalated fatal standoff, police 
say. The New York Times. Retrieved from http: //www .nytimes .com /2016 /08 /04 /us 
/instagram -police -fatal -shooting -maryland .html ?emc=edit_th_20160804 &nl 
=todaysheadlines &nlid=61571261.
Voxer. (n.d.a). (Android) privacy mode. Retrieved from https: //support .voxer .com 
/hc /en -us /articles /204332203 - -Android -Privacy -Mode.
Voxer. (n.d.b). Plans and pricing. Retrieved from http: //voxer .com /plans -and -pricing.
Vreeman, R., & Carroll, A. E. (2007). A systematic review of school-based interventions 
to prevent bullying. Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, 161(1), 78–88.
Waldman, A. E., & Clementi, J. (2015, October 1). Ending the cyberbullying epi-
demic five years after Tyler Clementi’s suicide. Retrieved from http: //www .nydaily 
news .com /opinion /waldman -clementi -ending -cyberbullying -epidemic -article -1 
.2381804.
References 265
Wallace, K. (2014, April 21). Police file raises questions about bullying in Rebecca 
Sedgwick’s suicide. CNN. Retrieved from http: //edition .cnn .com /2014 /04 /18 /living 
/rebecca -sedwick -bullying -suicide -follow -parents.
Wallace, K. (2015, January 9). Parents beware of bullying on sites you’ve never seen. 
CNN. Retrieved from http: //edition .cnn .com /2013 /10 /10 /living /parents -new -apps 
-bullying.
Wartella, E., & Jennings, N. (2000). Children and computers: New technology—old 
concerns. Future of Children and Computer Technology, 10(2), 31–43.
Warzel, C. (2016, August 11). A honeypot for assholes: Inside Twitter’s ten year fail-
ure to stop harassment. BuzzFeedNews. Retrieved from https: //www .buzzfeed .com 
/charliewarzel /a -honeypot -for -assholes -inside -twitters -10 -year -failure -to -s ?utm 
 _term = .el3b6Y7nv2 # .mc6gPYvxmO.
Watertown teens arrested for Instagram bullying. (2014, July 8). FoxCT. Retrieved 
from http: //foxct .com /2014 /07 /08 /watertown -high -school -students -allegedly -caught 
-using -anonymous -instagram -account -to -harrass -others.
Wasko, J. (2008). The Commodification of youth culture. In K. Drotner & S. Living-
stone (Eds.), The International Handbook of Children, Media & Culture (pp. 460–474). 
London: SAGE.
Wauters, E., Lievens, E., & Valcke, P. (2016). Empowering children through labeling 
in social networks: Illusion or solution? In M. Walrave, K. Ponnet, E. Vanderhoven, 
J. Haers, & B. Segært (Eds.), Youth 2.0: Social Media and Adolescence: Connecting, Shar-
ing & Empowering (pp. 227–249). Springer.
Websites could be made to reveal names of cyber bullies. (2013, August 9). London 
Evening Standard. Retrieved from http: //www .standard .co .uk /news /uk /websites -could 
-be -made -to -reveal -names -of -cyber -bullies -8753431 .html.
WhatsApp. (2016a). Frequently asked questions. Retrieved from http: //www .what 
sapp .com /faq /en /general /28030003.
WhatsApp. (2016b). Home. Retrieved from https: //www .whatsapp .com.
WhatsApp. (2016c). Terms of service. Retrieved from https: //www .whatsapp .com 
/legal / #key -updates.
What is a true threat on Facebook? (2014, December 1). New York Times. Retrieved 
from http: //www .nytimes .com /2014 /12 /02 /opinion /what -is -a -true -threat -on -facebook 
.html.
Whisper (2015a). Home. Retrieved from https: //whisper .sh.
Whisper (2015b). Stories. Retrieved from https: //whisper .sh /stories.
Whisper. (2016a). Terms of use. Retrieved from https: //whisper .sh /terms.
266 References
Whisper. (2016b). Community guidelines. Retrieved from https: //whisper .sh /guide 
lines.
White, P. (2014a, June 1). On the trail of Amanda Todd’s alleged tormentor. The 
Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http: //www .theglobeandmail .com /news /world /on 
-the -trail -of -amanda -todds -alleged -tormentor /article18935075 / ?page=all.
White, P. (2014b, June 25). Dutch police used controversial software in Amanda 
Todd case. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http: //www .theglobeandmail .com 
/news /world /dutch -police -used -contentious -software -in -amanda -todd -case /article 
19345909.
Whitworth, D. (2010, November 15). “New law needed” to stop bullying, says char-
ity. BBC. Retrieved from http: //www .bbc .co .uk /newsbeat /11746126.
Wilkinson, P. (2009, November 18). Social network sites criticized on bullying. CNN. 
Retrieved from http: //edition .cnn .com /2009 /TECH /11 /18 /cyber .bullying /index .html 
?iref=allsearch.
Williams, R. (2016, March 25). Rise in teens shamed in cyberbullying videos. Sky-
News. Retrieved from http: //news .sky .com /story /rise -in -teens -shamed -in -cyberbullying 
-videos-10217480.
Wiseman, R. (2009). Queen Bees and Wannabes: Helping Your Daughter Survive Cliques, 
Gossip, Boyfriends and the New Realities of Girl World (3rd ed.). New York: Random 
House.
Wiseman, R. (2013, November). Masterminds and wingmen. Paper presented at the 
Family Online Safety Institute’s Annual Conference, Washington D.C.
Wiseman, R. (2015). Speaking engagements. Retrieved from http: //rosalindwiseman 
.com /programs /rosalinds -events.
Wolak, J., Mitchell, K. J., & Finkelhor, D. (2006). Online Victimization of Youth: 5 Years 
Later. Retrieved from http: //www .unh .edu /ccrc /pdf /CV138 .pdf.
Wolak, J., Mitchell, K. J., & Finkelhor, D. (2007). Does online harassment constitute bul-
lying? An exploration of online harassment by known peers and online only contacts. 
Journal of Adolescent Health, 41(6), S51–S58. doi:10.1016/j.jado health .2007.08.019.
Wolf, J. (2012). The playground bully has gone digital: The dangers of cyberbully-
ing, the first amendment implications and the necessary responses. Cardozo Public 
Law, Policy and Ethics Journal (note 575–610.)
Wong, J. C. (2016, February 17). What is Kik and should your child be using it? The 
Guardian. Retrieved from https: //www .theguardian .com /technology /2016 /feb /16 
/what -is -kik -app -online -anonymous -tech -nicole -madison -lovell.
Woollaston, V. (2015, May 1). The secret’s out: Anonymous app shuts down follow-
ing legal battles and claims that it encouraged bullying. Retrieved September 6, 
References 267
2016, from: http: //www .dailymail .co .uk /sciencetech /article -3064077 /The -secret -s 
-Anonymous -app -shuts -following -legal -battles -claims -encouraged -bullying .html.
Xu, J. M., Jun, K.-S., Zhu, X., & Bellmore, A. (2012). Learning from bullying traces in 
social media. In J. Chu-Carroll (Ed.), The 2012 Conference of the North American Chapter 
of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (pp. 656–
666). Stroudsburg, PA: Association for Computational Linguistics.
Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence. (2013). Introducing the Facebook Bullying 
Prevention Hub. Retrieved from http: //ei .yale .edu /introducing -the -facebook -bullying 
-prevention -hub.
Ybarra, M. L., & Mitchell, K. J. (2004). Youth engaging in online harassment: With 
caregiver-child relationships, Internet use, and personal characteristics. Journal of 
Adolescence, 27(3), 319–336.
Ybarra, M., & Mitchell, J. (2007). Prevalence and frequency of Internet harassment 
instigation: Implications for adolescent health. Journal of Adolescent Health, 41(2), 
189–195.
Ybarra, M., Mitchell, K., Kosciw, J., & Korchmaros, J. (2015). Understanding linkages 
between bullying and suicidal ideation in a national sample of LGB and heterosex-
ual youth in the United States. Prevention Science, 16(3), 451–462.
Yellin, S. (2013, February 27). Resetting one of the longest running cyberbullying 
cases—DC v. RR. Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Retrieved from http: //blog .eric-
goldman .org /archives /2013 /02 /resetting_one_o .htm.
Yiannopoulos, M. (2016, August 1). Milo on Sky News: Twitter ban made me a house-
hold name. YouTube. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=FmctktE0xXI.
Yik Yak. (2014). Campus tour. Retrieved from http: //www .yikyakapp .com /tour.
Yik Yak. (2016a). Terms. Retrieved from http: //www .yikyakapp .com /terms.
Yik Yak. (2016b). Guidelines. Retrieved from http: //safety .yikyak .com /community.
YouTube. (n.d.a). YouTube community guidelines. Retrieved from https: //www .you 
tube .com /yt /policyandsafety /communityguidelines .html.
YouTube. (n.d.b). Statistics. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /yt /press /en -GB 
/statistics .html.
YouTube. (2016). YouTube help: Harassment and cyberbullying. Retrieved from 
https: //support .google .com /youtube /answer /2802268 ?hl=en &ref_topic=2803176.
YouTube .au. (2010, June 9). Terms of service. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube 
.com /static ?gl=AU &template=terms.
YouTube .gb. (2010, June 9). Terms of service. Retrieved from https: //www .youtube 
.com /static ?gl=GB &template=terms.
268 References
YouTubeCurriculum. (2012, July 6). YouTube digital citizenship curriculum [video file]. 
Retrieved from https: //www .youtube .com /watch ?v=vXw55E2JbPE.
Young, S. (2014, February 4). 9 facts parents need to know about Voxer app. Retrieved 
http: //www .chicagonow .com /between -us -parents /2014 /02 /facts -parents -need -to 
-know -about -the -voxer -app.
Zetter, K. (2009, May 4). Probation and $5,000 fine recommended for Lori Drew. Wired. 
Retrieved from https: //www .wired .com /2009 /05 /prosecutors -ask -for -fine -probation 
-for -lori -drew.
Zetter, K. (2010, March 18). Court: Cyberbullying threats are not protected speech. 





Alternative regulatory instruments 




blatancy in bullying and, 114, 
115, 185
degrees of, 60–62
pros and cons, 184–185
prosecutorial problems of, 56
traceable, 54
Anonymous, 4, 48, 70, 72–73
Anti-bullying Ambassadors Program 
Showcase (Facebook), 6, 194
Apple App Store, 46–47









enforcement mechanisms, effect of 
restrictive, 173–174
e-safety efforts, 78, 85, 132
IAC purchase of, 132, 173
law enforcement, cooperation 
with, 78
models for, 6
moderation practices, 108–109, 
110, 132
obligation to provide information, 5
power of, 3
Safety Center, 113
Sedwick suicide and, 4, 78
self-regulation, 101–102
Smith suicide and, 3, 4, 76, 79




Autonomy, community, 116–117, 
123–125, 129–132
Bangemann Report, 89
Bars and Melody, 6
Bazelon, Emily, 8, 74, 154
BeatBullying, 164




Better Internet for Kids (BIK) (EU), 148
Bill C-13 (Canada), 81–82









dynamics of, 12, 33–34, 35
gender and, 32
harassment conflated with, 52, 
108, 110
harm resulting from, 26–28
hate crimes compared, 34–35
legislation, 51–53, 70









Bullying Prevention Hub (Facebook), 
14, 111, 125, 158–159, 194
Bully-victim dynamic, 51–52
Bully-victim narrative, 71–72,  
74–76, 84
Byrne, Jasmina, 40
Cameron, David, 3, 76, 79
Carr, John, 40, 153–154
Cartes, Patricia, 109, 142
Censorship, 46–47
Center for Social Research (CSR), 151
CEO Coalition (EU), 100
Child Exploitation and Online Protec-
tion Center (CEOP) (UK),  
119–120, 151
Childline, 119
Childnet International, 151–152, 154
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) 
(US), 90
Children. See Youth
Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CIPA), 91
Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (COPPA) (US), 39, 57–59, 91, 
195–197
Citron, D. K., 8





Coles, Julian, 164–166, 187
Collier, Anne, 152–153
Columbine incident, 22, 28
Command and Control regulation, 
89–90, 163–164, 166
Common Sense Media, 154, 160
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 
8, 45, 53–54, 57, 78, 88, 89, 90,  
95, 148
Community. See also Users
autonomy of the, 116–117, 123–125, 
129–132
as citizens vs. consumers, 182
Community, delegating responsibility to
for bullying, 122–129, 134, 159,  
167, 181
for moderation, 122–129, 132, 144
for reporting, 114–115, 159, 176
Community empowerment
conflict resolution tools, 122–129, 
134, 159
social reporting tools, 159, 176
Compassion Research Day (Facebook), 
128, 158
CompuServe, 89
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 79
Connectivity, social media context  
of, 50










supervised machine learning, 15, 
177–178
Content removal
effectiveness of, 176, 184
fines for not removing, 84, 184
freedom of speech and, 115, 134, 
177, 184
legislating, 83–84, 183–184
negative impact of, 173




Conversation AI (Google), 141, 178
Copyright, 48. See also Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) (US)
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), 9, 
50–51, 181
Costolo, Dick, 142
Council of Europe Guide to Human 
Rights for Internet Users, 51





The Culture of Connectivity (van Dijck), 
11, 49–50
Cyberbullying
anonymity and levels of, 114,  
115, 185
arbiters of, 182–184
criminalization of, 52, 56, 94




media coverage of, 21–24
negative aspects of, 26
overview, 12–16
perpetration-victimization co- 
occurrence, 29, 34, 52
prevalence of, 13, 31–32
prosecuting, 79–81
responsibility for, delegating to  
users, 122–129, 134, 159,  
167, 181
statistics, 4–5, 25–26
suicide, relation to, 22, 24, 26, 28, 71
term usage, 17, 65–66
variety in forms/levels of, 112, 114, 
115, 178, 185
Cyberbullying legislation, 53.  





NGOs role in, 148
Nova Scotia, 4, 70
regulatory actions post-suicides, 
79–83, 94
true threat standard, 80–81
variation in, 52
Cyberbullying material, defined, 184
Cyberbullying prevention
business of, 5–6, 76, 85, 143, 
172–173, 181
digital citizenship solutions,  
157–161
dignity-based, 38, 52–53, 193–195
effective, 66
legislating, 53, 80–81, 148, 151
overview, 34–35
skill-based education for, 194
Cyberbullies
anonymous, identifying, 4, 82
minor, prosecuting, 56, 70, 73–74, 
82–83
parents as, 71–72, 79–80





by law enforcement, 81–82
electronic communication, state 
access to, 81
frictionless, 178
General Data Protection Regulation 
(EU), 195–197
Data Protection Legislation (EU), 53
Defamation Act (UK), 53
Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA) 
(US), 148
Delisting requests, 183
DeNardis, Laura, 7, 46
Digital bullying, 12–16, 29. See also 
Cyberbullying
Digital citizens, good, 39
Digital citizenship
as branding strategy, 161–162
children’s rights and, 40
consumerization of, 161, 182
defined, 39
as educational tool, 40
provision and participation in, 40
in school curricula, 39–40
term usage, 161–162
Digital Citizenship Curriculum  
(YouTube), 159–160
Digital citizenship education
dignity component in, 15, 194
effectiveness of, 181–182
relevance to youth, 162
Safety Centers as hubs for,  
157–161
YouTube, 159–160
Digital Community, Digital Citizen 
(Ohler), 39–40
Digital messengers. See also specific 
platforms




social media vs., 59–60
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) (US), 10–11, 54–55, 88, 
96, 183
Digital public sphere, privatization of 
the, 46–49, 77–78, 81, 85, 179, 
183–184
Dignity, 15, 35–40, 67–68, 85
Dignity-based solutions to bullying, 
52–53, 193–195
Dignity for All: How to Create a World 
Without Rankism (Fuller &  
Gerloff), 36




Drew, Lori, 67–68, 71–72, 79–80
Drezner, Daniel, 147
Education Development Center  
(EDC), 159
Educator Escalation Channel, 92–94





content removal (see content 
removal)
digital messengers, affordances 
informing, 135–137
effectiveness of, 6–7, 171–172,  
177, 194
minimum standards requirements, 174
NGOs ability to assess, 180–181
obligation to develop, 87





Enhancing Online Safety for Children 




approaches to honor children’s  
rights, 44
business of, 5–6, 76, 85, 143, 
172–173, 181
ethics of, 85
minimum standards requirements, 174
performative component of, 51
politicization of, 76–77
right of, 51
E-safety education, 21, 147, 148–149, 
195. See also Safety Centers
E-safety NGOs. See NGOs (non- 
governmental organizations)
EU Kids Online, 13, 25, 105, 195
European Commerce Directive, 8
European Data Protection Legislation, 53





community management system, 
92–93
Community Standards, 108, 111, 113
company profile, 203
Compassion Research Day, 128, 158
content removal, 45–46, 84
Digital Citizenship Research Grant, 159
Educator Escalation Channel, 92–94
Finkel v. Facebook, 56–57
harassment defined, 108
law enforcement, cooperation with, 77
nudity policy, 45–46, 116
obligation to provide information, 5
participatory governance, 116–117
Principles, 116
regulators, collaboration with, 92–94
reportable issue statistics, 139
self-regulation, 6, 101–102
Site Governance Page, 116




users, age of, 94
Facebook, anti-bullying mechanisms
Anti-bullying Ambassadors Program 
Showcase, 6, 194





Safety Advisory Board, 150–156
Safety Center, 14, 113
TOS agreements, 108
user empowerment, 159, 176
Facebook, bullying at
defined by, 108, 119
types found on, 112, 114
Facebook, moderation
effectiveness of, 121, 122
moderator wages, 139
outsourcing, 139
policies, criticism of, 118–119
quality controls, 139
Facebook, reporting mechanisms
abuse reporting system, 92–94




panic button, 119–120, 151
social reporting tool, 122–129,  
159, 176
Support Dashbord/Support Inbox, 
121–122
Facebook-NGO collaboration
Anti-bullying Ambassadors Program 
Showcase, 6
Safety Advisory Board, 150–156




Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI), 
151, 152
Filtering, 117–118, 173, 179, 190
Finkel v. Facebook, 56–57
First Amendment, 10, 15, 53
Flaming, 29




Freedom of expression and innovation, 
53–54
Freedom of speech
business model for, 144–145, 177–178
content removal and, 84, 115, 134, 
177, 184
filtering and, 118, 190
Google policy on, 47
online, constitutionality of 
 criminalizing, 80–81
private regulation of, 10, 46, 88, 114, 
179, 183
proactive moderation and, 15, 141, 
177–179
Twitter policy on, 109, 129
Fuller, Robert, 36, 38
Gasser, Urs, 95
General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (EU), 39, 57–59, 195–197
Geofencing, 8
Gerloff, Pamela, 36
Gibson, C., 21, 147
Gillespie, T., 8, 49
Goode, Erich, 23
Good Practice Guide for Social Net-
working Services, 164
Google, 47, 56, 84, 141, 178, 183
Google+, 61, 101–102, 113, 130–131, 
200, 206








term usage, 17, 29





Hicks, Donna, 37, 38, 67–68, 194
Hinduja, Sameer, 13
Human Dignity and Humiliation 
 Studies, 36
Humiliation, 37, 85











content removal, legal obligation, 84
obligation to provide information, 5





International forum shopping, 90
Internet
access statistics, 32–33
pornography, 53–54, 68–69, 89
regulation of content, 46–49
youth, percent of users as, 40
Internet intermediaries, 9–12
Index 275
Internet protection legislation for 
youth, 39, 57–59, 84, 90, 91, 
119–120, 148, 151, 184, 195–197
Internet Safety Technical Task Force, 
91–92, 148
Intimate images, nonconsensual 











law enforcement, cooperation with, 78
reporting mechanisms, 136–137
Safety Center, 113





data access and search, 81–82
effectiveness of, 72–74





LGBTQ youth, 13, 28, 32
Lievens, Eva, 96
Lindner, Evelin, 36
Livingstone, Sonia, 40, 88, 97–98, 105
Lunt, Peter, 97–98
Madelin, Robert, 6, 90, 99
Magid, Larry, 152
Malicious Communications Act (UK), 53
Marwick, Alice, 24, 30
MasterCard, 48
Matias, J. N., 8
McComas, Grace, 94
Mean-girls culture, 37
Media panics, 3–4, 23–24
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention 
Act, 53, 80–81, 148, 151





business of, 107, 178
effectiveness, 143–145, 166, 177
efficiency of, 144







responsibility for, delegating to users, 
122–129, 132, 144
transparency in, 139–140, 143–145, 179
Moderators, numbers employed, 177
Moral panic, 23–24
MySpace, 16, 24, 65, 68, 79, 92, 101
“My Story: Struggling, Bullying, Suicide 
and Self-Harm” (Todd), 68–69
National Network to End Domestic 
Violence, 151
Net Children Go Mobile, 25
NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations)
children’s rights to participation and 
provision, position on, 148





compensation in, 154–156, 160
cyberbullying policy development 
advisor role, 149–150
delegating for effectiveness and effi-
ciency, 155–156, 160
effectiveness of, 166–167
independence of NGOs in, 153–157, 
180–181
overview, 156–157
power of NGOs in, 150




Anti-bullying Ambassadors Program 
Showcase, 6
Bullying Prevention Hub, 159
compensation in, 156




Notice and takedown systems, 177–178










true threat standard, 81
Online intermediaries. See also Social 
media platforms
duty to act, 54–55
liability of, 51–57, 88, 94–96
overview, 9–12
policies, cultural sensitivity of, 46
roles assumed by, 46
status of, questioning, 46
Online Safety and Technology Working 
Group, 91, 148
Panic button, 119–120, 151
Parents
burden of responsibility, 88
cyberbullying by, 67–68, 71–72, 
79–80
of cyberbullies, liability of, 82
technology, understanding of, 33, 
88–89
“Parents: Cyberbullying Led to a Teen’s 
Suicide” (ABC), 71
Parsons, Rehtaeh, 4, 18, 66, 69–70, 
73–74, 79, 82–83
Participation rights, 40–43, 58, 161, 
182, 195–197
Patchin, Justin, 13, 173
PayPal, 48
Phillips, Whitney, 27
Platform, term usage, 49–50
Poels, K., 8
Policy
agendas shaping, 51, 79, 84–85
blame gaming, influence on, 76–77
defined, 8
effectiveness, evaluation of, 176–177
for intervention, 8
self-regulation in the context of, 98
Policy, recommendations for




guidelines, define and disclose when 
publishing, 186–187
independent evaluation of digital 
citizenship advice, 188
independent evaluators, standing 
body as, 188
notice and takedown, 189–190
regulatory requirements, 188–189
Index 277
“Safety by Design” requirement for 
start-ups, 187
social reporting-type tools for use 
among peers, 192




NGOs as third-party advisors, 
149–150
obligation for, 87
Pornography, 53–54, 68–69, 89
Pott, Audrie, 83
Privacy Policy (Twitter), 204
Privacy rights, 136
data access and search, 81–82
Facebook and, 154
General Data Protection Regulation 
(EU), 195–197
parents as, 67–68
private regulation of, 47, 143
proactive moderation and, 143, 
177–178, 190
public health monitoring and, 191
Whisper controversy, 208
of youth, 39, 57–59, 77–78, 91, 
195–197
Pro-anorexia sites, 25
Project Jigsaw (Google), 141, 178
Protection from Harassment Act  
(UK), 53
Protection rights, 40–43, 161, 182, 
195–197
Provision rights, 40–43, 161, 195–197
Pseudo-anonymity, 60–62
Queen Bees and Wannabes (Wiseman), 37
Rankism, 36–38, 194
Rebecca’s Law, 70
Regulation. See also Self-regulation
ARI’s, 96–100
by raised eyebrow, 99




traditional, limitations of, 89–90
US environment for, 90–92
Regulators, collaboration with, 174–176
Reporting. See also Facebook: reporting
effectiveness of, 14–15, 163
responsibility for, delegating to users, 
114–115, 159, 176
Reputational harm, 10
Resilience, building, 24, 26, 35, 42, 76, 
85, 192, 195
Right to be Forgotten ruling, 183–184
Risk exposure, harm vs. benefit of, 24, 
25–28, 32–33, 195
Roman, Katelyn, 70, 74–75
Sacco, Dena T., 52
Safe harbor provisions, 8
Safer Internet for Children (EU), 91, 148
Safer Social Networking Principles 
(SSNP) (EU), 91, 100–101
Safety Advisory Board (Facebook), 
150–156
Safety Centers. See also E-safety 
education
as hubs for digital citizenship, 
157–161
platforms with, 14, 113
scare tactics used, 160
standards of effectiveness,  
160–161
Sanchez, Linda, 80
Save the Children, 76
Scare tactics, 21, 160
Schneider, S. K., 8
Schools
bullying, responsibility for, 51
Educator Escalation Channel (Face-
book), 92–94
Schulz, Wolfgang, 95, 97
278 Index
Secret, 47, 61, 113–114, 133–134, 140, 
200, 209
Sedwick, Rebecca Ann, 4, 18, 66, 70, 




corporate social responsibility as, 14, 
50, 97
defined, 97
digital citizenship efforts in, 15
effectiveness of, 187
evolution of, 110–112
term usage, 9, 98
Self-regulation. See also Regulation
alternatives to, 163–164, 175
commitment to, 175
in the context of cyberbullying  
policies, 98
defined, 9, 96
effectiveness of, 100, 164–166
EU vs. US environments, 175
incentives for, 165
individualized, 97
innovation, protecting, 88,  
94–96
legalistic, the case of Facebook,  
92–94
legalistic vs. coordinated, 106
limitations of, 172
preference for, 88–89
process vs. outcome, 164–166




NGOs role in, 148




Shaw, Guadalupe, 70, 75, 78
Slut shaming, 65–66
Smartphone access, statistics, 33
Smith, E., 8





















connectivity in the context of, 50
defined, 7
digital messengers vs., 59–60
Social media platforms. See also Online 
intermediaries; specific platforms
affordances, 59
connectivity, business of, 11
defined, 7
liability of, 8–9, 51–57, 62, 78, 81, 83
non-disclosure agreements, 106
private regulation of, 9, 62
successful, factors in, 172–173
temporality of, 16
term usage, 49–50
transparency from, 6–7, 105–106, 
172, 176–179
user base, by company




Staksrud, Elisabeth, 42, 88, 182
Stalking Amanda Todd (CBS), 72
Suicides
Clementi, Tyler, 28
complexity of factors in, 22, 24, 26, 
71–72
McComas, Grace, 94
media panics following, 3–4
Meier, Megan, 18, 56, 65, 66–68, 71, 
79–80
Parsons, Rehtaeh, 4, 18, 66, 69–70, 
73–74, 79, 82–83
regulatory actions following, 3, 
79–83, 94
Sedwick, Rebecca Ann, 4, 18, 66, 70, 
74–75, 77, 78, 79, 84
simplistic binaries of finger pointing 
in, 71–75
Smith, Hannah, 3, 4, 18, 65, 66, 
70–71, 76
Todd, Amanda, 18, 65, 66, 68–69, 
72–73, 77–78, 79, 81, 83
in youth minority populations, 28
Sullivan, Joe, 153





Theory of Institutionalized Individual-
ization, 42
“They Call It Bunny Hunting” (Gibson), 
21, 147
Todd, Amanda, 18, 65, 66, 68–69, 
72–73, 77–78, 79, 81, 83
TOS agreements
acceptable behavior stipulated, 14
age of users, 57–58, 78
anti-bullying/harassment/abuse pro-
visions, 107–111
user’s circumvention of, 58
violations, response to, 10, 79–80, 117
Trolling, 27
True threat standard, 80–81
Trust and Safety Council (Twitter), 129
Tsui, Bonnie, 128
Tumblr, 61, 113, 131–132, 200, 210–211
Twitter, 114
abuse policy, 129
abusive behavior, factors of, 108, 109
affordances, 204
anonymity model, 61
anti-bullying measures, purpose in, 5





content removal, legal obligation, 84
corporate social responsibility, 
159–160
demise of, 173
digital citizenship curriculum, 
159–160
freedom of speech policy, 109, 129
moderation practices, 139, 142–143
NGO collaboration, 159–160
obligation to provide information, 5
reporting mechanisms, 129–130
Safety Center, 113
self-regulation, evaluation of, 
101–102
TOS agreements, 108
Trust and Safety Council, 129
user base, 200
“Twitter for Good,” 159–160
Twitter Rules, 111
UK Council for Child Internet Safety, 164
UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), 41, 43
United States v. Drew, 80
United States v. Elonis, 81
United States v. Thomas, 89
Users. See also Community
280 Index
age of, 57–58, 78, 94, 195–196
statistics, by company, 200
Vandebosch, H., 8
Van Royen, K., 8
Visa, 48
Vodafone, 76
Voxer, 4, 61, 78, 112–113, 136, 200, 208
WhatsApp, 61, 112–113, 136, 200, 207
Whisper, 61, 113, 113–114, 133, 140, 
200, 208–209
Willard, Nancy, 73, 81
WiredSafety, 151
Wiseman, Rosalind, 35, 37
Yahoo! 84
Yik Yak, 61, 113–114, 134–135, 200, 
209–210
Youth
behavior, criminalizing, 163–164, 172
cyberbullies, prosecuting, 56, 70, 
73–74, 82
digital technology involvement, 24
establishing help for the most vulner-
able, 191
as independent rights holders, 41
internet protection legislation, 39, 
57–59, 84, 90, 91, 119–120, 148, 
151, 184, 195–197
internet users, percent as, 40
relationships, influences on, 16
resilience in, building, 26, 35, 42, 76, 
85, 192, 195
risk exposure, pros and cons of, 
25–28, 195
social positioning processes, navigat-
ing, 85
technology use, parent’s role in, 88–89
Youth, rights of
balancing protection, provision, and 
participation rights, 40–43, 58, 148, 
161, 182, 195–197
as consumers vs. citizens, 182
dignity and, 35–40
of e-safety, 51
e-safety approaches to honor, 44




anti-bullying measures, purpose in, 5
business model, 49
community autonomy, 130
Community Guidelines, 111, 113
company profile, 205–206
Digital Citizenship Curriculum, 
159–160
harassment-bullying conflated,  
108, 110
Innocence of Muslims movie, removal 
of, 47
moderation practices, 107, 143
obligation to provide information, 5
reporting mechanisms, 114, 130
Safety Center, 113
self-regulation, evaluation of, 
101–102
TOS agreements, 108
“The YouTube Rant (I’m getting banned 
off YouTube),” 107
YouTube statistics
content upload, 138
user base, 200
